Two Puzzles from the Postscript

Legal Theory ◽  
1998 ◽  
Vol 4 (3) ◽  
pp. 359-380 ◽  
Author(s):  
Philip Soper

Conversions occur in legal theory about as often as they do in religion, which is to say rarely—so rarely that they fascinate as much for the fact that they happen at all as for the reasons they happen. It should not surprise, then, that the Postscript to H.L.A. Hart's famous work on jurisprudence reveals “the outstanding English philosopher of law of the twentieth century” reaffirming, rather than revising in any significant way, the two central tenets that distinguish his theory from that of both classical natural law theorists and modern “new naturalists” like Ronald Dworkin: (1) There is no necessary connection between law and morality; and (2) judges inevitably confront cases where the decision is “not dictated by the law” and the judge “must act as a conscientious legislator would by deciding according to his own beliefs and values” (p. 273).

2021 ◽  
pp. 65-80
Author(s):  
José Luis López Fuentes

RESUMEN: En el presente trabajo, con base en las teorías iusnaturalistas y del positivismo jurídico, se busca ofrecer un breve acercamiento al desarrollo que han tenido a través del tiempo las tesis más importantes en torno al problema de la relación entre derecho y moral, hasta llegar a lo que actualmente es denominado antipositivismo jurídico, pues el objetivo de este documento es presentar un análisis y exposición de las aportaciones de esta corriente de pensamiento a la teoría jurídica contemporánea, para lo cual, se analizan las propuestas de Ronald Dworkin y Robert Alexy, en especial de la tesis de los principios, y su relevancia en la interpretación y aplicación de la ley.ABSTRACT: In this work, based on natural law theories and legal positivism, I seek to offer a brief approach  to the development that the most important theses have had throughout time regarding the problem of the relationship between law and morality, arriving at what we now call legal anti-positivism, the objective of this document is to present an analysis and exposition of the contributions of this current of thought to contemporary legal theory, for which the proposals of Ronald Dworkin and Robert Alexy are analyzed, specially the thesis of the principles, and its relevance in the interpretation and application of the law.Keywords: Natural law theories, legal positivism, legal antipositivism, moral, thesis of principles.


2017 ◽  
Vol 1 (2) ◽  
pp. 137-144
Author(s):  
Jarmila Chovancová

Dominant discussion is understanding law and morality which represents neverending story. The article analyzes positive law in 20th century represented by H.L. A Hart and natural law development by L.L. Fuller and R. Alexy. Twentieth century can be called a period during which natural law has been shifted towards more positivism within the natural law. Positive law can be understood as a doctrine based on the Bentham’s utilitarism which didn’t accept other normative systems to be involved into concept of law. Prominent representatives of this theory have completely excluded moral content of the legal standards and they consider these to be irrelevant for the validity of the law. According to them evaluating standards through moral criteria is not appropriate because this brings chaos into the jural thinking.


2020 ◽  
pp. 167-200
Author(s):  
Michael Pakaluk

A theory may properly be called a theory of natural law, if either it functions as such a theory is expected to function; or it has the expected content; or it is a plausible interpretation of a theory generally acknowledged to be in the tradition of natural law. It functions as such a theory if it supports appeals to natural law intended to ‘contextualize’ human law. It has the expected content, if it adverts to providential, natural teleology as the basis for a law given to us prior to convention. It would clearly be located in the tradition, and rightly accounted as such a theory, if it were a plausible interpretation of Aquinas’ Treatise on Law, which is the locus classicus for the philosophical treatment of natural law. But the ‘New Natural Law,’ first expounded in Natural Law and Natural Rights (NLNR) of John Finnis, meets none of these criteria. NLNR seems best construed, then, as a contribution to the «law and morality » debate, not a theory of natural law. It gives merely another ‘method of ethics’ along with the many others put forward in the 20th c. If so, the philosophical work needed for a persuasive, contemporary revival of natural law still remains to be done.


Author(s):  
Massimo La Torre

Lon Louvois Fuller was a leading US legal philosopher and contracts lawyer who in his controversies with H.L.A. Hart and with US ‘legal realists’ advanced a version of ‘procedural natural law’ deriving an ‘inner morality of law’ from the formal properties of law. At the same time, through his insistence that legal interpretation must always consider the essentially purposive character of legal activity, he forms an intellectual bridge between earlier pragmatist accounts of law and the late twentieth-century interpretivist approach associated particularly with Ronald Dworkin.


1986 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 31-48 ◽  
Author(s):  
Philip Soper

I. INTRODUCTIONTwenty-five years is roughly the time that has elapsed since the exchange between H. L. A. Hart and Lon Fuller and the subsequent revival in this country of the natural law/positivism debate. During this time, a curious thing has happened to legal positivism. What began as a conceptual theory about the distinction between law and morality has now been turned, at least by some, into a moral theory. According to this theory, the reason we must see law and morality as separate is not (at least not entirely) because of the logic of our language, but because of the practical implications of holding one or the other of the two traditional views in this area. The natural law theorist, it is said, can connect law and morality only at the cost of investing official directives with undeserved moral authority, thus encouraging obedience where there should be none. The natural law position should therefore be rejected – and the positivist's accepted – on moral grounds.


2018 ◽  
Vol 14 (3) ◽  
pp. 620
Author(s):  
Timbo Mangaranap Sirait

Diskursus hubungan antara hukum dengan “moral” dan “fakta” selalu saja menarik untuk dibahas di kalangan sarjana hukum. Hukum kodrat irrasional adalah teori hukum besar yang pertama yang cara pandangnya theocentris mengakui bahwa hukum bersumber dari “moralitas” Tuhan YME. Derivasi nilai moral universal ternyata semakin bermetamorfosa dalam berbagai fenomena kehidupan kemudian dituntut agar diperlakukan setara di hadapan hukum. Di berbagai belahan dunia, Gerakan LGBT (Lesbian, Gay, Biseksual, dan Transgender) dengan perjuangan perkawinan sesama jenis berkembang semakin luas dan telah memfalsifikasi dominasi perkawinan kodrati heteroseksual. Untuk itu, perlu ditilik secara reflektif filosofis akseptabilitas Konstitusi Indonesia atas perkawinan sesama jenis ini. Penelitian ini dilakukan dengan metode pendekatan yuridis normatif melalui cara berpikir deduktif dengan kriterium kebenaran koheren. Sehingga disimpulkan: pertama, kritikan hukum kodrat irrasional yang teosentris terhadap perkawinan sesama jenis, menganggap bahwa sumber hukum adalah “moral” bukan “fakta”, oleh karenanya aturan perundang-undangan dipositifkan dari/dan tidak boleh bertentangan dengan moral Ketuhanan. Oleh karena itu, menurut hukum kodrat irrasional perkawinan sesama jenis tidak mungkin dapat diterima dalam hukum karena bertentangan dengan moralitas Ketuhanan Y.M.E. Kedua, bahwa Konstitusi Indonesia menempatkan Pancasila sebagai grundnorm dengan sila Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa menjadi fondasi dan bintang pemandu pada Undang-undang Perkawinan Indonesia, yang intinya perkawinan harus antara pria dan wanita (heteroseksual) dengan tujuan membentuk keluarga (rumah tangga). Perkawinan sesama jenis juga tidak dapat diterima karena ketidakmampuan bentuk perkawinan ini untuk memenuhi unsur-unsur utama perkawinan, untuk terjaminnya keberlangsungan kemanusiaan secara berkelanjutan (sustainable).The discourse of relationships between law, moral and facts are always interesting to be discussed among legal scholars. Irrational natural law is the first major legal theory that which theocentris worldview admit that the law derived from the “morality” of the God. The derivation of universal moral values appear increasingly metamorphosed into various life phenomena then are required to be treated equally before the law. In different parts of the world the movement LGBT (Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender) struggle for same-sex marriage has grown falsified domination of heterosexual marriage. Therefore it is necessary be a reflective philosophical divine the acceptability of the Constitution of Indonesia on same-sex marriage. This research was conducted by the method of normative juridical approach, in the frame of a coherent deductive acknowledgement. Concluded, Firstly, criticism Irrational natural law against same-sex marriage, assume that the source of the law is a “moral” rather than “facts”, therefore the rules of law are made of / and should not contradict with the morals of God. Therefore, according to irrational natural law that same-sex marriage may not be accepted in law as contrary to morality God. Secondly, That the Constitution of Indonesia puts Pancasila as the basic norms to please Almighty God be the foundation and a guiding star in the Indonesian Marriage Law, which is essentially a marriage should be between a man and a woman (heterosexual) with purpose of forming a family. Same-sex marriage is not acceptable also because of the inability to fulfill marriage form of the major elements of marriage, ensuring the sustainability of humanity in a sustainable manner.


2009 ◽  
pp. 181-192
Author(s):  
Carolina Gasparoli

- Hart is one of the most prominent philosophers of law of the last century. Published in 1961, his book The Concept of Law has influenced many of the leading figures in contemporary legal theory. Hart held the Chair of Jurisprudence at Oxford University from 1952 until 1968 and he chose Ronald Dworkin as his successor. In his last book Diritto e natura. H.L.A. e la filosofia di Oxford, Mario Ricciardi takes the uneasy relationship between the two philosophers as the starting point of his inquiry and claims that Dworkin's critique of Hart's legal theory has misinterpreted many relevant aspects of Hart's approach to law. As a result, many scholars have paid little attention to the cultural and philosophical background of Hart's work. In particular, Ricciardi suggests that, in this work, Hart uses a specific notion of analysis, namely connective analysis, which Gilbert Ryle and Peter F. Strawson had opposed to the decompositive one. Such a reading of The Concept of Law generates a new understanding of the role played by the minimum content of natural law in Hart's legal theory.


Author(s):  
N.E. Simmonds

Within the tradition of natural law thinking which finds its roots in the philosophies of Aristotle and Aquinas, the political community has generally been understood in terms of a fundamental goal: that of fostering the ethical good of citizens. Law, on this conception, should seek to inculcate habits of good conduct, and should support a social environment which will encourage citizens to pursue worthy goals, and to lead valuable lives. Pragmatic considerations may sometimes suggest the wisdom of restraint in the pursuit of these goals, and citizens may therefore, on appropriate occasions, be left free to indulge depraved tastes or otherwise fall short of acceptable standards. Such pragmatic arguments for the freedom to engage in vice, however, do not call into question the legitimacy of the state’s concern with individual morality. By contrast the liberal tradition has tended to place constraints of principle upon the scope and aims of the law. The most influential such attempt was J.S. Mill’s advocacy of ‘the harm principle’: that the law may forbid only such behaviour as is liable to cause harm to persons other than the agent. Many difficulties surround this and other, more recent, attempts to formulate and defend constraining principles. For instance, should one take into account only the immediate effects of behaviour, or more remote and diffuse effects as well? Thus it is argued that immoral behaviour which in the short term ‘harms nobody’ may, in the long run, lead to a decline in morality in society at large and thereby to diffuse harmful effects.


2021 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
pp. 51-61
Author(s):  
Dian Latifiani ◽  
Raden Muhammad Arvy Ilyasa

Moral values in legal science are important. However, the flow of law sees a variety of moral values. This paper aims to see the position of moral values in the science of law. Legal positivism separates strictly between law and morals. According to him, there is no law other than the command of the authorities. Even extreme identifying the law (Recht) as the law (wet). Legal positivism activities are aimed at concrete problems, which are different when compared to natural law thinking which engages itself with the validation of man-made law. For adherents of natural law theory, an unjust law is not law. there is an absolute relationship between law and morality. the two cannot be separated, so the law must refer to moral principles.


Author(s):  
David Copp

Legal Teleology seeks to embrace and to ground the most plausible tenets of both legal positivism and natural law theory. It is compatible with the positivist view that law consists at root in a social practice of a certain kind. Yet it also can accommodate at least some claims about the relation between law and morality that are advocated by opponents of positivism. Most important, it argues that law is “robustly normative”—roughly, law is a source of genuine reasons. Standard forms of positivism cannot account for this thesis, but, arguably, the central doctrines of positivism are compatible with it. Legal Teleology is an account of the normativity of law that is supported by “pluralist-teleology,” a naturalist account of normativity that has been proposed elsewhere (Copp 2009). Legal Teleology sees the law as having a purpose, and it says that law is defective insofar as it does not further that purpose. It agrees that jurists can sometimes help law better to serve its purpose when they invoke moral principles in interpreting law. Legal Teleology represents a kind of intermarriage between legal positivism and natural law theory.


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