scholarly journals The Effect of a Supplier’s Eco-Design on the Economic Benefits of a Supply Chain and Associated Coordination

Author(s):  
Junjun Liu ◽  
Yong Geng ◽  
Biao Chen ◽  
Xiqiang Xia

The eco-design of upstream suppliers can reduce the environmental impact from the production process for downstream customers. To analyze the effect of suppliers’ eco-design on the economic benefits of up-downstream supply chain and the mechanisms, this study constructed a master–slave game theory model for a supplier and a manufacturer. Based on this game theory model, this study comparatively analyzes the effects on raw material/part prices, retail product prices, sale volume, revenue, and eco-design effort level under three conditions (no eco-design, decentralized decision-making with eco-design, centralized decision-making with eco-design). And to further analyze the effect of eco-design costs on the optimal solution, this article takes the supply chain of tire production as an example. This analysis could provide suggestions for the suppliers and manufacturers to develop and improve their eco-design. The main results are as follows: the supplier eco-design is beneficial to improving the overall economic benefits for suppliers and manufacturers under certain conditions, and the range in which a supplier is willing to implement eco-design in a decentralized decision-making situation is wider than that in a centralized decision-making situation; when a supplier implements an eco-design, it will transfer part of the cost to the manufacturer by raising the unit raw material/parts prices. Meanwhile, the manufacturer can reduce the production cost when the benefit of eco-design is more than the increased purchasing price, and they can decrease the retail price to expand the sales volume. Hence, consumers will benefit from lower prices. Thus, it is a multi-win situation among the suppliers, manufacturers, and consumers.

2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-11
Author(s):  
Su Chen

In order to improve the efficiency of customization and reduce the cost of customization under Big data environment, this paper uses cost-sharing contract, pricing mechanism, Hotelling model, and game theory tools and research methods, for C2B Electronic Commerce (e-commerce) mode of Supply Chain Pricing Strategy for in-depth discussion. This paper first gives the architecture of the customization service system based on big data. The paper studies the game equilibrium of supply chain members under four scenarios: centralized decision-making, decentralized decision-making, C2B-dominated decision-making, and traditional enterprise-dominated decision-making in a supply chain composed of a supplier and C2B e-commerce enterprises with horizontal price competition, and examines the cross-price. Important parameters such as impact coefficient, impact coefficient of effort degree of personalized customization, and so on have an impact on variables such as effort degree of personalized customization, retail price, and profit of supply chain members of C2B e-commerce enterprises. Research shows that with the increase of cross-price impact coefficient, C2B e-commerce will enhance its personalized customization efforts in different situations in order to pursue higher profits.


2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-10
Author(s):  
Ziyu Liu ◽  
Yaping Li

In order to explore the impact of different decision-making methods on the profits of various entities in the supply chain of the community e-commerce platform, this paper adopts the method of the Stackelberg game. For the community e-commerce platform supply chain composed of suppliers, community e-commerce platforms, and grid station service providers, considering the degree of supplier value cocreation efforts, this paper studies the optimal decisions under centralized decision-making, supplier-led decentralized decision-making, and community e-commerce platform-led decentralized decision-making, respectively. The results show that the supply chain obtains the highest profit in centralized decision-making; under decentralized decision-making, the dominant party will get higher profits; and the supplier value cocreation sensitivity coefficient is positively correlated with sales price, value cocreation effort level, and total supply chain value. The results are helpful to improve the competitiveness of the community e-commerce platform supply chain in the market and are of great significance to the long-term development of the community e-commerce industry.


2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-15
Author(s):  
Yangang Feng ◽  
Yi Hu ◽  
Lin He

Considering that the demand for fresh agricultural products is affected by product freshness and price, a two-level fresh agricultural product supply chain decision model consisting of a risk-neutral supplier and a risk-averse retailer is constructed. In order to increase consumer demand for fresh agricultural products, the supplier will make appropriate efforts to preserve the freshness of agricultural products. The optimal fresh-keeping effort level of the supplier and the optimal pricing decision of the retailer under the centralized decision-making and decentralized decision-making modes were studied, respectively; through the design of traditional cost-sharing contracts, traditional cost and revenue-sharing contracts, and cost-sharing and compensation strategies, the supplier was encouraged to improve their fresh-keeping effort. The research shows that the traditional cost-sharing contract and the traditional cost-benefit sharing contract cannot coordinate the supply chain. Under the strategy of cost sharing and compensation, when the amount of compensation meets certain conditions, the coordination of supply chain can be realized. Finally, the important parameters of the model are analyzed by numerical simulation.


Author(s):  
Wei Liu

Due to the conflict between traditional channels and electronic channels in the e-commerce dual-channel supply chain, retailers are threatened and need to be compensated in some way. Based on this, an e-commerce dual-channel supply chain coordination compensation model based on optimized genetic algorithm is designed. Based on the problem description and basic assumptions, analyze the manufacturer’s profit and the retailer’s maximum profit in the case of centralized decision-making and decentralized decision-making. The genetic algorithm is optimized by introducing a collaborative genetic operator, and the optimized genetic algorithm is used to obtain dual e-commerce channels. The maximum profit of the supply chain, so far, the model design is completed. Through comparative experiments, the optimized genetic algorithm used in the model is compared with two traditional algorithms. Experimental results show that the proposed algorithm takes shorter iteration time to solve the problem, its convergence is better, and it can effectively obtain a global optimal solution instead of a local optimal solution.


2021 ◽  
Vol 4 (6) ◽  
pp. 1-9
Author(s):  
Honglian Guo ◽  
Xuexue Zhang

This is a study of the coordination model of consumer information sharing in the tourism supply chain with e-commerce platforms as the core. On the basis of considering the risks, a game theory is used to explore the information sharing effort level and the output profit of the tourism supply chain under both, centralized decision-making and decentralized decision-making. Finally, numerical simulation is used to verify the model and put forward a method of coordination for all parties in the tourism supply chain to achieve maximum profit.


2022 ◽  
Vol 9 ◽  
Author(s):  
Fuqiang Wang ◽  
Huimin Li ◽  
Yongchao Cao ◽  
Chengyi Zhang ◽  
Yunlong Ran

Knowledge sharing (KS) in the green supply chain (GSC) is jointly determined by the KS efforts of suppliers and manufacturers. This study uses the differential game method to explore the dynamic strategy of KS and the benefits of emission reduction in the process of low carbon (LC) technology in the GSC. The optimal trajectory of the knowledge stock and emission reduction benefits of suppliers and manufacturers under different strategies are obtained. The validity of the model and the results are verified by numerical simulation analysis, and the sensitivity analysis of the main parameters in the case of collaborative sharing is carried out. The results show that in the case of centralized decision-making, the KS efforts of suppliers and manufacturers are the highest, and the knowledge stock and emission reduction benefits of GSC are also the best. The cost-sharing mechanism can realize the Pareto improvement of GSC’s knowledge stock and emission reduction benefits, but the cost-sharing mechanism can only increase the supplier’s KS effort level. In addition, this study found that the price of carbon trading and the rate of knowledge decay have a significant impact on KS. The study provides a theoretical basis for promoting KS in the GSC and LC technology innovation.


2021 ◽  
Vol 336 ◽  
pp. 09004
Author(s):  
Yuxin Wen ◽  
Linyi Wu ◽  
Fengmin Yao

Affected by factors such as cost, the financial constraints faced by the supply chain are becoming more and more severe. This paper constructs a financing and pricing decision-making model for the construction supply chain under capital constraints, and uses Stackelberg game theory to analyze and obtain the best financing and pricing strategy for the construction supply chain under the internal and external financing modes. The study found that when centralized decision-making is adopted, there is a profit distribution model that makes the profits obtained by construction developers and contractors greater than the profits obtained in decentralized decision-making; the internal financing model of the construction supply chain is better than external financing, and can enable the construction supply chain get higher profits.


2019 ◽  
Vol 2019 ◽  
pp. 1-12
Author(s):  
Jiaquan Yang ◽  
Xumei Zhang ◽  
Yating Huang ◽  
Jiafu Su ◽  
Sang-Bing Tsai ◽  
...  

The dual-channel supply chain is widely adopted by main manufacturers, potentially incurring channel conflicts between the traditional retail channel which is owned by the independent retailer and the online channel which is directly managed by the manufacturer. The purpose of this paper is to deal with the scenario where channel conflicts may arise under production capacity uncertainty, when the manufacturer tends to privilege the direct selling channel over the retail selling channel. To achieve the goal, this paper establishes a Stackelberg game model consisting of a manufacturer and a retailer, studies the scenario where the manufacturer satisfies the direct selling channel first in the presence of capacity uncertainty, employs the decision optimization and the backward induction method to find the optimal inventory decision in the direct selling channel and the optimal order quantity decision making in the retail selling channel, and designs a compensation mechanism aiming to coordinate the channel conflict in the decentralized decision-making process. Results show that the optimal decisions aiming to maximize the expected profit of each supply chain member are not able to maximize the expected profit of entire dual-channel supply chain. However, when the manufacturer compensates the retailer’s profit loss based on the unsatisfied order and, in the meantime, adjusts the wholesale price to prevent the retailer which obtains the compensation from increasing order significantly, the compensation mechanism can coordinate the decision of each supply chain member, mitigate the channel conflict, maximize the expected profit of entire dual-channel supply chain, and achieve the Pareto improvement of supply chain members’ expected profit in the decentralized decision-making process.


2015 ◽  
Vol 2015 ◽  
pp. 1-19 ◽  
Author(s):  
Weihua Liu ◽  
Shuqing Wang ◽  
Donglei Zhu

This paper introduces the parameter of supply chain control power into existing supply chain coordination models and explores the impacts of control power on the profits of manufacturer, retailer, and the overall supply chain under four modes of decision-making, including the decentralized decision-making dominated by manufacturer, the decentralized decision-making dominated by retailer, centralized decision-making, and Nash negotiation decision-making. Some significant conclusions are obtained. Firstly, supply chain control power does have great impact on the supply chain profits. The profit of the whole supply chain with centralized decision-making is higher than those of the other three modes, while the overall profit of supply chain with decentralized decision-making is superior to the profit when retailer and manufacturer dominate the supply chain together. Secondly, with decentralized decision-making, for manufacturer and retailer, it is beneficial to gain the control powers of the supply chain; however, control power has an optimal value, not the bigger, the better. Thirdly, under certain circumstances, order quantity will increase and the wholesale price will decrease when control power is transferred from manufacturer to retailer. In this case, the total profit of supply chain dominated by retailer will be greater than that dominated by manufacturer.


2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 ◽  
pp. 1-22
Author(s):  
Jianjun Zhang ◽  
Daning Xing

Taking the dual-channel supply chain embedded by two-echelon logistics service providers as the research object, this paper studies the optimal decisions of each decision maker under the centralized and decentralized decision-making mode led by the retailer. Based on the decentralized decision-making mode, an improved coordination mechanism of residual profit sharing is designed to realize the interest coordination, in which the bargaining power of all participants is fully considered. The results show that, under the decentralized decision-making mode, the profit of FLSP increases first and then decreases as the sensitivity coefficient of cross-service level increases, while the profits of other decision makers and the supply chain system decrease with the increase of sensitivity coefficient of cross-service level. The relative size of the price sensitivity coefficient of online and offline channel has an inconsistent impact on the profit of FLSP, while it has a consistent impact on the profits of other decision makers. The profit of FLSP fluctuates greatly with changes in the sensitivity coefficient, and it is difficult to be guaranteed in the entire supply chain system. On this basis, an improved coordination mechanism of residual profit sharing is designed. The results show that, after the introduction of bargaining power coefficient of the Nash negotiation model, the variation coefficient of the profits of all decision makers is smaller after coordination, and the profit growth rates are more uniform.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document