scholarly journals The power of nothing: Risk preference in pigeons, but not people, is driven primarily by avoidance of zero outcomes

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jeffrey Matthew Pisklak ◽  
Christopher R Madan ◽  
Elliot Andrew Ludvig ◽  
Marcia L Spetch
Keyword(s):  
Homo Sapiens ◽  
Risk Preference ◽  
Columba Livia ◽  
Risky Choice ◽  
Repeated Exposure ◽  
Decision Context ◽  
Risk Seeking ◽  
Risky Choices ◽  
Risky Option ◽  
Risky Decisions

When making risky decisions, people and pigeons often show similar choice patterns. When people learn the reward probabilities through repeated exposure to the outcomes, their preference is disproportionately influenced by the extreme (highest and lowest) outcomes occurring in the decision context. Overweighting of these extremes increases preference for risky alternatives that lead to the highest outcome and decreases preference for risky alternatives that lead to the lowest outcome, termed the extreme-outcome rule. This rule predicts greater risk seeking for choices between safe and risky high-value outcomes than for choices between safe and risky low-value outcomes, when both choices occur in the same context. In a series of studies, we examine how this extreme-outcome rule generalizes within and across two evolutionary distant species: pigeons (Columba livia) and humans (Homo sapiens). Both species showed risky choices consistent with the extreme-outcome rule when a low-value risky option could yield an outcome of zero. When all outcome values were increased such that none of the options could lead to zero, people but not pigeons were still consistent with the extreme-outcome rule. Unlike people, pigeons no longer avoided a low-value risky option when it yielded a non-zero food outcome. These results suggest that, despite some similarities, different mechanisms underlie risky choice in pigeons and people.

scholarly journals The Role of Memory in Distinguishing Risky Decisions from Experience and Description

2017 ◽  
Vol 70 (10) ◽  
pp. 2048-2059 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christopher R. Madan ◽  
Elliot A. Ludvig ◽  
Marcia L. Spetch
Keyword(s):  
Risk Preferences ◽  
Risk Preference ◽  
Risky Choice ◽  
Risk Averse ◽  
Memory Biases ◽  
Opposite Pattern ◽  
Decisions From Experience ◽  
Risk Seeking ◽  
Subject Design

People's risk preferences differ for choices based on described probabilities versus those based on information learned through experience. For decisions from description, people are typically more risk averse for gains than for losses. In contrast, for decisions from experience, people are sometimes more risk seeking for gains than losses, especially for choices with the possibility of extreme outcomes (big wins or big losses), which are systematically overweighed in memory. Using a within-subject design, this study evaluated whether this memory bias plays a role in the differences in risky choice between description and experience. As in previous studies, people were more risk seeking for losses than for gains in description but showed the opposite pattern in experience. People also more readily remembered the extreme outcomes and judged them as having occurred more frequently. These memory biases correlated with risk preferences in decisions from experience but not in decisions from description. These results suggest that systematic memory biases may be responsible for some of the differences in risk preference across description and experience.

scholarly journals Reward context determines risky choice in pigeons and humans

2014 ◽  
Vol 10 (8) ◽  
pp. 20140451 ◽  
Author(s):  
Elliot A. Ludvig ◽  
Christopher R. Madan ◽  
Jeffrey M. Pisklak ◽  
Marcia L. Spetch
Keyword(s):  
Columba Livia ◽  
Risky Choice ◽  
Risk Averse ◽  
Common Features ◽  
Risk Seeking ◽  
Variable Delays ◽  
Choice Tasks

Whereas humans are risk averse for monetary gains, other animals can be risk seeking for food rewards, especially when faced with variable delays or under significant deprivation. A key difference between these findings is that humans are often explicitly told about the risky options, whereas non-human animals must learn about them from their own experience. We tested pigeons ( Columba livia ) and humans in formally identical choice tasks where all outcomes were learned from experience. Both species were more risk seeking for larger rewards than for smaller ones. The data suggest that the largest and smallest rewards experienced are overweighted in risky choice. This observed bias towards extreme outcomes represents a key step towards a consilience of these two disparate literatures, identifying common features that drive risky choice across phyla.

scholarly journals Reduced risk-seeking in chimpanzees in a zero-outcome game

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stefanie Keupp ◽  
Sebastian Grueneisen ◽  
Elliot Andrew Ludvig ◽  
Felix Warneken ◽  
Alicia P. Melis
Keyword(s):  
Pan Troglodytes ◽  
Risk Preferences ◽  
Risky Choice ◽  
Individual Risk ◽  
Risk Seeking ◽  
Economic Decisions ◽  
Experimental Parameters ◽  
Probability Of Success ◽  
Risky Option ◽  
Reduced Risk

A key component of economic decisions is the integration of information about reward outcomes and probabilities in selecting between competing options. In many species, risky choice is influenced by the magnitude of available outcomes, probability of success, and the possibility of extreme outcomes. Chimpanzees are generally regarded to be risk seeking. In this study we examined two aspects of chimpanzees’ risk preferences: First, whether setting the value of the non-preferred outcome of a risky option to zero changes chimpanzees’ risk preferences, and second, whether individual risk preferences are stable across two different measures. Across two experiments, we found chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes, n = 23) as a group to be risk-neutral to risk-avoidant with highly stable individual risk preferences. We discuss how the possibility of going empty-handed might reduce chimpanzees’ risk seeking relative to previous studies. This malleability in risk preferences as a function of experimental parameters and individual differences raises interesting questions about whether it is appropriate or helpful to categorize a species as a whole as risk-seeking or risk-avoidant.

scholarly journals What are the chances? How descriptions of probability affect risky decisions

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Jared Pickett
Keyword(s):  
Risk Preference ◽  
Expected Value ◽  
Past Experience ◽  
Response Patterns ◽  
Reinforcer Magnitude ◽  
Potential Outcome ◽  
Decisions From Experience ◽  
Risk Seeking ◽  
Risky Option ◽  
Increase In Risk

<p>People make different decisions when they know the odds of an event occurring, (e.g. told 10% chance of an earthquake that year) than when they draw on only their own experience (e.g. living in a city with, on average, one earthquake every 10 years). It may be that when we make decisions based on our past experience (decisions from experience) we are more likely to choose a risky option when it can lead to the biggest win and avoid it when it can lead to the biggest loss, this effect is called the Extreme-Outcome rule. Across three Experiments we tested the Extreme-Outcome rule by having participants make repeated choices between either safe or risky options which had the same expected value. In each experiment, we varied the magnitude of the reinforcer’s participants could win in both an Experience condition and a condition that had both description and experience information. In Experiment 1 where we had two reinforcer sizes (small and large) we found an Extreme-Outcome effect in the Experience condition, but not the Description-Experience condition. In Experiment 2 we tested a prediction of the Extreme-Outcome rule that participants would be sensitive to the best and worst outcome by adding another reinforcer size (reinforcers were small, medium and large) and therefore on some trials neither alternative included an extreme outcome. We also removed zero as a potential outcome to investigate whether zero aversion might be driving the effect of reinforcer magnitude in the Experience condition. We did not find response patterns consistent with an Extreme-Outcome rule in the Experience condition. Instead, participants were least risk seeking when the reinforcer was small, but there was no difference in levels of risk seeking between the medium and large reinforcer trials. In other words, there was an effect of the low-extreme outcome but not the high-extreme outcome. Like Experiment 1, in the Description-Experience condition risk preference was not influenced by reinforcer size, but the absolute levels were higher. To investigate whether this increase in risk preference was due to removing the zero, in Experiment 3 we manipulated whether zero was present or absent. When zero was absent, risk preference was not influenced by the size of the reinforcer in the Description-Experience condition, but there was an effect of the low-extreme outcome when zero was present. We also found an effect of the low extreme outcome in the Experience condition regardless of whether zero was present or absent. Overall, these findings suggest the Extreme-Outcome rule needs to be modified to take into account the effect of the low extreme but not the high extreme outcome.</p>

scholarly journals Comparative inspiration: From puzzles with pigeons to novel discoveries with humans in risky choice

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christopher R Madan ◽  
Elliot Andrew Ludvig ◽  
Marcia L Spetch
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Research Program ◽  
Risky Choice ◽  
Comparative Perspective ◽  
Risk And Uncertainty ◽  
Decisions From Experience ◽  
Risk Seeking ◽  
Relative Gains ◽  
Underlying Processes ◽  
Risky Decisions

Both humans and non-human animals regularly encounter decisions involving risk and uncertainty. This paper provides an overview of our research program examining risky decisions in which the odds and outcomes are learned through experience in people and pigeons. We summarize the results of 15 experiments across 8 publications, with a total of over 1300 participants. We highlight 4 key findings from this research: (1) people choose differently when the odds and outcomes are learned through experience compared to when they are described; (2) when making decisions from experience, people overweight values at or near the ends of the distribution of experienced values (i.e., the best and the worst, termed the “extreme-outcome rule”), which leads to more risk seeking for relative gains than for relative losses; (3) people show biases in self-reported memory whereby they are more likely to report an extreme outcome than an equally-often experienced non-extreme outcome, and they judge these extreme outcomes as having occurred more often; and (4) under certain circumstances pigeons show similar patterns of risky choice as humans, but the underlying processes may not be identical. This line of research has stimulated other research in the field of judgement and decision making, illustrating how investigations from a comparative perspective can lead in surprising directions.

scholarly journals What are the chances? How descriptions of probability affect risky decisions

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Jared Pickett
Keyword(s):  
Risk Preference ◽  
Expected Value ◽  
Past Experience ◽  
Response Patterns ◽  
Reinforcer Magnitude ◽  
Potential Outcome ◽  
Decisions From Experience ◽  
Risk Seeking ◽  
Risky Option ◽  
Increase In Risk

<p>People make different decisions when they know the odds of an event occurring, (e.g. told 10% chance of an earthquake that year) than when they draw on only their own experience (e.g. living in a city with, on average, one earthquake every 10 years). It may be that when we make decisions based on our past experience (decisions from experience) we are more likely to choose a risky option when it can lead to the biggest win and avoid it when it can lead to the biggest loss, this effect is called the Extreme-Outcome rule. Across three Experiments we tested the Extreme-Outcome rule by having participants make repeated choices between either safe or risky options which had the same expected value. In each experiment, we varied the magnitude of the reinforcer’s participants could win in both an Experience condition and a condition that had both description and experience information. In Experiment 1 where we had two reinforcer sizes (small and large) we found an Extreme-Outcome effect in the Experience condition, but not the Description-Experience condition. In Experiment 2 we tested a prediction of the Extreme-Outcome rule that participants would be sensitive to the best and worst outcome by adding another reinforcer size (reinforcers were small, medium and large) and therefore on some trials neither alternative included an extreme outcome. We also removed zero as a potential outcome to investigate whether zero aversion might be driving the effect of reinforcer magnitude in the Experience condition. We did not find response patterns consistent with an Extreme-Outcome rule in the Experience condition. Instead, participants were least risk seeking when the reinforcer was small, but there was no difference in levels of risk seeking between the medium and large reinforcer trials. In other words, there was an effect of the low-extreme outcome but not the high-extreme outcome. Like Experiment 1, in the Description-Experience condition risk preference was not influenced by reinforcer size, but the absolute levels were higher. To investigate whether this increase in risk preference was due to removing the zero, in Experiment 3 we manipulated whether zero was present or absent. When zero was absent, risk preference was not influenced by the size of the reinforcer in the Description-Experience condition, but there was an effect of the low-extreme outcome when zero was present. We also found an effect of the low extreme outcome in the Experience condition regardless of whether zero was present or absent. Overall, these findings suggest the Extreme-Outcome rule needs to be modified to take into account the effect of the low extreme but not the high extreme outcome.</p>

EFFECT OF FRAMING ON RISKY CHOICE: ONE CASE STUDY IN CHINA

2008 ◽  
Vol 36 (5) ◽  
pp. 651-658 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yin-ling Zhang ◽  
Li-jun Xiao ◽  
Yu Ma ◽  
Dan-min Miao
Keyword(s):  
Objective Measure ◽  
Risk Preference ◽  
Framing Effect ◽  
Risky Choice ◽  
Chinese Sample ◽  
Risk Seeking ◽  
Significant Difference ◽  
The Military ◽  
Chinese Undergraduates

The effect of framing on Chinese undergraduates was explored using Tversky and Kahneman's (1981) well-known Asian Disease Problem. Participants were divided into three groups with different formats: positive, negative, and balanced format, respectively. There was a significant difference between the Chinese sample and Tversky and Kahneman's American sample under positive format, but no difference under the negative format. Chinese students were more prone to risky options. Results of the Chinese sample showed that the type of framing effect was unidirectional, characterized by predominant risk seeking under both framing conditions, with more risk seeking under the negative frame than the positive frame. The framing effect was evaluated using the balanced format condition as an objective measure of the existing risk preference. Results suggest that the military participants were influenced by both positive format and negative format, and in the Chinese civil sample the negative format had an important effect. These findings expand the literature on risk decision by demonstrating the framing effect and comparing results from Chinese and American participants.

scholarly journals Shifting uncertainty intolerance: methylphenidate and attention-deficit hyperactivity disorder

2021 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Alekhya Mandali ◽  
Arjun Sethi ◽  
Mara Cercignani ◽  
Neil A. Harrison ◽  
Valerie Voon
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder ◽  
Attention Deficit ◽  
Computational Models ◽  
Risky Choice ◽  
Risk Tolerance ◽  
Healthy Population ◽  
Hyperactivity Disorder ◽  
Risky Choices ◽  
Cardinal Symptom

AbstractRisk evaluation is a critical component of decision making. Risk tolerance is relevant in both daily decisions and pathological disorders such as attention-deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD), where impulsivity is a cardinal symptom. Methylphenidate, a commonly prescribed drug in ADHD, improves attention but has mixed reports on risk-based decision making. Using a double-blinded placebo protocol, we studied the risk attitudes of ADHD patients and age-matched healthy volunteers while performing the 2-step sequential learning task and examined the effect of methylphenidate on their choices. We then applied a novel computational analysis using the hierarchical drift–diffusion model to extract parameters such as threshold (‘a’—amount of evidence accumulated before making a decision), drift rate (‘v’—information processing speed) and response bias (‘z’ apriori bias towards a specific choice) focusing specifically on risky choice preference. Critically, we show that ADHD patients on placebo have an apriori bias towards risky choices compared to controls. Furthermore, methylphenidate enhanced preference towards risky choices (higher apriori bias) in both groups but had a significantly greater effect in the patient population independent of clinical scores. Thus, methylphenidate appears to shift tolerance towards risky uncertain choices possibly mediated by prefrontal dopaminergic and noradrenergic modulation. We emphasise the utility of computational models in detecting underlying processes. Our findings have implications for subtle yet differential effects of methylphenidate on ADHD compared to healthy population.

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