scholarly journals Do We Live In A Universe Where There Are Reliable Experiments About Conscious Experience?

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nicholas Martin Rosseinsky

A primary dysfunction in the current field of consciousness science is its lack of examination of its own methodological foundations, from a physical perspective. Mainstream approaches currently make two contradictory assumptions: (1) a standard-physics setting; and (2) the existence of reliable experiments about conscious experience, based on report. The key question for consciousness science is whether we *do* live in a Universe where reliable experiments about conscious experience exist - which would contradict standard physics. Fortunately the kind of Universe we live in is itself subject to relatively-straightforward experimental test! [Chapter 4 from 'The Science We Need - One Experiment to Change the World'.]

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nicholas Martin Rosseinsky

A fully-functioning consciousness science is vital for humankind's navigation of the 21st century. Unfortunately the field currently has a number of significant dysfunctions. Fortunately, they're all eminently fixable! However, there's very little attention currently either to the deep roots of problems, or to fixes. Notably, there's a crucial experiment that needs to be done, if we're to have any kind of scientific approach to conscious experience ... This Chapter ends with an explicit strategy for engaging with, and transforming, the current field. [Chapter 3 from 'The Science We Need - One Experiment to Change the World'.]


2020 ◽  
Vol 16 (1) ◽  
pp. 5-32
Author(s):  
Işık Sarıhan

Pure representationalism or intentionalism for phenomenal experience is the theory that all introspectible qualitative aspects of a conscious experience can be analyzed as qualities that the experience non-conceptually represents the world to have. Some philosophers have argued that experiences such as afterimages, phosphenes and double vision are counterexamples to the representationalist theory, claiming that they are non- representational states or have non-representational aspects, and they are better explained in a qualia-theoretical framework. I argue that these states are fully representational states of a certain kind, which I call “automatically non-endorsed representations”, experiential states the veridicality of which we are almost never committed to, and which do not trigger explicit belief or disbelief in the mind of the subject. By investigating descriptive accounts of afterimages by two qualia theorists, I speculate that the mistaken claims of some anti-representationalists might be rooted in confusing two senses of the term “seeming”.


Author(s):  
Daniel W. Johnston

This text and accompanying audio-visual files document a theatre workshop aimed at investigating how philosophical phenomenology might be useful in the creative process. Phenomenology is understood here as the study of the way the world shows itself to conscious experience through practical engagement with the world. The workshop involved five professional actors and four undergraduates working on Act II of Anton Chekhov’s The Cherry Orchard over two days. Basic concepts of phenomenology were introduced including Worldhood, Being-with-others, Moods, and Temporality. Each participant used a digital voice recorder to reflect on a series of exercises and tasks aimed at focusing attention on the experience of objects, places, and rehearsal itself. The workshop had three phases: developing an awareness of one’s own experience of the world, applying the same aspects of worldhood to a character, and reflection on the creative process of the actor in the part. Given the limited timeframe of the rehearsal, this was merely a preliminary examination of how phenomenology might inform and contribute to the artistic process of theatre-making. Rather than constituting an entirely new approach to rehearsal, theatre phenomenology might enable performers to develop an awareness of their own engagement with the world and creative practice.


2020 ◽  
Vol 25 (1) ◽  
pp. 71-88
Author(s):  
Robert Farrugia

Michel Henry radicalises phenomenology by putting forward the idea of a double manifestation: the “Truth of Life” and “truth of the world.” For Henry, the world turns out to be empty of Life. To find its essence, the self must dive completely inward, away from the exterior movements of intentionality. Hence, Life, or God, for Henry, lies in non‑intentional, immanent self-experience, which is felt and yet remains invisible, in an absolutist sense, as an a priori condition of all conscious experience. In Christian theology, the doctrine of the Trinity illuminates the distinction between the immanent Trinity (God’s self‑relation) and the economic workings of the Trinity (God‑world relation). However, the mystery of God’s inmost being and the economy of salvation are here understood as inseparable. In light of this, the paper aims to: 1) elucidate the significance of Henry’s engagement with the phenomenological tradition and his proposal of a phenomenology of Life which advocates an immanent auto‑affection, radically separate from the ek‑static nature of intentionality, and 2) confront the division between Life and world in Henry’s Christian phenomenology and its discordancy with the doctrine of the Trinity, as the latter attests to the harmonious unity that subsists between inner life and the world.


2021 ◽  
pp. 320-342
Author(s):  
Valia Allori

Quantum mechanics is a groundbreaking theory: it not only is extraordinarily empirically adequate but also is claimed to having shattered the classical paradigm of understanding the observer-observed distinction as well as the part-whole relation. This, together with other quantum features, has been taken to suggest that quantum theory can help one understand the mind-body relation in a unique way, in particular to solve the hard problem of consciousness along the lines of panpsychism. In this chapter, after having briefly presented panpsychism, Valia Allori discusses the main features of quantum theories and the way in which the main quantum theories of consciousness use them to account for conscious experience.


2021 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
pp. 132-137
Author(s):  
Muhammad Luthfi Sonjaya ◽  
Muh Farid Hidayat

Polyethylene plastic waste is such hazard object in the world, while the benefits of this plastic rubbish are prodigious. An extruder machine is one of the great ways to reduce huge amounts of plastic waste not only to the manufacturing companies which recycle the plastic waste but also to the small society. This extruder machine was created to overcome the problems faced by all countries about plastic waste in land or in ocean. The results of extruded plastic waste were solid filament that can be utilized for some valuable stuff made by plastic. From this study, experimental test was applied by heating the plastic waste with different temperatures of 150, 160, 170, 180, 190, 200, 210, 220, and 230°C. As a result, the best temperature to heat the polyethylene plastic waste is 190°C according to surface roughness test and digital caliper measurement.


Author(s):  
Alexander Freer

Wordsworth’s writing detects and investigates pleasures that are overlooked, underacknowledged, and ‘unremembered’. This book explores Wordsworth’s sustained interest in the ethical and aesthetic value of lost, inaccessible, and unfelt pleasure throughout his poetry and critical prose. Such pleasures are marginal and fleeting; they pass by silently and are recognized only retrospectively. Yet they shape the aims, technique, and ultimately the whole affective economy of Wordsworth’s writing. Rather than understanding the domain of pleasure to be subjective personal experience, Wordsworth posits affects and attachments beyond conscious experience and possession. By tracing the intertwined history of romanticism and psychoanalysis, the work teases Wordsworth’s interest in unnoticed experience apart from the psychoanalytic concepts that have shaped our understanding of it. Reading Wordsworth against Freud, it rethinks central critical categories: repression, sublimation, mourning, happiness, pleasure, and the gift. In Wordsworth’s account of composition, it locates the resources to rethink poetic pleasure: not as wish-fulfilment, nor as aesthetic escape, but as an engaged and reparative relation to the world.


Author(s):  
Philip Goff

A core philosophical project is the attempt to uncover the fundamental nature of reality, the limited set of facts upon which all other facts depend. Perhaps the most popular theory of fundamental reality in contemporary analytic philosophy is physicalism: the view that the world is fundamentally physical in nature. The first half of this book argues that physicalist views cannot account for the evident reality of conscious experience and hence that physicalism cannot be true. However, the book also tries to show that familiar arguments to this conclusion—Frank Jackson’s form of the knowledge argument and David Chalmers’ two-dimensional conceivability argument—are not wholly adequate. The second half of the book explores and defends a radical alternative to physicalism known as “Russellian monism.” Russellian monists believe that (i) physics tells us nothing about the concrete, categorical nature of material entities, and that (ii) it is this “hidden” nature of matter that explains human and animal consciousness. Throughout the second half of the book various forms of Russellian monism are surveyed, and the key challenges facing it are discussed. Ultimately the book defends a cosmopsychist form of Russellian monism, according to which all facts are grounded in facts about the conscious universe.


Philosophy ◽  
1989 ◽  
Vol 64 (248) ◽  
pp. 207-217
Author(s):  
David Pugmire

Thomas Nagel claimed that subjectivity is what distinguishes those states known in the vernacular as conscious or as experiences. And he argued that subjectivity eludes reductivist theories of mind, which are obliged to ignore it and hence to fail. I shall be concerned here primarily with the formulation of the concept of subjectivity. Nagel tried to delineate subjectivity in a well known phrase: ‘an organism has conscious mental states if and only if there is something it is like to be that organism—something it is like for the organism’. Nagel offers to explain this condition of being host to conscious experience as the organism's having a point of view on the world, a point of view which is its own and nothing else's, however much or little the world as disclosed by it may agree with what is presented from other points of view.


2018 ◽  
Vol 41 (spe) ◽  
pp. 199-232 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alfredo Pereira Jr.

Abstract: The development of the interdisciplinary areas of cognitive, affective and action neurosciences contributes to the identification of neurobiological bases of conscious experience. The structure of consciousness was philosophically conceived a century ago (HUSSERL, 1913) as consisting of a subjective pole, the bearer of experiences, and an objective pole composed of experienced contents. In more recent formulations, Nagel (1974) refers to a “point of view”, in which qualitative experiences are anchored, while Velmans (1990, 1993, 2009, 2017) understands that phenomenal content is composed of mental representations “projected” to the space external to the brains that construct them. In Freudian psychology, the conscious mind contains a tension between the Id and the Ego (FREUD, 1913). How to relate this bipolar structure with the results of neuroscience? I propose the notion of projection [also used by Williford et al. (2012)] as a bridge principle connecting the neurobiological systems of knowing, feeling and acting with the bipolar structure. The projective process is considered responsible for the generation of the sense of self and the sense of the world, composing an informational phenomenal field generated by the nervous system and experienced in the first-person perspective. After presenting the projective hypothesis, I discuss its philosophical status, relating it to the phenomenal (BLOCK, 1995, 2008, 2011) and high-order thought (ROSENTHAL, 2006; BROWN, 2014) approaches, and a mathematical model of projection (RUDRAUF et al., 2017). Eight ways of testing the status of the projective hypothesis are briefly mentioned.


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