Nietzsche and the Genealogy of Evil
This chapter demonstrates that Friedrich Nietzsche’s Genealogy of Morals argues that, rather than being ahistoric, moral concepts are inherently historical. Focusing on its first essay, this chapter shows that Nietzsche’s approach (1) undercut the histories and thus justifications underpinning the Christian and Kantian frameworks, (2) demonstrates that the moral categories historically used in Western thinking are semiotically heterogeneous, and (3) shows that the meaning of moral concepts generally and ‘evil’ specifically are rooted in dynamic semiotic relations that are determined socially by heterogeneous and ever-changing power relations. ‘Evil’ as a moral category is not, then, an objective, ahistoric category, but one borne from a particular worldview and semiotic system. In turn, this shows that the meaning of this concept is dependent upon changing, heterogeneous, power relations manifested through pre-personal, socio-historical interactions and relations.