The radically embodied conscious cybernetic Bayesian brain: Towards explaining the emergence of agency
This manuscript attempts to characterize a broad range of intentional phenomena in terms of embodied self-models (ESMs), understood as body maps with agentic properties, functioning as predictive-memory systems and cybernetic controllers. ESMs may constitute a dominant organizing principle for neural architectures due to their initial and ongoing significance for the processes by which inference problems are solved in cognitive (and affective) development. Specifically, embodied experiences may provide a source of foundational lessons in learning curriculums in which agents explore increasingly challenging inference spaces along zones of proximal development, so helping to solve an unresolved problem in Bayesian cognitive science: what are biologically plausible mechanisms for equipping learners with sufficiently constraining/empowering inductive biases? Drawing on models from neurophysiology, psychology, and developmental robotics, I suggest a potentially surprising answer to how this problem might be solved: body maps are the primary source of (empirical) priors, or very reliably learnable posterior expectations. If ESMs play this kind of foundational role in bootstrapping cognitive development, then we ought to expect bidirectional linkages between all sensory modalities and frontal-parietal control hierarchies, so infusing all senses with somatic-motoric properties, thereby structuring all perception by relevant affordances, so solving frame problems for embodied learners/agents.