scholarly journals Coordination Model of Consumer Information Sharing in the Online Tourism Supply Chain

2021 ◽  
Vol 4 (6) ◽  
pp. 1-9
Author(s):  
Honglian Guo ◽  
Xuexue Zhang

This is a study of the coordination model of consumer information sharing in the tourism supply chain with e-commerce platforms as the core. On the basis of considering the risks, a game theory is used to explore the information sharing effort level and the output profit of the tourism supply chain under both, centralized decision-making and decentralized decision-making. Finally, numerical simulation is used to verify the model and put forward a method of coordination for all parties in the tourism supply chain to achieve maximum profit.

2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-10
Author(s):  
Ziyu Liu ◽  
Yaping Li

In order to explore the impact of different decision-making methods on the profits of various entities in the supply chain of the community e-commerce platform, this paper adopts the method of the Stackelberg game. For the community e-commerce platform supply chain composed of suppliers, community e-commerce platforms, and grid station service providers, considering the degree of supplier value cocreation efforts, this paper studies the optimal decisions under centralized decision-making, supplier-led decentralized decision-making, and community e-commerce platform-led decentralized decision-making, respectively. The results show that the supply chain obtains the highest profit in centralized decision-making; under decentralized decision-making, the dominant party will get higher profits; and the supplier value cocreation sensitivity coefficient is positively correlated with sales price, value cocreation effort level, and total supply chain value. The results are helpful to improve the competitiveness of the community e-commerce platform supply chain in the market and are of great significance to the long-term development of the community e-commerce industry.


2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-15
Author(s):  
Yangang Feng ◽  
Yi Hu ◽  
Lin He

Considering that the demand for fresh agricultural products is affected by product freshness and price, a two-level fresh agricultural product supply chain decision model consisting of a risk-neutral supplier and a risk-averse retailer is constructed. In order to increase consumer demand for fresh agricultural products, the supplier will make appropriate efforts to preserve the freshness of agricultural products. The optimal fresh-keeping effort level of the supplier and the optimal pricing decision of the retailer under the centralized decision-making and decentralized decision-making modes were studied, respectively; through the design of traditional cost-sharing contracts, traditional cost and revenue-sharing contracts, and cost-sharing and compensation strategies, the supplier was encouraged to improve their fresh-keeping effort. The research shows that the traditional cost-sharing contract and the traditional cost-benefit sharing contract cannot coordinate the supply chain. Under the strategy of cost sharing and compensation, when the amount of compensation meets certain conditions, the coordination of supply chain can be realized. Finally, the important parameters of the model are analyzed by numerical simulation.


Author(s):  
Wei Liu

Due to the conflict between traditional channels and electronic channels in the e-commerce dual-channel supply chain, retailers are threatened and need to be compensated in some way. Based on this, an e-commerce dual-channel supply chain coordination compensation model based on optimized genetic algorithm is designed. Based on the problem description and basic assumptions, analyze the manufacturer’s profit and the retailer’s maximum profit in the case of centralized decision-making and decentralized decision-making. The genetic algorithm is optimized by introducing a collaborative genetic operator, and the optimized genetic algorithm is used to obtain dual e-commerce channels. The maximum profit of the supply chain, so far, the model design is completed. Through comparative experiments, the optimized genetic algorithm used in the model is compared with two traditional algorithms. Experimental results show that the proposed algorithm takes shorter iteration time to solve the problem, its convergence is better, and it can effectively obtain a global optimal solution instead of a local optimal solution.


Author(s):  
Junjun Liu ◽  
Yong Geng ◽  
Biao Chen ◽  
Xiqiang Xia

The eco-design of upstream suppliers can reduce the environmental impact from the production process for downstream customers. To analyze the effect of suppliers’ eco-design on the economic benefits of up-downstream supply chain and the mechanisms, this study constructed a master–slave game theory model for a supplier and a manufacturer. Based on this game theory model, this study comparatively analyzes the effects on raw material/part prices, retail product prices, sale volume, revenue, and eco-design effort level under three conditions (no eco-design, decentralized decision-making with eco-design, centralized decision-making with eco-design). And to further analyze the effect of eco-design costs on the optimal solution, this article takes the supply chain of tire production as an example. This analysis could provide suggestions for the suppliers and manufacturers to develop and improve their eco-design. The main results are as follows: the supplier eco-design is beneficial to improving the overall economic benefits for suppliers and manufacturers under certain conditions, and the range in which a supplier is willing to implement eco-design in a decentralized decision-making situation is wider than that in a centralized decision-making situation; when a supplier implements an eco-design, it will transfer part of the cost to the manufacturer by raising the unit raw material/parts prices. Meanwhile, the manufacturer can reduce the production cost when the benefit of eco-design is more than the increased purchasing price, and they can decrease the retail price to expand the sales volume. Hence, consumers will benefit from lower prices. Thus, it is a multi-win situation among the suppliers, manufacturers, and consumers.


2021 ◽  
Vol 336 ◽  
pp. 09004
Author(s):  
Yuxin Wen ◽  
Linyi Wu ◽  
Fengmin Yao

Affected by factors such as cost, the financial constraints faced by the supply chain are becoming more and more severe. This paper constructs a financing and pricing decision-making model for the construction supply chain under capital constraints, and uses Stackelberg game theory to analyze and obtain the best financing and pricing strategy for the construction supply chain under the internal and external financing modes. The study found that when centralized decision-making is adopted, there is a profit distribution model that makes the profits obtained by construction developers and contractors greater than the profits obtained in decentralized decision-making; the internal financing model of the construction supply chain is better than external financing, and can enable the construction supply chain get higher profits.


2021 ◽  
Vol 29 (1) ◽  
pp. 88-111
Author(s):  
Zericho Marak ◽  
◽  
Deepa Pillai ◽  

Purpose: The present study aims to identify the critical factors of supply chain finance and the interrelationship between the factors using interpretive structural modeling. Methodology: Factors of supply chain finance were identified from the literature and experts from both industry and academia were consulted to assess the contextual relationships between the factors. Then, we applied interpretive structural modeling to examine the interrelationships between these factors and find out the critical factors. Findings: The model outcome indicates information sharing and workforce to be the most influential factors, followed by the automation of trade and financial attractiveness. Originality/value: Previous literature identified various factors that influence supply chain finance. However, studies showing interrelationships between these factors are lacking. This study is unique in the field as it applies total interpretive structural modeling for assessing the factors that affect supply chain finance. Our model will aid practitioners’ decision-making and the adoption of supply chain finance by providing a necessary framework.


2019 ◽  
Vol 2019 ◽  
pp. 1-12
Author(s):  
Jiaquan Yang ◽  
Xumei Zhang ◽  
Yating Huang ◽  
Jiafu Su ◽  
Sang-Bing Tsai ◽  
...  

The dual-channel supply chain is widely adopted by main manufacturers, potentially incurring channel conflicts between the traditional retail channel which is owned by the independent retailer and the online channel which is directly managed by the manufacturer. The purpose of this paper is to deal with the scenario where channel conflicts may arise under production capacity uncertainty, when the manufacturer tends to privilege the direct selling channel over the retail selling channel. To achieve the goal, this paper establishes a Stackelberg game model consisting of a manufacturer and a retailer, studies the scenario where the manufacturer satisfies the direct selling channel first in the presence of capacity uncertainty, employs the decision optimization and the backward induction method to find the optimal inventory decision in the direct selling channel and the optimal order quantity decision making in the retail selling channel, and designs a compensation mechanism aiming to coordinate the channel conflict in the decentralized decision-making process. Results show that the optimal decisions aiming to maximize the expected profit of each supply chain member are not able to maximize the expected profit of entire dual-channel supply chain. However, when the manufacturer compensates the retailer’s profit loss based on the unsatisfied order and, in the meantime, adjusts the wholesale price to prevent the retailer which obtains the compensation from increasing order significantly, the compensation mechanism can coordinate the decision of each supply chain member, mitigate the channel conflict, maximize the expected profit of entire dual-channel supply chain, and achieve the Pareto improvement of supply chain members’ expected profit in the decentralized decision-making process.


2015 ◽  
Vol 2015 ◽  
pp. 1-19 ◽  
Author(s):  
Weihua Liu ◽  
Shuqing Wang ◽  
Donglei Zhu

This paper introduces the parameter of supply chain control power into existing supply chain coordination models and explores the impacts of control power on the profits of manufacturer, retailer, and the overall supply chain under four modes of decision-making, including the decentralized decision-making dominated by manufacturer, the decentralized decision-making dominated by retailer, centralized decision-making, and Nash negotiation decision-making. Some significant conclusions are obtained. Firstly, supply chain control power does have great impact on the supply chain profits. The profit of the whole supply chain with centralized decision-making is higher than those of the other three modes, while the overall profit of supply chain with decentralized decision-making is superior to the profit when retailer and manufacturer dominate the supply chain together. Secondly, with decentralized decision-making, for manufacturer and retailer, it is beneficial to gain the control powers of the supply chain; however, control power has an optimal value, not the bigger, the better. Thirdly, under certain circumstances, order quantity will increase and the wholesale price will decrease when control power is transferred from manufacturer to retailer. In this case, the total profit of supply chain dominated by retailer will be greater than that dominated by manufacturer.


2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 ◽  
pp. 1-22
Author(s):  
Jianjun Zhang ◽  
Daning Xing

Taking the dual-channel supply chain embedded by two-echelon logistics service providers as the research object, this paper studies the optimal decisions of each decision maker under the centralized and decentralized decision-making mode led by the retailer. Based on the decentralized decision-making mode, an improved coordination mechanism of residual profit sharing is designed to realize the interest coordination, in which the bargaining power of all participants is fully considered. The results show that, under the decentralized decision-making mode, the profit of FLSP increases first and then decreases as the sensitivity coefficient of cross-service level increases, while the profits of other decision makers and the supply chain system decrease with the increase of sensitivity coefficient of cross-service level. The relative size of the price sensitivity coefficient of online and offline channel has an inconsistent impact on the profit of FLSP, while it has a consistent impact on the profits of other decision makers. The profit of FLSP fluctuates greatly with changes in the sensitivity coefficient, and it is difficult to be guaranteed in the entire supply chain system. On this basis, an improved coordination mechanism of residual profit sharing is designed. The results show that, after the introduction of bargaining power coefficient of the Nash negotiation model, the variation coefficient of the profits of all decision makers is smaller after coordination, and the profit growth rates are more uniform.


Author(s):  
Gao ◽  
Wang

Based on Stackelberg's master–slave game theory and green index decision-making conditions, this paper studies the benefit coordination of a supply chain network composed of a business flow network and logistics network, discusses the decision-making behavior of the main body of the supply chain network under the performance of green contracts or speculative behavior, respectively, and further constructs the supply chain network collaborative benefit coordination model under the guidance of a manufacturer considering a green development index. The supply chain network interest coordination model analyzes the relationship between the dominant manufacturer behavior and the supply chain network green index and network profit. The results show that fulfilling green contracts helps improve the profitability and sustainability of supply chain networks. A counter-intuitive but interesting result is that the dominant manufacturers increase the cost-sharing ratio or penalties of the logistics network, which will reduce the profit level and green index of the logistics network, and increase the cost-sharing ratio or punishment of the suppliers. Strength will increase the profitability and green index of the logistics network. Finally, we validate the relevant conclusions of the model through numerical simulation analysis.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document