scholarly journals How People Update Beliefs about Climate Change: Good News and Bad News

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Cass R Sunstein ◽  
Sebastian Bobadilla-Suarez ◽  
Stephanie C. Lazzaro ◽  
Tali Sharot
Keyword(s):  
Climate Change ◽  
Temperature Rise ◽  
Scientific Evidence ◽  
Bad News ◽  
Good News ◽  
International Agreement ◽  
Average Temperature ◽  
New Information ◽  
Politics And Law ◽  
New Evidence

102 Cornell L. Rev. 1431 (2017)People are frequently exposed to competing evidence about climate change. We examined how new information alters people’s beliefs. We find that people who are not sure that man-made climate change is occurring, and who do not favor an international agreement to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, show a form of asymmetrical updating: They change their beliefs in response to unexpected good news (suggesting that average temperature rise is likely to be less than previously thought) and fail to change their beliefs in response to unexpected bad news (suggesting that average temperature rise is likely to be greater than previously thought). By contrast, people who strongly believe that manmade climate change is occurring, and who favor an international agreement, show the opposite asymmetry: They change their beliefs far more in response to unexpected bad news (suggesting that average temperature rise is likely to be greater than previously thought) than in response to unexpected good news (suggesting that average temperature rise is likely to be smaller than previously thought). The results suggest that exposure to varied scientific evidence about climate change may increase polarization within a population due to asymmetrical updating. We explore the implications of our findings for how people will update their beliefs upon receiving new evidence about climate change, and also for other beliefs relevant to politics and law.

The Demand for, and Avoidance of, Information

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Russell Golman ◽  
George Loewenstein ◽  
Andras Molnar ◽  
Silvia Saccardo
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Time Lag ◽  
Relevant Information ◽  
Behavioral Theory ◽  
Bad News ◽  
Good News ◽  
Focus Attention ◽  
New Information ◽  
Attention Demand ◽  
Aid Decision

Management scientists recognize that decision making depends on the information people have but lack a unified behavioral theory of the demand for (and avoidance of) information. Drawing on an existing theoretical framework in which utility depends on beliefs and the attention paid to them, we develop and test a theory of the demand for information encompassing instrumental considerations, curiosity, and desire to direct attention to beliefs one feels good about. We decompose an individual’s demand for information into the desire to refine beliefs, holding attention constant, and the desire to focus attention on anticipated beliefs, holding these beliefs constant. Because the utility of resolving uncertainty (i.e., refining beliefs) depends on the attention paid to it and more important or salient questions capture more attention, demand for information depends on the importance and salience of the question(s) it addresses. In addition, because getting new information focuses attention on one’s beliefs and people want to savor good news and ignore bad news, the desire to obtain or avoid information depends on the valence (i.e., goodness or badness) of anticipated beliefs. Five experiments (n = 2,361) test and find support for these hypotheses, looking at neutrally valenced as well as ego-relevant information. People are indeed more inclined to acquire information (a) when it feels more important, even if it cannot aid decision making (Experiments 1A and 2A); (b) when a question is more salient, manipulated through time lag (Experiments 1B and 2B); and (c) when anticipated beliefs have higher valence (Experiment 2C). This paper was accepted by Yan Chen, behavioral economics and decision analysis.

scholarly journals A Guideline and Cautionary Note: How to Use the Belief Update Task Correctly

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tali Sharot ◽  
Neil Garrett
Keyword(s):  
Climate Change ◽  
Bad News ◽  
Good News ◽  
Belief Formation ◽  
Cautionary Note ◽  
Helpful Tool ◽  
Wide Range

In 2011 we published a paper showing that people update their beliefs to a greater extent in response to good news (e.g., learning that the likelihood of robbery is lower than expected) than bad news (e.g., learning it is lower than expected) (Sharot et al., 2011). This phenomenon, which can lead to increased optimistic beliefs, is absent in depression. Since then, our belief update task has been used by many others to test a wide range of questions related to belief formation and optimism. Most of these studies are rigorous and well conducted. However, a small number of researchers have used the task inappropriately, inserting new confounds and failing to control for other potential ones. This has resulted in the report of false findings which have muddied the literature and caused confusion. Given these incidents and the enthusiasm for using the task across different disciplines, the need for guidelines on how to use the belief update task correctly has become apparent. The belief update task can be a helpful tool in studying beliefs in domains ranging from climate change to health, but like any other task it must be used properly if valid conclusions are to be reached. We hope this guide will be helpful for scientists who would like to use the belief update task, as well as readers, reviewers and editors who are required to evaluate studies using this task.

The Good News-Bad News Effect: Asymmetric Processing of Objective Information about Yourself

2011 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
pp. 114-138 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Eil ◽  
Justin M Rao
Keyword(s):  
Negative Feedback ◽  
Confirmation Bias ◽  
Bad News ◽  
Good News ◽  
Bayes Rule ◽  
Past Work ◽  
Objective Information ◽  
New Information ◽  
Accuracy And Precision ◽  
News Effect

We study processing and acquisition of objective information regarding qualities that people care about, intelligence and beauty. Subjects receiving negative feedback did not respect the strength of these signals, were far less predictable in their updating behavior and exhibited an aversion to new information. In response to good news, inference conformed more closely to Bayes' Rule, both in accuracy and precision. Signal direction did not affect updating or acquisition in our neutral control. Unlike past work, our design varied direction and agreement with priors independently. The results indicate that confirmation bias is driven by direction; confirmation alone had no effect. (JEL D82, D83)

scholarly journals Climate sensitivity uncertainty: when is good news bad?

2015 ◽  
Vol 373 (2055) ◽  
pp. 20150092 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mark C. Freeman ◽  
Gernot Wagner ◽  
Richard J. Zeckhauser
Keyword(s):  
Climate Change ◽  
Climate Sensitivity ◽  
Atmospheric Carbon Dioxide ◽  
Climate Science ◽  
Well Being ◽  
Bad News ◽  
Good News ◽  
Intergovernmental Panel ◽  
Best Estimate ◽  
Ipcc Report

Climate change is real and dangerous. Exactly how bad it will get, however, is uncertain. Uncertainty is particularly relevant for estimates of one of the key parameters: equilibrium climate sensitivity—how eventual temperatures will react as atmospheric carbon dioxide concentrations double. Despite significant advances in climate science and increased confidence in the accuracy of the range itself, the ‘likely’ range has been 1.5–4.5°C for over three decades. In 2007, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) narrowed it to 2–4.5°C, only to reverse its decision in 2013, reinstating the prior range. In addition, the 2013 IPCC report removed prior mention of 3°C as the ‘best estimate’. We interpret the implications of the 2013 IPCC decision to lower the bottom of the range and excise a best estimate. Intuitively, it might seem that a lower bottom would be good news. Here we ask: when might apparently good news about climate sensitivity in fact be bad news in the sense that it lowers societal well-being? The lowered bottom value also implies higher uncertainty about the temperature increase, definitely bad news. Under reasonable assumptions, both the lowering of the lower bound and the removal of the ‘best estimate’ may well be bad news.

scholarly journals How reappraisal of new information contributes to optimistic belief updating

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tobias Kube ◽  
Julia Glombiewski
Keyword(s):  
Climate Change ◽  
Scientific Information ◽  
Good News ◽  
Control Group ◽  
Cognitive Mechanisms ◽  
Prior Beliefs ◽  
Belief Updating ◽  
Significant Group ◽  
New Information ◽  
N 93

People update their beliefs selectively in response to good news and disregard bad news, referred to as the optimism bias. Yet, the precise cognitive mechanisms underlying this asymmetry in belief updating are largely unknown. In three experiments, we tested the hypothesis that cognitive immunisation against new information contributes to optimistic belief updating (e.g. through questioning the reliability of new information). In each study, participants received new information in relation to their prior beliefs, and we examined the influence of cognitive immunisation on belief updating by using a three-group modulation protocol: In one group, cognitive immunisation against new information was promoted; in another group, cognitive immunisation was inhibited; and a control group received no manipulation. This modulation protocol was applied to beliefs about the self, i.e. performance expectations (Experiment 1&2; N=99 and N=93), and beliefs about climate change (Experiment 3; N=227) as an example of factual beliefs. The results of Experiments 1&2 showed that the cognitive immunisation manipulation had no influence on the update of performance-related expectations. In Experiment 3, we did find significant group differences in belief updating, and this effect interacted with participants’ general attitudes towards climate change: people who were sceptical about man-made climate change lowered their estimates of the projected temperature rise particularly if they perceived scientific information on climate change as being fraught with uncertainty. These findings suggest that the importance of cognitive immunisation in belief updating may depend on the content of beliefs (i.e. self-related vs. factual) and participants’ attitudes to the subject in question.

scholarly journals The automatic nature of motivated belief updating

2018 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 87-103 ◽  
Author(s):  
ANDREAS KAPPES ◽  
TALI SHAROT
Keyword(s):  
Motivated Reasoning ◽  
Bad News ◽  
Good News ◽  
Cognitive Resources ◽  
Relative Neglect ◽  
The Moment ◽  
Time Restriction ◽  
Car Accident ◽  
New Evidence ◽  
Manipulation Experiment

AbstractPeople's risk estimates often do not align with the evidence available to them. In particular, people tend to discount bad news (such as evidence suggesting their risk of being involved in a car accident is higher than they thought) as compared to good news (evidence suggesting it is lower) – this is known as the belief update bias. It has been assumed that individuals use motivated reasoning to rationalise away unwanted evidence (e.g., “I am a safe driver, thus these statistics do not apply to me”). However, whether reasoning is required to discount bad news has not been tested directly. Here, we restrict cognitive resources using a cognitive load (Experiment 1) and a time restriction manipulation (Experiment 3) and find that while these manipulations diminish learning in general, they do not diminish the bias. Furthermore, we also show that the relative neglect of bad news happens the moment new evidence is presented, not when participants are subsequently prompted to state their belief (Experiment 2). Our findings suggest that reasoning is not required for bad news to be discounted as compared to good news.

scholarly journals How People Update Beliefs about Climate Change: Good News and Bad News

2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Cass R. Sunstein ◽  
Stephanie C. Lazzaro ◽  
Tali Sharot
Keyword(s):  
Climate Change ◽  
Bad News ◽  
Good News

scholarly journals Strengthened scientific support for the Endangerment Finding for atmospheric greenhouse gases

Science ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 363 (6427) ◽  
pp. eaat5982 ◽  
Author(s):  
Philip B. Duffy ◽  
Christopher B. Field ◽  
Noah S. Diffenbaugh ◽  
Scott C. Doney ◽  
Zoe Dutton ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Public Health ◽  
Climate Change ◽  
Greenhouse Gases ◽  
Environmental Protection ◽  
Scientific Evidence ◽  
Scientific Support ◽  
Wide Range ◽  
Substantial Risk ◽  
New Evidence ◽  
The U.S

We assess scientific evidence that has emerged since the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency’s 2009 Endangerment Finding for six well-mixed greenhouse gases and find that this new evidence lends increased support to the conclusion that these gases pose a danger to public health and welfare. Newly available evidence about a wide range of observed and projected impacts strengthens the association between the risk of some of these impacts and anthropogenic climate change, indicates that some impacts or combinations of impacts have the potential to be more severe than previously understood, and identifies substantial risk of additional impacts through processes and pathways not considered in the Endangerment Finding.

Total Hip Arthroplasty: Good News, Bad News

2011 ◽  
Vol 10 (5) ◽  
pp. 58
Author(s):  
MARY ANN MOON
Keyword(s):  
Total Hip Arthroplasty ◽  
Hip Arthroplasty ◽  
Bad News ◽  
Good News ◽  
Total Hip
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