scholarly journals BENTUK POLITIK UANG PADA PILKADA PROVINSI BENGKULU TAHUN 2015

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dede Suprianto ◽  
Titin Purwaningsih ◽  
zaldi rusnaedy
Keyword(s):  
Vote Buying ◽  
Club Goods ◽  
Vote Trading

Artikel ini menjelaskan tentang politik uang yang terjadi pada Pilkada di Provinsi Bengkulu tahun 2015. Metode yang digunakan dalam penelitian ini adalah kualitatif, dengan menggunakan teknik pengumpulan data yaitu wawancara dan dokumentasi. Sedangkan yang menjadi sasaran penelitian ini adalah Bawaslu, KPUD dan Tim Sukses. Hasil penelitian ini menunjukkan bahwa bentuk politik uang terdiri dari vote buying sebanyak 33 kasus, vote trading sebanyak 2 kasus dan club goods sebanyak 1 kasus. Semua laporan tersebut tidak ditindaklanjuti karena tidak memenuhi syarat formal dan materil serta kedaluwarsa, kecuai kasus PPK Singaran Pati yang digugat pasangan Sultan-Mujiono ke Mahkamah Konstitsi. Meskipun MK akhirnya menolak gugatan tersebut berdasarkan pertimbangan ambang batas suara antara pemohon dan peraih suara terbanyak dengan selisih diantara keduanya sebesar 14%.

scholarly journals BENTUK POLITIK UANG PADA PILKADA PROVINSI BENGKULU TAHUN 2015

2019 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 15-28
Author(s):  
Dede Suprianto ◽  
Titin Purwaningsih ◽  
Zaldi Rusnaedy
Keyword(s):  
Vote Buying ◽  
Club Goods ◽  
Vote Trading

Artikel ini  menjelaskan tentang politik uang yang terjadi pada Pilkada di Provinsi Bengkulu tahun 2015. Metode yang digunakan dalam penelitian ini adalah kualitatif, dengan menggunakan teknik pengumpulan data yaitu wawancara dan dokumentasi. Sedangkan yang menjadi sasaran penelitian ini adalah Bawaslu, KPUD dan Tim Sukses. Hasil penelitian ini menunjukkan bahwa bentuk politik uang terdiri dari vote buying sebanyak 33 kasus, vote trading sebanyak 2 kasus dan club goods sebanyak 1 kasus. Semua laporan tersebut tidak ditindaklanjuti karena tidak memenuhi syarat formal dan materil serta kedaluwarsa, kecuai kasus PPK Singaran Pati yang digugat pasangan Sultan-Mujiono ke Mahkamah Konstitsi. Meskipun MK akhirnya menolak gugatan tersebut berdasarkan pertimbangan ambang batas suara antara pemohon dan peraih suara terbanyak dengan selisih diantara keduanya sebesar 14%.

The Myth of Vote Buying in India

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Pradeep K. Chhibber ◽  
Rahul Verma
Keyword(s):  
Survey Data ◽  
Tamil Nadu ◽  
National Election ◽  
Vote Buying ◽  
Club Goods ◽  
Common View ◽  
Election Studies ◽  
Buying In

A common view is that in Indian elections parties, politicians, and voters are engaged in a quid-pro-quo in which citizens vote for a politician who offers them individual benefits. We find no evidence that voters exchange votes for benefits. In fact, ideology is a better predictor of the vote than the receipt of private or club goods. The use of cash is indeed widespread in India during election time but money is needed to build the campaign, to mobilize votes and for candidates, and to establish candidates’ credibility as leaders of import. We show this using the survey data from national election studies, a case study, and the results of a small experiment in Tamil Nadu.

scholarly journals Vote Trading and Electoral Success in Nigerian Democracy

2021 ◽  
Vol 10 ◽  
pp. 1362-1366
Author(s):  
Ilori Oladapo Mayowa ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Free Will ◽  
Free Choice ◽  
Political Influence ◽  
Vote Buying ◽  
External Interference ◽  
Electoral Success ◽  
Democratic Experience ◽  
Vote Trading ◽  
The Law ◽  
The Right

Democracy is based on the principle of the majority able to choose who leads them in a free and fair context devoid of external interference and political influence. The right to elect a wrong candidate is even part of democracy. The law cannot regulate the legitimate choices that the democratic free will is entitled to make. It chooses what it will. It rejects what it will not choose, or else the democratic free will ceases to be what it fundamentally ought to be, namely “free”. Vote trading is a concept in the Nigerian democratic experience. The issue of vote-trading has been in Nigeria's democracy since its inception but became prominent during the present democratic dispensation. Vote buying has been serving as a clog in the wheel of free choice which is the hallmark of a democracy. Unfortunately, not all people that being influenced by vote-buying know what is going on. Some people indulge in the act of vote-trading unknowing. This study which is mainly based on literature and conceptually looked at the influence of vote trading on voter’s free choice, the factors that influenced both vote buying and selling, and how it can be curbed. Consequently, past literature, like journals, books, and other publications on vote-trading were considered in this study.

scholarly journals BENTUK DAN JARINGAN PATRON-KLIEN POLITIK UANG PADA PEMILU LEGISLATIF TAHUN 2019 DI KABUPATEN TASIKMALAYA

2021 ◽  
Vol 2 (3) ◽  
pp. 170-183
Author(s):  
Perhat Alfaz ◽  
Suswanta Suswanta
Keyword(s):  
Vote Buying ◽  
Club Goods ◽  
Pork Barrel

Politik uang dalam perhelatan pemilu legislatif tahun 2019 di Kabupaten Tasikmalaya adalah keniscayaan yang sulit dihindarkan. Jauh sebelum pemilu berlangsung, Bawaslu merilis Indeks Kerawanan Pemilu (IKP) 2019 sebagai upaya preventif terjadinya pelanggaran dalam pemilu. Berdasarkan hasil IKP 2019 Kabupaten Tasikmalaya memiliki tingkat kerawanan tinggi menempati urutan pertama dalam subdimensi kampanye dengan skor 77,08, dimana politik uang termasuk bagian di dalamnya. Pasca pemilu berlangsung, laporan pelanggaran banyak diterima Bawasalu, lima diantaranya menyangkut pelanggaran politik uang dan hanya ada satu kasus yang terbukti memenuhi syarat formil dan materil sehingga bisa sampai pada putusan pengadilan.Maksud dari penelitian ini mencoba untuk mengungkap bagaimana bentuk dan jaringan patron-klien politik uang yang terjadi pada pemilu legislatif tahun 2019 di Kabupaten Tasikmalaya. Penelitian ini menggunakan metode deskriptif kualitatif, dengan teknik pengumpulan data dengan wawancara, dokumentasi dan studi literatur. Hasil penilitian mengungkapkan bahwasannya praktik politik uang dalam pemilu legislatif tahun 2019 di Kabupaten Tasikmalaya banyak terjadi, hanya saja ada yang dilaporkan secara resmi ke Bawaslu dan ada yang dibiarkan begitu saja tidak dilaporkan. Ada enam jenis politik uang yang ditemukan, diantaranya: Vote buying, Individual gifts, Vote Tradding, Club goods, Services and activities dan Pork Barrel Project. Dari keenam jenis politik uang tersebut, kasus yang paling dominan ditemukan adalah vote buying sebanyak lima laporan yang resmi diterima Bawaslu, dengan pola penyebaran praktiknya melibatkan tim sukses yang didominasi oleh jaringan keluarga dan jaringan sosial. Strategi politik uang juga berpengaruh signifikan terhadap meningkatnya partisipasi pemilih di Kabupaten Tasikmalaya. pada pemilu 2014 partisipasi pemilih di Kabupaten Tasikmalaya mencapai angka 65 persen dan terjadi kenaikan partisipasi pemilih pada pemilu serentak tahun 2019 menjadi 71 persen.

scholarly journals The Paradox of Incumbency: Patronage, Clientelism, and Incumbent Defeat in Village Chief Elections

PCD Journal ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
pp. 197
Author(s):  
Norin Mustika Rahadiri Abheseka
Keyword(s):  
Social Distance ◽  
Social Bonds ◽  
Vote Buying ◽  
Club Goods ◽  
Village Elections ◽  
Material Resources ◽  
Territorial Representation

This article examines the practices of  patronage and clientelism during village elections. Examining Mekarsari Village, Yogyakarta, this study finds that patronage strategies such as programmatic politics, vote buying, club goods, and individual gifts were used by all candidates during village elections owing to the lack of  strong social bonds between candidates and voters. The incumbent with all advantages and access to material resources also used patronise and clientelism as strategy, but in fact, it cannot guarantee they win the election. This suggests that the societal relationships and practices of  patronage and clientelism continue to affect voter’s preference. Applying sociological, psychological, and rational approaches to understanding voter behaviour especially in Java, the study found that, apart from the instrumental and social distance considerations, territorial representation also influenced voter’s preference at Village.

On the Essence and Tipology of International Public Goods

2005 ◽  
pp. 131-141
Author(s):  
V. Mortikov
Keyword(s):  
Economic Policy ◽  
Social Construction ◽  
Public Goods ◽  
Public Good ◽  
Global Public Goods ◽  
Club Goods ◽  
Basic Properties ◽  
International Public Goods ◽  
Regional Public Goods ◽  
Joint Products

The basic properties of international public goods are analyzed in the paper. Special attention is paid to the typology of international public goods: pure and impure, excludable and nonexcludable, club goods, regional public goods, joint products. The author argues that social construction of international public good depends on many factors, for example, government economic policy. Aggregation technologies in the supply of global public goods are examined.

Conditionality & Coercion

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Isabela Mares ◽  
Lauren E. Young
Keyword(s):  
Mixed Method ◽  
Personal Characteristics ◽  
Policy Preferences ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Vote Buying ◽  
Private Benefits ◽  
Public Benefits ◽  
Local Actors ◽  
Democratic Systems ◽  
Method Approach

In many recent democracies, candidates compete for office using illegal strategies to influence voters. In Hungary and Romania, local actors including mayors and bureaucrats offer access to social policy benefits to voters who offer to support their preferred candidates, and they threaten others with the loss of a range of policy and private benefits for voting the “wrong” way. These quid pro quo exchanges are often called clientelism. How can politicians and their accomplices get away with such illegal campaigning in otherwise democratic, competitive elections? When do they rely on the worst forms of clientelism that involve threatening voters and manipulating public benefits? This book uses a mixed method approach to understand how illegal forms of campaigning including vote buying and electoral coercion persist in two democratic countries in the European Union. It argues that clientelistic strategies must be disaggregated based on whether they use public or private resources, and whether they involve positive promises or negative threats and coercion. The authors document that the type of clientelistic strategies that candidates and brokers use varies systematically across localities based on their underlying social coalitions, and also show that voters assess and sanction different forms of clientelism in different ways. Voters glean information about politicians’ personal characteristics and their policy preferences from the clientelistic strategies these candidates deploy. Most voters judge candidates who use clientelism harshly. So how does clientelism, including its most odious coercive forms, persist in democratic systems? This book suggests that politicians can get away with clientelism by using forms of it that are in line with the policy preferences of constituencies whose votes they need. Clientelistic and programmatic strategies are not as distinct as previous studies have argued.

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