What is a Complex? Freudian Resistances

Author(s):  
Simon Morgan Wortham

This chapter evaluates the question of the ‘complex’ in a range of scientific, political and psychoanalytic contexts, asking not only where lines of connection and demarcation occur among specific distributions of meaning, value, theory and practice; but also probing the psychoanalytic corpus, notably Freud’s writings on the notion of a ‘complex’, in order to reframe various implications of the idea that this term tends to resist its own utilisation as both an object and form of analysis. This section establishes connections between three sets of theoretical questions: the common practice of describing modernity and its wake in terms of a drive towards increasing complexity; the meaning and cultural legacy of phrases such as ‘military-industrial complex’ and sundry derivations in the political sphere; and the intricacies and ambiguities subtending the term ‘complex’ within psychoanalytic theory. As a concept that Freud both utilised and repudiated, the provocative power of the term ‘complex’ is linked to the way it thwarts various attempts at systemization (providing nonetheless an apparatus of sorts through which contemporary science, Slavoj Žižek, Noam Chomsky, Freud, Eisenhower, and post-war politics can be articulated to one another).

2021 ◽  
Vol 5 (199) ◽  
pp. 33-43
Author(s):  
I.F. Bogatyrev ◽  

The purpose of the study is to consider the status of state support, to determine its main trends in Russia, including in the radio-electronic industry, in connection with the harmonization of trade and industrial policy. To achieve the purpose of the study, the main approaches to the concepts of "harmonization", "harmonization of trade and industrial policy" were studied, the place of state support in the structure of the mechanism for harmonization of trade and industrial policy was determined, the problems of state support both in general and specifically in the radio-electronic industry were formulated, the ways of solving these problems were suggested. Within the framework of the study, legislative documents related to state support of the radio-electronic industry are analyzed, its main characteristics are determined. The relevance of state support of enterprises of the military-industrial complex, whose main activity is concentrated on the production of radio electronics, is shown. Possible ways of improving the activities of enterprises of the military-industrial complex are proposed, the use of state support tools of an institutional nature is highlighted. The results of the study have novelty and originality, expand the theory and practice of the issue of harmonization, since they focus on those aspects of it that were not previously considered in detail.


Author(s):  
Nick Fischer

This conclusion discusses the legacies of the Anticommunist Spider Web and the myriad ways in which they persist in the extraordinary life span and significance of anticommunism in US politics, economy, and culture. Among the most important consequences of anticommunism was the creation of the surveillance state and the promotion of a military–industrial complex. The Spider Web also wielded significant influence in the areas of partisan politics, big business, immigration policy, political economy, and liberal anticommunism. This conclusion shows that the Spider Web's descendants used the same arguments, rhetorical tropes, and state and corporate instruments to pursue the political, economic, and social agenda of their forebears. It argues that the cooperation of liberals and labor unions in the suppression of anything that smacked of “communism” restricted public debate about how the Left might or should influence the future of America while creating an ideological void that the heirs of the Spider Web rushed to fill.


Author(s):  
Chris Miller

This chapter discusses the political challenges that Gorbachev faced while devising policy during the late 1980s, and highlights the role played by economic interest groups, including the farm lobby, heavy industries, and the military industrial complex. These lobbies dominated economic policymaking and constrained Gorbachev’s ability to implement his desired policies. The chapter describes the political base of each of the major interest groups, and assesses their goals in shaping economic policymaking. Each of these groups, the chapter notes, had strong economic reasons to oppose Chinese-style reform.


2019 ◽  
pp. 11-17
Author(s):  
J.P.S. Uberoi

This chapter continues with the author’s critique of modern Western science. It traces the inherent dualisms of the modernist approach to spheres of thought, nature and society whether they be of the right, left or centre in the political spectrum. The question of dualism and non-dualism is discussed in relation to Marx, Engels, Hegel, Lenin, Goethe, Christianity, Soviet Marxism and Chinese Maoism, and the Renaissance and Reformation in Europe. The final section of the chapter deals with the relation between science and politics outlining the alliance between the science of the expert with the military industrial complex that makes impossible a praxis of Gandhian non-violence, a centrist position that has its reflection in the non-dualist streams of the European underground.


Author(s):  
John A. Alic

The three large military services—Army, Navy, and Air Force—comprise the core of the U.S. politico–military–industrial complex. They dominate decision making on multi-billion dollar weapon systems and the operational concepts these are intended to embody. The armed forces need private firms to realize their visions of new weaponry, since government has limited capacity in engineering design and development and limited production facilities. Running a successful defense business means giving the services what they want, or think they want, whether this makes technical and operational sense or not; thus industry caters to the views of the services, and while it seeks to influence them, does so mostly at the margins. The political dynamics of the complex take place in two primary domains, only loosely coupled. The first is largely contained within the Defense Department. This is the main arena for conflict and bargaining within and among the services and between the services, individually and collectively, and Pentagon civilians. Most of what happens here stays hidden from outsiders. Service leaders generally seek to resolve disagreements among themselves; the goal, often although not always achieved, is to present a united front to civilian officials and the public at large. The second domain extends to the rest of government, chiefly Congress, with its multiple committees and subcommittees, and the White House, home of the powerful Office of Management and Budget among other sources of policy leverage. The complex as a whole is an artifact of the Cold War, not greatly changed over the decades. Repeated efforts at restructuring and reform have led to little. The primary reason is that military leaders, senior officers who have reached the topmost ranks after lengthy immersion in generally conservative organizational cultures, usually have the upper hand in bureaucratic struggles. They believe the military’s views on choice of weapons—the views of seasoned professionals—should have precedence over those of civilians, whether Pentagon appointees and their staffs, elected officials, or outside experts. They usually prevail, since few of the political appointees on the civilian side of DoD and in policy-influencing positions elsewhere can command similar authority. If they do not prevail on a particular issue, service leaders expect to outwait their opponents; if they lose one battle over money or some cherished weapon system, they anticipate winning the next.


1985 ◽  
Vol 45 (2) ◽  
pp. 369-375 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ben Baack ◽  
Edward Ray

Despite the attention given by scholars to the military-industrial complex few studies have attempted to pinpoint and explain its origin. In this paper we argue that the coalescing of business, military, and political interest groups in support of a military build-up in the United States during peacetime occurred in the years between the Civil War and World War I. It was during this period that we observe the roots of institutional arrangements between the military and industry for the purpose of large-scale weapons acquisitions.


2019 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 547-565
Author(s):  
Maarten Zwiers

Segregationist politicians from the U.S. South played key roles in devising plans for the reconstruction of Germany, the Marshall Plan and the drafting of displaced persons legislation. This article discusses how their Jim Crow ideology calibrated the global and domestic order that emerged from the ashes of World War II. Southern advocates of this ideology dealt with national and foreign issues from a regional perspective, which was based on the protection of agricultural interests and a nascent military-industrial complex, but above all, on the defence of white supremacy. In general, they followed a lenient course toward Germany after the country’s defeat in World War II, for various reasons. The shared experience of post-war reconstruction, containment of communism and feelings of kinship between the Germanic people and the Anglo-Saxons of the U.S. South were some of the motives why many white southerners did not endorse punitive measures against the former enemy. For them, an obvious connection existed between the local and the global, which strongly reverberated in the formation of U.S. foreign and domestic policy in the post-war world. The rebuilding of Germany and the fugitive question were shaped on the basis of a Jim Crow blueprint.


2016 ◽  
Vol 78 (2) ◽  
pp. 307-308
Author(s):  
Charles Blattberg

Ronald Beiner wants to have it both ways. We know this because, near the end of his book, he tells us that he is a “dualist,” someone for whom “philosophy and citizenship are defined by radically distinct purposes: the job of philosophy is to strive unconditionally for truth, and the job of citizenship is to strive for good and prudent judgment about the common purposes of civic life, and each should focus strictly on fulfilling its own appointed end without worrying too much about the other.” So there needs to be “a steady appreciation of the fundamental chasm between what we (as citizens) need in the world of practice and what we (as human beings) need from the world of theory” (224). This, however, would be abhorrent to most of the political philosophers Beiner covers. Because they are not dualists but monists; to them, theory and practice should be one.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document