scholarly journals Is Online Copyright Enforcement Scalable?

Author(s):  
Annemarie Bridy

This article examines P2P file sharing and the copyright enforcement problem it has created through the lens of scalability. Writing about the growth and governance of the Internet, David Post observed that "scaling problems - the problems that arise solely as a consequence of increasing size or increasing numbers - can be profound, and profoundly difficult to solve." Both the Internet's designers and the designers of P2P networks solved difficult problems of scale in their effort to revolutionize the distribution of information goods. In doing so, however, they created a problem of scale in the form of "massive infringement." How to approach solving that problem of scale is the subject of this article.Part I traces the evolution of peer-to-peer (P2P) networks from Napster to BitTorrent, with a focus on the relative scalability of successive architectures. Part II takes up the difficult question of the scale of P2P infringement and its harms, examining the strategic number-crunching that underlies industry data on piracy, the government's credulous acceptance of that data, and the risk of letting industry hyperbole drive copyright policy and law enforcement priorities. Part III evaluates the efficacy of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) as a policy mechanism for scaling up online copyright enforcement. I argue in Part III that the DMCA has proven to be remarkably scalable for enforcing copyrights in hosted content but has altogether failed to scale in the context of P2P file sharing, leading to the dysfunctional workaround of mass John Doe litigation. Part IV weighs the costs and benefits of more scalable alternatives to mass litigation, including a potential amendment of the DMCA's pre-litigation subpoena provision and a pair of administrative dispute resolution systems - one hypothetical, the other real - for streamlining adjudication of P2P infringement claims.Annemarie BridyProfessor<http://www.uidaho.edu/law/faculty/annemariebridy>|University of Idaho College of Law|PO Box 83720-0051|Boise, ID 83720|Ph. 208.364.4583Affiliate Scholar<https://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/about/people/annemarie-bridy>|Stanford Center for Internet and SocietyAffiliate Fellow<http://isp.yale.edu/people-directory?type=19>|Yale Information Society ProjectSSRN<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/cf_dev/AbsByAuth.cfm?per_id=630766>|HeinOnline<http://heinonline.org/HOL/AuthorProfile?collection=journals&search_name=Bridy,%20Annemarie&base=js>|LinkedIn<https://www.linkedin.com/in/annemariebridy>|Twitter<https://twitter.com/AnnemarieBridy>

2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Annemarie Bridy

This article considers the evolution of ACTA's "digital environment" provisions in the context of concerns raised early in the negotiations that the agreement would require signatories to mandate graduated response regimes for online copyright enforcement (à la France's controversial HADOPI system). The Consolidated Text of ACTA released in October 2010, following the final round of negotiations in Japan, contains no provision mandating the adoption of graduated response. Such regimes are tacitly endorsed in the agreement, however, through language in the preamble and the digital environment provisions concerning the promotion of greater cooperation between rights owners and service providers. Moreover, opponents of graduated response should be wary of the fact that public law mechanisms - be they domestic or international - are not the only means by which graduated response can effectively become the law for Internet users. The United States and Ireland provide examples of the trend toward private ordering in the project of online copyright enforcement.Annemarie BridyProfessor<http://www.uidaho.edu/law/faculty/annemariebridy>|University of Idaho College of Law|PO Box 83720-0051|Boise, ID 83720|Ph. 208.364.4583Affiliate Scholar<https://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/about/people/annemarie-bridy>|Stanford Center for Internet and SocietyAffiliate Fellow<http://isp.yale.edu/people-directory?type=19>|Yale Information Society ProjectSSRN<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/cf_dev/AbsByAuth.cfm?per_id=630766>|HeinOnline<http://heinonline.org/HOL/AuthorProfile?collection=journals&search_name=Bridy,%20Annemarie&base=js>|LinkedIn<https://www.linkedin.com/in/annemariebridy>|Twitter<https://twitter.com/AnnemarieBridy>


2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Annemarie Bridy

At the end of 2008, the music industry ended its five-year campaign of litigation against individual peer-to-peer file sharers and announced that it would be shifting its online copyright enforcement efforts to a model known as graduated response. The most widely publicized form of graduated response is a "three strikes and you're out" model, in which a user's Internet access is suspended or terminated by his or her ISP following that user's receipt of three successive notices of copyright infringement. As it has been presented by entertainment industry trade groups, the enforcement paradigm embodied in graduated response forgoes litigation and statutory mandates in favor of voluntary cooperation between rights owners and Internet access providers - parties that have long been at loggerheads with each other in the war on piracy.This article seeks to explain, in the context of evolving network management technology and its impact on intermediary liability rules, why the time may be ripe for broadband providers and corporate rights owners to renegotiate their respective roles in the project of online copyright enforcement. Following an analysis of the turn to private ordering and technology-based mechanisms for policing copyrights online, this article proposes a set of principles to guide the implementation of graduated response regimes so that consumers, who have come to rely on uninterrupted Internet access for everything from banking to blogging, do not fall victim to immature filtering technologies and overzealous enforcement.Annemarie BridyProfessor<http://www.uidaho.edu/law/faculty/annemariebridy>|University of Idaho College of Law|PO Box 83720-0051|Boise, ID 83720|Ph. 208.364.4583Affiliate Scholar<https://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/about/people/annemarie-bridy>|Stanford Center for Internet and SocietyAffiliate Fellow<http://isp.yale.edu/people-directory?type=19>|Yale Information Society ProjectSSRN<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/cf_dev/AbsByAuth.cfm?per_id=630766>|HeinOnline<http://heinonline.org/HOL/AuthorProfile?collection=journals&search_name=Bridy,%20Annemarie&base=js>|LinkedIn<https://www.linkedin.com/in/annemariebridy>|Twitter<https://twitter.com/AnnemarieBridy>


2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Annemarie Bridy

When is the developer or distributor of a copying technology legally responsible for the copyright infringements committed by users of that technology? Over the past twenty years or so, development and deployment of digital copying technologies (personal computers, CD and DVD burners, iPods and other portable music devices, the Internet itself, etc.), and tools for Internet file sharing and file distribution, have thrust that question into the center of a high-profile public debate. That debate gave rise to the most closely watched copyright case of recent years, MGMStudios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals had held that defendants Grokster and StreamCast, the developers and distributors of peer-to-peer file-sharing software, were shielded from copyright liability by the so-called Sony doctrine (also called the Betamax case), interpreting that doctrine to mean that distributors of copying technology that is capable of commercially significant noninfringing use are shielded from liability for the infringement committed by users of the technology, unless the distributors had specific knowledge of infringement obtained at a time at which they contributed to the infringement and had failed to act upon that information. The Supreme Court unanimously reversed, holding that because Grokster and StreamCast had distributed their software with the object of promoting its use to infringe copyright, as shown by clear expression or other affirmative steps taken to foster infringement, Sony did not protect them from liability, whether or not their software was capable of commercially significant noninfringing use. The unanimous decision in the copyright holders' favor is, obviously, a big loss for Grokster Inc. and StreamCast, Ltd.; its broader implications for Internet file-sharing practices and file-sharing technology, however, are much less clear; to try to understand what they might be, we rewind the tape, back to Sony in 1984.Annemarie BridyProfessor<http://www.uidaho.edu/law/faculty/annemariebridy>|University of Idaho College of Law|PO Box 83720-0051|Boise, ID 83720|Ph. 208.364.4583Affiliate Scholar<https://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/about/people/annemarie-bridy>|Stanford Center for Internet and SocietyAffiliate Fellow<http://isp.yale.edu/people-directory?type=19>|Yale Information Society ProjectSSRN<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/cf_dev/AbsByAuth.cfm?per_id=630766>|HeinOnline<http://heinonline.org/HOL/AuthorProfile?collection=journals&search_name=Bridy,%20Annemarie&base=js>|LinkedIn<https://www.linkedin.com/in/annemariebridy>|Twitter<https://twitter.com/AnnemarieBridy>


2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Annemarie Bridy

Since the birth of Napster in 1999, corporate copyright owners have attempted to "govern" file sharing aggressively at three discrete points of intervention: the content level, the network level, and the user level. Their efforts have met with resistance at each of these points, however, because they have failed to appreciate the insight articulated by Michel Foucault that governing people, in the broad sense, is not only a matter of making them behave; it's also a matter of making them want to behave. This article surveys a decade's worth of anti-piracy regulation and examines the ways in which the entertainment industry's recourse to coercion at every point of intervention has functioned to undermine rather than advance the anti-piracy cause.Annemarie BridyProfessor<http://www.uidaho.edu/law/faculty/annemariebridy>|University of Idaho College of Law|PO Box 83720-0051|Boise, ID 83720|Ph. 208.364.4583Affiliate Scholar<https://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/about/people/annemarie-bridy>|Stanford Center for Internet and SocietyAffiliate Fellow<http://isp.yale.edu/people-directory?type=19>|Yale Information Society ProjectSSRN<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/cf_dev/AbsByAuth.cfm?per_id=630766>|HeinOnline<http://heinonline.org/HOL/AuthorProfile?collection=journals&search_name=Bridy,%20Annemarie&base=js>|LinkedIn<https://www.linkedin.com/in/annemariebridy>|Twitter<https://twitter.com/AnnemarieBridy>


2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Annemarie Bridy

In the years since passage of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act ("DMCA"), the copyright industries have demanded that online intermediaries - both those covered by the DMCA and those falling outside the statute's ambit - do more than the law requires to protect their intellectual property rights. In particular, they have sought new ways to reach and shutter "pirate sites" beyond the reach of United States law. Their demands have been answered through an expanding regime of nominally voluntary "DMCA-plus" enforcement.This chapter surveys the current landscape of DMCA-plus enforcement by dividing such enforcement into two categories: Type 1 and Type 2. Type 1 DMCA-plus enforcement is cooperation by DMCA-covered intermediaries over and above what is required for safe harbor. Type 2 DMCA-plus enforcement is cooperation by intermediaries whose activities fall outside the scope of the DMCA's safe harbors and who are not liable for their customers' copyright infringements under secondary liability rules.As the gap widens between what the law requires and what intermediaries are agreeing to do on a voluntary basis, there is reason to be concerned about the expressive and due process rights of users and website operators, who have no seat at the table when intermediaries and copyright owners negotiate "best practices" for mitigating online infringement, including which sanctions to impose, which content to remove, and which websites to block without judicial intervention.Annemarie BridyProfessor<http://www.uidaho.edu/law/faculty/annemariebridy>|University of Idaho College of Law|PO Box 83720-0051|Boise, ID 83720|Ph. 208.364.4583Affiliate Scholar<https://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/about/people/annemarie-bridy>|Stanford Center for Internet and SocietyAffiliate Fellow<http://isp.yale.edu/people-directory?type=19>|Yale Information Society ProjectSSRN<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/cf_dev/AbsByAuth.cfm?per_id=630766>|HeinOnline<http://heinonline.org/HOL/AuthorProfile?collection=journals&search_name=Bridy,%20Annemarie&base=js>|LinkedIn<https://www.linkedin.com/in/annemariebridy>|Twitter<https://twitter.com/AnnemarieBridy>


2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Annemarie Bridy

In Bring in the Nerds: Secrecy, National Security, and the Creation of Intellectual Property Law, David Levine juxtaposes two starkly different copyright policymaking processes: the closed international process that produced the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA) and the relatively open domestic process that led quite dramatically to the scuttling of the Stop Online Piracy Act (SOPA) and the PROTECT IP Act (PIPA). He reads the two processes against each other as a prelude to recommending Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) reform. The amendment to FOIA that Professor Levine proposes would open the international IP policymaking process to greater public scrutiny by creating a qualified public right to "foreign relations" national security information, which was systematically withheld from the public during the ACTA negotiations. This article, prepared for the Cardozo Arts and Entertainment Law Journal's 2012 Symposium, "Piracy and the Politics of Policing: Legislating and Enforcing Copyright Law," is a response to Professor Levine that draws on Jürgen Habermas' discourse theory of procedural democracy to examine the policymaking dynamics of ACTA and SOPA/PIPA and to assess the democracy-enhancing potential of the FOIA reform Professor Levine proposes.Annemarie BridyProfessor<http://www.uidaho.edu/law/faculty/annemariebridy>|University of Idaho College of Law|PO Box 83720-0051|Boise, ID 83720|Ph. 208.364.4583Affiliate Scholar<https://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/about/people/annemarie-bridy>|Stanford Center for Internet and SocietyAffiliate Fellow<http://isp.yale.edu/people-directory?type=19>|Yale Information Society ProjectSSRN<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/cf_dev/AbsByAuth.cfm?per_id=630766>|HeinOnline<http://heinonline.org/HOL/AuthorProfile?collection=journals&search_name=Bridy,%20Annemarie&base=js>|LinkedIn<https://www.linkedin.com/in/annemariebridy>|Twitter<https://twitter.com/AnnemarieBridy>


Author(s):  
S. H. Kwok ◽  
Y. M. Cheung ◽  
K. Y. Chan

A recent survey revealed that 18 millions American Internet users, or approximately 14% of total American Internet population have peer-to-peer (P2P) file-sharing applications running on their computers (Rainie & Madden, 2004). Not surprisingly, P2P applications have become common tools for information sharing and distribution since the appearance of Napster (Napster, 2003) in 1999. P2P systems are the distributed systems in which all nodes are equal in terms of functionality and able to directly communicate with each other without the coordination of a powerful server. Anonymity, scalability, fault resilience, decentralization and self-organization are the distinct characteristics of P2P computing (Milojicic et al., 2002) compared with the traditional client-server computing. P2P computing is believed to be capable of overcoming limitations of the computing environment placed by the client-server computing model. Milojicic et al. (2002), for example, suggested that P2P computing is capable of providing improved scalability by eliminating the limiting factor, the centralized server existing in the client-server computing. In the past few years, P2P computing and its promised characteristics have caught the attention of researchers who have studied the existing P2P networks, and the advantages and disadvantage of P2P systems. Important findings include the excessive network traffic caused by flooding-based searching mechanism that must be tackled in order to fully utilize the improved scalability of P2P systems (Matei, Iamnitchi, & Foster, 2002; Portmann & Seneviratne, 2002). There were proposed efficient searching techniques targeted for both structured and unstructured P2P systems. Other research projects were conducted to study, and were intended to complement, the drawbacks brought by distinct characteristics of P2P systems. For example, the P2P users’ free-riding behavior is generally attributed to the anonymity of such form of communication (Adar & Huberman, 2000). Recent research projects have shifted to a new line of investigation of P2P networks from the economic perspective and applications of P2P systems in workplaces (Kwok & Gao, 2004; Tiwana, 2003).


2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Annemarie Bridy

For more than a quarter century, interest among copyright scholars in the question of AI authorship has waxed and waned as the popular conversation about AI has oscillated between exaggerated predictions for its future and premature pronouncements of its death. For policymakers, the issue has sat on the horizon, always within view but never actually pressing. To recognize this fact, however, is not to say that we can or should ignore the challenge that AI authorship presents to copyright law's underlying assumptions about creativity. On the contrary, the relatively slow development of AI offers a reprieve from the reactive, crisis-driven model of policymaking that has dominated copyright law in the digital era.By engaging and extending insights from two relatively discrete lines of existing scholarship - the postmodern critique of romantic authorship and the more pragmatic literature on copyright in works produced with the aid of computers - this Article seeks to answer the vexing copyright questions that arise from the artificially intelligent production of cultural works. It does so by developing the argument that all creativity is inherently algorithmic and that works produced autonomously by computers are therefore less heterogeneous to both their human counterparts and the current structure of copyright law than appearances may at first suggest.Annemarie BridyProfessor<http://www.uidaho.edu/law/faculty/annemariebridy>|University of Idaho College of Law|PO Box 83720-0051|Boise, ID 83720|Ph. 208.364.4583Affiliate Scholar<https://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/about/people/annemarie-bridy>|Stanford Center for Internet and SocietyAffiliate Fellow<http://isp.yale.edu/people-directory?type=19>|Yale Information Society ProjectSSRN<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/cf_dev/AbsByAuth.cfm?per_id=630766>|HeinOnline<http://heinonline.org/HOL/AuthorProfile?collection=journals&search_name=Bridy,%20Annemarie&base=js>|LinkedIn<https://www.linkedin.com/in/annemariebridy>|Twitter<https://twitter.com/AnnemarieBridy>


2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Annemarie Bridy

A tricky question emerges from the Supreme Court's decision in Campbell: If a parodic work, to use Justice Souter's words, shades into satire, is it no longer classifiable (and therefore no longer defensible) as a parody? Should it be regarded as having crossed a critical boundary for fair use purposes? Campbell suggests that it should, but there are actually compelling reasons, rooted in principles underlying the doctrine of fair use, why some types of parodic works that shade into satire should not be regarded as infringing. After examining the curious development of the parody/satire distinction within the law of fair use, this article draws on literary theory to propose a workable and more accurate taxonomy than that provided in Campbell, by means of which courts engaging in a fair use analysis can evaluate works that are hybrids of parody and satire.Annemarie BridyProfessor<http://www.uidaho.edu/law/faculty/annemariebridy>|University of Idaho College of Law|PO Box 83720-0051|Boise, ID 83720|Ph. 208.364.4583Affiliate Scholar<https://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/about/people/annemarie-bridy>|Stanford Center for Internet and SocietyAffiliate Fellow<http://isp.yale.edu/people-directory?type=19>|Yale Information Society ProjectSSRN<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/cf_dev/AbsByAuth.cfm?per_id=630766>|HeinOnline<http://heinonline.org/HOL/AuthorProfile?collection=journals&search_name=Bridy,%20Annemarie&base=js>|LinkedIn<https://www.linkedin.com/in/annemariebridy>|Twitter<https://twitter.com/AnnemarieBridy>


2011 ◽  
Vol 16 ◽  
pp. 60-73
Author(s):  
Eric Kyper ◽  
Roger Blake

This research examines the role that ethics plays in an individual’s intention to engage in peer-to-peer (P2P) file sharing. Previous studies have focused on P2P file sharing as primarily an act of piracy; and accordingly many, although not all, have found that ethical considerations do play a role in file sharing intentions. While piracy over P2P networks has continued and ethical predispositions clearly remain important issues, in the face of new business models and increased use of P2P file sharing for perfectly legitimate applications, the percentage of pirated files has decreased even as overall P2P network traffic has grown. It is therefore important to understand a user’s intentions to engage in P2P file sharing as a whole, without restricting that understanding to the single aspect of piracy. But because piracy is still a factor, it is critical to consider the role of ethics in those intentions. The objectives of this research are to propose and test a model of file sharing intentions based on the theory of planned behavior which considers ethical predisposition. Structural equation modeling is used to analyze our model. The results show that while ethical predisposition does not have a significant effect on intentions, other factors do. From this we draw several important conclusions regarding P2P file sharing. These are findings that have significance for network managers and internet service providers, both of who are greatly concerned about the impact of this mode of file sharing. This work is the first of its kind to provide a macro level understanding of the role ethics plays in file sharing in general, not restricted to illicit activities.


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