scholarly journals Orthodox Christianity and War

2021 ◽  
Vol 63 (11) ◽  
pp. 39-57
Author(s):  
Jovan Babić

The subject of this article is the Orthodox Christianity’s approach to war. Christians of other denomination have developed an elaborate theory of war, so-called “Just War Theory” (JWT), which has also been accepted by non-Christians and even secular thinkers regarding the nature and justification of war. A vast literature has been produced in a dire attempt to render perfect the world by insisting on the claim that war is the act of punishment for breaking the law. The result is an epistemological ease from which everything seems evident in advance including who is right and who at fault, who is and who is not favored by God. By removing from war an essential feature – that it is a form of conflict – JWT takes away the concept of reciprocity and introduces an in advance declared inequality which enables removal of uncertainty about the war’s outcome. In Orthodox Christianity, the situation is different. With still live debate whether to persevere or abandon original Christian pacifism, for Orthodox Christianity, war is always a combination of cataclysm and temptation and far less Manichean than anything present in JWT. The aim of war is peace; but, however necessary, justice is an insufficient condition for justification. The difference between “justness” and “justification” is preserved through the uncertainty whom God, at war’s end, loves more, because both victors and vanquished remain and continue to be in His grace. Losing a war, as such, does not turn the vanquished into criminals, nor does victory give the vanquisher the right of revenge for defending oneself. The latter approach to war has significant potentialities: preserving the distinction of ius ad bellum and ius in bello, preserving reciprocity, mutual respect and trust, impossibility of incrimination of war per se, the possibility of honorable defeat, etc.

What does it mean to win a moral victory? In the history, practice, and theory of war, this question yields few clear answers. Wars often begin with ideals about just and decisive triumphs but descend into quagmires. In the just war and strategic studies traditions, assumptions about victory underpin legitimations for war but become problematic in discussions about its conduct and conclusion. After centuries of conflict, we still lack a clear understanding of victory or reliable resources for discerning its moral status, its implications for conduct in war, or its relationship to changing ways of war. This book brings together an interdisciplinary group of scholars to tackle such issues. It is organized in two parts. After a synoptic introduction, Part I, ‘Traditions: The Changing Character of Victory’, charts the historically variable notion of victory and the dialogues and fissures this opens in the just war and strategic canons. Individual chapters analyse the importance of victory in the Bible, Clausewitz’s strategy, the political uses of defeat, arguments for unlimited war, revisionist just war theory, and contemporary norms against fights to the finish. Part II, ‘Challenges: The Problem of Victory in Contemporary Warfare’, shows how changing security contexts exacerbate these issues. Individual chapters discuss ethics in unwinnable wars, the political scars of victory, whether we can ‘win’ humanitarian interventions, contemporary civil–military relations, victory in privatized war, and operations short of war. In both parts, contributors work towards a clearer understanding of victory, forwarding several shared themes discussed in a critical conclusion.


Land Law ◽  
2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ben McFarlane ◽  
Nicholas Hopkins ◽  
Sarah Nield

This chapter examines easements and how they relate to the content, acquisition and defences questions. Easement refers to the right of a landowner to enjoy a limited use of neighbouring land. An essential feature of an easement is the need for two pieces of land: the dominant land to which the benefit of the easement is attached and the servient land over which the easement is exercised. This chapter considers the four defining characteristics of an easement: there must be two distinct areas of land — dominant land and servient land; the dominant and servient land must be owned by diffrent people; the easement must ‘accommodate’ the dominant land; and the right must be capable of forming the subject matter of a grant. It also discusses the express creation vs. implied creation of an easement, along with defences that can defeat an easement.


Author(s):  
Alec D. Walen

This chapter argues for the extension of an idea from the previous chapter, that of a right of non-sacrifice. It argues that this right exists in certain cases of intervening agency: when the intervening agent presents the primary agent with a choice either to submit to suffering a harm or to resist, knowing that the intervening agent will then harm others. The argument proceeds in four parts. First, the chapter explains why such a case is puzzling; second, it dismisses two unsuccessful attempts to resolve the puzzle; third, it explains why intervening agency sometimes has the effect of changing the nature of the causal structure in which an agent acts, though noting as well that intervening agency is not unique in having that effect; and finally, it explores how these ideas might be relevant to just war theory and eliminative killing in that context.


1997 ◽  
Vol 11 ◽  
pp. 99-104 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Walzer

Responding to the critiques of the four previous authors, Walzer opens with a statement of the inherent imperfection of any theory of war. He reminds us that theories are merely frameworks for decisions and cannot provide answers in and of themselves. Moral decisions in war are especially difficult, for it is often necessary to choose between equally valid claims. Walzer continues the discussion of sieges initiated by both Koontz and Boyle and concedes the validity of Koontz's criticism of inconsistency in his theory of noncombatant immunity. Addressing the different authors' moral doctrines–Hendrickson's consequentialism and Koontz's and Boyle's deontology–Walzer argues that it is better to judge each case individually, weighing both the consequences and principles, rather than strictly adhere to one moral doctrine, an approach commended by Smith. Finally, in the search for a perfect just war theory, Walzer issues a realist reminder that there can be no such thing as a morally perfect war.


2019 ◽  
Vol 36 (2) ◽  
pp. 231-283
Author(s):  
Vera Lee-Schoenfeld ◽  
Anya Lunden

Abstract This paper explores fronted verb phrases in German, drawing attention to the difference between passive/unaccusative VPs and fronted agentive vPs. While both kinds of verb phrases have been discussed in the literature as being frontable, it has been largely overlooked that fronted vPs typically come with a certain kind of post-fronting context and a rise-fall or bridge-contour intonation, which is characteristic of I-topicalization. We observe that, unlike VPs, agentive vPs essentially need to be I-topics, with a high tone at the right edge of the fronted domain, in order to be frontable. Given the special context required for fronted vPs, the situation described by the vP does not contain new information but must already have been under discussion and is now being commented on. We present the results of two experimental studies and appeal to the thetic/categorical distinction to offer a new angle on the definiteness effect that has been associated with fronted verb phrases. We propose that a subject-containing fronted vP is associated with a thetic rather than the default categorical judgment, which means that the fronted subject and predicate form only one information-structural unit (a topic) rather than two (topic and comment). Contributing to the literature on theticity, we observe that, unlike in non-fronting thetic statements, the subject in fronted vPs cannot be a true definite. We attribute this to clashing intonation restrictions on theticity in non-fronting constructions versus theticity in just the fronted portion of a sentence.


2020 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Ivan Stankovic ◽  
Milica Jesic

The right conal (conus) artery either presents as the first ventricular branch of the right coronary artery (RCA) or arises directly from the aorta, in which case, it is considered the third coronary artery (TCA). Morphometric characterization of this artery is important for interpretation of coronarography, surgical revascularization of myocardium and embryological interpretations. Eight out of 23 hearts presented the TCA (34.8%). The difference in the frequency of the TCA between the sexes was statistically insignificant (p>0.05). In all the specimens, the ostium of the TCA was to the left of and superior to the ostium of the RCA. The supernumerary (third) coronary artery formed Vieussens' arterial ring in 50% of the cases with the TCA, while the conal branch of the RCA formed the anastomosis with the conal branch at a higher frequency (63% of the cases). The ratio of external diameters of the RCA and TCA was 2.84 ±0.78, while the ratio of external diameters of the RCA and its conal branch was 2.61±0.74. The difference in the ratios was statistically insignificant (p>0.05). There were no findings indicating that the presence of the TCA could be detrimental or advantageous when compared to the classical coronary scheme (right and left coronary arteries originating from the aortic sinuses). Based solely on the TCA's morphological features, there is insufficient evidence to suggest that the presence of the TCA per se, is associated with a known clinical or disease state.


Author(s):  
Victor Tadros

This chapter partially defends the significance of intentions to permissibility against critics and explores some different views about their relevance by exploring a range of contexts in just war theory where views about the significance of intentions make a difference in our judgments about the permissibility of military action. It clarifies two components of the doctrine of double effect (DDE) and distinguishes different versions of it. It then compares the DDE with some competing explanations of the intuitive difference between terror bombing and tactical bombing, arguing that the DDE is an important component of the right overall view of the permissibility of killing in war.


Author(s):  
Alec D. Walen

Much contemporary just war theory is modeled on the theory of self-defense. The dominant account of rights used by people interested in the right of self-defense is doubly problematic: its internal tensions undermine the plausibility of the views people try to defend, and it is in some ways morally distorting. This book is primarily concerned with developing and then deploying a new account of rights, one that will put the discussion of the right to defend against threats on more solid footing. The introductory chapter covers four themes. First, to explain why the current state of just war theory calls for a new account of rights, the chapter traces a brief history of recent discussions of the right of self-defense. Second, the chapter describes when it is permissible to defend against threats. Third, it explains how this relates to current law and to other philosophical work on the topic. Finally, it sketches an outline of the rest of the book.


Land Law ◽  
2020 ◽  
pp. 317-339
Author(s):  
Ben McFarlane ◽  
Nicholas Hopkins ◽  
Sarah Nield

This chapter examines easements and how they relate to the content, acquisition and defences questions. Easement refers to the right of a landowner to enjoy a limited use of neighbouring land. An essential feature of an easement is the need for two pieces of land: the dominant land to which the benefit of the easement is attached and the servient land over which the easement is exercised. This chapter considers the four defining characteristics of an easement: there must be two distinct areas of land — dominant land and servient land; the dominant and servient land must be owned by different people; the easement must ‘accommodate’ the dominant land; and the right must be capable of forming the subject matter of a grant. It also discusses, in relation to the acquisition question, the express and implied creation of an easement, as well as the involuntary acquisition of an easement through prescription. It concludes by considering with the defences that can defeat an easement.


Utilitas ◽  
2012 ◽  
Vol 24 (2) ◽  
pp. 214-236 ◽  
Author(s):  
CÉCILE FABRE

In his recent bookKilling in War, McMahan develops a powerful argument for the view that soldiers on opposite sides of a conflict are not morally on a par once the war has started: whether they have the right to kill depends on the justness of their war. In line with just war theory in general, McMahan scrutinizes the ethics of killing the enemy. In this article, I accept McMahan's account, but bring it to bear on the entirely neglected, but nevertheless interesting, issue of what the military call ‘blue-on-blue’ killings or, as I refer to such acts here, internecine war killings. I focus on the case of the soldier who is ordered by his officer, at gunpoint, to go into action or to kill innocent civilians, and who kills his officer in self-defence. I argue that, at the bar of McMahan's account of the right to kill in self-defence, the officer lacks a justification for attacking the soldier as a means of enforcing his order, and the soldier thus sometimes (but not always) has the right to kill his officer should the latter so act.


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