scholarly journals Nice Questions Unanswered: Grokster, Sony's Staple Article of Commerce Doctrine, and the Deferred Verdict on Internet File Sharing

2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Annemarie Bridy

When is the developer or distributor of a copying technology legally responsible for the copyright infringements committed by users of that technology? Over the past twenty years or so, development and deployment of digital copying technologies (personal computers, CD and DVD burners, iPods and other portable music devices, the Internet itself, etc.), and tools for Internet file sharing and file distribution, have thrust that question into the center of a high-profile public debate. That debate gave rise to the most closely watched copyright case of recent years, MGMStudios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals had held that defendants Grokster and StreamCast, the developers and distributors of peer-to-peer file-sharing software, were shielded from copyright liability by the so-called Sony doctrine (also called the Betamax case), interpreting that doctrine to mean that distributors of copying technology that is capable of commercially significant noninfringing use are shielded from liability for the infringement committed by users of the technology, unless the distributors had specific knowledge of infringement obtained at a time at which they contributed to the infringement and had failed to act upon that information. The Supreme Court unanimously reversed, holding that because Grokster and StreamCast had distributed their software with the object of promoting its use to infringe copyright, as shown by clear expression or other affirmative steps taken to foster infringement, Sony did not protect them from liability, whether or not their software was capable of commercially significant noninfringing use. The unanimous decision in the copyright holders' favor is, obviously, a big loss for Grokster Inc. and StreamCast, Ltd.; its broader implications for Internet file-sharing practices and file-sharing technology, however, are much less clear; to try to understand what they might be, we rewind the tape, back to Sony in 1984.Annemarie BridyProfessor<http://www.uidaho.edu/law/faculty/annemariebridy>|University of Idaho College of Law|PO Box 83720-0051|Boise, ID 83720|Ph. 208.364.4583Affiliate Scholar<https://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/about/people/annemarie-bridy>|Stanford Center for Internet and SocietyAffiliate Fellow<http://isp.yale.edu/people-directory?type=19>|Yale Information Society ProjectSSRN<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/cf_dev/AbsByAuth.cfm?per_id=630766>|HeinOnline<http://heinonline.org/HOL/AuthorProfile?collection=journals&search_name=Bridy,%20Annemarie&base=js>|LinkedIn<https://www.linkedin.com/in/annemariebridy>|Twitter<https://twitter.com/AnnemarieBridy>

2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Annemarie Bridy

This article examines P2P file sharing and the copyright enforcement problem it has created through the lens of scalability. Writing about the growth and governance of the Internet, David Post observed that "scaling problems - the problems that arise solely as a consequence of increasing size or increasing numbers - can be profound, and profoundly difficult to solve." Both the Internet's designers and the designers of P2P networks solved difficult problems of scale in their effort to revolutionize the distribution of information goods. In doing so, however, they created a problem of scale in the form of "massive infringement." How to approach solving that problem of scale is the subject of this article.Part I traces the evolution of peer-to-peer (P2P) networks from Napster to BitTorrent, with a focus on the relative scalability of successive architectures. Part II takes up the difficult question of the scale of P2P infringement and its harms, examining the strategic number-crunching that underlies industry data on piracy, the government's credulous acceptance of that data, and the risk of letting industry hyperbole drive copyright policy and law enforcement priorities. Part III evaluates the efficacy of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) as a policy mechanism for scaling up online copyright enforcement. I argue in Part III that the DMCA has proven to be remarkably scalable for enforcing copyrights in hosted content but has altogether failed to scale in the context of P2P file sharing, leading to the dysfunctional workaround of mass John Doe litigation. Part IV weighs the costs and benefits of more scalable alternatives to mass litigation, including a potential amendment of the DMCA's pre-litigation subpoena provision and a pair of administrative dispute resolution systems - one hypothetical, the other real - for streamlining adjudication of P2P infringement claims.Annemarie BridyProfessor<http://www.uidaho.edu/law/faculty/annemariebridy>|University of Idaho College of Law|PO Box 83720-0051|Boise, ID 83720|Ph. 208.364.4583Affiliate Scholar<https://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/about/people/annemarie-bridy>|Stanford Center for Internet and SocietyAffiliate Fellow<http://isp.yale.edu/people-directory?type=19>|Yale Information Society ProjectSSRN<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/cf_dev/AbsByAuth.cfm?per_id=630766>|HeinOnline<http://heinonline.org/HOL/AuthorProfile?collection=journals&search_name=Bridy,%20Annemarie&base=js>|LinkedIn<https://www.linkedin.com/in/annemariebridy>|Twitter<https://twitter.com/AnnemarieBridy>


2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Annemarie Bridy

Since the birth of Napster in 1999, corporate copyright owners have attempted to "govern" file sharing aggressively at three discrete points of intervention: the content level, the network level, and the user level. Their efforts have met with resistance at each of these points, however, because they have failed to appreciate the insight articulated by Michel Foucault that governing people, in the broad sense, is not only a matter of making them behave; it's also a matter of making them want to behave. This article surveys a decade's worth of anti-piracy regulation and examines the ways in which the entertainment industry's recourse to coercion at every point of intervention has functioned to undermine rather than advance the anti-piracy cause.Annemarie BridyProfessor<http://www.uidaho.edu/law/faculty/annemariebridy>|University of Idaho College of Law|PO Box 83720-0051|Boise, ID 83720|Ph. 208.364.4583Affiliate Scholar<https://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/about/people/annemarie-bridy>|Stanford Center for Internet and SocietyAffiliate Fellow<http://isp.yale.edu/people-directory?type=19>|Yale Information Society ProjectSSRN<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/cf_dev/AbsByAuth.cfm?per_id=630766>|HeinOnline<http://heinonline.org/HOL/AuthorProfile?collection=journals&search_name=Bridy,%20Annemarie&base=js>|LinkedIn<https://www.linkedin.com/in/annemariebridy>|Twitter<https://twitter.com/AnnemarieBridy>


1944 ◽  
Vol 38 (2) ◽  
pp. 266-288
Author(s):  
Robert E. Cushman

On February 15, 1943, Wiley B. Rutledge, Jr., a judge of the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, took the seat on the Supreme Court vacated by the resignation in October, 1942, of Mr. Justice Byrnes. There were no other changes in the Court's personnel. Disagreement among the justices abated somewhat. In only a dozen cases of importance did either four or three justices dissent, as against some thirty cases in the last term. The Court overruled two earlier decisions, both recent; and the reversal in each case was made possible by the vote of Mr. Justice Rutledge.A. QUESTIONS OF NATIONAL POWER1. WAR POWER-CIVIL VERSUS MILITARY AUTHORITYWest Coast Curfew Applied to Japanese-American Citizens. In February, 1942, the President issued Executive Order No. 9066, which authorized the creation of military areas from which any or all persons might be excluded and with respect to which the right of persons to enter, remain in, or leave should be subject to such regulations as the military authorities might prescribe. On March 2, the entire West Coast to an average depth of forty miles was set up as Military Area No. 1 by the Commanding General in that area, and the intention was announced to evacuate from it persons of suspected loyalty, alien enemies, and all persons, aliens and citizens alike, of Japanese ancestry.


2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Annemarie Bridy

In the years since passage of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act ("DMCA"), the copyright industries have demanded that online intermediaries - both those covered by the DMCA and those falling outside the statute's ambit - do more than the law requires to protect their intellectual property rights. In particular, they have sought new ways to reach and shutter "pirate sites" beyond the reach of United States law. Their demands have been answered through an expanding regime of nominally voluntary "DMCA-plus" enforcement.This chapter surveys the current landscape of DMCA-plus enforcement by dividing such enforcement into two categories: Type 1 and Type 2. Type 1 DMCA-plus enforcement is cooperation by DMCA-covered intermediaries over and above what is required for safe harbor. Type 2 DMCA-plus enforcement is cooperation by intermediaries whose activities fall outside the scope of the DMCA's safe harbors and who are not liable for their customers' copyright infringements under secondary liability rules.As the gap widens between what the law requires and what intermediaries are agreeing to do on a voluntary basis, there is reason to be concerned about the expressive and due process rights of users and website operators, who have no seat at the table when intermediaries and copyright owners negotiate "best practices" for mitigating online infringement, including which sanctions to impose, which content to remove, and which websites to block without judicial intervention.Annemarie BridyProfessor<http://www.uidaho.edu/law/faculty/annemariebridy>|University of Idaho College of Law|PO Box 83720-0051|Boise, ID 83720|Ph. 208.364.4583Affiliate Scholar<https://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/about/people/annemarie-bridy>|Stanford Center for Internet and SocietyAffiliate Fellow<http://isp.yale.edu/people-directory?type=19>|Yale Information Society ProjectSSRN<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/cf_dev/AbsByAuth.cfm?per_id=630766>|HeinOnline<http://heinonline.org/HOL/AuthorProfile?collection=journals&search_name=Bridy,%20Annemarie&base=js>|LinkedIn<https://www.linkedin.com/in/annemariebridy>|Twitter<https://twitter.com/AnnemarieBridy>


2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Annemarie Bridy

In Bring in the Nerds: Secrecy, National Security, and the Creation of Intellectual Property Law, David Levine juxtaposes two starkly different copyright policymaking processes: the closed international process that produced the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA) and the relatively open domestic process that led quite dramatically to the scuttling of the Stop Online Piracy Act (SOPA) and the PROTECT IP Act (PIPA). He reads the two processes against each other as a prelude to recommending Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) reform. The amendment to FOIA that Professor Levine proposes would open the international IP policymaking process to greater public scrutiny by creating a qualified public right to "foreign relations" national security information, which was systematically withheld from the public during the ACTA negotiations. This article, prepared for the Cardozo Arts and Entertainment Law Journal's 2012 Symposium, "Piracy and the Politics of Policing: Legislating and Enforcing Copyright Law," is a response to Professor Levine that draws on Jürgen Habermas' discourse theory of procedural democracy to examine the policymaking dynamics of ACTA and SOPA/PIPA and to assess the democracy-enhancing potential of the FOIA reform Professor Levine proposes.Annemarie BridyProfessor<http://www.uidaho.edu/law/faculty/annemariebridy>|University of Idaho College of Law|PO Box 83720-0051|Boise, ID 83720|Ph. 208.364.4583Affiliate Scholar<https://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/about/people/annemarie-bridy>|Stanford Center for Internet and SocietyAffiliate Fellow<http://isp.yale.edu/people-directory?type=19>|Yale Information Society ProjectSSRN<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/cf_dev/AbsByAuth.cfm?per_id=630766>|HeinOnline<http://heinonline.org/HOL/AuthorProfile?collection=journals&search_name=Bridy,%20Annemarie&base=js>|LinkedIn<https://www.linkedin.com/in/annemariebridy>|Twitter<https://twitter.com/AnnemarieBridy>


1951 ◽  
Vol 45 (1) ◽  
pp. 86-109
Author(s):  
Robert J. Harris

There were two changes in the personnel of the Supreme Court during the 1949 term. Attorney General Tom C. Clark was sworn in as an Associate Justice to succeed the late Justice Frank Murphy on August 24, 1949, after his nomination by President Truman had been approved on August 19 by a vote of 73 to 8. Judge Sherman Minton of the United States Circuit Court of Appeals was nominated to be an Associate Justice on September 15, 1949, to succeed Justice Wiley Rutledge. His nomination was approved by the Senate on October 4 by a vote of 48 to 16, and he was sworn in on October 12. During much of the term Justice Douglas was absent as the result of an accident incurred during the preceding summer recess. The loss of Justices Murphy and Rutledge greatly weakened the liberal alignment of the Court and very positively influenced the decision of a number of doubtful cases contrary to precedents of a recent date.


2017 ◽  
Vol 98 (7) ◽  
pp. 76-77
Author(s):  
Julie Underwood

How would the appointment of Neil Gorsuch to the Supreme Court (presuming he is confirmed by the U.S. Congress) affect the court’s dynamics, its ideological balance, and specifically its decisions on cases that bear upon K-12 education? Is he likely to be another Justice Antonin Scalia, will he be less conservative, or will he be more so? The author looks for clues in the opinions Gorsuch has written for the 10th Circuit Court of Appeals.


2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Annemarie Bridy

For more than a quarter century, interest among copyright scholars in the question of AI authorship has waxed and waned as the popular conversation about AI has oscillated between exaggerated predictions for its future and premature pronouncements of its death. For policymakers, the issue has sat on the horizon, always within view but never actually pressing. To recognize this fact, however, is not to say that we can or should ignore the challenge that AI authorship presents to copyright law's underlying assumptions about creativity. On the contrary, the relatively slow development of AI offers a reprieve from the reactive, crisis-driven model of policymaking that has dominated copyright law in the digital era.By engaging and extending insights from two relatively discrete lines of existing scholarship - the postmodern critique of romantic authorship and the more pragmatic literature on copyright in works produced with the aid of computers - this Article seeks to answer the vexing copyright questions that arise from the artificially intelligent production of cultural works. It does so by developing the argument that all creativity is inherently algorithmic and that works produced autonomously by computers are therefore less heterogeneous to both their human counterparts and the current structure of copyright law than appearances may at first suggest.Annemarie BridyProfessor<http://www.uidaho.edu/law/faculty/annemariebridy>|University of Idaho College of Law|PO Box 83720-0051|Boise, ID 83720|Ph. 208.364.4583Affiliate Scholar<https://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/about/people/annemarie-bridy>|Stanford Center for Internet and SocietyAffiliate Fellow<http://isp.yale.edu/people-directory?type=19>|Yale Information Society ProjectSSRN<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/cf_dev/AbsByAuth.cfm?per_id=630766>|HeinOnline<http://heinonline.org/HOL/AuthorProfile?collection=journals&search_name=Bridy,%20Annemarie&base=js>|LinkedIn<https://www.linkedin.com/in/annemariebridy>|Twitter<https://twitter.com/AnnemarieBridy>


2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Annemarie Bridy

This article considers the evolution of ACTA's "digital environment" provisions in the context of concerns raised early in the negotiations that the agreement would require signatories to mandate graduated response regimes for online copyright enforcement (à la France's controversial HADOPI system). The Consolidated Text of ACTA released in October 2010, following the final round of negotiations in Japan, contains no provision mandating the adoption of graduated response. Such regimes are tacitly endorsed in the agreement, however, through language in the preamble and the digital environment provisions concerning the promotion of greater cooperation between rights owners and service providers. Moreover, opponents of graduated response should be wary of the fact that public law mechanisms - be they domestic or international - are not the only means by which graduated response can effectively become the law for Internet users. The United States and Ireland provide examples of the trend toward private ordering in the project of online copyright enforcement.Annemarie BridyProfessor<http://www.uidaho.edu/law/faculty/annemariebridy>|University of Idaho College of Law|PO Box 83720-0051|Boise, ID 83720|Ph. 208.364.4583Affiliate Scholar<https://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/about/people/annemarie-bridy>|Stanford Center for Internet and SocietyAffiliate Fellow<http://isp.yale.edu/people-directory?type=19>|Yale Information Society ProjectSSRN<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/cf_dev/AbsByAuth.cfm?per_id=630766>|HeinOnline<http://heinonline.org/HOL/AuthorProfile?collection=journals&search_name=Bridy,%20Annemarie&base=js>|LinkedIn<https://www.linkedin.com/in/annemariebridy>|Twitter<https://twitter.com/AnnemarieBridy>


2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Annemarie Bridy

At the end of 2008, the music industry ended its five-year campaign of litigation against individual peer-to-peer file sharers and announced that it would be shifting its online copyright enforcement efforts to a model known as graduated response. The most widely publicized form of graduated response is a "three strikes and you're out" model, in which a user's Internet access is suspended or terminated by his or her ISP following that user's receipt of three successive notices of copyright infringement. As it has been presented by entertainment industry trade groups, the enforcement paradigm embodied in graduated response forgoes litigation and statutory mandates in favor of voluntary cooperation between rights owners and Internet access providers - parties that have long been at loggerheads with each other in the war on piracy.This article seeks to explain, in the context of evolving network management technology and its impact on intermediary liability rules, why the time may be ripe for broadband providers and corporate rights owners to renegotiate their respective roles in the project of online copyright enforcement. Following an analysis of the turn to private ordering and technology-based mechanisms for policing copyrights online, this article proposes a set of principles to guide the implementation of graduated response regimes so that consumers, who have come to rely on uninterrupted Internet access for everything from banking to blogging, do not fall victim to immature filtering technologies and overzealous enforcement.Annemarie BridyProfessor<http://www.uidaho.edu/law/faculty/annemariebridy>|University of Idaho College of Law|PO Box 83720-0051|Boise, ID 83720|Ph. 208.364.4583Affiliate Scholar<https://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/about/people/annemarie-bridy>|Stanford Center for Internet and SocietyAffiliate Fellow<http://isp.yale.edu/people-directory?type=19>|Yale Information Society ProjectSSRN<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/cf_dev/AbsByAuth.cfm?per_id=630766>|HeinOnline<http://heinonline.org/HOL/AuthorProfile?collection=journals&search_name=Bridy,%20Annemarie&base=js>|LinkedIn<https://www.linkedin.com/in/annemariebridy>|Twitter<https://twitter.com/AnnemarieBridy>


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document