Trade Union Membership and the Free Rider Problem: the Role of Harassment Activities

Labour ◽  
1992 ◽  
Vol 6 (2) ◽  
pp. 49-63 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bruno Chiarini
Keyword(s):  
Trade Union ◽  
Union Membership ◽  
Free Rider ◽  
Free Rider Problem

scholarly journals Norm-Based Trade Union Membership: Evidence for Germany

2004 ◽  
Vol 5 (4) ◽  
pp. 481-504 ◽  
Author(s):  
Laszlo Goerke ◽  
Markus Pannenberg
Keyword(s):  
Panel Data ◽  
Labour Market ◽  
Trade Union ◽  
Union Membership ◽  
Union Density ◽  
Free Rider ◽  
Free Rider Problem ◽  
Social Custom ◽  
The Impact

Abstract In the absence of closed shops and discriminatory wage policies, union membership can be explained by the existence of social norms.We describe a model, incorporating institutional features of the German labour market, which explicitly allows for social custom effects in the determination of union membership. Using panel data for Germany, we find evidence for according effects which restrict freeriding. The impact of social norms tends to increase with net union density. Hence, observed reductions in the demand for union membership can weaken the impact of a norm and accentuate the free-rider problem.

scholarly journals Membership density and trade union power

2017 ◽  
Vol 23 (1) ◽  
pp. 47-61 ◽  
Author(s):  
Colin Crouch
Keyword(s):  
Trade Union ◽  
Union Membership ◽  
Occupational Structure ◽  
Union Power ◽  
Advanced Economies ◽  
Political Forces ◽  
High Employment ◽  
Almost All ◽  
Governing Institutions

Union membership has declined in almost all European and other advanced economies, though in many cases the membership that remains reflects overall changes in the gender and occupational structure of the economy. Meanwhile, in most countries unions’ incorporation in governing institutions of the labour market has remained stable or risen. Union strength (membership density and incorporation) and to a lesser extent bargaining coordination correlate positively with core employee interests in the post-Keynesian economy: a combination of high employment and low inequality, and a balance between flexibility and security. The evidence suggests that unions’ most important role today is as part of wider political forces, where the role of membership strength remains ambiguous.

On The Poitical Economy of the April Uprising of 1876

2021 ◽  
Vol 29 (4) ◽  
pp. 339-356
Author(s):  
Pencho Penchev
Keyword(s):  
Economic Analysis ◽  
Free Rider ◽  
Time Span ◽  
Primary Sources ◽  
Free Rider Problem ◽  
Political Views ◽  
The Future

Based on a politico-economic analysis, the paper provides answers to important questions about the April Uprising of 1876: why the Bulgarians revolted, why many Bulgarians did not revolt, and why the uprising was relatively short as a time-span. According to the available primary sources the Bulgarians who revolted in April 1876 revolted because they were relatively wealthy and as such they had something to lose. Revolutionary sentiments, however, did not prevail in their political views concerning the Bulgarian question. Here comes the role of the propaganda lie about the authority planned massacre of the Bulgarians. As a result, live and property of the future rebels, were considered as endangered. The response to the threat is a risky and desperate anti-state uprising. The organizers of the uprising did not overcome the free-rider problem. The population in the insurgent settlements was left to pay the price of putting the Bulgarian question before Europe. Additional difficulties in the implementation of a relatively mass riot pose the short deadlines for its preparation. They resulted in high prices of and do not allow the supply of larger quantities of weapons and gunpowder.

Takeover Bidding and Shareholder Information

2012 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-27 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert Marquez ◽  
Bilge Yılmaz
Keyword(s):  
Shareholder Value ◽  
Free Rider ◽  
Precise Information ◽  
Free Rider Problem ◽  
Acquisition Price

We study the role of shareholder information during the acquisition of widely held firms. When target shareholders share the same information about the post-takeover value, increasing the precision of information has no effect on the expected acquisition price. However, more precise information aggravates the free-rider problem, allowing shareholders to better discern when it is worthwhile to hold out rather than tender their shares. By contrast, when information is dispersed among shareholders, providing shareholders with superior information induces the raider to offer higher prices, thus increasing shareholder value. However, in this case, neither prices nor tendering decisions aggregate any information. (JEL G34, D82)

Bargaining Representation and Union Membership in the Federal Sector: A Free Rider's Paradise

1989 ◽  
Vol 18 (3) ◽  
pp. 311-323 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mariek F. Masters ◽  
Robert Atkin
Keyword(s):  
Federal Government ◽  
Union Membership ◽  
Free Rider ◽  
Federal Sector ◽  
Future Directions ◽  
Federal Employee ◽  
Free Rider Problem ◽  
Employee Union

The federal government is extensively organized in terms of the number of employees belonging to exclusively recognized bargaining units. Yet, the largest federal-employee union is in serious financial trouble because of its relatively small membership. This article examines bargaining representation and union membership data among the three principal federal-employee unions during the 1981–1987 period. It finds that 1) each union faces a sizable free rider problem, and 2) the magnitude of the problem differs substantially across unions. The article discusses the financial implications of this problem and offers insights as to future directions in federal-sector unionism.

scholarly journals Domestic Policies as Strategic Measures in Multinational Markets

2016 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 1
Author(s):  
Ali Dadpay
Keyword(s):  
Free Rider ◽  
Public Firms ◽  
Free Riders ◽  
Free Rider Problem ◽  
Strategic Measures ◽  
Private And Public ◽  
Domestic Policies

<p>This paper studies the role of privatization and subsidization policies as trade strategies in a single multinational market where private and public firms of different nationalities interact. It finds out when a country subsidizes its industry the rival country would have the incentive to retaliate by adopting a subsidization regime to prevent a free riders’ situation from happening when it moves to liberalize the market. However this step does not eliminate the free rider problem governments are facing in this market when they privatize their public firms unilaterally. </p>

scholarly journals The Union Membership Wage-Premium Puzzle: Is There a Free Rider Problem?

ILR Review ◽  
2004 ◽  
Vol 57 (3) ◽  
pp. 402 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alison L. Booth ◽  
Mark L. Bryan
Keyword(s):  
Union Membership ◽  
Wage Premium ◽  
Free Rider ◽  
Free Rider Problem ◽  
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