CHAPTER ONE. THE CONTEXT OF ORIGEN’S MORAL AUTONOMY POLEMICS

Keyword(s):  
2016 ◽  
Vol 8 (3) ◽  
pp. 75-92
Author(s):  
Christian Schröer

An act-theoretical view on the profile of responsibility discourse shows in what sense not only all kinds of technical, pragmatic and moral reason, but also all kinds of religious motivation cannot justify a human action sufficiently without acknowledgment to three basic principles of human autonomy as supreme limiting conditions that are human dignity, sense, and justifiability. According to Thomas Aquinas human beings ultimately owe their moral autonomy to a divine creator. So this autonomy can be considered as an expression of secondary-cause autonomy and as the voice of God in the enlightened conscience.


Author(s):  
Benedetta Zavatta

Based on an analysis of the marginal markings and annotations Nietzsche made to the works of Emerson in his personal library, the book offers a philosophical interpretation of the impact on Nietzsche’s thought of his reading of these works, a reading that began when he was a schoolboy and extended to the final years of his conscious life. The many ideas and sources of inspiration that Nietzsche drew from Emerson can be organized in terms of two main lines of thought. The first line leads in the direction of the development of the individual personality, that is, the achievement of critical thinking, moral autonomy, and original self-expression. The second line of thought is the overcoming of individuality: that is to say, the need to transcend one’s own individual—and thus by definition limited—view of the world by continually confronting and engaging with visions different from one’s own and by putting into question and debating one’s own values and certainties. The image of the strong personality that Nietzsche forms thanks to his reading of Emerson ultimately takes on the appearance of a nomadic subject who is continually passing out of themselves—that is to say, abandoning their own positions and convictions—so as to undergo a constant process of evolution. In other words, the formation of the individual personality takes on the form of a regulative ideal: a goal that can never be said to have been definitively and once and for all attained.


2020 ◽  
Vol 25 (4) ◽  
pp. 515-540
Author(s):  
Hauke Brunkhorst

AbstractIn a lecture that Habermas gave on his 90th birthday he ironically, but with serious intent, called a good Kant a sufficiently Marxist educated Kant. This dialectical Kant is the only one of the many Kants who maintains the idea of an unconditioned moral autonomy but completely within evolution, history and in the middle of societal class and other struggles. The article tries to show what Kant could have learned from his later critics to enable him to become a member of the Frankfurt School’s neo-Marxist theory of society.


Author(s):  
Paul Cliteur

This chapter discusses the difference between a nonsecular or religious critique of religious ethics and politics and a specifically secular critique. It introduces the central notion of a secular critique, autonomy, and its two types, moral and political. Moral autonomy entails the separation of religion from ethics. The ideal of making that separation is called “moral secularism.” The opposite of moral autonomy is “moral heteronomy.” An extreme case of moral heteronomy is discussed: Abraham’s willingness to sacrifice his own son when God commanded him to do so. Next, the importance of political autonomy and political secularism is illustrated with reference to the conflict between the king Ahab (the model of a secular ruler) and the prophet Elijah (the model of a religious leader). Some stories in the holy scriptures of the monotheist religions held in common by Judaism, Christianity, and Islam are unfavorable toward secularism (both moral and political).


Synthese ◽  
1983 ◽  
Vol 57 (2) ◽  
pp. 249-266
Author(s):  
Laurence Thomas

Interchange ◽  
1988 ◽  
Vol 19 (1) ◽  
pp. 46-53
Author(s):  
Wesley Cragg

Politics ◽  
2003 ◽  
Vol 23 (2) ◽  
pp. 141-144
Author(s):  
James (Eddie) Hyland

The claim that democracy requires a particular type of political scepticism for its justification has an initial plausibility. The present article argues, however, that Bufacchi does not succeed in adequately identifying the relevant type of uncertainty. Secondly, it is claimed here that Bufacchi's analysis neglects a crucial element in the justification of democracy, namely, the positive evaluation of moral autonomy. When the role of autonomy is given its proper place epistemology becomes secondary, providing a basis not for scepticism but for a theory such as Rawls's theory of reasonable disagreement.


1970 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 7-17
Author(s):  
Tadeusz Ślipko

The idea of expressing an opinion on the difficult issue of relating to the anthropological basis of human dignity, arose in response to writings coming from two ideologically very different philosophical positions. The first of these is to be found in the author's academic neighborhood, namely school of Christian personalist philosophy associated with the Catholic University of Lublin. The second, on the other hand, originates from the sphere of libertarian humanist philosophy and expresses itself in a secular concept of human moral autonomy. Ideas coming from these two diametrically opposed standpoints provoke critical reflection; the latter will form the basis on which an alternative concept of human dignity will be outlined. With this aim in mind, analysis of this subject will consist of two parts: the first will take the form of a commentary-style critique, while the second will consist of proposals and clarifications.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document