scholarly journals Financing political parties in the United Kingdom

2010 ◽  
Vol 6 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
Jacob Rowbottom

Shortly after the 2010 general election in the United Kingdom, the new Conservative/Liberal Democrat coalition government promised to reform the way British political parties are financed and ‘to remove big money from politics’. Such promises are not new, and in the last decade there has been no shortage of legislative action on party funding. The problem has been that the laws failed to address some of the biggest concerns about money in politics, and that the political actors found strategies to avoid the controls. Looking at the UK approach, this article aims to give an overview of the controls in place, while highlighting some of the main difficulties experienced. While the UK laws have some differences compared with those proposed in New Zealand (particularly in relation to third-party activity), there is much common ground and the British experience may offer some lessons and show some of the pitfalls in regulating political finance. 

Author(s):  
Jan Misiuna

The paper compares the systems of financing political parties in France, Germany and the UK. The analysis concentrates on effectiveness of collecting contributions, dependency on large donors for providing funds for financing election campaigns and daily operation of political parties, and the level of transparency of finances of political parties. The final conclusion is that only introducing limits on expenditures on election campaigns allows to keep the costs of election campaigns and political parties at a low level, while mandatory common accounting standards and public access to financial information is necessary to preserve transparency of finances of political parties.


Author(s):  
Neil MacCormick

This chapter recommends a reversion from the 1707 Union of Parliaments to the 1603 Union of Crowns (though not of governments). Its argument is originally submitted to the joint attention of the Royal Society and the British Academy on a date very close to 5 November 2003. James succeeded in preserving peace in the islands during his long reign — long in England itself, longer yet in Scotland. In Westminster as well as Edinburgh and elsewhere, real power has come to be invested in parliaments, and thus in the governments that command parliamentary majorities through the dominance of political parties. The UK system works so long as party ties make more or less unquestioned the loyalty of the head of a devolved Scottish government to the head of the United Kingdom government. Generally, the present contribution is offered primarily as a scholarly, not a political one. It is enough if it has sketched grounds for taking seriously the question what ‘new unions for old’ might mean.


2021 ◽  
pp. 88-110

The Armenian people were hopeful that after the capitulation of Turkey in the First World War (WWI) and the dislocation of the Allies troops in Transcaucasia, territories of Western Armenia and Transcaucasia would be included within the First Republic of Armenia. However, the Armenian people experienced another disappointment. In 1918–1920, Great Britain, who had gained dominance in Transcaucasia, ignoring the promises given to the Armenians during the war and their particular contribution to the victory of the Allies, adopted anti-Armenian attitude towards the Karabakh conflict. By constant pressure on the Republic of Armenia and Artsakh, the British strived to achieve hegemony of Azerbaijan over Karabakh, nevertheless, the uncompromising stance and unwavering resistance of the Armenians of Artsakh thwarted the anglo-azerbaijani plan. The anti-Armenian attitude of Great Britain was shaped by its strategic plans. Its main purpose in Transcaucasia was to gain control over the economic and military-political life and withdraw Russia from the region and the East in general. With the aim to carry out this important plan, it chose as an ally its recent rival in e WWI – Turkey, and Azerbaijan, which was created with the latter’s help. This selection was influenced by their military-economic potential and anti-Russian attitude. Nowadays (since 1988) when the Armenians of Karabakh struggle for their reunion with Armenia, from which Karabakh was cut off and annexed to Azerbaijan with the help of Soviet Russia on July 5, 1921, the British adopted anti-Armenian attitude towards the Karabakh conflict once again. They supported the aggressive actions of Azerbaijan and its ally Turkey by all means. The United Kingdom’s attitude proceeds from its political and economic interests. The United Kingdom has a large share of Azerbaijan’s most profitable oil mines, as well as the Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan oil pipeline, which was put into operation in 2006 due to its active efforts (30% of the shares in the pipeline are owned by British Petroleum). The anti-Armenian and pro-Azerbaijani policy of Great Britain activated during the Second Karabakh War, which began on September 27, 2020, by Azerbaijan’s aggression against the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic (the Republic of Artsakh). British companies expressed their support to Azerbaijan during this war have signed new economic agreements as well as have provided the other side with the maps of mined areas. In October, 2020, during the session in the UN Security Council, the UK suspended resolution of the OSCE Minsk Group member countries with an appeal to stop the war. Hence, the UK supported both war, intervention of the third party countries and terroristic groups in it. Thus, England once again betrayed democracy, justice, right of nations to self-determination, though the United Kingdom publicly presents itself as a protector of these values.


2015 ◽  
Vol 17 ◽  
pp. 36-65 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rachael MULHERON

AbstractOver the course of 2013–15, there have been significant developments in the reform of class actions in Europe. The European Commission published its Recommendation of common principles concerning collective redress in June 2013, whilst the Consumer Rights Act 2015 – which was introduced into the United Kingdom Parliament in January 2014 and obtained Royal Assent on 26 March 2015 – contains a class action for competition law infringements. Although there is some ‘common ground’ between these legislative instruments, their divergences are far more legally significant, and comprise the focus of analysis in this article. Regarding the two topics of standing to sue, and the opt-in versus opt-out approach to forming the class, the approaches of the European Commission and the UK Parliament differ markedly, reflecting the deep policy, political and judicial divisions which have manifested in this area of reform for over a decade. The legislators have also ultimately chosen different scopes of application, with the European Commission preferring a ‘horizontal’ approach to reform, whilst the UK Parliament has pursued a sector-specific reform agenda. In respect of standing to sue and the opt-in versus opt-out debate, there are numerous sound legal and political reasons that manifestly support the UK law-makers’ decision to depart from the 2013 Recommendation. However, in respect of the horizontal-versus-sectoral debate, the topsy-turvy history of reform at both European and domestic levels has resulted, ironically, in both the Commission and UK policy-makers reversing the views which each had initially adopted within the past decade. Undoubtedly, as these reform measures demonstrate, the collective redress landscape is both evolving and controversial.


Author(s):  
Gleeson Simon ◽  
Guynn Randall

This chapter explains how the UK bank resolution is managed, as the United Kingdom is unusual amongst EU countries in a number of ways as regards resolution. In particular, the UK authorities have set out in their approach documents a detailed plan as to how resolution powers might be used in different circumstances, and these plans are described and analysed. The basis of the approach is the division of bank resolutions into three phases: the stabilization phase, in which the provision of critical economic functions is assured, either through transfer to a solvent third party or through bail-in to recapitalize the failed firm; the restructuring phase, during which any necessary changes are made to the structure and business model of the whole firm or its constituent parts to address the causes of failure; and the exit from resolution, where the involvement of the resolution authority in the failed firm and any successor firms comes to a close. The chapter also considers the special regimes—the bank insolvency regime, the bank administration regime, and the investment firm special administration regime.


2019 ◽  
Vol 68 (2) ◽  
pp. 293-310
Author(s):  
Iain McMenamin

Political finance scholars have paid little attention to the partisan preferences of business donors. This was because business donors were overwhelmingly concerned with the left-right dimension and enjoyed stable relationships with centre-right parties. These parties are increasingly tempted by economic nationalism. This new ideological flux provides an opportunity to measure the extent to which donors are party identifiers or react to changes in the policy space. Dramatic shifts in party policy on both the left-right and globalisation dimensions and a relatively transparent political finance regime make the United Kingdom a particularly apposite case to study this question. I analyse 19,000 donations to the Conservative Party and show that business donors reacted strongly to recent shifts on both the left-right and globalisation dimensions. Thus, centre-right parties may not be able to rely on party identification and their left-right position to maintain business funding. Economic nationalism is likely to cost centre-right parties money.


Author(s):  
Philip N. Howard ◽  
Daniel Kreiss

Political parties are among the most lax, unregulated organizations handling large volumes of personally identifiable data about citizens’ behavior and attitudes. We analyze the privacy practices of political parties in Australia, Canada, United Kingdom, and United States to assess the current state of electorate data, compare regulatory efforts, and offer policy recommendations. While data has long been a part of political practice, there has been a revolution over the last decade in the opportunities for gathering, storing, and acting upon data. Candidates, parties, lobby groups and data–mining firms collect massive amounts of data. They trade analytical tools, databases, and consulting expertise on a vast and unregulated market. In these practices, political actors routinely violate the privacy norms of many citizens. There are also documented cases of data breeches in all four countries. Meanwhile, political parties face relatively few restrictions on their use of data, and have developed a wide variety of largely voluntary privacy policies that are inadequate. We argue that some straightforward policy oversight would significantly improve the way personal records are handled by political actors.


2012 ◽  
Vol 20 (2) ◽  
pp. 300-318 ◽  
Author(s):  
Eric Blyth

In the United Kingdom, four distinct time periods may be identified during which differentiated information about their genetic origins may be available to a donor-conceived person. In addition, an individual conceived as the result of a surrogacy arrangement and who is also subject to a subsequent Parental Order may access differentiated information relating to the surrogacy arrangement dependent on which of the UK nations the Parental Order was made in. This paper outlines the historical, legal and social context of these provisions and identifies continuing issues for debate and possible further regulatory and legislative reform.


Until 2019, TBE was considered only to be an imported disease to the United Kingdom. In that year, evidence became available that the TBEV is likely circulating in the country1,2 and a first “probable case” of TBE originating in the UK was reported.3 In addition to TBEV, louping ill virus (LIV), a member of the TBEV-serocomplex, is also endemic in parts of the UK. Reports of clinical disease caused by LIV in livestock are mainly from Scotland, parts of North and South West England and Wales.4


2016 ◽  
Vol 4 (4) ◽  
pp. 30
Author(s):  
Nooriha Abdullah ◽  
Darinka Asenova ◽  
Stephen J. Bailey

The aim of this paper is to analyse the risk transfer issue in Public Private Partnership/Private Finance Initiative (PPP/PFI) procurement documents in the United Kingdom (UK) and Malaysia. It utilises qualitative research methods using documentation and interviews for data collection. The UK documents (guidelines and contracts) identify the risks related to this form of public procurement of services and makeexplicittheappropriateallocation of those risks between the public and the private sector PPP/PFI partners and so the types of risks each party should bear. However, in Malaysia, such allocation of risks was not mentioned in PPP/PFI guidelines. Hence, a question arises regarding whether risk transfer exists in Malaysian PPP/PFI projects, whether in contracts or by other means. This research question is the rationale for the comparative analysis ofdocumentsand practicesrelatingtorisk transfer in the PPP/PFI procurements in both countries. The results clarify risk-related issues that arise in implementing PPP/PFI procurement in Malaysia, in particular how risk is conceptualised, recognised and allocated (whether explicitly or implicitly), whether or not that allocation is intended to achieve optimum risk transfer, and so the implications forachievement ofvalue for moneyor other such objectivesinPPP/PFI.


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