scholarly journals Inference from explanation

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lara Kirfel ◽  
Thomas Icard ◽  
Tobias Gerstenberg

What do we communicate with causal explanations? Upon being told, "E because C", one might learn that C and E both occurred, and perhaps that there is a causal relationship between C and E. In fact, causal explanations systematically disclose much more than this basic information. Here, we offer a communication-theoretic account of explanation that makes specific predictions about the kinds of inferences people draw from others' explanations. We test these predictions in a case study involving the role of norms and causal structure. In Experiment 1, we demonstrate that people infer the normality of a cause from an explanation when they know the underlying causal structure. In Experiment 2, we show that people infer the causal structure from an explanation if they know the normality of the cited cause. We find these patterns both for scenarios that manipulate the statistical and prescriptive normality of events. Finally, we consider how the communicative function of explanations, as highlighted in this series of experiments, may help to elucidate the distinctive roles that normality and causal structure play in causal judgment, paving the way toward a more comprehensive account of causal explanation.

Author(s):  
Brad Skow

This chapter argues that the notion of explanation relevant to the philosophy of science is that of an answer to a why-question. From this point of view it surveys most of the historically important theories of explanation. Hempel’s deductive-nomological, and inductive-statistical, models of explanation required explanations to cite laws. Familiar counterexamples to these models suggested that laws are not needed, and instead that explanations should cite causes. One theory of causal explanation, David Lewis’s, is discussed in some detail. Many philosophers now reject causal theories of explanation because they think that there are non-causal explanations; some examples are reviewed. The role of probabilities and statistics in explanation, and their relation to causation, is also discussed. Another strategy for dealing with counterexamples to Hempel’s theory leads to unificationist theories of explanation. Kitcher's unificationist theory is presented, and a new argument against unificationist theories is offered. Also discussed in some detail are Van Fraassen’s pragmatic theory, and Streven’s and Woodward’s recent theories of causal explanation.


2019 ◽  
Vol 34 (3) ◽  
pp. 221-242
Author(s):  
Egil Øvrelid ◽  
Bendik Bygstad

Radical shifts in large information technology programmes or digital infrastructures are unusual, but they do occur, usually as a consequence of problems or misalignment. What we know less about is the role of discourse in these shifts. Our interest in this article is to investigate the role of discourse when digitalisation programmes encounter problems. Building on Foucault’s theory of discourse, our research question is: what is the role of discourse in the transformation of digital infrastructures? Our research approach is a critical realist case study, discussing three cases from eHealth innovation. We use Foucault’s archaeological methodology to identify the emerging discursive formations when a programme encounters difficulties. This enables us to analyse the causal relationship between discursive formations and other mechanisms in the infrastructure. We offer two contributions: first, we outline a framework to understand the role of discursive formations in digital transformation; second, we propose a set of configurations to explain how contextual factors and causal mechanisms contingently lead to the transformation of a digital infrastructure.


Author(s):  
Jonathan Birch

HRG has been criticized for being an ‘empty statement’ or tautology, for failing to yield predictions, and for failing to yield causal explanations of change. There is some justification for these charges, yet they do not undermine the value of HRG as an organizing framework. In response to the ‘tautology’ complaint, we should admit that HRG is tautology-like, in that it avoids detailed dynamical assumptions. But this is an advantage in an organizing framework, because it ensures its compatibility with a wide range of more detailed models. In response to the ‘prediction’ complaint, we should concede that HRG is not very useful for prediction, but the role of an organizing framework is not predictive. In response to the ‘causal explanation’ complaint, this chapter argues that HRG, by organizing our thinking about ultimate causes, generates understanding of those causes. It also compares favourably to other possible organizing frameworks.


2021 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 175-184
Author(s):  
Deddy Mursanto

Police responsibility is very complex ranging from in public service to supporting security against the security of the State. Seeing or studying the task of the Police to the scale of the Police then  the author wants to describe the duties and responsibilities of the National Police  mandated by law in carrying out its duties and responsibilities  by taking samples, namely baubau city police in controlling the mandate of the Law and  information related to the handling of the Covid-19 Pandemic where the city of Baubau was not spared the impact of the pandemic. The purpose of this study is to understand the role of the police in the implementation of kamtibmas during the Covid 19 pandemic in Baubau City. The types of data used in the study are primary and secondary data collected from the interview process and literature studies,  which will then be analyzed qualitatively with the steps that have reduced the data. The results of this study concluded the role of Bhabinkamtibmas and Intelkam is very basic and supports all police duties in maintaining public order and looking for basic information about people who do not comply with the recommendations of health protocols in the community during the Current Covid-19 Pandemic and provide input to the community to prevent the emergence of new perpetrators of crimes due to the Covid-19 pandemic by giving input on what should be done by the community.


1987 ◽  
Author(s):  
William A. Worrall ◽  
Ann W. Stockman

2019 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-9
Author(s):  
Robert M. Anderson ◽  
Amy M. Lambert

The island marble butterfly (Euchloe ausonides insulanus), thought to be extinct throughout the 20th century until re-discovered on a single remote island in Puget Sound in 1998, has become the focus of a concerted protection effort to prevent its extinction. However, efforts to “restore” island marble habitat conflict with efforts to “restore” the prairie ecosystem where it lives, because of the butterfly’s use of a non-native “weedy” host plant. Through a case study of the island marble project, we examine the practice of ecological restoration as the enactment of particular norms that define which species are understood to belong in the place being restored. We contextualize this case study within ongoing debates over the value of “native” species, indicative of deep-seated uncertainties and anxieties about the role of human intervention to alter or manage landscapes and ecosystems, in the time commonly described as the “Anthropocene.” We interpret the question of “what plants and animals belong in a particular place?” as not a question of scientific truth, but a value-laden construct of environmental management in practice, and we argue for deeper reflexivity on the part of environmental scientists and managers about the social values that inform ecological restoration.


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