La "responsabilitŕ di proteggere". Riflessioni a margine del caso birmano

Author(s):  
Giustiniani Flavia Zorzi

- The responsibility to protect doctrine was designed at the dawn of the new millennium to resolve situations when a State fails to protect its people against avoidable suffering. While it received a great deal of attention in doctrinal debates, the expectations put on it were not matched by reality. Indeed the concept, as endorsed by the international community in the 2005 UN World Summit declaration, is conspicuous by its scarce innovative value and its ambiguities. Among the questions left unanswered there is, in particular, the problem of its applicability in humanitarian emergency situations due to the combined effect of a natural catastrophe and the criminal behaviour of territorial authorities. This latter situation, so far considered as a hypothetical scenario, became true in Myanmar following the passage of cyclone Nargis. The Burmese emergency can thus be taken as a test-case whose inquiry will enable us to scrutinize the actual extent of the responsibility to protect.

2011 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 37-60 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Langmore ◽  
Ashley McLachlan-Bent

AbstractIn May 2008 Cyclone Nargis created significant international debate when the ruling military regime in Myanmar refused to allow international relief supplies and specialists into the country. The discussion that followed included invoking the principle of Responsibility to Protect as a way of forcing the regime to accept international assistance. This proposal caused sharp division amongst governments, relief agencies, journalists and citizens. The regime's shocking refusal to accept assistance constituted a crime against humanity and, as such, deserved consideration as an R2P situation. The damage which military action involves was severely underestimated by those proposing it and although the situation following Nargis clearly met the threshold criteria, permitting coercive intervention, the precautionary principles were not satisfied, thus making coercive intervention under R2P impermissible. The involvement of the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) following Nargis facilitated entry of disaster assessment teams and some aid into Myanmar. In light of Myanmar's fear of intervention in its affairs, the international community should have used R2P to frame a response and worked with ASEAN from the outset to pressure the regime to respond to the disaster more effectively.


Author(s):  
Charles Cater ◽  
David M. Malone

This chapter addresses the evolution of the responsibility to protect concept from September 1999 to its adoption in the World Summit Outcome Document of September 2005. It covers Kofi Annan’s ‘dilemma of intervention’, some early human security initiatives by Canada including the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) and its report The Responsibility to Protect which first articulated the moniker as well as the concept, the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change and the Secretary-General’s report In Larger Freedom, the negotiations and Outcome Document of the World Summit, and the early incorporation of protection of civilians within Security Council resolutions. Throughout this narrative, the importance of sustained advocacy by key individuals—including Kofi Annan, Lloyd Axworthy, and Gareth Evans among others—is presented as vital to the evolution (in theory and in practice) of the responsibility to protect.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Aidan Gnoth

<p>The way in which different regions are receiving the international norm of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) has been attracting increasing attention within academia in recent years, most notably after the NATO led intervention in Libya in 2011. Academics have attempted to analyse the extent to which R2P has been diffused in various states and have argued that states within developing regions have begun to localise R2P to make it more congruent with their pre-existing norms and practices in order to increase its acceptance. These studies have utilised traditional theories of norm diffusion which conceive of norms as static entities with fixed content and as such they have not attempted to analyse how the norm has been changing as a result of this process. Furthermore these studies have tended to analyse the diffusion of R2P in isolation from other states and other regions and as such, no comparative analysis of how regions have received R2P exists. This thesis employs a discursive approach, seeking to look at how R2P has been received within three developing regions (Africa, Southeast Asia, and Latin America) and in doing so aims to find how regions receptions of R2P differ and whether the content of R2P has changed between them. It finds that since the 2005 World Summit, receptions to R2P have not significantly altered and that where R2P is being gradually diffused it is increasingly becoming a norm for prevention rather than response.</p>


2010 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 161-166 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Chandler

AbstractThis article is part of a forum on the report of the United Nations Secretary-General, 'Implementing the Responsibility to Protect', which was released on 12 January 2009. The report was written as a response to 'one of the cardinal challenges of our time, as posed in paragraphs 138 and 139 of the 2005 World Summit Outcome: operationalizing the responsibility to protect'. The forum seeks to provide a range of perspectives on the report. It features contributions from Jennifer Welsh, Hugo Slim, David Chandler and Monica Serrano, and it concludes with a response from Special Advisor to the Secretary-General Edward Luck.


2015 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 81-108 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kimberly Nackers

The Responsibility to Protect (r2p), as enshrined in the 2005 World Summit Outcome document, aims to protect populations from the commission of mass atrocities. Yet both Sri Lankan government and Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (ltte) forces killed thousands of civilians during the conclusion of Eelam War Four in Sri Lanka, in spite of the adoption of r2p by the Sri Lankan government. In this article, I argue that these atrocities occurred with little involvement on the part of the international community to stop them, in large part due to existing international political dynamics, which the framing efforts of the Sri Lankan government played upon. The government was able to determine the dominant discourse on the conflict and portrayed it as part of the War on Terror. This facilitated states in supporting the government in the conflict, while diminishing criticism from actors that may otherwise have been more supportive of the invocation of r2p.


2020 ◽  
Vol 57 (3) ◽  
pp. 296-316
Author(s):  
Akanksha Singh

The concept of ‘Responsibility to Protect’ (R2P) took shape to refine the contested concept of ‘humanitarian intervention’. In the initial phase, the concept of R2P did not receive enthusiastic endorsement. Developing countries including India perceived it as a new body with the old spirit and likened it with the concept of humanitarian intervention, and this was reinforced by the US-led war against Iraq in 2003. However, the 2005 World Summit proved to be a watershed in the evolution of R2P, just as it is a landmark to understand an important phase of India’s approach to the idea. It would not be accurate to characterize India as a determined nay-sayer on R2P endorsement, particularly in view of the widely known priority India attached at the World Summit to the question of United Nations (UN) Security Council enlargement. Eventually, by 2009 (with the introduction of ‘three- pillar principles’ of R2P), India became a major proponent for the cautious and legitimate implementation of R2P. However, the experiences gained from Libya made India become a voice of caution in invoking forcible options under the R2P principle in Syria. In this article, the attempt has been made to articulate various permutations and combinations regarding India’s evolving approach to R2P on a case-by-case basis.


2008 ◽  
Vol 11 (7) ◽  
pp. 699-705 ◽  
Author(s):  
Laura Rossi ◽  
Daniel Verna ◽  
Susie L Villeneuve

AbstractObjectiveTo evaluate the impact and appropriateness of programmes for the management and treatment of severe malnutrition in emergency situations.DesignA central unified database was set up with all data and statistics provided by nutritional centres (NC) active in Burundi.SettingThe paper describes the case of Burundi as an example of the response of the humanitarian community to nutritional crisis.SubjectsSince 1999, more than one million (1 054 210) severely malnourished patients were treated in NC established in Burundi.ResultsPeaks of beneficiaries were registered in 2000 and 2001; the admission rate started to decrease in 2002. In 2004, twenty therapeutic feeding centres (TFC) and 224 supplementary feeding centres (SFC) were active for the treatment of 127 420 beneficiaries. Nutritional programmes were present in every province with a coverage rate of 55 %. The most convincing impact of the nutritional programme in Burundi was the reduction of mortality rate in children under 5 years of age; an impact on the prevalence of acute malnutrition could not be demonstrated. Children under 5 years old accounted for 62 % of beneficiaries in TFC and 76 % in SFC. TFC performance indicators fulfilled the minimum standards in disaster response; the performance of SFC was not so optimal with a low recovery rate (69 % v. >80 %) and a high non-respondent rate (16 % v. <5 %). With the combination of coverage and cure rate, the programme met 44 % of the assessed needs in 2004.ConclusionsIn Burundi the stabilisation of security conditions permitted a combination of humanitarian responses ranging from emergency activities to strengthening of community-based initiatives that could correct the coverage and impact limitations.


2006 ◽  
Vol 20 (2) ◽  
pp. 143-169 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alex J. Bellamy

At the 2005 World Summit, the world‘s leaders committed themselves to the “responsibility to protect”, recognizing both that all states have a responsibility to protect their citizens from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity and that the UN should help states to discharge this responsibility using either peaceful means or enforcement action. This declaration ostensibly marks an important milestone in the relationship between sovereignty and human rights but its critics argue that it will make little difference in practice to the world’s most threatened people. The purpose of this article is to ask how consensus was reached on the responsibility to protect, given continuing hostility to humanitarian intervention expressed by many (if not most) of the world‘s states and whether the consensus will contribute to avoiding future Kosovos (cases where the Security Council is deadlocked in the face of a humanitarian crises) and future Rwandas (cases where states lack the political will to intervene). It suggests that four key factors contributed to the consensus: pressure from proponents of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, its adoption by Kofi Annan and the UN’s High Level Panel, an emerging consensus in the African Union, and the American position. Whilst these four factors contributed to consensus, each altered the meaning of the responsibility to protect in important ways, creating a doctrine that many states can sign up to but that does little to prevent future Kosovos and Rwandas and may actually inhibit attempts to build a consensus around intervention in future cases.


2010 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 149-154 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jennifer Welsh

AbstractThis article is part of a forum on the report of the United Nations Secretary-General, 'Implementing the Responsibility to Protect', which was released on 12 January 2009. The report was written as a response to 'one of the cardinal challenges of our time, as posed in paragraphs 138 and 139 of the 2005 World Summit Outcome: operationalizing the responsibility to protect'. The forum seeks to provide a range of perspectives on the report. It features contributions from Jennifer Welsh, Hugo Slim, David Chandler and Monica Serrano, and it concludes with a response from Special Advisor to the Secretary-General Edward Luck.


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