Perceptual Knowledge Report Analysis (PKRA): un nuovo strumento

2013 ◽  
pp. 23-44
Author(s):  
Paola Abrate ◽  
Stella Ambel ◽  
Elena Checchin ◽  
Tiziana Frau ◽  
Sabrina Giorcelli ◽  
...  
Author(s):  
Yusuke Nakatake ◽  
Makoto Okabe ◽  
Shota Sato

Abstract In this paper, we carried out PIND (Particle Impact Noise Detection) test and X-ray inspection of a transistor in a TO-18 package for commercial and industrial applications. From our evaluation results, we explain the validity of the PIND test by comparing PIND test and X-ray inspection results. We make clear that PIND test is able to detect internal foreign material that may be transparent to X-ray inspection. In addition, we report analysis results of internal foreign materials from defective devices. This matter suggests that a problem is contamination control in the manufacturing process, most likely the sealing process.


Author(s):  
Sarah McGrath

Proponents of moral perception hold that some of our moral knowledge is perceptual knowledge. Discussions of whether moral perception is possible often seem to assume that there is some attractive alternative account of how we arrive at moral knowledge in those cases that are regarded as among the best candidates for cases of full-fledged moral perception. This chapter challenges that assumption by critically examining some alternative accounts of how we arrive at knowledge in the relevant class of cases, arguing that the more closely one examines these alternative accounts, the more implausible they seem as accounts of how we actually manage to arrive at moral knowledge. A modest version of moral perception is sketched, one that does not suffer from any similarly implausible commitments. There are some concluding reflections on why it matters whether some of our moral knowledge is perceptual.


Author(s):  
Barry Stroud

This chapter offers a response to Quassim Cassam’s ‘Seeing and Knowing’, which challenges some of the conditions Cassam thinks the author has imposed on a satisfactory explanation of our knowledge of the external world. According to Cassam, the conditions he specifies can be fulfilled in ways that explain how the knowledge is possible. What is at stake in this argument between Cassam and the author is the conception of what is perceived to be so that is needed to account for the kind of perceptual knowledge we all know we have. That is what must be in question in any promising move away from the overly restrictive conception of perceptual experience that gives rise to the hopelessness of the traditional epistemological problem. The author suggests that we should explore the conditions of successful ‘propositional’ perception of the way things are and emphasizes the promise of such a strategy.


2020 ◽  
pp. 025371762097858
Author(s):  
Sujita Kumar Kar ◽  
Sagar Rai ◽  
Nivedita Sharma ◽  
Amit Singh

Author(s):  
Benjamin Camblor ◽  
Jean-Marc Salotti ◽  
Charles Fage ◽  
David Daney

2021 ◽  
Vol 118 ◽  
pp. 339-357
Author(s):  
Ankur Das ◽  
Janmenjoy Nayak ◽  
Bighnaraj Naik ◽  
Uttam Ghosh

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