scholarly journals Domestic Policies as Strategic Measures in Multinational Markets

2016 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 1
Author(s):  
Ali Dadpay
Keyword(s):  
Free Rider ◽  
Public Firms ◽  
Free Riders ◽  
Free Rider Problem ◽  
Strategic Measures ◽  
Private And Public ◽  
Domestic Policies

<p>This paper studies the role of privatization and subsidization policies as trade strategies in a single multinational market where private and public firms of different nationalities interact. It finds out when a country subsidizes its industry the rival country would have the incentive to retaliate by adopting a subsidization regime to prevent a free riders’ situation from happening when it moves to liberalize the market. However this step does not eliminate the free rider problem governments are facing in this market when they privatize their public firms unilaterally. </p>

On The Poitical Economy of the April Uprising of 1876

2021 ◽  
Vol 29 (4) ◽  
pp. 339-356
Author(s):  
Pencho Penchev
Keyword(s):  
Economic Analysis ◽  
Free Rider ◽  
Time Span ◽  
Primary Sources ◽  
Free Rider Problem ◽  
Political Views ◽  
The Future

Based on a politico-economic analysis, the paper provides answers to important questions about the April Uprising of 1876: why the Bulgarians revolted, why many Bulgarians did not revolt, and why the uprising was relatively short as a time-span. According to the available primary sources the Bulgarians who revolted in April 1876 revolted because they were relatively wealthy and as such they had something to lose. Revolutionary sentiments, however, did not prevail in their political views concerning the Bulgarian question. Here comes the role of the propaganda lie about the authority planned massacre of the Bulgarians. As a result, live and property of the future rebels, were considered as endangered. The response to the threat is a risky and desperate anti-state uprising. The organizers of the uprising did not overcome the free-rider problem. The population in the insurgent settlements was left to pay the price of putting the Bulgarian question before Europe. Additional difficulties in the implementation of a relatively mass riot pose the short deadlines for its preparation. They resulted in high prices of and do not allow the supply of larger quantities of weapons and gunpowder.

Takeover Bidding and Shareholder Information

2012 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-27 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert Marquez ◽  
Bilge Yılmaz
Keyword(s):  
Shareholder Value ◽  
Free Rider ◽  
Precise Information ◽  
Free Rider Problem ◽  
Acquisition Price

We study the role of shareholder information during the acquisition of widely held firms. When target shareholders share the same information about the post-takeover value, increasing the precision of information has no effect on the expected acquisition price. However, more precise information aggravates the free-rider problem, allowing shareholders to better discern when it is worthwhile to hold out rather than tender their shares. By contrast, when information is dispersed among shareholders, providing shareholders with superior information induces the raider to offer higher prices, thus increasing shareholder value. However, in this case, neither prices nor tendering decisions aggregate any information. (JEL G34, D82)

The Measles and Free Riders

2016 ◽  
Vol 25 (3) ◽  
pp. 472-478 ◽  
Author(s):  
KATHARINE BROWNE
Keyword(s):  
Collective Action ◽  
Free Rider ◽  
Collective Action Problem ◽  
Free Riders ◽  
Free Rider Problem ◽  
Free Ride ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
Parental Decisions

Abstract:This article takes up a game-theoretic perspective on California’s recently passed bill (SB 277) that closes all nonmedical exemptions for school-mandated vaccination. Such a perspective characterizes parental decisions to vaccinate their children as a collective action problem and reveals the presence of an incentive to free ride—to enjoy the benefits of others’ efforts to vaccinate their children without vaccinating one’s own. This article defends California’s legislation as a reasonable means of overcoming the free rider problem and of ensuring that the burdens of vaccination are shared equally.

On the limits of unsolvability of the “free rider problem”

2016 ◽  
pp. 57-75
Author(s):  
A. Yudanov ◽  
O. Pyrkina ◽  
E. Bekker
Keyword(s):  
Mathematical Model ◽  
Markov Chain ◽  
Social Groups ◽  
Free Rider ◽  
Public And Private ◽  
Institutional Conditions ◽  
Free Riders ◽  
Free Rider Problem ◽  
Effective Decision ◽  
Absorbing States

The article reinterprets the classic «free rider problem» known as unsolvable from the position of how the free rider’s surrounding affects him. It introduces the concepts of public and private harm from the free rider’s activity. It also describes a wide variety of manifestations of the “free ridership” in which the private harm suffered by significant social groups is large enough to cause on their part an active opposition to free riders. According to the authors, under proper institutional conditions this opposition results in effective decision of the “free rider problem”. They offer a mathematical model of the process: the Markov chain with a single or multiple absorbing states.

scholarly journals A Two-Step Methodology for Free Rider Mitigation with an Improved Settlement Algorithm: Regression in CBL Estimation and New Incentive Payment Rule in Residential Demand Response

Energies ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 11 (12) ◽  
pp. 3417 ◽  
Author(s):  
Eunjung Lee ◽  
Dongsik Jang ◽  
Jinho Kim
Keyword(s):  
Demand Response ◽  
Electricity Consumption ◽  
Free Rider ◽  
Estimation Accuracy ◽  
Peak Time ◽  
Incentive Payment ◽  
Step Method ◽  
Free Riders ◽  
Free Rider Problem ◽  
Baseline Estimation

Recent demand response (DR) research efforts have focused on reducing the peak demand, and thereby electricity prices. Load reductions from DR programs can be viewed as equivalent electricity generation by conventional means. Thus, utility companies must pay incentives to customers who reduce their demand accordingly. However, many key variables intrinsic to residential customers are significantly more complicated compared to those of commercial and industrial customers. Thus, residential DR programs are economically difficult to operate, especially because excess incentive settlements can result in free riders, who get incentives without reducing their loads. Improving baseline estimation accuracy is insufficient to solve this problem. To alleviate the free rider problem, we proposed an improved two-step method—estimating the baseline load using regression and implementing a minimum-threshold payment rule. We applied the proposed method to data from residential customers participating in a peak-time rebate program in Korea. It initially suffered from numerous free riders caused by inaccurate baseline estimation. The proposed method mitigated the issue by reducing the number of free riders. The results indicate the possibility of lowering the existing incentive payment. The findings indicate that it is possible to run more stable residential DR programs by mitigating the uncertainty associated with customer electricity consumption.

Costs and benefits in hunter-gatherer punishment

2012 ◽  
Vol 35 (1) ◽  
pp. 19-20 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christopher Boehm
Keyword(s):  
Capital Punishment ◽  
Free Rider ◽  
Second Order ◽  
Costs And Benefits ◽  
Free Riders ◽  
Free Rider Problem ◽  
Social Structural ◽  
Ethnographic Analysis ◽  
Made In

AbstractHunter-gatherer punishment involves costs and benefits to individuals and groups, but the costs do not necessarily fit with the assumptions made in models that consider punishment to be altruistic – which brings in the free-rider problem and the problem of second-order free-riders. In this commentary, I present foragers' capital punishment patterns ethnographically, in the interest of establishing whether such punishment is likely to be costly; and I suggest that in many cases abstentions from punishment that might be taken as defections by free-riders are actually caused by social-structural considerations rather than being an effect of free-rider genes. This presentation of data supplements the ethnographic analysis provided by Guala.

scholarly journals How the Second-Order Free Rider Problem Is Solved in a Small-Scale Society

2017 ◽  
Vol 107 (5) ◽  
pp. 578-581 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sarah Mathew
Keyword(s):  
Free Rider ◽  
Second Order ◽  
Small Scale ◽  
High Stakes ◽  
Free Riders ◽  
Free Rider Problem ◽  
Outstanding Question ◽  
Moralistic Punishment

Moralistic punishment enables human cooperation, but an outstanding question is why people voluntarily sanction when they can obtain the benefits of punishment without being enforcers themselves. To address how decentralized societies solve this second-order free rider issue, I examine why people punish among the Turkana, a population in Kenya in which informal peer sanctioning sustains participation in high-stakes interethnic warfare. Using vignette experiments I show that Turkana subjects express punitive sentiments toward second-order free riders and those who sanction irresponsibly. The prevalence of such meta norms regulating punishment reveal a possible pathway by which moralistic punishment could have evolved.

scholarly journals Vaccine Refusal Is Not Free Riding

2021 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Ethan Bradley ◽  
Mark Navin
Keyword(s):  
Free Riding ◽  
Free Rider ◽  
Ethical Analysis ◽  
Costs And Benefits ◽  
Free Riders ◽  
Free Rider Problem ◽  
Vaccine Refusal ◽  
Policy Interventions ◽  
Community Protection ◽  
The Relationship

Vaccine refusal is not a free rider problem. The claim that vaccine refusers are free riders is inconsistent with the beliefs and motivations of most vaccine refusers. This claim also inaccurately depicts the relationship between an individual’s immunization choice, their ability to enjoy the benefits of community protection, and the costs and benefits that individuals experience from immunization and community protection. Modeling vaccine refusers as free riders also likely distorts the ethical analysis of vaccine refusal and may lead to unsuccessful policy interventions.

LESS THAN THEY BARGAINED FOR: UNION BARGAINING FEES IN CERTIFIED AGREEMENTS- A MATTER OF LAW, POLITICS OR PUBLIC POLICY?

2005 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
pp. 408
Author(s):  
GUY DONOVAN
Keyword(s):  
Public Policy ◽  
Industrial Relations ◽  
Free Rider ◽  
Financial Security ◽  
Freedom Of Association ◽  
High Court ◽  
Free Rider Problem ◽  
Workplace Relations ◽  
The Government

<div class="page" title="Page 1"><div class="layoutArea"><div class="column"><p><span>[</span><span>The High Court of Australia’s decision in </span><span>Electrolux No 3</span><span>, combined with the Australian government’s changes to workplace relations law, has en- sured that unions are prohibited from charging bargaining fees. The gov- ernment claimed to have prohibited the fees on the basis that they offend the principle of “freedom of association”. However, the government failed to consider other policy considerations and considerable international precedents that suggest if bargaining fees are limited to an amount cover- ing bargaining services alone, they provide unions with a beneficial source of financial security, whilst also overcoming the free-rider problem and maintaining respect for the concept of voluntary unionism. Therefore, it is perhaps incorrect to suggest that the prohibition of bargaining fees was prescribed by the government on the basis of some overriding concern for the freedom of association. Rather it seems more realistic to suggest that freedom of association was the guise under which the government was able to further marginalise the role of unions in industrial relations in or- der to promote its own ideological and economic agenda</span><span>.] </span></p></div></div></div>

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