scholarly journals What drives support for QAnon? Evidence from a survey experiment

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jack Thompson ◽  
Sierra Davis

A growing body of research examines the extent of public support for QAnon — a conspiracy theory which purports that a cabal of Satan worshiping pedophiles is running a global child sex-trafficking ring and plotting against President Trump. However, little is known about the concomitants of support for QAnon as well as what informational cues may weaken support for the conspiracy. In this paper, we address this important gap by using original data from a nationally representative survey in addition to an embedded experiment. The results reveal that exposure to information about racist and anti-Semitic online QAnon content weakens support for QAnon,while learning about the representation of QAnon beliefs in Congress increases support for the conspiracy (though these effects diminish with the addition of a competing frame). We also find that exposure to information about the origins of QAnon, as well as the many incorrect ”Q” predictions does not shape support for QAnon. We conclude that drawing attention to the virulently racist and anti-Semitic dimensions of QAnon adherence may provide the best approach to weaken support for the conspiracy theory

2018 ◽  
Vol 5 (3) ◽  
pp. 205316801879435 ◽  
Author(s):  
Haifeng Huang ◽  
Xinsheng Liu

How is citizens’ factual historical knowledge related to their national identity? With original data from a nationally representative survey experiment in China, we find that significantly more Chinese citizens overestimate rather than underestimate China’s objective historical achievements, and those who overestimate the achievements of ancient Chinese civilization have higher levels of national identity. To an even greater degree, citizens who underestimate Chinese historical achievements have lower levels of national identity. We also find that correcting misinformation can potentially affect individuals’ national identity, although the effects did not reach statistical significance, likely because the survey experiment was under-powered for interaction effects, and because our information treatment was brief and on a very limited number of questions. These findings shed light on the subtle relationships between historical knowledge, propaganda, and national identity, and suggest avenues for future research.


Author(s):  
Thomas Gift ◽  
Carlos X. Lastra-Anadón

Abstract Foreign students are one of the most significant immigrant categories in many North American and Western European countries. Yet, as their numbers have swelled, many governments have experienced increasing pressures to cap their entry. This is true despite the sizable benefits that foreign students bring to host countries, and despite standard political economy concerns about immigrants—that they take away jobs or abuse public entitlements—not applying to foreign students. We field a nationally-representative survey experiment in the UK, one of the top destinations for foreign students, to examine potential activators of public support for capping the number of foreign students. Results show that support for caps is most activated when citizens are primed to think about foreign students competing with domestic students for scarce admissions slots at universities.


2018 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 121-147
Author(s):  
Alexander W. Severson

AbstractIdeologically impure candidates—RINOs and DINOs—risk losing the endorsement of their fellow copartisans. However, which copartisans? In this article, I assess how party affiliation and the strength of partisan affiliation condition the evaluation of ideologically impure, non-prototypical candidates. Using a nationally representative survey experiment, I present evidence that while partisans negatively evaluate non-prototypical copartisans, there is not a consistent relationship between strength of identification and the degree of punitiveness. Moreover, candidate non-prototypicality causes convergence in candidate support between Republicans and Democrats. My results provide evidence that nominal partisan affiliation is by itself insufficient to save an ideologically non-prototypical candidate from the rebuke of fellow copartisans and thus that the “in-name-only” charge holds some weight.


2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (3) ◽  
pp. 252-276
Author(s):  
Ana María Montoya ◽  
Juan Tellez

Efforts to end civil wars via negotiations often generate sharp divisions in public opinion. A large, quantitative literature has found evidence for numerous variables serving as potential drivers of public support of and opposition to conflict negotiations. Yet the formation of policy preferences is a complex process, and while many factors might make small contributions to an individual’s conflict termination preferences, we lack a sense of which factors matter most or how to adjudicate among competing explanations. In this article, we leverage a large amount of nationally representative survey data from Colombia (2004–2015) and use machine learning tools to systematically explore which variables are the strongest predictors of public support for negotiations with Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC). We find that certain aspects of conflict exposure, individual values bearing on justice and punishment, and belief in the efficacy of the state are among the strongest predictors of negotiation preferences, while many conventionally important variables in the literature have little predictive power. The results have implications for scholars seeking to understand broad drivers of (dis)satisfaction with negotiations and shed light on the polarising Colombian peace process.


2020 ◽  
Vol 48 (S4) ◽  
pp. 183-190
Author(s):  
Ian Ayres ◽  
Spurthi Jonnalagadda

A nationally representative survey of 2000 American adults shows broad support for prohibiting gun-possession on private land without the landowner's explicit permission. Many states have laws which permit concealed weapon carry unless explicitly prohibited by the landowner, but our survey suggests statistically-significant majorities would prefer “no carry” defaults with regard to homeowners, employers, and retailers. While respondents who are Republican, male, or gun owners are more likely to support “carry” defaults, we find that the majoritarian rejection of “carry” defaults does not tend to vary by region or state. However, our survey does find majority support for a default right to possess guns in rented property and on an employer's parking lot. Respondents across all contexts also report substantial ignorance or misinformation about the law. Landowners who don't know or mistakenly believe that concealed carry is, by default, prohibited on their land may be less able to protect themselves by explicitly prohibiting such third-party possession.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alexander Landry ◽  
Jonathan Schooler ◽  
Robb Willer ◽  
Paul Seli

Dehumanization, the belief that other people are less than fully human, dampens empathy, increases animosity, and catalyzes conflict between groups. Research has revealed that a troubling number of American partisans blatantly dehumanize members of the other party. Nonetheless, this research has also found that partisans substantially overestimate the extent to which members of the rival party dehumanize them. Here, we predict that partisans’ perceptions of being dehumanized by rival partisans (or meta-dehumanization) leads them to respond with reciprocal dehumanization. By implication, partisans’ own dehumanization of rival partisans could be reduced by correcting their exaggerated meta-dehumanization. We test this hypothesis in a pre-registered, nationally-representative survey experiment of Democrats and Republicans (N = 2,127). We find that a brief, informational intervention correcting partisans’ exaggerated perceptions of how much rival partisans dehumanize them reduced levels of partisan dehumanization by 45%, and this effect persisted in a follow-up survey conducted approximately one week later. We also investigated the effects of our intervention on additional outcomes, finding that it reduced desire for social distance from, and negative affect toward, rival partisans, and that these effects also persisted a week later. Together, these results suggest that correcting inaccurate perceptions of the extent of partisan dehumanization can be a tool for durably mitigating partisan enmity.


2020 ◽  
pp. 194016122093532
Author(s):  
Ali Çarkoğlu ◽  
Simge Andı

The increasing popularity of online news and social media sites has made it more difficult than ever to control the flow of information. However, governments across the world are successfully continuing to restrict access to content that adversely affects their interests. This study examines the determinants of public support for censorship, as public support is likely to influence governments’ ability to regulate information. Using the Balance Theory and nationally representative survey data from Turkey, we analyze the support for censorship of both online and offline media. Our results suggest that pro-censorship attitudes are positively associated with peoples’ sympathy for the censor.


2020 ◽  
Vol 8 (3) ◽  
pp. 333-355 ◽  
Author(s):  
Byungkyu Lee ◽  
Peter Bearman

AbstractThis study documents historical trends of size and political diversity in Americans’ discussion networks, which are often seen as important barometers of social and political health. Contrasting findings from data drawn out of a nationally representative survey experiment of 1,055 Americans during the contentious 2016 U.S. presidential election to data arising from 11 national data sets covering nearly three decades, we find that Americans’ core networks are significantly smaller and more politically homogeneous than at any other period. Several methodological artifacts seem unlikely to account for the effect. We show that in this period, more than before, “important matters” were often framed as political matters, and that this association probably accounts for the smaller networks.


2020 ◽  
Vol 114 (3) ◽  
pp. 837-855 ◽  
Author(s):  
ALEXANDRA A. SIEGEL ◽  
VIVIENNE BADAAN

We use an experiment across the Arab Twittersphere and a nationally representative survey experiment in Lebanon to evaluate what types of counter-speech interventions are most effective in reducing sectarian hate speech online. We explore whether and to what extent messages priming common national identity or common religious identity, with and without elite endorsements, decrease the use of hostile anti-outgroup language. We find that elite-endorsed messages that prime common religious identity are the most consistently effective in reducing the spread of sectarian hate speech. Our results provide suggestive evidence that religious elites may play an important role as social referents—alerting individuals to social norms of acceptable behavior. By randomly assigning counter-speech treatments to actual producers of online hate speech and experimentally evaluating the effectiveness of these messages on a representative sample of citizens that might be incidentally exposed to such language, this work offers insights for researchers and policymakers on avenues for combating harmful rhetoric on and offline.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document