scholarly journals Turkey’s Game Plan in Northern Syria and its Implications for the EU

2021 ◽  
Vol 7 (4) ◽  
pp. 233-252
Author(s):  
Zafer Kizilkaya ◽  
Sofie Hamdi ◽  
Mohammad Salman

Throughout the civil war, the Syrian opposition has been politically and militarily supported by several countries. At present, with its boots on the ground, Turkey is the main backer of the armed opposition in northern Syria. In the region, Ankara envisions a long-term presence which is characterized by a continuous control along the M-4 highway from Idlib in the west to the Iraqi border in the east. This will depend, however, on Turkey’s negotiations with Russia and its relations with the US. Meanwhile, the EU has limited its engagement with Ankara, by mainly focusing on the refugee crisis. Yet, divergent views and contesting interests are hindering an effective cooperation between the two on the Syrian “dossier”. In light of this, this paper argues that the EU should broaden its perspectives, while establishing permanent contact with Turkey. This necessitates the continuation of the EU’s financial support given to Ankara to host refugees; the backing of Turkey in maintaining a frozen conflict situation in Idlib; the increasement of diplomatic engagement in the provision of humanitarian aid; the backing of any effort that aims at ending the hostilities and establishing ceasefires; and the showing of empathy towards Turkish concerns on border security and terrorism. Keywords: Syrian crisis, Turkey, European Union, Northern Syria, humanitarian aid

European View ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 17 (1) ◽  
pp. 52-57
Author(s):  
Manfred Weber

The EU has a fundamental interest in having a constructive relationship with Turkey. However, the EU–Turkey relationship has become strained over recent years. This is why EU–Turkey relations need a new start, based on honesty about the long-term goal: EU membership is not an option for Turkey. Instead, the EU and Turkey should focus on concrete fields of cooperation. Humanitarian aid in the refugee crisis is a good example of a field in which a joint solution has been successful, as is the protection of the common external border. More joint action from the EU and Turkey is needed as regards the situation in Syria and Iraq. Turkey must overcome its democratic shortcomings. Further economic cooperation will depend on the application of the rule of law in Turkey.


2014 ◽  
pp. 13-29 ◽  
Author(s):  
S. Glazyev

This article examines fundamental questions of monetary policy in the context of challenges to the national security of Russia in connection with the imposition of economic sanctions by the US and the EU. It is proved that the policy of the Russian monetary authorities, particularly the Central Bank, artificially limiting the money supply in the domestic market and pandering to the export of capital, compounds the effects of economic sanctions and plunges the economy into depression. The article presents practical advice on the transition from external to domestic sources of long-term credit with the simultaneous adoption of measures to prevent capital flight.


2020 ◽  
pp. 182-200
Author(s):  
Bo Stråth

This chapter outlines changing relationships between Scandinavia and Europe. The Scandinavian ‘isolationist’ approach to Europe after the Napoleonic wars shifted to more active integrationist policies in the 1920s, with the arrival of left governments and the acceptance of the League of Nations; a new isolationist trend (‘neutrality’) set in after 1933. Against the backdrop of this long-term pattern, the focus is on shifting Scandinavian attitudes to the project of European integration and on attempts to be both within and outside Europe. Before and after the Danish entry into the EU in 1973, tensions between different approaches and between the countries concerned have been evident. The Cold War was a major factor, and its end reinforced the pro-integration approach. More recently, problems with the euro and the refugee crisis have provoked more ambiguous responses, but less so in Finland than in the Scandinavian countries.


2018 ◽  
Vol 18 (3) ◽  
pp. 431-449 ◽  
Author(s):  
STEPHANIE BRUNELIN ◽  
JAIME DE MELO ◽  
ALBERTO PORTUGAL-PEREZ

AbstractThe value of preferential market access schemes has fallen sharply. Drawing on a relaxation announcement of July 2016 simplifying origin requirements for access to the EU that should help improve market access, thereby contributing to alleviate the refugee crisis in Jordan, this paper argues that a simplification of origin requirements is a straightforward way to enhance preferential market access. Yet, the EU decision limits the beneficiaries who must be located in designated special economic zones, which limits preferential market access. The paper compares the performance of Jordanian exports to the EU and the US under their respective FTAs. It shows that Jordanian exports to the US have grown more rapidly than exports to the EU over the last 15 years. The study documents lower utilisation of preferences in the EU than in the US, especially in Textiles and Apparel (T&A) in spite of non-negligible preferences. Three contributing factors are identified: (i) higher adjusted preferences for apparel in the US than in the EU; (ii) greater competition from other suppliers (mostly from LDCs) in the EU market than in the US market; (iii) simpler origin requirements in the case of the Jordan–US FTA. Comparative evidence from the two FTAs and econometric estimates suggest that this should help restore market access for Jordanian exports to the EU. These estimates provide additional evidence that origin requirements suppress market access. Other pathways to simplify origin requirements are offered in the conclusion.


Subject Populists' exploitation of the refugee crisis in Central Europe. Significance Support for populist parties has risen after last year's refugee crisis across the EU, but nowhere have they been as successful as in Central Europe (CE). Peddling migrant fears has secured the re-election of Robert Fico's Smer (Slovakia) and the revival of Viktor Orban's Fidesz (Hungary) from a post-election popularity slump. On the back of the migration tide, populists are transforming CE's political trajectory. Impacts A united CE front will gain prominence at the EU, stoking tensions with Berlin on migration policy and the future of EU integration. The strengthened legitimacy of illiberal positions on migration will foster the emergence of imitators elsewhere in Europe. The chance of an EU-level, long-term solution to the refugee crisis will remain slim in the medium term.


2015 ◽  
Vol 59 (11) ◽  
pp. 38-46
Author(s):  
A. Kokeev

Relations between Germany, the US and NATO today are the core of transatlantic links. After the Cold War and the reunification of Germany, NATO has lost its former importance to Germany which was not a "frontline state" anymore. The EU acquired a greater importance for German politicians applying both for certain political independence and for establishing of a broad partnership with Russia and China. The task of the European Union Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) development has been regarded by Berlin as a necessary component of the NATO's transformation into a “balanced Euro-American alliance”, and the realization of this project as the most important prerequisite for a more independent foreign policy. Germany’s refusal to support the US invasion of Iraq in 2003 led to the first serious crisis in US Germany relations. At the same time, there was no radical break of the deeply rooted Atlanticism tradition in German policy. It was Angela Merkel as a new head of the German government (2005) who managed to smooth largely disagreements in relations with the United States. Atlanticism remains one of the fundamental foreign policy elements for any German government, mostly because Berlin’s hope for deepening of the European integration and transition to the EU CFSP seems unrealistic in the foreseeable future. However, there is still a fundamental basis of disagreements emerged in the transatlantic relationship (reduction of a military threat weakening Berlin’s dependence from Washington, and the growing influence of Germany in the European Union). According to the federal government's opinion, Germany's contribution to the NATO military component should not be in increasing, but in optimizing of military expenses. However, taking into account the incipient signs of the crisis overcoming in the EU, and still a tough situation around Ukraine, it seems that in the medium-term perspective one should expect further enhancing of Germany’s participation in NATO military activities and, therefore, a growth in its military expenses. In Berlin, there is a wide support for the idea of the European army. However, most experts agree that it can be implemented only when the EU develops the Common Foreign and Defense Policy to a certain extent. The US Germany espionage scandals following one after another since 2013 have seriously undermined the traditional German trust to the United States as a reliable partner. However, under the impact of the Ukrainian conflict, the value of military-political dimension of Germany’s transatlantic relations and its dependence on the US and NATO security guarantees increased. At the same time, Washington expects from Berlin as a recognized European leader a more active policy toward Russia and in respect of some other international issues. In the current international political situation, the desire to expand political influence in the world and achieve a greater autonomy claimed by German leaders seems to Berlin only possible in the context of transatlantic relations strengthening and solidarity within the NATO the only military-political organization of the West which is able to ensure the collective defense for its members against the external threats. However, it is important to take into consideration that not only the value of the United States and NATO for Germany, but also the role of Germany in the North Atlantic Alliance as a “representative of European interests” has increased. The role of Germany as a mediator in establishing the West–Russia relations remains equally important.


European View ◽  
2021 ◽  
pp. 178168582110056
Author(s):  
Maria Snegovaya

The regime that has emerged in Russia under President Vladimir Putin is no longer only Russia’s problem. By promoting corruption, kleptocratic practices and the violation of democratic norms in Western societies, and by using chemical weapons on their territories and carrying out assassinations abroad, Putin’s regime has become a significant domestic problem for the EU and the US. However, the preventative measures put in place by the West fall short of fundamentally influencing the regime’s behaviour. This article offers some suggestions on how to adjust existing European policy to enable it to more effectively influence the actions of the Kremlin on the international stage.


2015 ◽  
Vol 62 (3) ◽  
pp. 291-311
Author(s):  
Lucian Croitoru

Abstract In this study, we analyse the factors that have led to the fall of real interest rates on the long term. We show that this tendency, i.e. the fall in real interest rates, which began three decades ago in developed countries is well explained by the emergence and growth of the global saving glut. We formulate the hypothesis according to which the increase in the global excess saving is mostly the result of a process whereby countries place themselves on a secondary position vis-à-vis the US (i.e. secondarity) with regard to taking and managing risks which occur after a crisis. The ensuing peculiarity of global excess saving is that it is generated in an increasing number of countries or economic areas, with the overwhelming part located in a few of them, while the overwhelming part of the global deficit of savings is located in the US. Secondarity is caused both by governments, which have sought to move to excess saving, as was the case of Asian countries (Bernanke, 2005), or to capping budget deficits, as it happened in the Eurozone and in the EU, and by the free choice of every economic agent in the private sector. Secondarity represents a major cause for a vicious circle in which the decline in interest rates to ever lower levels has led to the emergence of financial bubbles, whose bursting requires the further reduction of interest rates, thus generating new bubbles and so on and so forth. Misinterpreted in real time as the “Great Moderation”, this vicious circle went unobserved.


2015 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 14-25 ◽  
Author(s):  
Carolina Vendil Pallin

Abstract Events in Ukraine have made many re-evaluate their view of Russia and suggest new approaches. While there are good reasons to do so, there is also every reason to revisit some old lessons and draw the right conclusions from events further back in time than the annexation of Crimea. First, Russian domestic politics will continue to play a prominent role in deciding Russia’s room for manoeuvre in its security policy. Second, change can only come from within Russia - the West (mainly the US and Europe) will be able to influence events only on the margins and perhaps not always receiving the intended response. Finally, and perhaps at first a bit paradoxically taking the first two points in view, what the West does will matter. It will matter because it will influence developments inside Russia in a long-term perspective if there is an alternative model. But even more importantly, what the West does will decide what position it finds itself in when Russia does change.


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