scholarly journals Being, Substance and Form in Aristotle’s Metaphysics

2019 ◽  
pp. 43-52
Author(s):  
Md Abdul Muhit
Keyword(s):  
Primary Mode ◽  
Mode Of Being ◽  
First Philosophy ◽  
Aristotle's Metaphysics

The concepts of ‘being‘, ‘substance‘ and ‘form‘ are central to Aristotle‘s metaphysics. According to him, there are different modes of being, and of all these different modes of being, substance is the primary mode of being, and First Philosophy is especially concerned with the mode of being which belongs to substances. Again, he tries to give an analysis of what a substance is in terms of the concept of form, and claims that it is essence or form that may be called substance in the truest and fullest sense. Thus we see that the concepts of ‘being‘, ‘substance‘ and ‘form‘ are intimately related. This paper is an attempt to analyze clearly what Aristotle means by these three important concepts. Philosophy and Progress, Vol#61-62; No#1-2; Jan-Dec 2017 P 43-52

Avicenna’s Interpretation of Aristotle’s Metaphysics (Ε1, 1026a13-16)

2018 ◽  
pp. 137-143
Author(s):  
Silvia Gullino
Keyword(s):  
Modern Philosophy ◽  
Middle Ages ◽  
Natural Science ◽  
Arab World ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
The Real ◽  
First Time ◽  
First Philosophy ◽  
Aristotle's Metaphysics

During the 9th century Aristotle’s Metaphysics was translated for the first time from Greek into Arabic by Ustâth, at the request of al-Kindî and, afterwards, the interest of the Arab world in this oeuvre grew with the production of several translations, comments and paraphrases of the work. Among the books which compose the Metaphysics, one of the most studied was book Epsilon. In particular Arab philosophers focused their interest on the passage of Ε1, which contains a classification of the theoretical sciences (1026a13-1026a16), founded on the degree of immateriality and of separation from the matter of their object. Aristotle states: “Natural science deals with things which are inseparable from matter but not immovable, and some parts of mathematics deal with things which are immovable, but probably not separable, but are embodied in matter; while the first science deals with things which are both separable and immovable”. According to the Arab exegetes, Aristotle introduces here the doctrine of the three degrees of abstraction, on the base of which the object of first philosophy is the most abstract among the beings, both from the conceptual point of view and from the real one. This interpretation of the Aristotelian text – already present in Avicenna – had a huge influence on the Latin Middle Ages and on modern philosophy.

A Comparison between Book E and Book K of Aristotle’s Metaphysics

2018 ◽  
pp. 47-54
Author(s):  
Lisa Bressan
Keyword(s):  
Per Se ◽  
Object Of Study ◽  
First Philosophy ◽  
Aristotle's Metaphysics

In Aristotle’s Metaphysics K 8, in the part which is the parallel discussion of being as truth done in book Epsilon (chapter 4), the author, in defining being per se, uses the phrase τὸ ἔξω ὂν καὶ χωριστόν. This is not what Aristotle states in book E, namely that being as truth, along with being per accidens, is founded on the remaining kind of being and does not manifest - any nature outside of being (οὐκ ἔξω οὖσάν τινα φύσιν τοῦ ὄντος). Through the analysis and comparison of the two expositions, I will try to highlight how this difference depends on the different conception in the author of book Kappa about the object of the philosophy. In fact, while in book E the object of philosophy is being qua being and in particular being per se, and the separate substance turns out to be the object of first philosophy as the cause and the principle (that is as the explanation of being qua being) in book K, on the con-trary, the separate substance, since it is identified tout court with being qua being (cf. K 7, 1064a29 - there is a science of being qua being and qua separate, τοῦ ὄντος ᾗ ὂν καὶ χωριστόν), is itself the true object of study of philosophy.

scholarly journals “The universal being is either nothing or posterior”: an inquiry into the constitution and priority of being as being in Peripatetic metaphysics

2020 ◽  
Vol 14 (2) ◽  
pp. 499-516
Author(s):  
Maria Varlamova
Keyword(s):  
The Other ◽  
De Anima ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
Alexander Of Aphrodisias ◽  
I 11 ◽  
The Subject ◽  
First Philosophy ◽  
Aristotle's Metaphysics

As a subject of the first philosophy, the being as being is defined as the most universal and primary one. However, Aristotle proves in the Metaphysics that neither One nor being are substances, therefore they do not exist separately. Furthermore, in the De Anima he claims that those that are said to be universal are "either nothing or posterior", because they cannot be on its own in separation from the particular things. How, then, the universal being which can be named nothing or posterior postulated as the subject of first philosophy that is most worthy of knowing? And, on the other hand, if the being as universal is not a substance, on what ground it has it's unity? In order to answer these questions, I will consider Alexander of Aphrodisias' Commentary on Aristotle's Metaphysics and also the Quaestio I.3 and I.11 of his Quaestiones.

scholarly journals La Respuesta al Problema del No-Ser en La Metafísica de Aristóteles

2018 ◽  
Vol 26 (52) ◽  
pp. 141-158
Author(s):  
Maria Carmen Segura Peraita ◽  
Keyword(s):  
The Difference ◽  
First Philosophy ◽  
Aristotle's Metaphysics

The aim of this research is to propose a reading of Aristotle’s Metaphysics understood as an answer to the problem of non-being. This orientation will reveal the validity of the Aristotelian ontological approaches for the present, because today also the movement, the difference, the inidentity and the time constitute fundamental philosophical problems. We know that Aristotle displayed his ontology in dialogue and discussion with his predecessors. In this paper, I point out certain aspects of this debate to the extent that they contribute to highlighting those topics of the first philosophy that constitute a solution to the problem of non-being.

scholarly journals Axioms of Philosophy in Aristotle’s Metaphysics

wisdom ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 16 (3) ◽  
pp. 7-17
Author(s):  
Robert DJIJIAN ◽  
Hasmik HOVHANNISYAN
Keyword(s):  
Modern Trend ◽  
The Law ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
First Philosophy ◽  
Aristotle's Metaphysics

The goal of this article is to study Aristotle’s concept of philosophical principles. Metaphysics required from a philosopher to reveal the axioms of his teaching. It declared the law of contradiction as the most certain of all principles and axioms. This article proves that Aristotelian definition of truth makes it necessary to accept the ontological formulations of all the three main laws of thought as axioms of first philosophy. This article points out the absence of any reference in Metaphysics on Categorias and vice versa. This circumstance questions if could Aristotle be the author of the both works? Authors of this article underline that the modern trend of meta-philosophical studies requires investigating the possibility of building the system of axiomatic philosophy.

Senses of Dunamis and the Structure of Aristotle’s Metaphysics Θ1

Phronesis ◽  
2011 ◽  
Vol 56 (4) ◽  
pp. 388-425 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andreas Anagnostopoulos
Keyword(s):  
Mode Of Being ◽  
Capacity For Change ◽  
Capacity Characteristic ◽  
Aristotle's Metaphysics

AbstractThis essay aims to analyze the structure of Aristotle’s Metaphysics Θ by explicating various senses of the term δύναµις at issue in the treatise. It is argued that Aristotle’s central innovation, the sense of δύναµις most useful to his project in the treatise, is the kind of capacity characteristic of the pre-existent matter for substance. It is neither potentiality as a mode of being, as recent studies maintain, nor capacity for ‘complete’ activity. It is argued further that, in starting with the κύρι&ogr;ς sense of δύναµις as capacity for change, Aristotle begins with the most familiar and acknowledged kind of capacity, in order to move to the less familiar but ultimately more useful notion of capacity for substance, and to bring these two kinds together through an analogical relation.

scholarly journals The Concrete Notion of the Ready-To-Hand Equipment: A Dialectical View on the Existential Analytic

2021 ◽  
Vol 9 (SPE2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Artur Ravilevich Karimov ◽  
Aleksei Sergeyevich Guryanov ◽  
Elina Borisovna Minnullina
Keyword(s):  
Creative Work ◽  
Hand Tools ◽  
Actual Knowledge ◽  
Primary Mode ◽  
The World ◽  
Mode Of Being

The article explores one of the aspects of Heidegger's existential analytic – everyday dealings with ready-to-hand equipment (tools). The author’s aim is to analyze the phenomenon of equipment in a broader perspective to widen the borders of everyday being-in-the-world characterized by routine nonthematic dealings with things that distract man from his true being. The author claims that in everyday use man discovers only functionality of equipment which cannot be considered its genuine grasp. The actual knowledge of things is accessible mainly to their creators for whom they are not ready-to-hand tools but the aim of their thematic investigative thought. The concrete notion of a thing is developed by those who know the origin and formation of things. Accordingly, Dasein’s everyday concern for the world is not the primary mode of being-in-the-world. The primary one is the master's non-daily creative work in his being-in-the-world which allows him/her to discover true being of things.

On Aristotle's Metaphysics

Dialogue ◽  
1964 ◽  
Vol 2 (4) ◽  
pp. 454-459
Author(s):  
D. J. Allan
Keyword(s):  
Pure Form ◽  
The Other ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
The Arts ◽  
The Difference ◽  
The One ◽  
Theoretical Science ◽  
Comprehensive Study ◽  
First Philosophy ◽  
Aristotle's Metaphysics

The problem which Professor Décarie has chosen for investigation can be briefly sketched, since it is familiar. In indicating the superiority of the highest kind of contemplation to the departmental studies and to the arts, Aristotle terms it at one time ‘wisdom’, at another ‘first philosophy’, at another theology. The difference between the names seems not to be verbal, but to be accompanied by a real fluctuation of emphasis. So one question above all obtrudes itself upon the reader and is, indeed, propounded within the treatise itself in E I ( = K 7). Is the supreme theoretical science particular, being focussed upon the highest order of reality, upon pure form, upon the divine ? Or is it a comprehensive study of being qua being, which will not only consider the lesser categories of being (because these are held to be derivative from ousia), but contemplate more than one grade of ousia itself? On the one hand, the supreme science is occasionally called theologikê. On the other hand, it is also declared to ‘contemplate being qua being’, a phrase commonly understood to mean that it surveys from a certain aspect all that is real, leaving other aspects to other sciences.

“Service-first” philosophy

1988 ◽  
Vol 52 (9) ◽  
pp. 509-512 ◽  
Author(s):  
AJ Formicola
Keyword(s):  
First Philosophy
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