scholarly journals What does the cognitive reflection test really measure: A process dissociation investigation.

Author(s):  
Jonathon McPhetres

The cognitive reflection test (CRT) is a series of brain-teaser type questions believed to measure intuitive versus reflective thinking. However, those measures are confounded by the single-continuum scoring method whereby a decrease in reflective thinking also results in a simultaneous increase in intuitive thinking, making interpretation of the scores difficult. This confound also precludes testing of the relation between the two processes—whether intuition and reflection operate in serial or in parallel. The present studies directly address these limitations using process dissociation (PD) to quantify and manipulate each process independently. If the CRT measures both intuition and reflection then using PD to isolate each score should provide unique information about each process and allow for testing of models describing the relation between the two processes. However, results of four studies (two preregistered) call in to question whether the CRT actually measures intuition (studies 1-3) and provides some limited evidence for a serial processing model of cognition (studies 3-4). Moving forward, it is recommended that researchers 1) consider alternative measures of cognitive reflection, 2) are cognizant of the phrasing used when describing intuitions as inferred from the CRT, and 3) move towards various conceptual measures of intuition.

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Niraj Patel

The Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT) has quickly become a popular measure of individual differences in propensity to reflect versus rely on intuition (Frederick, 2005). The test consists of three questions, and it has been found to be associated with many different every day beliefs, such as religious beliefs, and performance on heuristics and biases tasks. As such, it has dominated recent theorizing about individual differences in intuitive/reflective thinking propensities. However, it is unclear whether these questions primarily measure individual differences in reflective versus intuitive thinking propensities, versus numeracy, or even another cognitive skill such as cognitive restructuring (i.e. the ability to reframe problems). The present research examined the extent to which the CRT performance can be attributed to individual differences in intuitive/reflective thinking propensities, versus other factors such as numeracy and/or insight problem solving ability, by observing whether presenting the correct answers in multiple-choice format without the "intuitive" answers would make the problems trivially easy or if many participants would still be unable to solve the problems correctly. Furthermore, it sought to determine whether the CRT's associations with other judgments and beliefs (e.g. religiosity, paranormal beliefs, etc.) can be explained by its assessment of intuition/reflection or one of these other factors. Results indicate that performance on the CRT is multiply determined, with numeracy and insight problem solving ability also being primary factors. Furthermore, numeracy in particular could help explain some differences in everyday beliefs. Keywords: Cognitive Reflection, Intuition, Numeracy, Insight, Beliefs, Judgments


2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel Edgcumbe

Abstract:Performance on Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT) is thought to predict moral judgments concerning the Moral Foundations Questionnaire (MFQ). This relationship is hypothesised to be mediated by the tendency toward thinking dispositions such as actively open-minded thinking (AOT), rational (REI-R) and experiential thinking (REI-E), and religiosity. The relationship between cognitive reflection, intuitive thinking and moral judgments with thinking dispositions are examined. As the MFQ measures five types of moral judgments which include ‘individualising values’ – harm and fairness, and ‘binding values’ - loyalty, authority and purity it was hypothesised that performance on these moral foundations would be influenced by thinking dispositions and cognitive reflection. Results indicate that the relationship between cognitive reflection and moral judgments were mediated differently by thinking dispositions. Religious participants and intuitive thinkers alike scored highly on binding moral values. Analytic thinkers and non-religious participants scored highly on individualising moral values. The data is consistent with religiosity and intuition being inherently linked and suggests that moral values are influenced by individual differences in thinking dispositions and cognitive style.


2018 ◽  
Vol 30 (7) ◽  
pp. 1011-1022 ◽  
Author(s):  
Oshin Vartanian ◽  
Erin L. Beatty ◽  
Ingrid Smith ◽  
Kristen Blackler ◽  
Quan Lam ◽  
...  

Performance on heuristics and bias tasks has been shown to be susceptible to bias. In turn, susceptibility to bias varies as a function of individual differences in cognitive abilities (e.g., intelligence) and thinking styles (e.g., propensity for reflection). Using a classic task (i.e., lawyer–engineer problem), we conducted two experiments to examine the differential contributions of cognitive abilities versus thinking styles to performance. The results of Experiment 1 demonstrated that the Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT)—a well-established measure of reflective thinking—predicted performance on conflict problems (where base rates and intuition point in opposite directions), whereas STM predicted performance on nonconflict problems. Experiment 2 conducted in the fMRI scanner replicated this behavioral dissociation and enabled us to probe their neural correlates. As predicted, conflict problems were associated with greater activation in the ACC—a key region for conflict detection—even in cases when participants responded stereotypically. In participants with higher CRT scores, conflict problems were associated with greater activation in the posterior cingulate cortex (PCC), and activation in PCC covaried in relation to CRT scores during conflict problems. Also, CRT scores predicted activation in PCC in conflict problems (over and above nonconflict problems). Our results suggest that individual differences in reflective thinking as measured by CRT are related to brain activation in PCC—a region involved in regulating attention between external and internal foci. We discuss the implications of our findings in terms of PCC's possible involvement in switching from intuitive to analytic mode of thought.


2017 ◽  
Vol 45 (5) ◽  
pp. 483-496 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alyson L. Dodd ◽  
Matthew Haigh

Background: The integrative cognitive model of mood swings proposes that mood symptoms are driven by extreme, self-referent appraisals. For example, if activated mood is appraised positively, this prompts selection of mood regulation strategies that act to up-regulate mood. Appraisals are driven by fast and automatic Type 1 cognitive processes, which, left unchecked, can cause activated mood to escalate. Aims: It was hypothesized that greater propensity to override these automatic processes by engaging in reflective (Type 2) thinking would be negatively associated with extreme appraisals of activation and activation. Method: Study 1 (n = 150) was a cross-sectional survey consisting of measures of activation, extreme appraisals, and an objective performance-based measure of the propensity to engage in reflective thought (cognitive reflection test; CRT). In Study 2 (n = 241) participants completed these measures plus three alternative measures of effortful cognitive engagement (CRT-2, Need for Cognition and Actively Open-Minded Thinking). Results: In Study 1, propensity to engage in reflective thought (higher CRT scores) was not significantly associated with activated mood or extreme appraisals, but activated mood and extreme appraisals were positively correlated. In study 2, the association between activation and extreme appraisals was replicated. Predicted associations between alternative measures of reflective thinking, activated mood, and extreme appraisals were not found. Conclusions: Extreme appraisals of internal states may be a psychological mechanism underlying activated mood. Propensity to reflect on and override default cognitions was unrelated to these extreme appraisals and activated mood. Further research in a clinical sample using mood-relevant measures of reflective thinking is warranted.


2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nick Byrd ◽  
Paul Conway

Conventional sacrificial moral dilemmas propose directly causing some harm to prevent greater harm. Theory suggests that accepting such actions (consistent with utilitarian philosophy) involves more reflective reasoning than rejecting such actions (consistent with deontological philosophy). However, past findings do not always replicate, confound different kinds of reflection, and employ conventional sacrificial dilemmas that treat utilitarian and deontological considerations as opposite. In two studies, we examined whether past findings would replicate when employing process dissociation to assess deontological and utilitarian inclinations independently. Findings suggested two categorically different impacts of reflection: measures of arithmetic reflection, such as the Cognitive Reflection Test, predicted only utilitarian, not deontological, response tendencies. However, measures of logical reflection, such as performance on logical syllogisms, positively predicted both utilitarian and deontological tendencies. These studies replicate some findings, clarify others, and reveal opportunity for additional nuance in dual process theorists’ claims about the link between reflection and dilemma judgments.


2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mohsen Mosleh ◽  
Gordon Pennycook ◽  
Antonio Alonso Arechar ◽  
David Gertler Rand

We investigate the relationship between individual differences in cognitivereflection and behavior on the social media platform Twitter, using a sample of N=1,901 individuals from Prolific. We find that people who score higher on the Cognitive Reflection Test – a widely used measure of reflective thinking – were more discerning in their social media use: they followed more selectively, shared news content from more reliable sources, and Tweeted about weightier subjects (e.g., politics). Furthermore, a network analysis indicates that the phenomenon of echo chambers, in which discourse is more likely with like-minded others, is not limited to politics: people who scored lower in cognitive reflection tended to follow a set of accounts which are avoided by people who scored higher in cognitive reflection. Our results help to illuminate the drivers of behavior on social media platforms and challenge intuitionist notions that reflective thinking is unimportant for everyday judgment and decision-making.


2016 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
pp. e97-103 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shu Wen Tay ◽  
Paul Macdara Ryan ◽  
C Anthony Ryan

Background: Diagnostic decision-making is made through a combination of Systems 1 (intuition or pattern-recognition) and Systems 2 (analytic) thinking. The purpose of this study was to use the Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT) to evaluate and compare the level of Systems 1 and 2 thinking among medical students in pre-clinical and clinical programs.Methods: The CRT is a three-question test designed to measure the ability of respondents to activate metacognitive processes and switch to System 2 (analytic) thinking where System 1 (intuitive) thinking would lead them astray. Each CRT question has a correct analytical (System 2) answer and an incorrect intuitive (System 1) answer. A group of medical students in Years 2 & 3 (pre-clinical) and Years 4 (in clinical practice) of a 5-year medical degree were studied.Results: Ten percent (13/128) of students had the intuitive answers to the three questions (suggesting they generally relied on System 1 thinking) while almost half (44%) answered all three correctly (indicating full analytical, System 2 thinking). Only 3-13% had incorrect answers (i.e. that were neither the analytical nor the intuitive responses). Non-native English speaking students (n = 11) had a lower mean number of correct answers compared to native English speakers (n = 117: 1.0 s 2.12 respectfully: p < 0.01). As students progressed through questions 1 to 3, the percentage of correct System 2 answers increased and the percentage of intuitive answers decreased in both the pre-clinical and clinical students. Conclusions: Up to half of the medical students demonstrated full or partial reliance on System 1 (intuitive) thinking in response to these analytical questions. While their CRT performance has no claims to make as to their future expertise as clinicians, the test may be used in helping students to understand the importance of awareness and regulation of their thinking processes in clinical practice.


2021 ◽  
Vol 12 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mariana V. C. Coutinho ◽  
Justin Thomas ◽  
Alia S. M. Alsuwaidi ◽  
Justin J. Couchman

The Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT) is a measure of analytical reasoning that cues an intuitive but incorrect response that must be rejected for successful performance to be attained. The CRT yields two types of errors: Intuitive errors, which are attributed to Type 1 processes; and non-intuitive errors, which result from poor numeracy skills or deficient reasoning. Past research shows that participants who commit the highest numbers of errors on the CRT overestimate their performance the most, whereas those with the lowest error-rates tend to slightly underestimate. This is an example of the Dunning-Kruger Effect (DKE). The present study examined how intuitive vs. non-intuitive errors contribute to overestimation in the CRT at different levels of performance. Female undergraduate students completed a seven-item CRT test and subsequently estimated their raw score. They also filled out the Faith in Intuition (FI) questionnaire, which is a dispositional measure of intuitive thinking. Data was separated into quartiles based on level of performance on the CRT. The results demonstrated the DKE. Additionally, intuitive and non-intuitive errors predicted miscalibration among low, but not high performers. However, intuitive errors were a stronger predictor of miscalibration. Finally, FI was positively correlated with CRT self-estimates and miscalibration, indicating that participants who perceived themselves to be more intuitive were worse at estimating their score. These results taken together suggest that participants who perform poorly in the CRT and also those who score higher in intuitive thinking disposition are more susceptible to the influences of heuristic-based cues, such as answer fluency, when judging their performance.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christie Newton ◽  
Justin Feeney ◽  
Gordon Pennycook

A common claim is that people vary not just in what they think, but how they think. In fact, there are a large number of scales that have been developed to ostensibly measure thinking styles. These measures share a lot of conceptual overlap and, in particular, most purport to index some aspect of the disposition to think more analytically and effortfully rather than relying more on intuitions and gut feelings. To address this issue, we gave a sample of 774 participants a subset of 90 items from 15 scales and narrowed the list of items down to 50 by isolating items that were meaningfully correlated with the Cognitive Reflection Test, a behavioral measure of individual differences in analytic thinking. Then, across six studies with 1149 participants, we systematically narrowed down the items and tested the underlying factor structure. This revealed that a four-factor correlated structure was best: Actively Open-minded Thinking, Close-Minded Thinking, Preference for Intuitive Thinking, and Preference for Effortful Thinking. Predictive validity for the resulting 24-item (6 items per sub-scale) Comprehensive Thinking Style Questionnaire (CTSQ) was established using a set of cognitive ability measures as well as several outcome measures (e.g., epistemically suspect beliefs, bullshit receptivity, empathy, moral judgments, among others), with some subscales having stronger predictive validity for some outcomes but not others. The CTSQ helps alleviate the jangle fallacy in thinking styles research and allows for the assessment of separate aspects thinking styles in a single comprehensive measure.


2021 ◽  
Vol 11 (9) ◽  
pp. 1230
Author(s):  
Laura Zamarian ◽  
Katharina M. -A. Fürstenberg ◽  
Nadia Gamboz ◽  
Margarete Delazer

Media news during the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic often entail complex numerical concepts such as exponential increase or reproduction number. This study investigated whether people have difficulties in understanding such information and whether these difficulties are related to numerical competence, reflective thinking, and risk proneness. One hundred sixty-three participants provided answers to a numeracy scale focusing on complex numerical concepts relevant to COVID-19 (COV Numeracy Scale). They also provided responses to well-established objective and subjective scales, questions about affective states, and questions about the COVID-19 pandemic. Higher scores on the COV Numeracy Scale correlated with higher scores on the Health Numeracy Scale, in the Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT), and in self-assessments of verbal comprehension, mathematical intelligence, and subjective numeracy. Interestingly, scores on the COV Numeracy Scale also positively correlated with the number of consulted information sources about COVID-19. Accuracy in the CRT emerged as a significant predictor, explaining ca. 14% of variance on the COV Numeracy Scale. The results suggest that people with lower reflective thinking skills and lower subjective and objective numerical competence can be more at disadvantage when confronted with COVID-related numerical information in everyday life. These findings advise caution in the communication of relevant public health information that entails complex numerical concepts.


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