scholarly journals Francis Hutcheson and the Heathen Moralists

2010 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 51-62 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas Ahnert
Keyword(s):  
Moral Theory ◽  
Classical Antiquity ◽  
Ethical Thought ◽  
Francis Hutcheson ◽  
Secondary Literature ◽  
Intellectual Achievement ◽  
In Christ ◽  
Moral Philosophers

Throughout his career Hutcheson praised the achievements of the pagan moral philosophers of classical antiquity, the Stoics in particular. In recent secondary literature his moral theory has been characterized as a synthesis of Christianity and Stoicism. Yet Hutcheson's attitude towards the ancient heathen moralists was more complex and ambivalent than this idea of ‘Christian Stoicism’ suggests. According to Hutcheson, pagans who did not believe in Christ and who had never even heard of him were capable of virtue, and even, he asserted controversially, of salvation. Yet Hutcheson did not think that the virtue of pagans, let alone their salvation, was a result of their moral philosophical theories. Hutcheson's applause for pagan philosophy as an intellectual achievement did not indicate a commitment to it, but was based on a detached and cautious evaluation that involved significant reservations concerning the truth and usefulness of pagan ethical thought.

Descriptive Moral Theories

2020 ◽  
pp. 45-72
Author(s):  
Anne-Marie Søndergaard Christensen
Keyword(s):  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
Ludwig Wittgenstein ◽  
Moral Theory ◽  
Moral Problem ◽  
Moral Language ◽  
Moral Theories ◽  
Moral Problems ◽  
Insight Into ◽  
Moral Philosophers

This chapter develops an alternative, descriptive understanding of moral theory in order to reconcile two apparently conflicting insights; the insight of the critics of moral theory into the problems of the dominant conception of moral theory and the insight into the relevance that we still attribute to the positions traditionally conceived as theories such as Kantianism and utilitarianism. Building on the work of theory-critics, but without giving up the notion of moral theory, the chapter presents a view according to which theories are descriptive rather than prescriptive and serve heuristic and elucidatory purposes. Inspired by the notion of grammar found in the later work of Ludwig Wittgenstein, it is furthermore claimed that theories are descriptions which provide overviews of various normative structures of concerns—or moral grammars—and which may serve two different purposes, providing either general descriptions of the logic of our moral language or descriptions that elucidate a specific moral problem. According to this view, moral philosophers must accept the co-existence of a plurality of moral theories that describe a plurality of moral grammars, and they must give up the idea that moral theories are mutually exclusive. Moreover, the development of the second purpose reveals that theories cannot be the sole tool of moral philosophy, they need to be supplemented with grammatical investigations of the particularities involved in moral problems. Moral theories can be helpful, but they are never sufficient when addressing a problem in moral philosophy.

Commerce, Virtue, and Politics: Adam Ferguson's Constitutionalism

1983 ◽  
Vol 45 (4) ◽  
pp. 536-552 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gary L. McDowell
Keyword(s):  
Eighteenth Century ◽  
David Hume ◽  
Adam Smith ◽  
Scottish Enlightenment ◽  
Thomas Reid ◽  
Political Thinking ◽  
Francis Hutcheson ◽  
History Of ◽  
Moral Philosophers

Adam Ferguson was one of several moral philosophers who contributed to the Scottish Enlightenment, a period aptly described as one of “remarkable efflorescence.” The works of Ferguson and his fellow Scotsmen — Adam Smith, David Hume, Dugald Stewart, Lord Kames, Francis Hutcheson and Thomas Reid — were widely distributed, seriously read, and vigorously debated during the last quarter of the eighteenth century. The greatest contribution of this Scottish school to the history of political thinking was the refinement of the idea of commercial republicanism, the synthesis of modern notions of polity and economy.

Ethics, Personal Identity, and Ideals of the Person

1982 ◽  
Vol 12 (2) ◽  
pp. 229-246 ◽  
Author(s):  
Samuel Scheffler
Keyword(s):  
Personal Identity ◽  
Moral Theory ◽  
Human Beings ◽  
Side Constraints ◽  
Regulative Principle ◽  
Moral Conception ◽  
Moral Philosophers

It is not uncommon for contemporary moral philosophers to appeal, in support or in criticism of one moral theory or another, to supposed features of or facts about persons. Rawls, for example, maintains that ‘utilitarianism does not take seriously the distinction between persons,’ and that since ‘the correct regulative principle for anything depends on the nature of that thing,’ we should not expect utilitarianism to be the correct regulative scheme for human beings. Nozick, in a similar spirit, suggests that the deontological restrictions he calls ‘side constraints’ are desirable components of a moral conception because, without them, a moral scheme is unable to ‘sufficiently respect and take account of the fact that … [each individual] is a separate person,’ unable to take account of the fact that, with respect to each individual, ‘his is the only life he has.’ And Williams, to cite still another example, suggests that utilitarianism is a defective moral theory because ‘it cannot coherently describe the relations between a man's projects and his actions.'

Particularity and Perspective Taking: On Feminism and Habermas's Discourse Theory of Morality

Hypatia ◽  
2004 ◽  
Vol 19 (4) ◽  
pp. 49-76 ◽  
Author(s):  
Charles Wright
Keyword(s):  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
Perspective Taking ◽  
Moral Theory ◽  
Discourse Theory ◽  
Moral Philosophers

Seyla Benhabib's critique of Jürgen Habermas's moral theory claims that his approach is not adequate for the needs of a feminist moral theory. I argue that her analysis is mistaken. I also show that Habermas's moral theory, properly understood, satisfies many of the conditions identified by feminist moral philosophers as necessary for an adequate moral theory. A discussion of the compatibility between the model of reciprocal perspective taking found in Habermas's moral theory and that found in Maria Lugones's essay “Playfulness,‘World’-Travelling, and Loving Perception” reinforces the claim that his moral theory holds as yet unrecognized promise for feminist moral philosophy.

Moral justification

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
T.M. Scanlon
Keyword(s):  
Moral Philosophy ◽  
Moral Theory ◽  
The Other ◽  
Moral Justification ◽  
Moral Argument ◽  
Moral Thinking ◽  
Moral Claims ◽  
Moral Philosophers ◽  
The Way

Questions of justification arise in moral philosophy in at least three ways. The first concerns the way in which particular moral claims, such as claims about right and wrong, can be shown to be correct. Virtually every moral theory offers its own account of moral justification in this sense, and these accounts naturally differ from each other. A second question is about the justification of morality as a whole – about how to answer the question, ‘Why be moral?’ Philosophers have disagreed about this, and about whether an answer is even possible. Finally, some philosophers have claimed that justification of our actions to others is a central aim of moral thinking. They maintain that this aim provides answers to the other two questions of justification by explaining the reasons we have to be moral and the particular form that justification takes within moral argument.

A Relational Moral Theory

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thaddeus Metz
Keyword(s):  
Moral Theory ◽  
Global South ◽  
Philosophical Tradition ◽  
Ethical Thought ◽  
Common Assumption ◽  
Respect For Autonomy ◽  
Relational Perspective ◽  
International Audience ◽  
Standing Question ◽  
Blind Spots

A Relational Moral Theory provides a new answer to the long-standing question of what all morally right actions might have in common as distinct from wrong ones, by drawing on neglected resources from the Global South and especially the African philosophical tradition. The book points out that the principles of utility and of respect for autonomy, the two rivals that have dominated Western moral theory for about two centuries, share an individualist premise. Once that common assumption is replaced by a relational perspective that has been salient in African ethical thought, a different comprehensive principle focused on harmony or friendliness emerges, one that is shown to correct the blind spots of the Western principles and to have implications for a wide array of applied controversies that an international audience of moral philosophers, professional ethicists, and similar thinkers will find attractive.

The Common Good

2021 ◽  
pp. 65-76
Author(s):  
Thaddeus Metz
Keyword(s):  
Moral Theory ◽  
Common Good ◽  
Well Being ◽  
Individual Rights ◽  
The Common Good ◽  
The Past ◽  
Economic Sphere ◽  
The Common ◽  
Moral Philosophers

Chapter 4, which begins Part II, addresses the moral theory from the African tradition according to which one is obligated to promote the common good without violating individual rights. This principle has been advanced by Kwame Gyekye, one of the most widely discussed African moral philosophers of the past twenty-five years. His ‘moderate communitarian’ ethic, although focused on promoting well-being, differs from Western utilitarianism, such that one cannot argue against the former by invoking well-known criticisms of the latter. The chapter advances fresh reasons for rejecting Gyekye’s welfarist approach to morality, principally on the ground that it does a poor job of capturing several intuitions salient in the African tradition. Sometimes permitting great inequalities of wealth, being competitive in the economic sphere, and undermining cultures can best improve well-being without violating individual rights, yet many African philosophers would judge these actions to be wrong to some degree.

Two Kinds of Moral Reasoning: Ethical Egoism as A Moral Theory

1975 ◽  
Vol 5 (3) ◽  
pp. 323-356 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jesse Kalin
Keyword(s):  
Moral Reasoning ◽  
Moral Theory ◽  
Ethical Principle ◽  
Moral Reasons ◽  
Ethical Egoism ◽  
Self Interest ◽  
Logical Flaw ◽  
Moral Philosophers

Ethical egoism, when summarized into a single ethical principle, is the position that a person ought, all things considered, to do an action if and only if that action is in his overall self-interest. The criticisms standardly advanced against this view try to show either that it is subject to some fatal logical flaw or else that, even if logically coherent, it can give no account of the basic parts of morality. Both these objections are mistaken, however, and it is the point of this paper to make this clear. Central to my argument is the distinction drawn in Section 1 between two kinds of moral reasoning and hence two kinds of moral reasons. I call these ‘traditional’ and ‘nontraditional’ (the latter could be termed ‘conventional’ or ‘institutional’ without much change of meaning). Both are present in the writings of contemporary moral philosophers but have not been emphasized or seen as crucial.

scholarly journals Scanlon’s contractualism: A review essay

2017 ◽  
Vol 60 (2) ◽  
pp. 68-84
Author(s):  
Anton Markoc
Keyword(s):  
Review Essay ◽  
Moral Theory ◽  
Ethical Theory ◽  
Secondary Literature ◽  
Normative Ethical Theory ◽  
Thomas Scanlon

The purpose of this essay is to give a succinct summary of contractualism, an influential moral theory of American philosopher Thomas Scanlon. Scanlon introduced contractualism in his essay ?Contractualism and Utilitarianism? from 1982 and developed it in his book What We Owe to Each Other from 1998. The essay begins by situating Scanlon?s contractualism in the tradition of contract theories of morality. It then examines its peculiarities as a metaethical and a normative ethical theory. Finally, it discusses the most important objections to contractualism, ending with recommended secondary literature for subsequent researchers.

Research Ethics

2021 ◽  
pp. 189-200
Author(s):  
Thaddeus Metz
Keyword(s):  
Informed Consent ◽  
Research Ethics ◽  
Moral Theory ◽  
Medical Field ◽  
Ethical Thought ◽  
Ancillary Care ◽  
Study Participants

Chapter 10 addresses the duties of researchers, particularly those in the medical field, again contending that the relational moral theory is revealing relative to Western competitors. It first proffers a new account of the obligation to obtain free and informed consent to participate in a study, as something to be upheld not so much as a way to promote health (utilitarianism) or to avoid degrading autonomy (Kantianism), but more as a way to respect people as capable of communal or friendly relationship. Rightness as friendliness is next shown to entail duties of confidentiality, albeit, plausibly, ones not as stringent as what is common in Western ethical thought. Lastly, the chapter argues that the communal ethic grounds a powerful account of ancillary care obligations—duties to compensate for harms that have befallen study participants that the study did not cause—by giving an account that challenges an influential autonomy-based theory of them.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document