The Post-Academic Trend in the Evolution of Methodological Consciousness

2021 ◽  
Vol 64 (5) ◽  
pp. 128-139
Author(s):  
Natalia K. Kisel
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Science ◽  
Functional Organization ◽  
Cognitive Activity ◽  
Academic Science ◽  
Individual Level ◽  
Cognitive Components ◽  
Social Physics ◽  
The One ◽  
The Individual ◽  
Levels Of Functioning

The development of science at all stages of its penetration into a technogenic society is accompanied by changes in methodological consciousness in its various incarnations. However, preferring to analyze the metamorphoses of science as special knowledge about the world, to examine the evolution of its methodological tools, forms of structural and functional organization of scientific and cognitive activity, at the same time, modern research practices leave aside the evolution of methodological consciousness as such. Although, according to the author, analysis of this phenomenon makes possible to define, if not a paradigmatic, then at least a syntagmatic approach to the study of modern post-academic science. The representation of methodological consciousness can be carried out in different versions. The article considers its evolution at various levels of functioning – individual and supra-individual, embodied in the methodological innovations of science itself as well as in the philosophical and methodological discourse interconnected with it. The assertion of unique forms of methodological consciousness at the supraindividual level, in particular, characterizes the development of modern social physics, which combines syntagmatics, inter- and transdisciplinarity as strategies of scientific search. The evolution of methodological consciousness at the individual level is inextricably linked with the renewal of the scientific habitus of individual scientists. In the context of the commercialization of post-academic science, destructive changes in the qualities of scientific creativity and scientific ethos undoubtedly affect the mental and cognitive components of the scientific habits of researchers. For the majority of the scientific community, the transformation of the scientific habitus proceeds spontaneously. Awareness of the uniqueness of post-academic science today occurs mainly within the framework of philosophical and methodological discourse. The result of this process is problematized by the author as a phenomenon of “post-academic philosophy of science,” characterized by a number of features of a substantive, methodological, and institutional nature. The question of its correlation with the traditional philosophy of science, on the one hand, and with disciplinary strategies in the study of science, on the other, opens up prospects for the emergence of new paradigms of modern philosophical and methodological discourse. 

Nominations, Ratings, and the Dimensions of Sociometric Status

1997 ◽  
Vol 21 (1) ◽  
pp. 179-199 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gerard H. Maassen ◽  
Jos L. van der Linden ◽  
Wies Akkermans
Keyword(s):  
Rating Scales ◽  
Rating Scale ◽  
Sociometric Status ◽  
Dimensional Model ◽  
One Dimensional ◽  
Individual Level ◽  
Research Designs ◽  
The One ◽  
The Individual ◽  
Group Member

In 1944, U. Bronfenbrenner remarked on the need for a two-dimensional model of sociometric status. The low value of the correlation between the variables liking and disliking-assumed basic dimensions of sociometric status-is often cited as evidence for the correctness of Bronfenbrenner’ssuggestion. Sociometric status is derived from a coalescence of judgements at the individual level. In this article we argue that score attribution at this level (where one group member assesses another) is one-dimensional along the liking-disliking continuum. Two-dimensionality of sociometric status arises at the group level. However, we also show that at this level liking and disliking are not two distinct dimensions, but the poles of just one, the other being visibility (or impact). If the one-dimensional model of liking score attribution on the individual level is accepted, the obvious thing to do is to instruct respondents accordingly. Rating scales are suitable for this. The rating-scale methods we suggested in previous publications (e.g. Maassen, Akkermans, & van der Linden, 1996) are in keeping with this argument. Moreover, these methods may be recommended for their reliability, validity and for the variety of research designs to which they can be applied.

Divinatory failure: the religious and social role of Gisu diviners

Africa ◽  
1991 ◽  
Vol 61 (3) ◽  
pp. 299-317 ◽  
Author(s):  
Suzette Heald
Keyword(s):  
Social Relationships ◽  
Social Role ◽  
Belief Systems ◽  
The Other ◽  
Diagnostic Systems ◽  
Individual Level ◽  
Social Invisibility ◽  
The One ◽  
The Individual

AbstractThe literature has tended to deal with diviners only where they have been seen to play a notable role in the transformation of social relationships. This leads us to overlook their relative social invisibility in many African societies. Yet we may gain insight into the rise of prophets and charismatic healers by looking at the other side of this story in the multitude of very humble practitioners plying their trade. This is the context in which this article explores the role of diviners among the Gisu of Uganda.The privacy of consultation, the search for distant diviners, the way they are approached only at times of crisis and as agents of private counteraction or vengeance, go some way towards explaining why it is difficult for diviners to gain recognition. Added to which are the difficulties of another order which relate to what might here be regarded as divinatory success. For divination may be seen to fail at a number of different levels: in the lack of credibility of a given practitioner, i n a lack of unanimity among those consulted and in the multiplicity of causal agents evoked.An argument put forward here is that scepticism is endemic to the system and, possibly, distinctive to it. We should ask not, as Evans-Pritchard did, how belief i s sustained despite the presence of scepticism but what it is about these beliefs which encourages scepticism. It is not useful to explore this issue in terms of the rationality question or the ‘truth’ of belief systems. If we are to draw a comparison with modern attitudes, of greater significance are the organisation and differentiation of knowledge and its relationship to power. It is suggested that diagnostic systems used by societies such as the Gisu encourage an agnostic attitude in a way i n which those of the modern West do not.In the final part of the article the social role of divination is reconsidered and some of the positive functions proposed for it are questioned. Gisu divination can be seen to have evolved into a very narrow niche whose parameters are bound, on the one hand, by the limits of belief and, on the other, by a system of interpersonal vengeance. We may say that the socially marginal attributes of diviners, exclusively concerned with the negative aspects of social relationships, represent a real social marginality. At best they are agents by which the individual may be reconciled with harshnesses imposed by his own destiny, of ancestral affliction; at worst they are agents of individual vengeance and retribution. This may be taken as more or less disqualifying them from articulating a positive, future-oriented vision on behalf of the community. Clearly it is not impossible but it is a huge jump from these humble practitioners, interpreting the present in terms of the past and trading evil with evil at an individual level, to prophets capable of formulating a positive social vision, a means forward, on behalf of a wider moral or social community.

scholarly journals Do shared values promote social cohesion? If so, which? Evidence from Denmark

2017 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 97-118 ◽  
Author(s):  
Karen N. Breidahl ◽  
Nils Holtug ◽  
Kristian Kongshøj
Keyword(s):  
Social Cohesion ◽  
Shared Values ◽  
Social Scientists ◽  
Individual Level ◽  
Community Values ◽  
Liberal Nationalism ◽  
National Values ◽  
Liberal Citizenship ◽  
The One ◽  
The Individual

Social scientists and political theorists often claim that shared values are conducive to social cohesion, and trust and solidarity in particular. Furthermore, this idea is at the heart of what has been labeled the ‘national identity argument’, according to which religious and/or cultural diversity is a threat to the shared (national) values underpinning social cohesion and redistributive justice. However, there is no consensus among political theorists about what values we need to share to foster social cohesion and indeed, for example, nationalists, liberals, and multiculturalists provide different answers to this question. On the basis of a survey conducted in Denmark in 2014, this study empirically investigates the relation between, on the one hand, commitments to the community values of respectively conservative nationalism, liberal nationalism, liberal citizenship, and multiculturalism, and on the other, trust and solidarity. First, we investigate in what ways commitments to these four sets of values are correlated to trust and solidarity at the individual level and, then, whether the belief that others share one’s values is correlated to these aspects of social cohesion for individuals committed to these four sets of values. We find that conservative and liberal nationalism are negatively correlated to our different measures of trust and solidarity, whereas liberal citizenship and (in particular) multiculturalism are positively correlated. In broad terms, this picture remains when we control for a number of socio-economic factors and ideology (on a left-right scale). Finally, individuals who believe that others share their values do not, in general, have higher levels of trust and solidarity. Rather, this belief works in different ways when associated with different sets of community values.

Some Remarks on the Logic of Explanation in the Social Sciences

1970 ◽  
Vol 4 ◽  
pp. 64-81
Author(s):  
Albrecht Wellmer
Keyword(s):  
Social Sciences ◽  
Philosophy Of Science ◽  
Scientific Explanation ◽  
The Other ◽  
Analytical Philosophy ◽  
Practical Consequence ◽  
The Social ◽  
History Of ◽  
The One ◽  
The Individual

If one were to write a history of the philosophy of science in the spirit of T. S. Kuhn, one would have to consider the model of scientific explanation which Popper proposed and Hempel and Oppenheim developed to be one of the great paradigms of contemporary analytical philosophy of science. This analogue to the historically important paradigms of the individual sciences seems to me to be justifiable for the following reasons: first, the Hempel—Oppenheim model (or HO-model, as I shall call it) claims universal methodological validity; second, discussions on the problem of explanation have centred on this model for some time; third, the recent cognitive progress in this field has been largely the result of the interrelation between criticism of this model on the one hand and its improvement and explication on the other hand; and lastly, this model stands for a particular comprehension of the problems and possibilities of science, a concept of quite important practical consequence.

Group Belief

2021 ◽  
Vol 58 (1) ◽  
pp. 82-93
Author(s):  
Domingos Faria ◽  
Keyword(s):  
The Other ◽  
Group Level ◽  
Individual Level ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
Group Belief ◽  
Level I ◽  
The One ◽  
The Individual ◽  
Group Acceptance

Beliefs are commonly attributed to groups or collective entities. But what is the nature of group belief? Summativism and nonsummativism are two main rival views regarding the nature of group belief. On the one hand, summativism holds that, necessarily, a group g has a belief B only if at least one individual i is both a member of g and has B. On the other hand, non-summativism holds that it is possible for a group g to have a belief B even if no member of g has B. My aim in this paper is to consider whether divergence arguments for non-summativism and against summativism about group belief are sound. Such divergence arguments aim to show that there can be a divergence between belief at the group level and the corresponding belief at the individual level. I will argue that these divergence arguments do not decisively defeat a minimal version of summativism. In order to accomplish this goal, I have the following plan: In section 2, I will analyze the structure of two important counterexamples against the summativist view, which are based on divergence arguments. Such counterexamples are based on the idea that a group decides to adopt a particular group belief, even if none of its members holds the belief in question. However, in section 3, I will show that these counterexamples fail, because they can be explained without the need to posit group beliefs. More specifically, I argue that in these apparent counterexamples, we have only a ‘group acceptance’ phenomenon and not a ‘group belief’ phenomenon. For this conclusion, I advance two arguments: in subsection 3.1, I formulate an argument from doxastic involuntarism, and in subsection 3.2, I develop an argument from truth connection. Thus, summativism is not defeated by divergence arguments. Lastly, in section 4, I will conclude with some advantages of summativism.

What Does It Mean Philosophy of the Collective Science?

2020 ◽  
pp. 115-123
Author(s):  
Alexander A. Krushanov ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Science ◽  
Special Section ◽  
Cognitive Activity ◽  
Modern Science ◽  
Scientific Work ◽  
Scientific Activity ◽  
Research Teams ◽  
Language Of Science ◽  
The Individual ◽  
Population Effects

One of the most important tasks which the philosophy of science faces today is the comprehension and methodological regulation of new forms of collective scientific work that are emerging today. The solution to this problem presup­poses, in turn, a rethinking of traditional epistemological ideas about cognitive activity, and above all, the idea of its subject. The interpretation of the cognition subject as a cognitive robinson needs to be rethought. For this purpose, the author believes, the philosophy of science should turn to the analysis of the peculiar population effects arising in modern scientific communities. Moreover, in the au­thor's opinion, for a more effective implementation of this analysis, it should be extracted into a special section of the philosophy of science – the philosophy of collective science – which focuses on features of scientific research within the framework of collaboration – cooperation, rather than on the individual cre­ative activity of scientists. Today the research in this direction develops inten­sively. Both foreign (among whom I would like to note the works of P. Galison) and domestic researchers (I. Kasavin, V. Pronskikh, B. Pruzhinin) are working in this direction today. To the population effects requiring a special philosophical and methodological analysis the author refers: difficulties in developing a profes­sional language of science for the scientific community which performs collec­tive research; the existence of the phenomenon of fashionable scientific direction that deforms cognition; phenomena associated with the exchange of information using scientific messages. The article also touches on the issue of analyzing the structure of the collective subject of cognition. Research teams as subsystems of a collective subject are divided into: structural research teams and informal research teams. All these phenomena reveal themselves in many areas of modern science. But they are especially vividly observed within the framework of the so-called Big Science (megascience). The article also attempts to show that three different types of “collectivity” of scientific activity can be distinguished in col­lective science.

Young and Temporary: Youth Employment Insecurity and Support for Right-Wing Populist Parties in Europe

2019 ◽  
pp. 1-22 ◽  
Author(s):  
Piotr Zagórski ◽  
Jose Rama ◽  
Guillermo Cordero
Keyword(s):  
Job Insecurity ◽  
Right Wing ◽  
Individual Level ◽  
The Great Recession ◽  
Employment Insecurity ◽  
Recent Success ◽  
Youth Labour Market ◽  
The One ◽  
The Individual ◽  
The Impact

AbstractThe recent success of right-wing populist parties (RPPs) in Europe has given rise to different explanations. Economic factors have proven to be significant mainly at the aggregate level. As for the individual level, it has been argued that the so-called ‘losers of globalization’ – the less educated and less skilled, profiles with higher job insecurity – are more likely to support RPPs. Nevertheless, RPPs perform strikingly well in countries less affected by the Great Recession, gathering high levels of support among profiles not considered the losers of globalization. Moreover, the effect of age on support for RPPs is not clear, as, on the one hand, the young are better educated and skilled, but, on the other, they suffered the effects of the economic crisis more. To address this puzzle, we focus on the impact of unemployment and employment insecurity among the youth on voting for RPPs in 17 European countries. We find that youth support for RPPs can be explained by the precariousness of the youth labour market.

scholarly journals Sustainable Social and Individual Implications of Telework: A New Insight into the Romanian Labor Market

2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (13) ◽  
pp. 3506 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alina-Mihaela Dima ◽  
Claudia-Elena Țuclea ◽  
Diana-Maria Vrânceanu ◽  
Gabriela Țigu
Keyword(s):  
Latent Variables ◽  
Structural Equation ◽  
Local Community ◽  
Management Strategies ◽  
Work Force ◽  
Individual Level ◽  
Study Results ◽  
Managerial Implications ◽  
The One ◽  
The Individual

This research aims to evaluate the individual and social implications of telework, along with the foreseeable permanent result that could be generated. Consistent with this objective, a survey has been carried out on a sample of 1180 Romanian employees, on which a model has been developed, based on structural equation modelling. The model includes five latent variables, on the one hand targeting telework features and on the other hand, its possible effects on individuals and society. At an individual level, the study results emphasize that telework could contribute to a better work–life balance and could also help teleworkers to develop specific teleworking abilities. At a social level, telework could generate sustainable effects targeting the long-term management of the work force and providing solutions to potential problems at local community levels. The managerial implications of this study are directed toward the need to implement a series of sustainable human resource management strategies and efficient employee training and development programs. Moreover, organizations need to be more proactive in assuming corporate social responsibilities.

Some Remarks on the Logic of Explanation in the Social Sciences

1970 ◽  
Vol 4 ◽  
pp. 64-81
Author(s):  
Albrecht Wellmer
Keyword(s):  
Social Sciences ◽  
Philosophy Of Science ◽  
Scientific Explanation ◽  
The Other ◽  
Analytical Philosophy ◽  
Practical Consequence ◽  
The Social ◽  
History Of ◽  
The One ◽  
The Individual

If one were to write a history of the philosophy of science in the spirit of T. S. Kuhn, one would have to consider the model of scientific explanation which Popper proposed and Hempel and Oppenheim developed to be one of the great paradigms of contemporary analytical philosophy of science. This analogue to the historically important paradigms of the individual sciences seems to me to be justifiable for the following reasons: first, the Hempel—Oppenheim model (or HO-model, as I shall call it) claims universal methodological validity; second, discussions on the problem of explanation have centred on this model for some time; third, the recent cognitive progress in this field has been largely the result of the interrelation between criticism of this model on the one hand and its improvement and explication on the other hand; and lastly, this model stands for a particular comprehension of the problems and possibilities of science, a concept of quite important practical consequence.

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