Spinoza and Power

2020 ◽  
pp. 210-223
Author(s):  
Alexandre Matheron

In this chapter, Matheron lays out in perhaps its most concise form the Spinozist theory of power in language that is particularly inflected with Marxist terminology. From the initial claim that God is absolute causal power, from which nothing is exempt, Matheron builds up Spinoza’s theory point by point from the perspective of an isolated individual faced with nature to our preliminary interactions with others. Matheron then shifts to the perspective of a multitude of human individuals, describing the chaotic and despotic relations of power that necessarily inhere in the ‘state of nature’ and which are subsequently transformed with the establishment of political society. The ideal political organization would be one the encourages the maximum amount of democracy. However, Spinoza is no theorist of bourgeois democracy precisely because he sees the State as the result of a relation of forces, and not the actual realisation of the ideals of ‘reason’ or ‘liberty’.

1969 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Mark Friesen

Historically human societies have never collectively organized, politically or socially, in any singular, standardized and/or universal way. Beginning with the Peace of Westphalia in 1647 the nation-state gradually proliferated as a legitimate manifestation of collective human organization at a global level. This proliferation has culminated in the standardization of a singular means of mobilizing and organizing human societies. The statist age that began in the 16th and 17th centuries consolidated and centralized the political power of the state. Divergent factions and regional power blocks within European states were discouraged, as politics became centralized at the national level. The proliferation of the nation-state represented the standardization of human political organization according to a single model. Given that there are, and have been, a variety of means by which humans identify and organize politically, this suggests that this universal acceptance and entrenchment of one model may be somewhat inappropriate.


2016 ◽  
Vol 78 (2) ◽  
pp. 177-200 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christopher R. Hallenbrook

AbstractThis article challenges the prevailing interpretations of Hobbes's thought as providing only minimal protection for the natural right of individuals in political society. Natural right requires the protection of not just the subjects' lives, but their ability to live commodiously, and as a result the protection that natural right receives in political society places substantive constraints on the actions of the sovereign. When those entrusted with sovereign power overstep this constraint, they cease to be sovereign and the former subjects are returned to the state of nature to seek protection as each judges fit. I develop the substance of commodious living more thoroughly than similar analyses and demonstrate that this understanding is not limited to Leviathan but can be found in Hobbes's earlier political work as well.


2008 ◽  
Vol 13 (2) ◽  
pp. 1-45 ◽  
Author(s):  
Helga Varden

In this paper, I present and defend Kant's non-voluntarist conception of political obligations. I argue that civil society is not primarily a prudential requirement for justice; it is not merely a necessary evil or a moral response to combat our corrupting nature or our tendency to act viciously, thoughtlessly or in a biased manner. Rather, civil society is constitutive of rightful relations among persons because only in civil society can we interact in ways reconcilable with each person's innate right to freedom. Civil society is the means through which we can rightfully interact even on the ideal assumption that no one ever succumbs to immoral temptation. Kant's account, therefore, provides ideal reasons to support the claim that voluntarism cannot be the liberal ideal of political obligations.


2018 ◽  
Vol 80 (4) ◽  
pp. 675-700 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yann Allard-Tremblay

AbstractI contrast two perspectives adopted to theorize political authorities. The first is the modern perspective. It conceives of political society as a civic union of free and equal citizens and regards the state as the political organization of this society. This perspective is primarily concerned with the principles that should govern the use of state power. The second is the political pluralist perspective. It recognizes a multiplicity of normative orders as equally legitimate. The focus is put on the civic processes by which a diverse citizenry should negotiate its interactions. I illustrate these perspectives by considering how they approach diversity, and more specifically the political claims of indigenous peoples. The pluralist perspective is argued to be normatively motivated by a consideration for the actual freedom of citizens to sustain diverse normative orders, to negotiate the structure of political society, and to jointly search for justice.


2019 ◽  
Vol 15 (2) ◽  
pp. 148-166 ◽  
Author(s):  
Simon Koschut

Emotions that run through relations of power are complex and ambivalent, inviting resistance and opposition as much as compliance. While the literature in International Relations broadly accepts emotions as an intrinsic element of power and governance, relatively little attention has been given to situations when the emotional meanings of “the state” are openly contested. This essay highlights a situation in which emotional meanings are contested, or what I refer to as affective sites of contestation: situations and events where rules and norms about the proper expression of emotions are challenged, resisted, and potentially redefined. It is the ambivalence and alternation of particular emotional meanings, which, I will suggest, makes emotions an object of contestation in world politics. Whenever “official” emotions are contested from “below,” “the state” itself, representing a national project, is called into question, potentially transforming the relationship between citizens and the state. Building on the works of sociologist Mabel Berezin and others, this essay develops the ideal types of “the secure state” and “communities of feeling” as analytical prisms to reconstruct the political contestation of emotional meanings, pertaining to how collective grief is expressed after a terror attack.


2017 ◽  
Vol 27 (1) ◽  
pp. 303-314
Author(s):  
Amirpasha Tavakkoli

Résumé: Influencé par la philosophie des Lumières et hostile à l’égard de la morale chrétienne, Sade envisage de déconstruire le discours philosophico-moral de son temps. Il s’intéresse à l’idée de l’état de nature sous un angle différent de celui des philosophes et des moralistes. En plaçant le Mal au centre de ses réflexions, l’objectif pour lui est de renverser le discours dominant de son temps en prenant l’inceste, le meurtre et les perversions comme étant les maximes conductrices de sa pensée. Malgré l’apparence immorale de ses écrits, Sade tombe dans un schéma moralisant reposant sur l’idéal du Mal qu’il adore. Agir et penser selon les commandements du Mal, deviennent les fondements de l’éthique sadienne. Une réflexion que nous allons approfondir à la lumière des réflexions de Klossowski, Bataille et Jacques Lacan.Mots-clés : mal; état de nature; loi; éthique; transgression.Abstract: Influenced by the philosophy of the Enlightment and hostile toward Christian morality, Sade endeavored to criticize the moral-philosophical discourse of his time, focusing on the idea of the state of nature in a radically different way from contemporary philosophers and moralists. By placing Evil at the center of his considerations, he aims to overturn the dominant discourse of his time by enlisting incest, murder, and perversions as the tenets guiding his thought. Despite the immoral appearance of his writings, Sade falls prey to a moralizing schema based on the ideal of Evil. Acting and thinking according to the commandments of Evil then becomes the fundaments of Sade’s ethics. The idea moving this paper is to deepen our understanding of this theory in light of reflections by Klossowski, Bataille, and Lacan.Keywords: Evil, state of nature, law, ethic, transgression.


2015 ◽  
Vol 13 (1) ◽  
pp. 33-48 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mathews Mathew ◽  
Debbie Soon

Debates in Singapore about immigration and naturalisation policy have escalated substantially since 2008 when the government allowed an unprecedentedly large number of immigrants into the country. This essay will discuss immigration and naturalisation policy in Singapore and the tensions that have been evoked, and how these policies are a key tool in regulating the optimal composition and size of the population for the state’s imperatives. It will demonstrate that although the state has, as part of its broader economic and manpower planning policy to import labour for economic objectives, it seeks to retain only skilled labour with an exclusive form of citizenship.  Even as the Singapore state has made its form of citizenship even more exclusive by reducing the benefits that non-citizens receive, its programmes for naturalising those who make the cut to become citizens which include the recently created Singapore Citizenship Journey (SCJ) is by no means burdensome from a comparative perspective. This paper examines policy discourse and the key symbols and narratives provided at naturalisation events and demonstrates how these are used to evoke the sense of the ideal citizen among new Singaporeans. 


Author(s):  
Karl Widerquist ◽  
Grant S. McCall

Earlier chapters of this book found that the Hobbesian hypothesis is false; the Lockean proviso is unfulfilled; contemporary states and property rights systems fail to meet the standard that social contract and natural property rights theories require for their justification. This chapter assesses the implications of those findings for the two theories. Section 1 argues that, whether contractarians accept or reject these findings, they need to clarify their argument to remove equivocation. Section 2 invites efforts to refute this book’s empirical findings. Section 3 discusses a response open only to property rights theorists: concede this book’s empirical findings and blame government failure. Section 4 considers the argument that this book misidentifies the state of nature. Section 5 considers a “bracketing strategy,” which admits that observed stateless societies fit the definition of the state of nature, but argues that they are not the relevant forms of statelessness today. Section 6 discusses the implications of accepting both the truth and relevance of the book’s findings, concluding that the best response is to fulfil the Lockean proviso by taking action to improve the lives of disadvantaged people.


Author(s):  
Corey Brettschneider

How should a liberal democracy respond to hate groups and others that oppose the ideal of free and equal citizenship? The democratic state faces the hard choice of either protecting the rights of hate groups and allowing their views to spread, or banning their views and violating citizens' rights to freedoms of expression, association, and religion. Avoiding the familiar yet problematic responses to these issues, this book proposes a new approach called value democracy. The theory of value democracy argues that the state should protect the right to express illiberal beliefs, but the state should also engage in democratic persuasion when it speaks through its various expressive capacities: publicly criticizing, and giving reasons to reject, hate-based or other discriminatory viewpoints. Distinguishing between two kinds of state action—expressive and coercive—the book contends that public criticism of viewpoints advocating discrimination based on race, gender, or sexual orientation should be pursued through the state's expressive capacities as speaker, educator, and spender. When the state uses its expressive capacities to promote the values of free and equal citizenship, it engages in democratic persuasion. By using democratic persuasion, the state can both respect rights and counter hateful or discriminatory viewpoints. The book extends this analysis from freedom of expression to the freedoms of religion and association, and shows that value democracy can uphold the protection of these freedoms while promoting equality for all citizens.


Author(s):  
Kleanthis Kyriakidis

In the Arabian Gulf two identities can be really considered almost as important as the national one: the tribal and the sectarian ones. Someone should expect that the reinforcement of these identities is a direct response to inequality and processes of exclusion. Furthermore, parochial tribalism is expected to arise as the protector of cultural heritage, especially in a region where the ex-pats vastly outnumber the locals. Nonetheless, both statements are far from truth. In this paper we will analyze how in the Gulf, sectarian identity came to play a significant role only after the 1979 Islamic revolution in Iran and it keeps on surviving through mainly instigations and Iranian propaganda, provocations and support. It should be noted that Sunni identity has been allegedly subjugated in other Middle East States (mainly in Syria and Iraq) but in the Gulf the sectarian challenge stems from the Shia communities, openly supported by Tehran. Strangely enough, the tribal identity does not pose that much of a challenge, since tribes are more the friend than the enemy of all Gulf States. Actually, these countries could not have survived without the loyalty and commitment of the tribes not only to the Royal families but also to the idea of the State and the ideal of the Nation – and Gulf Nations do protect their cultural heritage. Keywords: Gulf, Globalization, Fragmentation, Sectarianism, Tribalism


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