scholarly journals Mad Marx? Rethinking Emotions, Euroscepticism and Nationalism in the Populist Left

2021 ◽  
Vol 17 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Emmy Eklundh

Much attention has been devoted to how right-wing populists in Europe challenge the consensus on the benefits of European integration, but left-wing resistance to the EU is less discussed. Existing analyses tend to distinguish between three constructions of political community: a postnational EU, the populist right invoking national sovereignty, and the populist left invoking popular sovereignty. However, empirical analyses struggle to find consensus on how left populists relate to the EU, and if they invoke claims to national or popular sovereignty. This article argues that this empirical impasse stems from that populism and Euroscepticism are performative categories and not simply analytical tools, and serve to produce exclusion. There are two dichotomies in this exclusionary frame: emotional populists/rational EU, and the postnational EU/nationalist populists. Through an analysis of Podemos in Spain and the UK Labour Party under Jeremy Corbyn, I show how the lines between the postnational EU, the national sovereign, and the popular sovereign are frailer than previously thought. The article concludes that these categories are less analytically astute than they are politically motivated, and analyses of the populist left in Europe must consider the performative dimension of its key terms.

2021 ◽  
pp. 99-125
Author(s):  
Kent Jones

This chapter discusses the role Europe’s long history of conflict over geography, religion, and national identity, as well as its aristocratic traditions, on modern European populism. The Brexit referendum gave direct electoral voice to the accumulated resentments of populist forces in the United Kingdom against EU rules administered by what its supporters regarded as an elite bureaucracy in Brussels. Their concerns, mainly over budgetary and regulatory issues, overrode the prospect of losing trade benefits from the EU single market. Elsewhere in the European Union populist parties continue to be active, and many of them are Euroskeptic, based largely on immigration and monetary issues. Many right-wing and left-wing populist parties in particular tend to favor protectionism, but will not be in a position to challenge centralized EU trade policy until they gain power in large EU countries. The UK exit from the European Union will weaken a prominent pro-trade voice in the EU Council of Ministers.


2020 ◽  
pp. 101-118
Author(s):  
Filip Ilkowski

The article presents the analysis of activities and ideological motivations of politicians and political formations connected to those parts of non-Labour British left, that appealed during the 2016 referendum to vote for leaving the European Union by the United Kingdom. It points to key ideological pillars of this heterogenic political milieu with its common and divergent elements. The thesis is put forward in the text that, as in the case of Labour politicians, also among the left-wing outside the Labour Party, we can point to two ideological and political poles that decide to opt for leaving the EU by the UK: socialist universalism and national-identity particularism. Their key determinant was the views on immigration control, also affecting their attitude to cooperation with the anti-EU right-wing political milieu.


Author(s):  
David Denver ◽  
Mark Garnett

The years immediately after the 2015 general election were dominated by another vote, held in 2016. In 2013, the electoral challenge from UKIP had forced David Cameron to promise an in–out referendum on the EU should his party win the next general election. Cameron fulfilled his promise, after negotiations with the EU which only partially addressed the grievances of Eurosceptics in UKIP and within his own party. The chapter discusses the narrow victory for ‘Leave’ in the 2016 referendum, arising from divisions within the UK which cut across previous party allegiances and introduced a new element of volatility in an electorate which was already barely recognizable from that of 1964. The situation was complicated further by the election of the radical left-wing MP Jeremy Corbyn as Labour leader after his party’s 2015 defeat. By contrast, when David Cameron resigned as Conservative leader and Prime Minister after the referendum he was succeeded by Theresa May, who was regarded as a pragmatic centre-right politician who could negotiate a compromise ‘Brexit’ deal with the EU. The chapter examines May’s failure to carry out this promise, marked in particular by her inept attempt to secure a convincing parliamentary majority in the 2017 general election. When May was forced from office in 2019 she was succeeded by Boris Johnson, a far more controversial and divisive character who nevertheless was able to lead the Conservatives to a comfortable electoral victory, not least because their pro-European opponents were hopelessly divided. However, the victorious Conservatives had no reason to feel complacent; even if Johnson’s government could deliver the favourable Brexit deal which it had promised, over the years since 1964 the British electorate had become far more fickle and parties were increasingly vulnerable to events outside their control. Within a few months of the 2019 election, party competition in Britain, which had seemed so stable back in 1964, was exposed to a new and deadly source of disturbance—the outbreak in China of the Covid-19 virus—which presented the most serious challenge faced by any UK government since 1945.


2021 ◽  
pp. 095892872110230
Author(s):  
Gianna Maria Eick ◽  
Christian Albrekt Larsen

The article theorises how covering social risks through cash transfers and in-kind services shapes public attitudes towards including/excluding immigrants from these programmes in Western European destination countries. The argument is that public attitudes are more restrictive of granting immigrants access to benefits than to services. This hypothesis is tested across ten social protection programmes using original survey data collected in Denmark, Germany and the UK in 2019. Across the three countries, representing respectively a social democratic, conservative and liberal welfare regime context, the article finds that the public does indeed have a preference for easier access for in-kind services than for cash benefits. The article also finds these results to be stable across programmes covering the same social risks; the examples are child benefits and childcare. The results are even stable across left-wing, mainstream and radical right-wing voters; with the partial exception of radical right-wing voters in the UK. Finally, the article finds only a moderate association between individual characteristics and attitudinal variation across cash benefits and in-kind services.


2017 ◽  
Vol 1 (100) ◽  
pp. 1139
Author(s):  
Antonio Carlos Pereira Menaut

Resumen:En conjunto puede decirse que tanto la UE como la Constitución española de 1978 han sido grandes éxitos que ahora celebran sus aniversarios, pero ambas tienen problemas que deben ser resueltos. En el caso de la UE, parece haber un puñado de defectos estructurales difíciles de eliminar y que dificultan mucho solucionar el déficit democrático y la plena constitucionalización de la Unión. Los mismos defectos estructurales plantean la cuestión de hasta dónde puede llegar la integración europea, manteniendo, al mismo tiempo, la integridad constitucional española, o al menos no amenazándola. Nos inclinamos por abandonar el método funcionalista, pasar a un tipo de gobierno plenamente político y constitucional, y encaminarnos hacia un federalismo pluralista, más bien dual y del tipo del americano.Summary:I. By way of an introduction. II. Some points to start with. III. On federalism, once again. IV. Has european constitutionalism some structural failures? A. Constitutionalism and the functionalist method. B. The impact of the insufficient EU democracy on Spanish constitutionalism. C. Is the EU a pluralistic, multilevel political community composed of smaller, yet real, political communities? D. Globalisation, European constitutionalism, and Spanish constitutionalism. V. How much European integration is the Spanish constitution apt to admit of?Abstract:On the whole, one may safely say that both the EU and the 1978 Spanish Constitution have been runaway successes that are now about celebrating their anniversaries, yet both have problems that should be addressed to. In the case of the EU, there seems to exist a handful of structural failures that are not easy to remove and make very difficult to cope with the democratic deficit and the full constitutionalising of the Union. The same inbuilt failures pose the question of how far may European integration go while at the same time maintaining, or not menacing, the integrity of the Spanish Constitution. Our leanings go towards abandoning the functionalist method, embracing a fully political, constitutional rule, and making for a pluralistic, rather dual, American-like, kind of federalism.


2021 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 75
Author(s):  
Stephen Trinder

As a master’s and Ph.D. student at Anglia Ruskin University in 2011, I recall the central message in lectures given by my eventual Ph.D. supervisor Professor Guido Rings was that we cannot underestimate the enduring strength of the legacy of colonialism in Europe and its influence on shaping contemporary attitudes towards immigration. Indeed, as I was completing my studies, I became increasingly aware of the negative rhetoric towards migrants in politics and right-wing press. In an attempt to placate the far-right of his party and address a growing threat from the UK Independence Party (UKIP), a discourse of ‘othernising’ migrants on the basis of their supposed rejection of ‘Britishness’ from former UK Prime Minister David Cameron in particular caught my attention. The result of this was tightening of immigration regulations, which culminated of course in the now-infamous Brexit vote of 2016. Almost a decade after my graduation, Professor Rings is currently Vice Chair for the Research Executive Agency of the European Commission and continues to work at Anglia Ruskin University at the level of Ph.D. supervisor. He still publishes widely in the field of Migration Studies and his recent high-profile book The Other in Contemporary Migrant Cinema (Routledge, 2016) and editorships in the fields of culture and identity (iMex Interdisciplinario Mexico) argue for increased intercultural solidarity in Europe as well as a strengthening of supranational organizations like the EU and the UN to offset growing nationalism. I got in touch with Professor Rings to find out where he feels Europe stands today with regard to migration and get his comments on the continued rise of nationalism on the continent.


2018 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 103-122 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tomasz Kubin

The exit of the United Kingdom from the European Union (so-called Brexit) is one of the most important events in the process of European integration. It has a lot of extremely remarkable implications – both for the EU and for the United Kingdom. Among other, Brexit will affect the security of the United Kingdom and the EU. The aim of the study is to answer the research question: how will Britain’s exit from the EU influence the EU common security and defence policy? In order to answer this question, the factors that are most relevant to the United Kingdom’s significance for the EU’s security and defence policy will be identified. This will show how the EU’s potential of the security and defence policy will change, when the UK leaves this organisation. The most important conclusions are included in the summary.


2020 ◽  
pp. 019145372091045
Author(s):  
Victor Kempf

This article explores the possibility of a notion of left-wing populism that is conceptually opposed to the identitarian logic of embodiment that characterises right-populist interpellations of ‘the people’. In the first part, I will demonstrate, that in Laclau’s constructivist approach, any populist embodiment of the people actually has a partial, subaltern and performative origin. On this basis, it becomes possible to distinguish between a radical-democratic version of the people that is self-reflexively aware of this origin and a regressive and reified one that ideologically betrays and negates its own subaltern tradition of democratic struggle by proclaiming to embody a positive, pre-established substance of ‘rooted’, ‘well-born’ community. In the second part of the article, I will focus on this self-negation as a starting point for an immanent critique of right-wing populism. Such an immanent critique is promising, because it could overcome the shortcomings of decisionism and moralism that limit the contemporary critique of right-wing populism. However, it remains still an open question how to defend and define a negativist truth of political community and subjectivation that is necessary for developing such a left-Hegelian critique of regressive and reified notions of ‘the people’.


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