scholarly journals Representing Justice: Architecture and the New Zealand Supreme Court

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Matthew Thomas Watson

<p>This thesis investigates the architectural significance of a recent exemplar of judicial architecture, the New Zealand Supreme Court complex (2010), in order to assess the complex’s design as an embodiment of judicial aspirations. The underlying assumption of this study (based on the works of Goodsell, Edelman, Garapon and others) is that the architecture of the Supreme Court complex legibly responds to its layered (but not always publicly accessible) briefing process, a process which expresses the aspirations of the New Zealand justice system at the beginning of the 21st century. By way of background, the study describes the history of the New Zealand judicial system, outlining the evolution of New Zealand’s court hierarchy (including the genesis of the Supreme Court as New Zealand’s court of final appeal) and of New Zealand’s judicial architecture. The role of the Supreme Court within New Zealand’s constitutional and legal framework is also examined, particularly in relation to recognising and supporting the rule of law and Treaty of Waitangi in New Zealand jurisprudence. The judicial aspirations of the Supreme Court are evinced through analyses of the Supreme Court Act 2003 and the Supreme Court project’s briefing process. These aspirations are coupled with an analysis of the Supreme Court complex’s built form to enable an assessment of architectural expressions in the Supreme Court complex of concepts of judicial independence, history and tradition; the indigenous nature of the Supreme Court; and the Court’s role in upholding the rule of law and sovereignty of Parliament. The outcome of this research is a greater understanding of the function of the Supreme Court complex as a symbol of the judicial values and aspirations for New Zealand’s justice system in the early 21st century. The significant findings of this study are that the Supreme Court complex is legibly successful in terms of its architectural engagement with New Zealand’s judicial heritage and the contemporary approaches of openness, transparency and access in the judicial system, but that the architecture the Supreme Court fails to appropriately engage with the significance of the on-going M􀀀ori–Crown constitutional relationship embodied in the Treaty of Waitangi, evincing a disconnect between the judicial aspirations expressed at the establishment of the institution and those expressed in the Court’s built form. It is suggested that this discrepancy highlights a layering of aspirations that occurred in the Supreme Court complex’s briefing process.</p>

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Matthew Thomas Watson

<p>This thesis investigates the architectural significance of a recent exemplar of judicial architecture, the New Zealand Supreme Court complex (2010), in order to assess the complex’s design as an embodiment of judicial aspirations. The underlying assumption of this study (based on the works of Goodsell, Edelman, Garapon and others) is that the architecture of the Supreme Court complex legibly responds to its layered (but not always publicly accessible) briefing process, a process which expresses the aspirations of the New Zealand justice system at the beginning of the 21st century. By way of background, the study describes the history of the New Zealand judicial system, outlining the evolution of New Zealand’s court hierarchy (including the genesis of the Supreme Court as New Zealand’s court of final appeal) and of New Zealand’s judicial architecture. The role of the Supreme Court within New Zealand’s constitutional and legal framework is also examined, particularly in relation to recognising and supporting the rule of law and Treaty of Waitangi in New Zealand jurisprudence. The judicial aspirations of the Supreme Court are evinced through analyses of the Supreme Court Act 2003 and the Supreme Court project’s briefing process. These aspirations are coupled with an analysis of the Supreme Court complex’s built form to enable an assessment of architectural expressions in the Supreme Court complex of concepts of judicial independence, history and tradition; the indigenous nature of the Supreme Court; and the Court’s role in upholding the rule of law and sovereignty of Parliament. The outcome of this research is a greater understanding of the function of the Supreme Court complex as a symbol of the judicial values and aspirations for New Zealand’s justice system in the early 21st century. The significant findings of this study are that the Supreme Court complex is legibly successful in terms of its architectural engagement with New Zealand’s judicial heritage and the contemporary approaches of openness, transparency and access in the judicial system, but that the architecture the Supreme Court fails to appropriately engage with the significance of the on-going M􀀀ori–Crown constitutional relationship embodied in the Treaty of Waitangi, evincing a disconnect between the judicial aspirations expressed at the establishment of the institution and those expressed in the Court’s built form. It is suggested that this discrepancy highlights a layering of aspirations that occurred in the Supreme Court complex’s briefing process.</p>


Author(s):  
Zulkarnain Ridlwan ◽  
Ade Arif Firmansyah

An independent judicial power is very important as one of the main characteristics of the rule of law, therefore its position must be maintained in Indonesia. The purpose of this paper confirms that any attempt to intervene in the authority of the Supreme Court and the Constitutional Court in the justice system, including intervention from the President, must be considered an unconstitutional act and violates the ideals of the Indonesian rule of law. A review of the President's position in the statutory regulations found the fact that there was still a gap in the infiltration of the President's power over judicial authority. Specifically in two cases, the first relates to the ambivalence of the prosecutor's position that is not as firm as the Police. Second, the constitutional judge selection model. The need to re-arrange the mechanism for selecting constitutional judges derived from the President's proposal so that it can be more aligned with efforts to distance the President's power from the power of the judiciary. In addition to the recommendations to the formers to reorganize the two potential infiltrations, this paper also recommends the institutionalization of public petitions based on Mark Tushnet's ideas about populist constitutional law. The existence of a public petition institution becomes a forum for gathering input and advice in law enforcement and justice. The opening of the President to accept public petitions makes it easier for the people to submit law enforcement issues which, in a sense of people's justice, must be addressed.


2020 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
pp. 73-104
Author(s):  
Rustam Magun Pikahulan

Abstract: The Plato's conception of the rule of law states that good governance is based on good law. The organization also spreads to the world of Supreme Court justices, the election caused a decadence to the institutional status of the House of Representatives as a people's representative in the government whose implementation was not in line with the decision of the Constitutional Court. Based on the decision of the Constitutional Court No.27/PUU-XI/2013 explains that the House of Representatives no longer has the authority to conduct due diligence and suitability (elect) to prospective Supreme Judges proposed by the Judicial Commission. The House of Representatives can only approve or disapprove candidates for Supreme Court Justices that have been submitted by the Judicial Commission. In addition, the proportion of proposed Supreme Court Justices from the judicial commission to the House of Representatives (DPR) has changed, whereas previously the Judicial Commission had to propose 3 (three) of each vacancy for the Justices, now it is only one of each vacant for Supreme Court Judges. by the Supreme Court. The House of Representatives no longer has the authority to conduct due diligence and suitability (elect) to prospective Supreme Judges proposed by the Judicial Commission. The House of Representatives can only "approve" or "disagree" the Supreme Judge candidates nominated by the Judicial Commission.


1999 ◽  
Vol 33 (2) ◽  
pp. 216-258 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ruth Gavison

A discussion of the role of courts in Israel today demands some introductory remarks. The Supreme Court and the President of the Supreme Court enjoy great acclaim and respect within Israel and abroad, but have recently come under attack from a variety of sources. These attacks are often confused, and many of them are clearly motivated by narrow partisan interests and an inherent objection to the rule of law and judicial review. But these motives do not necessarily weaken the dangers which the attacks pose to the legitimacy of the courts in general, and the Supreme Court in particular, in Israel's public life. The fact that in some sectors extremely harsh criticism of the court is seen to be an electoral boost, testifies to the serious and dangerous nature of the threat. This situation creates a dilemma for those who want a strong and independent judiciary, believing it is essential for freedom and democracy, but who also believe that, during the last two decades, the courts have transgressed limits they should respect. The dilemma becomes especially acute when the political echo sounds out in one's criticism, and when one is part of the group that believes that the legal and the judicial systems have made some contribution to the prevalence of these hyperbolic and dangerous attacks, as I am.


Author(s):  
O. Kravchuk ◽  
I. Ostashchuk

The oath of a judge as an oath of office and as an element of judicial symbolism is considered in the article. The oath of a judge belongs to the categories of oaths of office, taken by an official upon taking office. At the same time, it belongs to the judicial oaths used in the justice process and is an element of judicial symbols. The oath of a judge as an oath of office symbolizes the endowment of a judge as an official by the state (judicial) power, the moment of his acquisition of powers (it is the inauguration ceremony), and the duty of a judge as an official to perform his duties properly. The oath of a judge as a judicial symbol represents a public and solemn obligation of the judge to exercise a fair trial in all its manifestations, including: independence and impartiality of the court, adversarial proceedings, equality of arms, and the rule of law. The judge takes the oath in a solemn atmosphere in the presence of senior officials (in Ukraine – in the presence of the President of Ukraine). It is an important ritual – a symbol of giving a person judicial power. The oath itself is a symbolic action of conscious choice of responsible and impartial observance of the law in the professional functions of realization of the rule of law for the good of all people. The coronavirus pandemic has shown that gathering a large number of people in one room can be problematic, so the oath ceremony was held even outdoors. It is stated that holding a ceremony in one of the judicial bodies, for example, in the premises of the Supreme Court or (subject to quarantine restrictions) in the territory of the Supreme Court may symbolize the independence of the judiciary and each judge from other branches of power. The peculiarity of the oath of a judge in Ukraine is its one-time nature. It should be taken only by a person first appointed to the position of a judge. In case of an appointment or transfer to another court, the judge shall not take the oath again. In this aspect, the oath of a judge is similar to the oath of a civil servant, which is taken only by persons recruited for the first time.


Author(s):  
Molly Joeck

Abstract This article examines the state of Canadian refugee law since the decision of the Supreme Court in Febles v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) [2014] 3 SCR 431. Drawing upon an analysis of a set of decisions of the Immigration and Refugee Board, the administrative tribunal tasked with refugee status determination in Canada, the article seeks to determine whether administrative decision makers are heeding the guidance of Febles when excluding asylum seekers from refugee protection on the basis of serious criminality pursuant to article 1F(b) of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees. In doing so, it examines the controversy around article 1F(b) since its inception across various jurisdictions and amongst academic commentators, situating Febles within that controversy in order to demonstrate that the Supreme Court’s reluctance to clearly set out the purpose underlying article 1F(b) is in step with a longstanding tendency to understand the provision as serving a gatekeeping function, that prevents criminalized non-citizens from obtaining membership in our society. It argues that by omitting to set out a clear and principled standard by which asylum seekers can be excluded from refugee protection pursuant to article 1F(b), the Supreme Court failed to live up to a thick understanding of the rule of law. It concludes by calling for a reassertion of the rule of law into exclusion decision making, both nationally and internationally, in order to ensure that the legitimacy of the international refugee law regime is maintained.


2019 ◽  
Vol 17 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Rasji . ◽  
Cinthia .

Indonesia is a country based on the law (rechstaat) whose basis is stated in Article 1 Paragraph (3) of the UUD NRI 1945. The essential principles of the rule of law based on Article 24 Paragraph (1) of the UUD NRI 1945 are the guarantee of the organizer of the power of an independent judicial institution without interference from other parties to hold a court to uphold law and justice. Ideally, the results of the two institutions' decisions do not cause problems in society. However, the results of the decisions of the two institutions are still found differently regarding the issue of nominating individual participants in the members of the Regional Representatives Council. Any other way, the results of the Constitutional Court ruling prohibited members of the Regional Representatives Council who were still in the position of administrators of political parties. Meanwhile, the decision of the Supreme Court allows candidates for members of the Regional Representatives Council who are still in the position of managing political parties. In this study, the researcher will examine the differences between the Supreme Court's decision and the Constitutional Court's decision regarding the nomination of individual participants in the Regional Representatives Council by using normative legal methods and conducting interviews as supporting data. The results of the study revealed that based on the legal basis and authority of the institution, the verdict that had legal certainty regarding the nomination of individual participants in the Regional Representatives Council election was the decision of the Constitutional Court.


2018 ◽  
Vol 112 (4) ◽  
pp. 707-713
Author(s):  
Jacquelene Mwangi

The decision of the Supreme Court of Kenya (Court) in Francis Karioko Muruatetu and Another v. Republic (Muruatetu), finding the mandatory nature of the death penalty unconstitutional, represents not only a victory for human rights in Africa but also the transformative capacity of contemporary constitutions in Africa and the growing assertiveness of African judiciaries. In the judgment, the Court held that the mandatory death penalty is “out of sync with the progressive Bill of Rights” in Kenya's 2010 Constitution (para. 64) and an affront to the rule of law. The Court also relied on global death penalty jurisprudence to find the mandatory death sentence “harsh, unjust and unfair” (para. 48). Consequently, the Court mandated that all trial courts conduct a pre-sentencing hearing to determine whether the death penalty is deserved. The Court's judgment could spell the end of the mandatory death penalty in Kenya after almost 120 years on the statute books.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document