scholarly journals Patterson D. M. Dworkin on the Semantics of Legal and Political Concepts / trans. from Engl. A. B. Didikin, S. A. Aleksandrov

2021 ◽  
Vol 6 (2) ◽  
pp. 83-93
Author(s):  
A. B. Didikin ◽  
◽  
S. A. Aleksandrov ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Natural Kind ◽  
Scientific Method ◽  
Natural Kinds ◽  
Semantic Theory ◽  
Ronald Dworkin ◽  
Recent Comment ◽  
The Concept Of Law ◽  
Theory Of Law ◽  
Concept Of Law

In a recent comment on H. L. A. Hart’s «Postscript» to The Concept of Law, Ronald Dworkin claims that the meaning of legal and political concepts maybe understood by analogy to the meaning of natural kind concepts like «tiger», «gold» and «water». This article questions the efficacy of Dworkin’s claims by challenging the use of natural kinds as the basis for a semantic theory of legal and political concepts. Additionally, in matters of value there is no methodological equivalent to the scientific method. Thus, there is little hope of finding hidden essences to explain the meaning of legal and political concepts. Finally, even if there are natural kinds, Dworkin’s arguments for their efficacy in jurisprudence are problematic and unpersuasive. The problem for Dworkin is that his embrace of natural kinds undermines the «fit» side of the fit/justification model of adjudication that lies at the heart of his theory of law

scholarly journals Jurisprudence in the Era of Change: Subject and Structure of the Discipline

Lex Russica ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 88-117
Author(s):  
Yu. A. Vedeneev
Keyword(s):  
General System ◽  
Political Sciences ◽  
Legal Science ◽  
History Of ◽  
The Law ◽  
The Concept Of Law ◽  
Theory Of Law ◽  
Concept Representations ◽  
Canonical Texts ◽  
Concept Of Law

The law exists in the form of institutions and in the form of representations of institutions, since the representation of something (phenomenon) has a conceptual dimension in the representation of something (concept). Representations of law and representations of law are two aspects of the expression and manifestation of the general legal reality. This, in fact, leads to a fundamental dilemma in determining the subject of legal science. This is the science of law or the science of legal science. Given that the concept of law is a theory of law developed into a system of definitions, the practical language of law finds itself in the theoretical language of jurisprudence, and vice versa. The languages in which the law operates, and the languages in which the phenomenon of law is interpreted, constitute the general object and subject of jurisprudence.Jurisprudence is a conceptual part of legal reality, both an object and a subject of legal science. The evolution of jurisprudence in the cultural-historical logic of changes in its subject and methods is the basis for changes in its disciplinary structure and connections in the general system of social and political sciences. Each cultural and historical epoch of the existence of law corresponds to its own grammar of law and its own epistemology of law, that is, its own analytical language and disciplinary format of legal knowledge. The law exists in the definitions of its concept. The concept of law has both an ontological and epistemological status. One thinks of law because it exists, and one understands the law because it is defined. Each tradition of understanding the law can be conceptually seen in the phenomenon of law that other traditions of legal understanding do not see or do not notice. The history of the development of the concept of law (conceptualization of law) contains the history of the development of legal institutions (institutionalization of law). Both components of legal reality — objective and subjective grounds and conditions for the emergence and development of the phenomenon of law live in the framework definitions of their social culture, its language and discourse. That is, they live in historical forms of awareness and understanding of one’s own law — from the law indicated in rituals, myths, signs and symbols, to the law indicated in canonical texts, doctrines and concepts; from the law of disciplinary society to the law of network communities; from the law of political domination and bureaucratic management to the law of civil communications and network agreements.

Diritto e natura a Oxford: il caso di H.L.A. Hart

2009 ◽  
pp. 181-192
Author(s):  
Carolina Gasparoli
Keyword(s):  
Natural Law ◽  
Legal Theory ◽  
Ronald Dworkin ◽  
Oxford University ◽  
Starting Point ◽  
Philosophical Background ◽  
The Concept Of Law ◽  
Concept Of Law

- Hart is one of the most prominent philosophers of law of the last century. Published in 1961, his book The Concept of Law has influenced many of the leading figures in contemporary legal theory. Hart held the Chair of Jurisprudence at Oxford University from 1952 until 1968 and he chose Ronald Dworkin as his successor. In his last book Diritto e natura. H.L.A. e la filosofia di Oxford, Mario Ricciardi takes the uneasy relationship between the two philosophers as the starting point of his inquiry and claims that Dworkin's critique of Hart's legal theory has misinterpreted many relevant aspects of Hart's approach to law. As a result, many scholars have paid little attention to the cultural and philosophical background of Hart's work. In particular, Ricciardi suggests that, in this work, Hart uses a specific notion of analysis, namely connective analysis, which Gilbert Ryle and Peter F. Strawson had opposed to the decompositive one. Such a reading of The Concept of Law generates a new understanding of the role played by the minimum content of natural law in Hart's legal theory.

On Two Functions of Notions in Scientific Knowledge of Law

10.12737/5497 ◽  
2014 ◽  
Vol 2 (9) ◽  
pp. 18-25
Author(s):  
Ерзат Бекбаев ◽  
Erzat Bekbaev
Keyword(s):  
Scientific Knowledge ◽  
The Other ◽  
Logical Function ◽  
Complete Knowledge ◽  
Science Theory ◽  
The Law ◽  
The Concept Of Law ◽  
Theory Of Law ◽  
Amount Of Knowledge ◽  
Concept Of Law

The function of the concept of law in scientific knowledge is shown as an exact idea about the signs of law distinguishing it from the other objects. Another logical function of concept of law is in the ability to reflect in thoughts more or less complete result, the amount of knowledge about the law. It is argued that the essence of law can be known, provided the pre-obtained full and complete knowledge of the law as a special subject of scientific knowledge. The possibility of using logical principles of the construction of scientific theories in the science theory of law.

Judicial Discretion and the Concept of Law

1976 ◽  
Vol 35 (1) ◽  
pp. 135-157 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joseph M. Steiner
Keyword(s):  
Judicial Discretion ◽  
Ronald Dworkin ◽  
Legal Argument ◽  
Judicial Reasoning ◽  
The Concept Of Law ◽  
Concept Of Law

In a series of recent papers Professor Ronald Dworkin has presented a critique of the legal positivist's analysis of law as typified by the work of H. L. A. Hart. Dworkin argues that the “model of rules” provides an incomplete and inadequate characterisation of the nature of legal argument and judicial reasoning and, hence, of law, by virtue of its failure to recognise that judges are bound, in making decisions, not only by rules, but also by principles which have rather different logical properties.

scholarly journals Semantics of legal concepts and natural kind terms: D. Patterson’s arguments

2021 ◽  
Vol 6 (2) ◽  
pp. 94-98
Author(s):  
A. B. Didikin ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Natural Kind ◽  
Natural Kinds ◽  
Methodological Approach ◽  
Legal Language ◽  
Legal Philosopher ◽  
Natural Kind Terms ◽  
Kind Terms ◽  
Theory Of Law ◽  
Legal Concepts

The paper is devoted to the analysis of the arguments of the american legal philosopher Dennis Patterson regarding the applicability of the natural kinds terms to the semantics of the legal language. Based on the Ronald Dworkin’s theory of law, reasonable criticized by D. Patterson, the features of the formation and interpretation of legal concepts are considered. Arguments are presented that demonstrate the content of R. Dworkin and D. Patterson’s methodological approach to the interpretation of the semantics of legal concepts as well as argumentation regarding the normativity of legal reality, the objects of which are displayed in the content of legal concepts

The Concept of Law

1950 ◽  
Vol 10 (3) ◽  
pp. 423-431
Author(s):  
B. E. King
Keyword(s):  
Social Sciences ◽  
Legal Theory ◽  
Legal Science ◽  
The Social ◽  
Points Of View ◽  
The Concept Of Law ◽  
Theory Of Law ◽  
Final Work ◽  
Concept Of Law

Twenty years ago Mr. Cairns set himself the task of looking at law from three points of view, that of the social sciences, that of logic and the empirical sciences, and that of philosophy. Law and the Social Sciences was published in 1935, the Theory of Legal Science in 1941. The volume under review completes the trilogy. The object of all these volumes is the same—‘To construct the foundation of a theory of law which is the necessary antecedeat of a possible jurisprudence’. All those who have come under the spell of Mr. Cairns' stimulating thought will look forward with the greatest interest to the application and expansion of his conclusions which is now promised us in a projected final work, The Elements of Legal Theory.

Incorporationism, Conventionality, and the Practical Difference Thesis

Legal Theory ◽  
1998 ◽  
Vol 4 (4) ◽  
pp. 381-425 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jules L. Coleman
Keyword(s):  
Good Deal ◽  
Legal Positivism ◽  
Ronald Dworkin ◽  
Lively Debate ◽  
Joseph Raz ◽  
Legal Positivist ◽  
The Concept Of Law ◽  
Influential Book ◽  
Proper Interpretation ◽  
Concept Of Law

H.L.A. Hart's The Concept of Law is the most important and influential book in the legal positivist tradition. Though its importance is undisputed, there is a good deal less consensus regarding its core commitments, both methodological and substantive. With the exception of an occasional essay, Hart neither further developed nor revised his position beyond the argument of the book. The burden of shaping the prevailing understanding of his views, therefore, has fallen to others: notably, Joseph Raz among positivists, and Ronald Dworkin among positivism's critics. Dworkin, in particular, has framed, then reframed, the conventional understanding, not only of Hart's positivism, but of the terms of the debate between positivists and him. While standing on the sidelines, Hart witnessed the unfolding of not only a lively debate between positivists and Dworkin, but an equally intense one among positivists as to positivism's (and his) core claims. The most important debate has been between so-called inclusive and exclusive positivists: a debate as much about Hart's legacy as about the proper interpretation of legal positivism.

Epistemic Uncertainty and Legal Theory by Brian Burge-Hendrix (Aldershot, UK: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2008). [ISBN 978-0-7546-7521-1.] All page references in parentheses are to this book.

2010 ◽  
Vol 23 (1) ◽  
pp. 249-253
Author(s):  
Philip Soper
Keyword(s):  
Natural Law ◽  
Legal Theory ◽  
Epistemic Uncertainty ◽  
Moral Authority ◽  
Proper Place ◽  
Legal Standards ◽  
The Concept Of Law ◽  
Theory Of Law ◽  
Publishing Limited ◽  
Concept Of Law

Making the perspective of insiders critical to a theory of law, including particularly those who accept and enforce legal standards, has been the hallmark of corrections to John Austin’s theory at least since Hart’s The Concept of Law. Burge-Hendrix’s book continues this tradition and brings its insights to bear on the particular dispute between inclusive and exclusive positivists. That being said, the project has always seemed to me to be incomplete. If the participant’s perspective is indeed the critical one, then the recognition that participants make normative claims about the concept of law itself (not just about their legal standards) surely deserves its own proper place in a legal theory. Those normative claims about law range, at the very least, from claims that coercion is (morally) justified to claims of (moral) authority. If these claims turn out to be false in cases of laws that are extremely unjust, then either they are not “laws” at all according to the participants’ own views(in which case the natural law theorists are correct.) Or, participants will have to give up their normative claims about law and recognize that all that counts is pedigree and the power to coerce. In that case, we will be back to Austin’s coercive account of law, and much of the dispute between exclusive and inclusive positivists will be irrelevant.

scholarly journals THE CHOICE OF AN OBJECT OF STUDY IN THE THEORY OF LAW

2020 ◽  
Vol 24 (3) ◽  
pp. 530-546
Author(s):  
Erzat Z. Bekbaev
Keyword(s):  
General Theory ◽  
Modern Science ◽  
Written Language ◽  
Legal Science ◽  
The World ◽  
Fundamental Research ◽  
The Concept Of Law ◽  
Theory Of Law ◽  
Object Of Study ◽  
Concept Of Law

The relevance of the problem of choosing the object of study in the theory of law is determined by the need to tackle the debatable issue of pluralism in understanding of law. It is noted that one of the reasons for theoretical and legal pluralism on the concept of law is the lack of uniform criteria for identifying the object of study in the general theory of law. The situation with the concept of law in legal science, including with the pluralism of opinions, is considered largely as a result of the scientists and practitioners attitude described as first understand the law and then create a single concept of law. The fundamental research carried out in legal science and wide discussions on the concept of law are taken as positive; one of the parameters is the principle of separation of the object and subject of legal science. It is shown that when constructing a scientific theory of law, the primary question is the object of study, that is, the question of law itself as a special fragment of the real world, but not a disputable issue of the concept of law. However, in practice, when identifying the object of scientific knowledge in the general theory of law, scholars choose to study the most diverse fragments of the world, although they designate them with the same term law. Since various objects called law are subjected to scientific research, one cannot expect to derive a single concept of law. With regard to the analysis of the concept of law and the data of modern science, the following set of attributes for identifying law as an object of study in law theory is proposed for consideration: Law is a set of social norms enshrined in written language by the state and designed for people to interact with each other and with public authority such as state and other entities.

scholarly journals Hukum Sebagai Interpretasi

1970 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
pp. 61-78
Author(s):  
Petrus CKL Bello
Keyword(s):  
Legal Positivism ◽  
Coherent System ◽  
Ronald Dworkin ◽  
Legal Cases ◽  
Sharp Separation ◽  
Legal Principles ◽  
The Concept Of Law ◽  
Theory Of Law ◽  
Legal Concepts ◽  
Interpretation Model

Abstract: The issue of interpretation is one of the major themes in the study of law and legal practices. Nonetheless, while legal interpretation plays a crucial role in the study of law, scholars have yet to reach an agreement about its nature and status in the discipline. One of the most prolific legal philosophers who is deeply engaged in the discourse of this issue is Ronald Dworkin. This article will examine his views on law as an interpretation. The constructive interpretation model that Dworkin develops has posed a serious challenge for analytical jurisprudence in general, and especially, for legal positivism. The challenge is substantive and methodological; substantive, in the sense that it seeks to radically criticize a sharp separation between law and morality as prevalent in legal positivism, and methodological in the sense that it seeks to put together the analysis of legal concepts with the interpretation of law as it is regarded from the perspective of particular legal cases. Through the concept of law as interpretation, Dworkin wishes to formulate his own understanding of law as a coherent system of legal principles. Keywords: Ronald Dworkin, constructive interpretation model, external and internal skepticism, theory of law, rights thesis, difficult cases.   Abstrak: Persoalan interpretasi merupakan salah satu tema besar dalam studi hukum dan praktik hukum. Kendati demikian, sementara interpretasi hukum memainkan peran krusial dalam studi hukum, para pakar masih belum sepakat mengenai hakikat dan kedudukannya dalam disiplin ilmu tersebut. Salah seorang ahli filsafat hukum yang sangat produktif dan sangat serius menggeluti persoalan ini adalah Ronald Dworkin. Artikel ini akan mengkaji pandangan Dworkin tentang hukum sabagai sebuah interpretasi. Model interpretasi konstruktif yang dikembangkan oleh Dworkin merupakan tantangan yang sangat serius bagi yurisprudensi analitis pada umumnya, dan khususnya bagi positivisme hukum. Tantangan ini bersifat substantif dan metodologis. Bersifat substantif dalam arti bahwa Dworkin mengkritik secara radikal pemisahan yang begitu tajam antara hukum dan moralitas seperti lazim terjadi dalam positivisme hukum. Tantangan ini juga bersifat metodologis dalam arti bahwa tantangan tersebut berkehendak menyatukan analisis atas konsep hukum dengan interpretasi terhadapnya, dipandang dari perspektif kasus-kasus hukum partikular. Melalui konsep hukum sebagai interpretasi, Dworkin ingin memformulasikan pemahamannya tentang hukum sebagai sebuah sistem prinsip-prinsip hukum yang koheren. Kata-kata kunci: Ronald Dworkin, model interpretasi konstruktif, skeptisisme eksternal dan internal, teori hukum, tesis hak, kasus-kasus sulit.

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