Scientific Explanation

2015 ◽  
Author(s):  
Brad Skow
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Science ◽  
Statistical Models ◽  
Scientific Explanation ◽  
Causal Explanation ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
Causal Explanations ◽  
Pragmatic Theory ◽  
Causal Theories

This chapter argues that the notion of explanation relevant to the philosophy of science is that of an answer to a why-question. From this point of view it surveys most of the historically important theories of explanation. Hempel’s deductive-nomological, and inductive-statistical, models of explanation required explanations to cite laws. Familiar counterexamples to these models suggested that laws are not needed, and instead that explanations should cite causes. One theory of causal explanation, David Lewis’s, is discussed in some detail. Many philosophers now reject causal theories of explanation because they think that there are non-causal explanations; some examples are reviewed. The role of probabilities and statistics in explanation, and their relation to causation, is also discussed. Another strategy for dealing with counterexamples to Hempel’s theory leads to unificationist theories of explanation. Kitcher's unificationist theory is presented, and a new argument against unificationist theories is offered. Also discussed in some detail are Van Fraassen’s pragmatic theory, and Streven’s and Woodward’s recent theories of causal explanation.

scholarly journals Searching for Non-Causal Explanations in a Sea of Causes

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alisa Bokulich
Keyword(s):  
Scientific Explanation ◽  
Causal Explanation ◽  
Causal Explanations ◽  
Explanatory Pluralism ◽  
Sand Ripples ◽  
Scientific Explanations ◽  
Model Based ◽  
Aeolian Geomorphology

In the spirit of explanatory pluralism, this chapter argues that causal and non-causal explanations of a phenomenon are compatible, each being useful for bringing out different sorts of insights. First the chapter reviews the author’s model-based account of scientific explanation, which can accommodate causal and non-causal explanations alike. Then it distills from the literature an important core conception of non-causal explanation. This non-causal form of model-based explanation is illustrated using the example of how Earth scientists in a subfield known as aeolian geomorphology are explaining the formation of regularly-spaced sand ripples. The chapter concludes that even when it comes to everyday “medium-sized dry goods” such as sand ripples, where there is a complete causal story to be told, one can find examples of non-causal scientific explanations.

scholarly journals A Defence of Manipulationist Noncausal Explanation: The Case for Intervention Liberalism

Erkenntnis ◽  
2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nicholas Emmerson
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Science ◽  
Causal Explanation ◽  
Science Literature ◽  
Cambridge University ◽  
Oxford University ◽  
The Core ◽  
Mechanistic Constitution ◽  
Core Feature ◽  
Specific Position

AbstractRecent years have seen growing interest in modifying interventionist accounts of causal explanation in order to characterise noncausal explanation. However, one surprising element of such accounts is that they have typically jettisoned the core feature of interventionism: interventions. Indeed, the prevailing opinion within the philosophy of science literature suggests that interventions exclusively demarcate causal relationships. This position is so prevalent that, until now, no one has even thought to name it. We call it “intervention puritanism”. In this paper, we mount the first sustained defence of the idea that there are distinctively noncausal explanations which can be characterized in terms of possible interventions; and thus, argue that I-puritanism is false. We call the resultant position “intervention liberalism” (I-liberalism, for short). While many have followed Woodward (Making Things Happen: A Theory of Causal Explanation, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2003) in committing to I-pluralism, we trace support for I-liberalism back to the work of Kim (in: Kim (ed) Supervenience and mind, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1974/1993). Furthermore, we analyse two recent sources of scepticism regarding I-liberalism: debate surrounding mechanistic constitution; and attempts to provide a monistic account of explanation. We show that neither literature provides compelling reasons for adopting I-puritanism. Finally, we present a novel taxonomy of available positions upon the role of possible interventions in explanation: weak causal imperialism; strong causal imperialism; monist intervention puritanism; pluralist intervention puritanism; monist intervention liberalism; and finally, the specific position defended in this paper, pluralist intervention liberalism.

scholarly journals General Psychology as Common Ground and Point of View: Enduring and Evolving Features

2020 ◽  
Vol 24 (1) ◽  
pp. 6-17 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lisa M. Osbeck
Keyword(s):  
Big Data ◽  
Philosophy Of Science ◽  
Data Analytics ◽  
Common Ground ◽  
Big Data Analytics ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
Critical Psychology ◽  
General Psychology ◽  
The Past

The article draws from historical and contemporary resources to articulate the enduring or persistent responsibilities of general psychology, suggesting “common ground” and “point of view” as useful concepts in line with these. It then explores three important developments in the discipline over the past several decades—big data analytics, methodological proliferation, and critical psychology—and considers the role of general psychology in relation to these developments. The point of the article is to claim and illustrate that general psychology includes a philosophy of science from within, and that it has lasting importance to the broader discipline, even as the discipline itself transforms.

scholarly journals Inference from explanation

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lara Kirfel ◽  
Thomas Icard ◽  
Tobias Gerstenberg
Keyword(s):  
Causal Relationship ◽  
Causal Explanation ◽  
Causal Structure ◽  
Causal Judgment ◽  
Basic Information ◽  
Causal Explanations ◽  
Communicative Function ◽  
Series Of Experiments

What do we communicate with causal explanations? Upon being told, "E because C", one might learn that C and E both occurred, and perhaps that there is a causal relationship between C and E. In fact, causal explanations systematically disclose much more than this basic information. Here, we offer a communication-theoretic account of explanation that makes specific predictions about the kinds of inferences people draw from others' explanations. We test these predictions in a case study involving the role of norms and causal structure. In Experiment 1, we demonstrate that people infer the normality of a cause from an explanation when they know the underlying causal structure. In Experiment 2, we show that people infer the causal structure from an explanation if they know the normality of the cited cause. We find these patterns both for scenarios that manipulate the statistical and prescriptive normality of events. Finally, we consider how the communicative function of explanations, as highlighted in this series of experiments, may help to elucidate the distinctive roles that normality and causal structure play in causal judgment, paving the way toward a more comprehensive account of causal explanation.

scholarly journals The Philosophy of Science

2018 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Science ◽  
Science Studies ◽  
Scientific Explanation ◽  
Research Area ◽  
Scientific Change ◽  
Current State ◽  
Special Sciences ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Common Vision

Philosophy of science studies the methods, theories, and concepts used by scientists. It mainly developed as a field in its own right during the twentieth century and is now a diversified and lively research area. This book surveys the current state of the discipline by focusing on central themes such as confirmation of scientific hypotheses, scientific explanation, causality, the relationship between science and metaphysics, scientific change, the relationship between philosophy of science and science studies, the role of theories and models, and unity of science. These themes define general philosophy of science. The book also presents subdisciplines in the philosophy of science dealing with the main sciences: logic, mathematics, physics, biology, medicine, cognitive science, linguistics, social sciences, and economics. Although it is common to address the specific philosophical problems raised by physics and biology in such a book, the place assigned to the philosophy of special sciences is much more unusual. Most authors collaborate on a regular basis in their research or teaching and share a common vision of philosophy of science and its place within philosophy and academia in general. The chapters have been written in close accordance with the three editors, thus achieving strong unity of style and tone.

The Rule under Attack

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jonathan Birch
Keyword(s):  
Causal Explanation ◽  
Causal Explanations ◽  
Empty Statement ◽  
Wide Range

HRG has been criticized for being an ‘empty statement’ or tautology, for failing to yield predictions, and for failing to yield causal explanations of change. There is some justification for these charges, yet they do not undermine the value of HRG as an organizing framework. In response to the ‘tautology’ complaint, we should admit that HRG is tautology-like, in that it avoids detailed dynamical assumptions. But this is an advantage in an organizing framework, because it ensures its compatibility with a wide range of more detailed models. In response to the ‘prediction’ complaint, we should concede that HRG is not very useful for prediction, but the role of an organizing framework is not predictive. In response to the ‘causal explanation’ complaint, this chapter argues that HRG, by organizing our thinking about ultimate causes, generates understanding of those causes. It also compares favourably to other possible organizing frameworks.

scholarly journals Network explanations and explanatory directionality

2020 ◽  
Vol 375 (1796) ◽  
pp. 20190318 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lina Jansson
Keyword(s):  
Biological Networks ◽  
Scientific Explanation ◽  
Network Models ◽  
Causal Models ◽  
Topological Properties ◽  
Theme Issue ◽  
Causal Explanations ◽  
Philosophical Foundations ◽  
Direction Of Causation

Network explanations raise foundational questions about the nature of scientific explanation. The challenge discussed in this article comes from the fact that network explanations are often thought to be non-causal, i.e. they do not describe the dynamical or mechanistic interactions responsible for some behaviour, instead they appeal to topological properties of network models describing the system. These non-causal features are often thought to be valuable precisely because they do not invoke mechanistic or dynamical interactions and provide insights that are not available through causal explanations. Here, I address a central difficulty facing attempts to move away from causal models of explanation; namely, how to recover the directionality of explanation. Within causal models, the directionality of explanation is identified with the direction of causation. This solution is no longer available once we move to non-causal accounts of explanation. I will suggest a solution to this problem that emphasizes the role of conditions of application. In doing so, I will challenge the idea that sui generis mathematical dependencies are the key to understand non-causal explanations. The upshot is a conceptual account of explanation that accommodates the possibility of non-causal network explanations. It also provides guidance for how to evaluate such explanations. This article is part of the theme issue ‘Unifying the essential concepts of biological networks: biological insights and philosophical foundations’.

scholarly journals The role of metaphor, metonymy, and conceptual blending in understanding advertisements: the case of drug-prevention ads

2006 ◽  
pp. 169 ◽  
Author(s):  
Javier Herrero Ruiz
Keyword(s):  
Drug Prevention ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
Conceptual Blending ◽  
Future Time ◽  
Cognitive Perspective ◽  
Proper Understanding ◽  
Pragmatic Theory ◽  
Eyes Open ◽  
Long Life

Over the last years, there has been a growing interest in the analysis of advertisements from the point of view of pragmatic theory (cf. Brierley, 1995; Myers, 1994; Rein, 1982; Tanaka, 1994). Nevertheless, pragmatic studies of the language of advertising from a cognitive perspective are scarce (cf. Turner & Fauconnier, 2000; Coulson, 2000; Sánchez & Gómez, 2002). In this connection, the aim of this study is twofold: first, we attempt to provide additional evidence about the role of metaphor, metonymy, and conceptual blending in the proper understanding of a set of drug-prevention ads and, second, we shall demonstrate that, in addition to determining the semantics of the slogans, the underlying mappings also constrain the choice of their related visual layouts; thus, the overall communicative effects brought about by the advertisement are further reinforced. With this purpose in mind, we have drawn a corpus of sixteen drug-prevention advertisements, both in Spanish and English, which include slogans and images. The adverts under consideration have been entirely retrieved from the net, and contain expressions such as "keep your eyes open," "there is a long life ahead," or "turn away from drugs." We shall show that the interpretation of such examples ultimately exploits metaphor (e.g. FUTURE TIME IS IN FRONT OF EGO, KNOWING IS SEEING) and metonymy (e.g. EFFECT FOR CAUSE), either independently or in interaction, and conceptual blending.

Elucidation of block boundaries as the dissolution channels in hydrated cement

1978 ◽  
Vol 36 (1) ◽  
pp. 484-485
Author(s):  
N.V. Belov ◽  
U.I. Papiashwili ◽  
B.E. Yudovich
Keyword(s):  
Liquid Phase ◽  
Grain Boundaries ◽  
Benzoyl Peroxide ◽  
Phase Contrast ◽  
Active Role ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
Hardened Cement ◽  
Hydrated Cement ◽  
Hardened Cement Paste

It has been almost universally adopted that dissolution of solids proceeds with development of uniform, continuous frontiers of reaction.However this point of view is doubtful / 1 /. E.g. we have proved the active role of the block (grain) boundaries in the main phases of cement, these boundaries being the areas of hydrate phases' nucleation / 2 /. It has brought to the supposition that the dissolution frontier of cement particles in water is discrete. It seems also probable that the dissolution proceeds through the channels, which serve both for the liquid phase movement and for the drainage of the incongruant solution products. These channels can be appeared along the block boundaries.In order to demonsrate it, we have offered the method of phase-contrast impregnation of the hardened cement paste with the solution of methyl metacrylahe and benzoyl peroxide. The viscosity of this solution is equal to that of water.

Whatever Happened to the Cambridge Capital Theory Controversies? (With comments by L. Pasinetti, F. Fisher, J. Felipe and J. McCombie, R. Greenfield and reply by the authors)

2009 ◽  
pp. 4-27
Author(s):  
A. Cohen ◽  
G. Harcourt
Keyword(s):  
Economic Theory ◽  
Economic Thought ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
Chronological Order ◽  
Capital Theory

The article written by the well-known theorists and historians of economic thought contains a detailed overview of the Cambridge capital controversy, which had raged from the mid-1950-s through the mid-1970-s. The authors track the origins of the controversy and cover arguments of both sides in chronological order. From their point of view, the discussion hasnt been resolved, and its main underlying aspects were ideological beliefs and fundamental methodological controversies on the nature of equilibrium and on the role of time in economic theory. The article is published with comments written by other leading theoreticians.

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