scholarly journals Normative Pluralism Worthy of the Name is False

2017 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-20 ◽  
Author(s):  
Spencer Case
Keyword(s):  
Practical Reason ◽  
Good Reason ◽  
Normative Pluralism ◽  
Better Than

Normative pluralism is the view that practical reason consists in an irreducible plurality of normative domains, that these domains sometimes issue conflicting recommendations and that, when this happens, there is never any one thing that one ought simpliciter to do. Here I argue against this view, noting that normative pluralism must be either unrestricted or restricted. Unrestricted pluralism maintains that all coherent standards are reason-generating normative domains, whereas restricted pluralism maintains that only some are. Unrestricted pluralism, depending on how it is cashed out, is either nihilism about practical reason or else it is subjectivism. Neither view is consistent with normative pluralism; hence, pluralism must be restricted. Restricted pluralism, however, faces two problems. The first stems from the question: “Why is it that some standards are normative domains while others are not?” The question seems to demand an answer, but it is hard to give any answer without appealing to considerations that imply facts about what we ought simpliciter to do. Second, restricted pluralism has difficulty accounting for our intuitions about cases in which one option is optimal in all domains, but not better than each alternative in any one domain. The unique option that is optimal in every domain seems better than its competitors, though it isn’t better within any domain. This is different than the widely discussed argument from notable-nominal comparisons. So I conclude that we have good reason to reject restricted pluralism, the only form of normative pluralism really worthy of that name.

The Sage of Königsberg

2019 ◽  
pp. 19-33
Author(s):  
Immanuel Kant
Keyword(s):  
Good Reason ◽  
Moral Life ◽  
Moral Law ◽  
Moral Argument ◽  
Rational Commitment ◽  
Better Than ◽  
Power And Authority

Better than anyone, Kant recognized the power and authority of the moral law. On that foundation he constructed two variants of the moral argument. His argument from grace pertains to whether or not the moral life is possible. Morality requires us to achieve a stand too demanding to meet on our own. Divine assistance is needed to close the resulting gap. So rationality dictates that we postulate God’s existence. Kant’s argument from providence pertains to the aforementioned rational need for happiness and virtue to cohere. Full rational commitment to morality requires that morality is a rationally stable enterprise, which entails the ultimate correspondence between virtue and (both individual and corporate) fulfillment. Without God’s existence there’s no particularly good reason to think such correspondence obtains. So rationality dictates the postulation of God’s existence.

Why the moral equality account of the hypocrite’s lack of standing to blame fails

Analysis ◽  
2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen
Keyword(s):  
Good Reason ◽  
Moral Norms ◽  
Moral Equality ◽  
Standing To Blame ◽  
Better Than

Abstract It is commonly believed that blamees can dismiss hypocritical blame on the ground that the hypocrite has no standing to blame their target. Many believe that the feature of hypocritical blame that undermines standing to blame is that it involves an implicit denial of the moral equality of persons. After all, the hypocrite treats herself better than her blamee for no good reason. In the light of the complement to hypocrites and a comparison of hypocritical and non-hypocritical blamers subscribing to hierarchical moral norms, I show why we must reject the moral equality account of the hypocrite’s lack of standing to blame.

Epistemic infinitism

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Scott Aikin
Keyword(s):  
Infinite Series ◽  
Good Reason ◽  
The Other ◽  
Regress Problem ◽  
Two Factors ◽  
Particular Solution ◽  
Basic Beliefs ◽  
Better Than ◽  
Epistemic Regress Problem ◽  
Do So

If you believe something rationally, you believe it for a reason. And that reason can’t just be any old reason. You’ve got to rationally hold it as a good reason. In order to do so, you must have another reason. And that reason needs another. And so a regress of reasons ensues. This is a rough-and-ready picture of the epistemic regress problem. Epistemic infinitism is the view that justifying reasons are infinite, and so it is a particular solution to the regress problem. Consider, also, that justification comes in degrees – some beliefs are better justified than others. Moreover, it seems that people can know things better than others. Call this the gradability phenomenon. Epistemic infinitism is the view that for someone to be justified maximally is for that person to have an infinite series of supporting reasons. Epistemic infinitisms admit of a wide variety. Differences between versions of infinitism arise according to two factors for the view: one dialectical, the other ecumenical. The dialectical factor for epistemic infinitisms is the matter of what philosophical problems or questions they answer. Infinitisms are designed to either provide models for how to solve the epistemic regress problem or address the phenomenon of the gradability of justification and knowledge. Infinitisms will differ depending on which issue they are designed to address, and an infinitism designed to address one issue may not be the same as one designed to address another. The ecumenical factor for epistemic infinitisms is the matter of how consistent the view is with other competing theories about how to address the regress problem and the gradability phenomenon. With the regress problem, infinitism’s main competitor theories are foundationalism, the view that there are basic beliefs for which there is no need for further reason, and coherentism, the view that justifying reasons come in large mutually supporting packages. For the most part, infinitism is taken to be a form of noncoherentist antifoundationalism about justification, because the infinitist holds that reasons must be infinitely long chains of nonrepeating reasons. However, there are versions of infinitism consistent with both foundationalism and coherentism. Infinitism faces a variety of challenges, and two of particular importance are whether infinitism is actually a form of scepticism and whether infinitism is a complete theory of justification.

Soundoff: Teach Geometry before Second-Year Algebra

1988 ◽  
Vol 81 (4) ◽  
pp. 236-298
Author(s):  
Beverly W. Nichols
Keyword(s):  
High School ◽  
Mathematics Education ◽  
Good Reason ◽  
First Year ◽  
School Program ◽  
Teachers And Students ◽  
Second Year ◽  
Traditional High School ◽  
Better Than ◽  
High School Program

For years we have debated whether geometry should come before or after second-year algebra in the traditional high school program. Teachers and students at my high school, with the support of the Mathematics Education Trust, have completed a threeyear study of this issue. I have good reason to claim that the traditional first-year algebra, geometry, second-year algebra sequence is better than the first-year algebra, secondyear algebra, geometry sequence.

scholarly journals VISIBILITAS HUBUNGAN KEMITRAAN PADA POLA INTERAKSI SUAMI-ISTRI DALAM PANDANGAN AL-SYAFI’I

2015 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
pp. 101
Author(s):  
Mu’ammar Zayn Qadafy
Keyword(s):  
Gender Equality ◽  
Resource Use ◽  
Good Reason ◽  
Married Couples ◽  
Primary Resource ◽  
Islamic Jurisprudence ◽  
And Gender ◽  
Bride Price ◽  
Better Than ◽  
Husband And Wife

The Perspective of al-Syafi’I on Partnership in Marriage In husband and wife relationships, contemporary couples prefer a partnership pattern rather than one of  leadership. Although the latter is not necessary better than the former, it is obviously more accommodative of modern ideas of justice, egalitarianism and gender equality.  This article aims to explore the connections between household partnership patterns, as fundamental to contemporary Muslim’s, and the traditional Islamic jurisprudence (fikih) most dominant among the diverse adherents of Islam.   More specifically, this research describes al-Syafi`í thought. To explore the partnership patterns of married couples, it elaborates on three points: (1) the meaning of qawwamuna, (2) the concept of bride price and household expenses, and (3) interactions between husband and wife. The primary resource use in this research is al-Umm. This article concludes that Syafi’i jurisprudence implicitly accommodates the idea of partnership between marriage partners, as evident in (1) the acknowledgement of a woman’s right to choose her husband; (2) the bride price, which has both legal, formal and moral implications; (3) the co-understanding of the marriage partners in matters of household expenses and the emphasizing of discussion in solving financial problems; and (4) the use of good reason in dealing with household and personal conflicts.

Utilitarianism

2020 ◽  
pp. 232-255
Author(s):  
Terence Irwin
Keyword(s):  
Practical Reason ◽  
Good Reason ◽  
Basic Principles ◽  
Moral Beliefs ◽  
Approximate Truth ◽  
Moral Rules ◽  
Theory Of Value ◽  
Widespread View

While Hutcheson and Hume present a utilitarian outlook, Mill and Sidgwick offer a systematic defence of it. They argue: (1) Utilitarianism makes sense of ordinary moral beliefs, so that anyone who takes these beliefs seriously has good reason to be a utilitarian. The utilitarian principle is the primary principle that explains the approximate truth of the secondary principles—ordinary moral rules. Apparent exceptions to utilitarianism—e.g., principles about justice and rights—can be reconciled with it. The hedonist theory of value—suitably interpreted—can explain the widespread view that pleasure is not the only good. (2) Utilitarianism follows from basic principles of practical reason, so that anyone who questions ordinary moral beliefs still has good reason to be a utilitarian. Once we understand that rational concern for our own interest requires us to aim at our own greatest good, without caring more or less about different times, we see that rational concern for everyone’s interest requires us to maximize the total good, without caring about whether this or that person gets more of it.

Why cognitivism?

2018 ◽  
Vol 48 (2) ◽  
pp. 223-244 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yair Levy
Keyword(s):  
Practical Reason ◽  
Practical Knowledge ◽  
Good Reason ◽  
Important Position ◽  
Intentional Acts

AbstractIntention Cognitivism – the doctrine that intending to V entails, or even consists in, believing that one will V – is an important position with potentially wide-ranging implications, such as a revisionary understanding of practical reason, and a vindicating explanation of ‘Practical Knowledge.’ In this paper, I critically examine the standard arguments adduced in support of IC, including arguments from the parity of expression of intention and belief; from the ability to plan around one’s intention; and from the explanation provided by the thesis for our knowledge of our intentional acts. I conclude that none of these arguments are compelling, and therefore that no good reason has been given to accept IC.

WHY EXACTLY IS COMMITMENT IMPORTANT FOR RATIONALITY?

2005 ◽  
Vol 21 (1) ◽  
pp. 5-14 ◽  
Author(s):  
AMARTYA SEN
Keyword(s):  
Practical Reason ◽  
Rational Choice Theory ◽  
Choice Theory ◽  
Causal Explanation ◽  
Good Reason ◽  
Important Work ◽  
Self Interest ◽  
Gary Becker ◽  
Rational Thought

Gary Becker and others have done important work to broaden the content of self interest, but have not departed from seeing rationality in terms of the exclusive pursuit of self-interest. One reason why committed behavior is important is that a person can have good reason to pursue objectives other than self interest maximization (no matter how broadly it is construed). Indeed, one can also follow rules of behavior that go beyond the pursuit of one's own goals, even if the goals include non-self-interested concerns. By living in a society, one develops possible reasons for considering other people's goals as well, which takes one beyond an exclusive concentration on one's own goals, not to mention the single-minded pursuit of one's own self interest. The recognition of other people's goals may be a part of rational thought. If rational behavior may depart from the relentless pursuit of one's own goals, commitment has to be important in a theory of rationality. Furthermore, seeing the role of commitment in human behavior can have explanatory importance in allowing us to understand behavior patterns that are hard to fit into the narrow format of contemporary rational choice theory. Commitment is, thus, important both for practical reason and for causal explanation.

Why Omissions are Special

Legal Theory ◽  
1995 ◽  
Vol 1 (3) ◽  
pp. 311-335 ◽  
Author(s):  
A. P. Simester
Keyword(s):  
Criminal Law ◽  
Good Reason ◽  
Differential Treatment ◽  
The Other ◽  
Positive Interventions ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
Positive Action ◽  
The Law ◽  
Better Than

The criminal law presently distinguishes between actions and omissions, and only rarely proscribes failures to avert consequences that it would be an offense to bring about. Why? In recent years it has been persuasively argued by both Glover and Bennett that,celeris paribus, omissions to prevent a harm are just as culpable as are actions which bring that harm about. On the other hand, and acknowledging that hitherto “lawyers have not been very successful in finding a rationale for it,” Tony Honoré has sought to defend the law's differential treatment. He proposes a “distinct-duties theory” that in addition to the general duties we owe to everyone (e.g., not to inflict harm), we also owe distinct duties to a more limited collection of people and associations, specified by features of our relationship with them (we owe, for instance, duties as parents to our own children). Where a distinct duty holds, breach by omission may well be no better than breach by positive action. But absent a distinct duty, omissions, per Honoré, are less culpable. They are mere failures to intervene and improve or rectify things, whereas actions are positive interventions which make things worse. And, thus, the law has good reason to differentiate between them.

Utilitarianism and Its Critics

2020 ◽  
pp. 279-290
Author(s):  
Terence Irwin
Keyword(s):  
Practical Reason ◽  
Good Reason ◽  
Moral Judgments ◽  
Respect For Persons ◽  
Moral Concepts ◽  
Correct Account ◽  
Moral Properties ◽  
Principles Of Justice ◽  
Considered Moral Judgments ◽  
Supreme Principle

Later defences of utilitarianism, by Lewis and Hare, support Sidgwick’s claim that the utilitarian outlook is the outlook of practical reason. They argue that the appropriate extension of sympathy requires imaginative identification with the pleasures and pains of other people, in a way that leads to the utilitarian attitude. Ross, however, argues that utilitarianism gives us neither a correct account of moral concepts nor a correct account of moral properties. When we consider what makes right actions right, we have good reason to agree with Price in rejecting utility as the supreme principle of morality. Rawls defends this argument against utilitarianism. To decide what our considered moral judgments commit us to, we describe fair conditions in which we can choose between different principles of justice. In these fair conditions we accept principles that conflict with utilitarianism, but conform to Kant’s principle of respect for persons as ends.

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