scholarly journals Forecasting Decisons in Conflicts: Analogy, Game Theory, Unaided Judgement, and Simulation Compared

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Kesten Charles Green
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Formal Method ◽  
Student Role ◽  
Alternative Measures ◽  
Role Players ◽  
Better Than

<p>There has been surprisingly little research on how best to predict decisions in conflicts. Managers commonly use their unaided judgement for the task. Game theory and a disciplined use of analogies have been recommended. When tested, experts using their unaided judgement and game theorists performed no better than chance. Experts using structured analogies performed better than chance, but the most accurate forecasts were provided by simulated interaction using student role players. Twenty-one game theorists made 98 forecasts for eight diverse conflicts. Forty-one experts in conflicts made 60 solo forecasts using structured analogies and 96 solo forecasts using unaided judgement (a further seven provided collaborative forecasts only) while 492 participants made 105 forecasts in simulated interactions. Overall, one-in-three forecasts by game theorists and by experts who did not use a formal method were correct. Forecasters who used structured analogies were correct for 45 percent and forecasts from simulated interactions were correct for 62 percent of forecasts. Analysis using alternative measures of accuracy does not affect the findings. Neither expertise nor collaboration appear to affect accuracy. The findings are at odds with the opinions of experts, who expected experts to be more accurate than students regardless of the method used.</p>

scholarly journals Forecasting Decisons in Conflicts: Analogy, Game Theory, Unaided Judgement, and Simulation Compared

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Kesten Charles Green
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Formal Method ◽  
Student Role ◽  
Alternative Measures ◽  
Role Players ◽  
Better Than

<p>There has been surprisingly little research on how best to predict decisions in conflicts. Managers commonly use their unaided judgement for the task. Game theory and a disciplined use of analogies have been recommended. When tested, experts using their unaided judgement and game theorists performed no better than chance. Experts using structured analogies performed better than chance, but the most accurate forecasts were provided by simulated interaction using student role players. Twenty-one game theorists made 98 forecasts for eight diverse conflicts. Forty-one experts in conflicts made 60 solo forecasts using structured analogies and 96 solo forecasts using unaided judgement (a further seven provided collaborative forecasts only) while 492 participants made 105 forecasts in simulated interactions. Overall, one-in-three forecasts by game theorists and by experts who did not use a formal method were correct. Forecasters who used structured analogies were correct for 45 percent and forecasts from simulated interactions were correct for 62 percent of forecasts. Analysis using alternative measures of accuracy does not affect the findings. Neither expertise nor collaboration appear to affect accuracy. The findings are at odds with the opinions of experts, who expected experts to be more accurate than students regardless of the method used.</p>

Research of Flash Automatic Marking Based on Logical Formal

2012 ◽  
Vol 468-471 ◽  
pp. 2849-2853
Author(s):  
Wei Zheng ◽  
Ya Ping Wu ◽  
Yao Fei Chen
Keyword(s):  
Formal Method ◽  
Formal System ◽  
Average Error ◽  
Formal Description ◽  
Whole Process ◽  
Better Than

The author proposes a scheme of flash automatic marking based on animation effects. Describe the question's marking information by using the logical formal method. Achieve automatic marking by building the logical formal system. Focuses on two components of the scheme: logical formal description and SWF to XML. Describes the whole process of logical formal marking with example. Analysis of manual and automatic marking shows that: logical Formal automatic marking error is better than the manual average error.

scholarly journals Planck frequencies as Schelling points in SETI

2020 ◽  
Vol 19 (6) ◽  
pp. 446-455
Author(s):  
Jason T. Wright
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Fine Structure ◽  
Cooperative Game ◽  
Frequency Comb ◽  
Structure Constant ◽  
Fine Structure Constant ◽  
Electromagnetic Spectrum ◽  
Frequency Combs ◽  
Planck Energy ◽  
Better Than

AbstractIn SETI, when searching for ‘beacons’ – transmissions intended for us and meant to get our attention – one must guess the appropriate frequency to search by considering what frequencies would be universally obvious to other species. This is a well-known concept in game theory, where such solutions to a non-communicative cooperative game (such as a mutual search) are called ‘Schelling points’. It is noteworthy, therefore, that when developing his eponymous units, Planck called them ‘natural’ because they ‘remain meaningful for all times and also for extraterrestrial and non-human cultures’. Here, I apply Planck's suggestion in the context of Schelling points in SETI with a ‘Planck Frequency Comb’, constructed by multiplying the Planck energy by integer powers of the fine structure constant. This comb includes a small number of frequencies in regions of the electromagnetic spectrum where laser and radio SETI typically operates. Searches might proceed and individual teeth in the comb, or at many teeth at once, across the electromagnetic spectrum. Indeed, the latter strategy can be additionally justified by the transmitter's desire to signal at many frequencies at once, to improve the chances that the receiver will guess one of them correctly. There are many arbitrary and anthropocentric choices in this comb's construction, and indeed one can construct several different frequency combs with only minor and arbitrary modifications. This suggests that it may be fruitful to search for signals arriving in frequency combs of arbitrary spacing. And even though the frequencies suggested here are only debatably ‘better’ than others proposed, the addition of the Planck Frequency Comb to the list of ‘magic frequencies’ can only help searches for extraterrestrial beacons.

How to Play XML: Markup Technologies as Nomic Game

2009 ◽  
Author(s):  
Wendell Piez
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Life Sciences ◽  
Language Game ◽  
Media Production ◽  
Software Application ◽  
Philosophical Investigations ◽  
Rule Set ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
Better Than ◽  
Application Design

What is a “game”? A definition is famously difficult. Wittgenstein, for example, after having described language as a game in his Philosophical Investigations, goes on to ask what a game is and how we know what's a game, using the word (“Spiel” in German) as a vivid example of the provisional and contingent nature of the supposedly clear concepts communicated by language. Game theory, a branch of mathematics, solves this question by avoiding it, providing its own definition of “game”, which only partially fits many or most games as we know them. And talking about games becomes really interesting when we reflect, as is inescapable since Peter Suber coined the term “nomic game” in 1982, that part of the action of many games, and indeed the essence of some, is in the process, play or competition of providing the game itself with its rules and hence its definition. Originally developed in reference to legislative systems as an illustration of “a game of self-amendment”, Suber's rule set for the game “Nomic” quickly took on a life of its own and spawned a small thought industry among gamers and philosophers, implicating economics, sociology and anthropology, life sciences, psychology and politics. Markup technologies such as HTML, XML and everything that goes with them, from schemas to processing languages to public specifications and standards, have many gamelike aspects. We have players, equipment, and opportunities to compete and cooperate. When applications work as well as or better than planned, there are victories. When projects fail or initiatives collapse, there are defeats. As in many games, much of the activity of markup technologies is devoted to rules enforcement; it also, in nomic fashion, extends to breaking received rules and making new ones. (Illustrations and examples are offered at micro and macro levels.) An engagement with markup technologies, or with any media production or software application design that relies on them, demands tactics and strategy, presenting us with problems and tradeoffs enmeshed in complexities both on and off the board, and challenging us to decide not only how we play, but what game we wish to be playing. And the deeper we go, the more nomic it gets. As we ponder what we are doing with markup technologies and how they are changing what else we do – as technologists, publishers, scholars, teachers, and creative producers – it is well if we reflect on who is making the rules and how; for whose benefit; whether, when, to what extent and how we should follow their rules or make our own; and finally how the rules we make about the games we play can have far-reaching effects even beyond the game we thought we were playing.

Variation, Consistency, and Reputation

2020 ◽  
pp. 141-172
Author(s):  
John M. McNamara ◽  
Olof Leimar
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Individual Variation ◽  
Natural Populations ◽  
Market Situation ◽  
Individual Consistency ◽  
The Cost ◽  
Signalling Systems ◽  
Assortative Pairing ◽  
Current Behaviour ◽  
Better Than

There is typically considerable between-individual variation in trait values in natural populations. Game theory has often ignored this, treating individuals as the same. However, the existence and amount of variation is central to many predictions in biological game theory, as this chapter illustrates. Variation is central to signalling systems and stabilizes these systems as well as extensive-form games. Variation leads to individuals taking a chance that a partner is better than average; for example, promoting cooperation in a finitely repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma game. When there is both variation and within-individual consistency, so that past behaviour is predictive of current behaviour, reputation is important. As is demonstrated, once population members respond to reputation, this then selects for all to modify their behaviour so as to change their reputation and so change how others interact with them in the future, with consequences for the level of cooperation in the population. Furthermore, as a game of trust shows, the extent to which reputation matters can depend on whether individuals are prepared to pay the cost of being socially sensitive, which depends on the amount of variation. Variation selects for individuals to be choosy about their partner, and choosiness can lead to assortative pairing in a population, again promoting cooperation. The importance of choosiness in a market situation is demonstrated by a model in which partners have to decide how much to commit to one another, with factors that enhance choosiness leading to higher levels of commitment.

Look how far we have come

2011 ◽  
Vol 7 (4) ◽  
pp. 517-522 ◽  
Author(s):  
CHRISTOPHER CLAGUE
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Behavioral Economics ◽  
Current Literature ◽  
Field Experiments ◽  
Recent Literature ◽  
Behavioral Models ◽  
Poor Countries ◽  
Professional Journals ◽  
Experimental Subjects ◽  
Better Than

Abstract:Economics has changed enormously since Professor Ha-Joon Chang burst onto the scene in the early 1990s. His critiques of mainstream economics are far more applicable to the discipline at that time than they are now. Whatever the shortcomings of the current literature on institutions and development, progress is not being held back by conceptual blinders imposed by economic orthodoxy. Game theory and behavioral economics have enriched the menu of models acceptable in the professional journals. More important, empirical standards have greatly advanced. Behavioral models are being confronted with computerized games and even with in-the-field experiments, especially in poor countries where recruiting experimental subjects is cheaper. The recent literature does not merely undermine traditional assumptions; it offers parsimonious interpretations that help us to understand the economy and the polity better than before.

Research of SQL Server Automatic Marking Based on Logical Formal

2011 ◽  
Vol 328-330 ◽  
pp. 2376-2379
Author(s):  
Yao Fei Chen
Keyword(s):  
Formal Method ◽  
Formal System ◽  
Skill Assessment ◽  
Sql Server ◽  
Formal Description ◽  
Whole Process ◽  
Data Definition ◽  
Data Objects ◽  
System Focus ◽  
Better Than

The author proposes a scheme of SQL Server Automatic Marking based on logical formal. The scheme consists of three parts: generating paper, skill assessment and automatic marking. Describe the question's Marking information by using the logical formal method. Achieve automatic Marking by building the logical formal system. Focus on three components of the scheme: logical formal description, get information of database based on ADOX(Microsoft ActiveX Data Objects Extensions for Data Definition Language and Security) and automatic marking of three database operations:Creat,Modify and Delete. Describes the whole process of logical formal Marking with example. Analysis the assessment effect of the results about the example. Analysis between manual and automatic Marking shows that: logical Formal automatic Marking is better than the average artificial error and close to the minimum artificial error.

scholarly journals The Effect of Diversification under Different Ownership Structures and Economic Conditions: Evidence from the Great Recession

2019 ◽  
Vol 12 (2) ◽  
pp. 82
Author(s):  
Ivonne A. Liebenberg ◽  
Zhilu Lin
Keyword(s):  
Financial Crisis ◽  
Economic Conditions ◽  
Corporate Diversification ◽  
External Financing ◽  
Ownership Structures ◽  
The Great Recession ◽  
Alternative Measures ◽  
Insurance Firms ◽  
Diversified Firms ◽  
Better Than

The effect of corporate diversification on firm performance has been extensively documented in the literature. In the general finance literature, Kuppuswamy and Villalonga (2015) studied the diversification effect during the 2007–2009 financial crisis and found that diversification adds value in the presence of external financing constraints. Motivated by this finding, we investigate whether a similar effect applies to insurance firms and we develop hypotheses for their different ownership structures (stock vs. mutual insurers; and group vs. non-group affiliated insurers). Using a sample of property-liability insurers over a period of 2004 to 2013, we find that the effect of diversification on performance is contingent on ownership structures and economic conditions. The diversification effect for stock insurers and insurers affiliated with a group is not significantly affected by economic conditions. However, the diversification effect for mutual insurers and non-affiliated insurers is reversed during the financial crisis. More specifically, diversified firms with these kinds of ownership structures perform better than focused firms during normal economic conditions, but their performance was significantly worse during the financial crisis. Our results are robust to alternative measures of performance and diversification, and to corrections for endogeneity. Our study contributes to the diversification literature by showing how the effect of diversification varies with ownership structure under different economic conditions and the results shed light on the specific circumstances in which diversification can improve or reduce performance.

A Novel Scheduling Algorithm Based on Game Theory and Reinforcement Learning

2011 ◽  
Vol 66-68 ◽  
pp. 1948-1953
Author(s):  
Wen Sheng Zou
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Reinforcement Learning ◽  
Bin Packing ◽  
Dynamic Scheduling ◽  
Scheduling Algorithm ◽  
Learning Approach ◽  
Scheduling Problem ◽  
Power Scheduling ◽  
Long Duration ◽  
Better Than

In this paper we proposed a new dynamic scheduling algorithm for power scheduling problem. The algorithm is based on game theory and reinforcement learning approach. We compared the performance of our algorithm with that of online bin packing and MAB algorithm. We observed that our algorithm performs better than online bin packing when there is a variation in the deadlines. This is because our algorithm schedules the requests on the basis of their actions and the probability of missing the deadline and online bin packing algorithm schedules requests based on the sequence of requests as they arrive. We observed that our approach is more useful, when scheduling requests repeat themselves for long duration.

scholarly journals Divisia Index Monetary Aggregates: Do they Matter for Monetary Policy in Malaysia?

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jauhari Dahalan
Keyword(s):  
Monetary Policy ◽  
Dynamic Error ◽  
Monetary Aggregate ◽  
Divisia Index ◽  
Monetary Aggregates ◽  
Long Run ◽  
Excellent Candidate ◽  
Out Of Sample ◽  
Alternative Measures ◽  
Better Than

Divisia for narrowly and broadly defined monetary aggregate of a developing country Malaysia, are constructed. Unlike the Divisia for narrowly defined monetary aggregate MI, the Divisia for broader defined monetary aggregate M2 does show significant differences in both level and growth rates that signified the degree of the important and usefulness of Divisia index in formulating the monetary policy We ascertained that there exist long-run relationships between all measures of monetary aggregates in this study with inflations. By constructing dynamic error-correction models for all the alternative measures of monetary aggregates. we performed out-of-sample forecasting for three different periods. Analysis of the forecasting statistics indicates that the Divisia monetary aggregates performed better than their simple-sum counterparts in forecasting ability. We conclude that Divisia monetary aggregate namely Divisia M2, has the best forecast ability among all. As such, Divisia M2 can serve as an excellent candidate as a target or indicator in formulating the monetary policy for Malaysia.  

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document