scholarly journals Reduced risk-seeking in chimpanzees in a zero-outcome game

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stefanie Keupp ◽  
Sebastian Grueneisen ◽  
Elliot Andrew Ludvig ◽  
Felix Warneken ◽  
Alicia P. Melis
Keyword(s):  
Pan Troglodytes ◽  
Risk Preferences ◽  
Risky Choice ◽  
Individual Risk ◽  
Risk Seeking ◽  
Economic Decisions ◽  
Experimental Parameters ◽  
Probability Of Success ◽  
Risky Option ◽  
Reduced Risk

A key component of economic decisions is the integration of information about reward outcomes and probabilities in selecting between competing options. In many species, risky choice is influenced by the magnitude of available outcomes, probability of success, and the possibility of extreme outcomes. Chimpanzees are generally regarded to be risk seeking. In this study we examined two aspects of chimpanzees’ risk preferences: First, whether setting the value of the non-preferred outcome of a risky option to zero changes chimpanzees’ risk preferences, and second, whether individual risk preferences are stable across two different measures. Across two experiments, we found chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes, n = 23) as a group to be risk-neutral to risk-avoidant with highly stable individual risk preferences. We discuss how the possibility of going empty-handed might reduce chimpanzees’ risk seeking relative to previous studies. This malleability in risk preferences as a function of experimental parameters and individual differences raises interesting questions about whether it is appropriate or helpful to categorize a species as a whole as risk-seeking or risk-avoidant.

scholarly journals The Role of Memory in Distinguishing Risky Decisions from Experience and Description

2017 ◽  
Vol 70 (10) ◽  
pp. 2048-2059 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christopher R. Madan ◽  
Elliot A. Ludvig ◽  
Marcia L. Spetch
Keyword(s):  
Risk Preferences ◽  
Risk Preference ◽  
Risky Choice ◽  
Risk Averse ◽  
Memory Biases ◽  
Opposite Pattern ◽  
Decisions From Experience ◽  
Risk Seeking ◽  
Subject Design

People's risk preferences differ for choices based on described probabilities versus those based on information learned through experience. For decisions from description, people are typically more risk averse for gains than for losses. In contrast, for decisions from experience, people are sometimes more risk seeking for gains than losses, especially for choices with the possibility of extreme outcomes (big wins or big losses), which are systematically overweighed in memory. Using a within-subject design, this study evaluated whether this memory bias plays a role in the differences in risky choice between description and experience. As in previous studies, people were more risk seeking for losses than for gains in description but showed the opposite pattern in experience. People also more readily remembered the extreme outcomes and judged them as having occurred more frequently. These memory biases correlated with risk preferences in decisions from experience but not in decisions from description. These results suggest that systematic memory biases may be responsible for some of the differences in risk preference across description and experience.

scholarly journals The power of nothing: Risk preference in pigeons, but not people, is driven primarily by avoidance of zero outcomes

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jeffrey Matthew Pisklak ◽  
Christopher R Madan ◽  
Elliot Andrew Ludvig ◽  
Marcia L Spetch
Keyword(s):  
Homo Sapiens ◽  
Risk Preference ◽  
Columba Livia ◽  
Risky Choice ◽  
Repeated Exposure ◽  
Decision Context ◽  
Risk Seeking ◽  
Risky Choices ◽  
Risky Option ◽  
Risky Decisions

When making risky decisions, people and pigeons often show similar choice patterns. When people learn the reward probabilities through repeated exposure to the outcomes, their preference is disproportionately influenced by the extreme (highest and lowest) outcomes occurring in the decision context. Overweighting of these extremes increases preference for risky alternatives that lead to the highest outcome and decreases preference for risky alternatives that lead to the lowest outcome, termed the extreme-outcome rule. This rule predicts greater risk seeking for choices between safe and risky high-value outcomes than for choices between safe and risky low-value outcomes, when both choices occur in the same context. In a series of studies, we examine how this extreme-outcome rule generalizes within and across two evolutionary distant species: pigeons (Columba livia) and humans (Homo sapiens). Both species showed risky choices consistent with the extreme-outcome rule when a low-value risky option could yield an outcome of zero. When all outcome values were increased such that none of the options could lead to zero, people but not pigeons were still consistent with the extreme-outcome rule. Unlike people, pigeons no longer avoided a low-value risky option when it yielded a non-zero food outcome. These results suggest that, despite some similarities, different mechanisms underlie risky choice in pigeons and people.

Respondents in Asian Cultures (e.g., Chinese) are More Risk-Seeking and More Overconfident than Respondents in Other Cultures (e.g., in United States) but the Reciprocal Predictions are in Total Opposition: How and Why?

2004 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 263-292 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shu Li ◽  
Yongqing Fang
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Social Network ◽  
Risk Taking ◽  
Risk Preferences ◽  
Risk Preference ◽  
Cross Cultural ◽  
Cultural Variations ◽  
Risk Seeking ◽  
The Social ◽  
Predicted Risk

AbstractTriggered by rather surprising findings that respondents in Asian cultures (e.g., Chinese) are more risk-seeking and more overconfident than respondents in other cultures (e.g., in United States) and that the reciprocal predictions are in total opposition, four experiments were designed to extend previous collective-culture oriented researches. Results revealed that (1) Singapore 21, which is a vision of Singapore in the 21st century and has highlighted the promotion of a collective culture, did not advocate greater risk-seeking but led to weaker overconfidence; (2) the knowledge of "financial help from social network" did not permit prediction of risk preference but the knowledge of "the value difference between possible outcomes" did; (3) the social network could be viewed not only as a positive "cushion" but also as a negative "burden" in both gain and loss domains of risky choices; (4) the predictions of the risk-as-value, risk-as-feelings and stereotype hypotheses were not consistent with the predicted risk preferences of others but the predictions of the economic-performance hypothesis were consistent with the predicted risk preferences as well as the predicted overconfidence of others. The implications for cross-cultural variations in overconfidence and for cross-cultural variations in risk-taking were discussed.

Aspirations or survival: decision modeling and the effect of focus of attention in risky choice

2021 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Guy Moshe Ross
Keyword(s):  
Risk Taking ◽  
Reference Point ◽  
Effect Study ◽  
Focus Of Attention ◽  
Risky Choice ◽  
Reference Points ◽  
Aspiration Level ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Randomized Controlled Studies ◽  
Risky Option

Purpose This research aims to test focus of attention effects in risky choice. Design/methodology/approach As opposed to traditional aspiration-level theory, the shifting-focus concept introduces a second reference point, the survival point, and assumes a shifting focus of attention between the two reference points. In this conceptualization, risk-taking is a function of focus of attention on the survival reference point or the aspiration-level and resources relative to the two reference points. Four randomized controlled studies tested this concept. Findings Study 1 showed that with aspiration focus the probability of choosing a risky option was higher below an aspiration-level than above it. With survival focus, the effect was reversed. Study 2 found that close to the survival reference point, the probability of choosing a risky option was higher with aspiration focus relative to survival focus. Study 3 revealed that with scarce resources the risk taken was higher with aspiration focus than with survival focus, and the scarcer the resources the stronger was the effect. Study 4 demonstrated that with aspiration focus the risk taken was higher below an aspiration-level than above it. With survival focus the effect was reversed. Originality/value In addition to providing support for the validity of the shifting focus concept, this paper elaborates on the theoretical model by providing evidence for moderation effects. Risk-taking was affected by a focus of attention on one of two reference points, and the effect was moderated by resources relative to the two focal points. An advanced model is proposed to capture the effects of focus of attention and resources on risk-taking behavior.

Effect of pretesting on measures of individual risk preferences.

1973 ◽  
Vol 25 (2) ◽  
pp. 192-198 ◽  
Author(s):  
George D. Gaskell ◽  
Ewart A. Thomas ◽  
Robert M. Farr
Keyword(s):  
Risk Preferences ◽  
Individual Risk

Effects of Type of Payoff and Instructions on Individual Risk-Taking Behavior

1982 ◽  
Vol 51 (3) ◽  
pp. 855-860 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard T. Ettenson ◽  
Richard C. Coughlin
Keyword(s):  
Risk Taking ◽  
The Other ◽  
Individual Risk ◽  
Probability Level ◽  
Real Money ◽  
Real Risk ◽  
Probability Of Success ◽  
Risk Taking Behavior

32 subjects were presented 4 items involving decisions either to take a certain amount of money or select a probability level for winning a larger amount. In a 2 × 2 design, subjects either made these decisions hypothetically or actually played out their choices for money. For half of each group, the items described a fixed payoff regardless of the probability level selected, while for the other half there were variable payoffs where the amount won increased as the probability of success decreased. Data indicated that subjects were more conservative when playing for real money with a fixed payoff but not when there was a variable payoff. These results suggest that the presence of conservatism in real risk-taking situations may be a function of the type of payoff.

Contrasting Rational and Psychological Analyses of Political Choice

1988 ◽  
Vol 82 (3) ◽  
pp. 719-736 ◽  
Author(s):  
George A. Quattrone ◽  
Amos Tversky
Keyword(s):  
Risk Aversion ◽  
Prospect Theory ◽  
Expected Utility ◽  
Reference Point ◽  
Utility Theory ◽  
Expected Utility Theory ◽  
Risky Choice ◽  
Political Candidates ◽  
Risk Seeking ◽  
Psychological Analysis

We contrast the rational theory of choice in the form of expected utility theory with descriptive psychological analysis in the form of prospect theory, using problems involving the choice between political candidates and public referendum issues. The results showed that the assumptions underlying the classical theory of risky choice are systematically violated in the manner predicted by prospect theory. In particular, our respondents exhibited risk aversion in the domain of gains, risk seeking in the domain of losses, and a greater sensitivity to losses than to gains. This is consistent with the advantage of the incumbent under normal conditions and the potential advantage of the challenger in bad times. The results further show how a shift in the reference point could lead to reversals of preferences in the evaluation of political and economic options, contrary to the assumption of invariance. Finally, we contrast the normative and descriptive analyses of uncertainty in choice and address the rationality of voting.

scholarly journals Living near the edge: How extreme outcomes and their neighbours drive risky choice

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Elliot Andrew Ludvig ◽  
Christopher R Madan ◽  
Neil McMillan ◽  
Yaqian Xu ◽  
Marcia L Spetch
Keyword(s):  
Risky Choice ◽  
Special Role ◽  
Risk Seeking ◽  
Relative Gains ◽  
Open Question

Extreme stimuli are often more salient in perception and memory than moderate stimuli. In risky choice, when people learn the odds and outcomes from experience, the extreme outcomes (best and worst) also stand out. This additional salience leads to more risk-seeking for relative gains than for relative losses—the opposite of what people do when queried in terms of explicit probabilities. Previous research has suggested that this pattern arises because the most extreme experienced outcomes are more prominent in memory. An important open question, however, is what makes these extreme outcomes more prominent? Here we assess whether extreme outcomes stand out because they fall at the edges of the experienced outcome distributions or because they are distinct from other outcomes. Across four experiments, proximity to the edge determined what was treated as extreme: Outcomes at or near the edge of the outcome distribution were both better remembered and more heavily weighted in choice. This prominence did not depend on two metrics of distinctiveness: lower frequency or distance from other outcomes. This finding adds to evidence from other domains that the values at the edges of a distribution have a special role.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document