scholarly journals Kontrowersje wokół ustalania odpowiedzialności z tytułu naruszenia więzi rodzinnych jako dobra osobistego

2019 ◽  
pp. 189-211
Author(s):  
Bogusław Lackoroński

The question if family relations can be deemed as a subject of a personal right effective erga omnes has been considered in Polish jurisprudence and judgments of different courts including the Supreme Court since 2010. In 2018 there was a breakthrough in this debate of great theoretical and practical significance. On March 27, 2018, the Supreme Court of Poland passed three resolutions in extended benches (7 judges) in which it was confirmed that family relations are recognized as a subject of a personal right and that their protection is effective erga omnes. The Supreme Court said also that pecuniary compensation for infringement of family relations which are subject to a personal right can be granted not only in case someone caused that a person – party to a family relation – is dead, but also that the person is seriously and permanently injured. The question of recognition family relation as a subject of a personal right and that their protection is effective erga omnes is very controversial in the jurisprudence of civil law. The controversies are discussed in this paper. The author of this paper does not consider the controversies as enough to question the general idea of recognition of family relations as a subject to a personal right (erga omnes). The author of this paper shares the general view of the Supreme Court (Civil Chamber) presented in the resolutions passed on March 27, 2018, provided to some minor critical remarks. However, it should be pointed out that on October 22, 2019, the Supreme Court (Extraordinary Control and Public Affairs Chamber) passed the resolution in an extended bench (7 judges) in which the admissibility of recognizing family relations as a subject to a personal right (erga omnes) has been questioned. It means that this question is to be resolved by the joint chambers of the Supreme Court.

2019 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 31-44

The system of appeal measures in civil proceedings under the Polish law has been subject to profound evolution over the years. The Supreme Court Law of 8 December 2017 has introduced a new legal measure called the extraordinary complaint, which allows rebuttal of final judgments terminating respective proceedings. Extraordinary complaint examination has been entrusted to the newly established Extraordinary Control and Public Affairs Chamber of the Supreme Court. Literature has referred to this extraordinary measure of appeal as a total instrument with considerable material and temporal scope, allowing contestation of final judgements regardless of whether any legal measures had been applied in the course of respective proceedings and the type of measures used. Although parties to civil proceedings have gained another extraordinary measure of appeal, they have no real influence over its application. The expansion of the extraordinary appeal measures catalogue in Polish civil law proceedings has triggered multiple reservations as to the connection between parallel complaints. One should not assume a priori that the new extraordinary measure of appeal shall destabilise the legal system in Poland – albeit certain operational distortions seem realistic.


2017 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
pp. 313
Author(s):  
Roman Trzaskowski

Effects of Constitutional Tribunal’s Judgments in the Time PerspectiveSummaryThe problem of the time effects of the Constitutional Tribunal’s rulings remain within the area of interest of both constitutional and civil law scholars. It is widely discussed because of its enormous practical importance: more and more often the common courts and the Supreme Court have to deal with the laws which have been declared unconstitutional.The main question is whether the courts should apply the unconstitutional law while deciding on a case in which legally significant events had taken place before the law was declared null and void.The Polish Constitution does not give a clear answer to this question. The most important provisions seem to be contradictory, which makes it possible to use them as arguments for opposing positions.The scholars’ opinions differ significantly: some of them, followed by the Supreme Court, accept the so-called „retrospective” effect (the unconstitutional law cannot by applied), the others, together with the Constitutional Tribunal, take the opposite view. A few try to find a compromise.The proposition presented in this paper is to be classified as belonging to the third group.Indeed it seems that there is a need for a flexible approach. The time effects of a ruling shall be expressly stated by the Constitutional Tribunal. When the Tribunal fails to do so, the common courts have to asses themselves the rulings’ effects, being guided, among other things, by the principles of the civil law. There are strong arguments that the Constitution seems to favor the retroactive effect, yet it is not decisive. There are certainly situations, where a prospecitve effect shall be accepted: ultimately it is a question of balancing different constitutional and civil law values. 


2020 ◽  
Vol 29 (1) ◽  
pp. 291
Author(s):  
Cezary Kulesza

<p class="PreformattedText">The gloss refers to the problem of the impact of bank employees’ performance on borrowers’ liability for fraud. The author approves the view formulated in the thesis of the Supreme Court that the employees of the injured bank were obliged to exercise special diligence in checking the accuracy of the documents submitted by the accused necessary to obtain a loan. The position taken by the Supreme Court in the commented judgement can be considered as at least a partial departure from the previous jurisprudence of the Supreme Court accepting that the victim’s contribution to the occurrence of fraud is not relevant to the responsibility of the perpetrators. The author, starting from the results of victimological research, accepts the view that the basis of criminal liability for fraud is the complex behaviour of the perpetrator (extraneous) and representatives of the injured bank (intraneus) and their mutual activity. In the last part of the commentary, the author indicates the specific obligations of banks when granting loans. He also emphasizes the inclusion in civil law of the victim’s contribution to damage as a basis for its mitigation.</p>


Author(s):  
Anna Moskal

Does forgiveness nullify the effects of previous disinheritance? The legal nature of forgiveness is the subject of passionate debates among the representatives of civil law doctrine. According to the dominant position in the literature, forgiveness is an act of affection or its manifested expression of forgiveness of the perpetrator of experienced injustice and related to this grudge. This institution has been applied three times in the Civil Code — once with the donation agreement, twice in regulations of inheritance law. Article 1010 § 1 provides that a testator cannot disinherit eligible for legal portion if he forgave him. The wording of the above article indicates that accomplishment of disinheritance in case if testator eligible for legal portion has previously forgiven. The legislator did not, however, determine the effects of forgiveness in relation to previous disinheritance. In the act of 1971, the Supreme Court accepted that such forgiveness would automatically nullify the effects of disinheritance, and could be made in any form. In recent years, lower courts have begun to question the Supreme Court's position, and judges increasingly refer to the critical statements of numerous doctrines. As it was rightly stated, admitting the possibility of invoking the forgiveness made after disinheritance poses a serious threat to the realization of the testator’s will, who, by forgiving, does not necessarily want to revoke the effects of his previous disinheritance. The postulate of de lege ferenda is, according to the author of the article, giving of freedom of judging the effects of forgiveness to the courts and each examination of the forgiving testator’s will on the possible abatement of the consequences of previous disinheritance.]]>


Author(s):  
David Ormerod ◽  
Karl Laird

This chapter examines the law governing theft. It considers the extent to which the criminal law of theft conflicts with civil law concepts of property; whether it is possible to steal property that belongs to oneself; the types of property that may be stolen; and the extent to which it is possible to provide a definition of ‘dishonesty’. The test for dishonesty has been fundamentally altered by the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeal, developments which are analysed in this chapter.


1996 ◽  
Vol 101 (3) ◽  
pp. 911
Author(s):  
F. Thornton Miller ◽  
Judith Kelleher Schafer

1996 ◽  
Vol 40 (2) ◽  
pp. 216
Author(s):  
Thomas D. Russell ◽  
Judith Kelleher Schafer

2016 ◽  
Vol 28 (2) ◽  
pp. 348
Author(s):  
Mohammad Amir Hamzah

AbstractThe frst court and the appellate-level court serve as the judex facti, but there are different regulations about procedural law in HIR, RBG, and Law No. 20 of 1947. It causes high fling of cassation appeals. As a result, the Supreme Court is impaired in fostering and developing the (civil) law due to it being hectic from examining cases. Through reform of civil procedure law of the appellate­level court (PT), the court will be placed in the appropriate position as the means of fltering proceedings, so that not all cases can be fled for a cassation appeal. It is also the time to revoke Law No. 20 of 1947.IntisariPada dasarnya Pengadilan Negeri dan Pengadilan Tinggi diposisikan sebagai judex facti. Namun demikian, terdapat beberapa pengaturan mengenai hukum acara perdata mulai dari HIR, RBG hingga UU No.20 Tahun 1947 yang mengatur hal tersebut secara berbeda. Akibatnya, pengajuan kasasi meningkat sehinggamengganggu fokus Mahkamah Agung melaksanakan fungsi pembinaan hukum. Seharunya pengadilan banding diposisikan sebagai penyaring sehingga tidak semua kasus dapat diajukan ke banding dan kasasi. Selain itu, melalui pembaharuan hukum ini juga UU Nomor 20 Tahun 1947.


Author(s):  
А. І. Дрішлюк

Наукова стаття присвячена визначенню значення рішень Верховного Суду України, прийнятих за результатами розгляду заяв про перегляд судових рішень з мотивів неод­накового застосування судом (судами) касаційної інстанції одних і тих самих норм ма­теріального права в аналогічних правовідносинах, порядку і її вплив на систему джерел цивільного і цивільно-процесуального права, після законодавчого закріплення обов'язко­вості рішень Верховного Суду України для всіх суб'єктів владних повноважень (суб'єктів правозастосовчої діяльності). На підставі проведеного дослідження сформульована авторська позиція щодо систе­ми джерел цивільного права, судової практики, а також впливу останньої на трансфор­мацію системи джерел цивільного та процесуального права України на сучасному етапі її розвитку.   The scientific article is sanctified to determination of value of decisions of the Supreme court of Ukraine, statements accepted on results consideration about the revision of court decisions on reasons of different application by the court (by courts) of appeal instance of one the same norms of material right in analogical legal relationships, order and her influence on the system of sources civil and civil judicial law of Ukraine, after legislative fixing of obligatoryness of decisions of the Supreme court of Ukraine for all the subjects of imperious plenary powers (subjects of law using activity). On the basis of the conducted research author position is formulated in regard to the system of sources civil law, judicial practice, and also the influence of the last on transformation the system of sources civil and civil judicial law of Ukraine on the modern stage of its development.


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