British Communists and the Palestine Conflict, 1929–1948

2006 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 131-153 ◽  
Author(s):  
Paul Kelemen

During the 1930s and 1940s, the Communist Party of Great Britain was a significant force in Britain on the left-wing of the labour movement and among intellectuals, despite its relatively small membership. The narrative it provided on developments in Palestine and on the Arab nationalist movements contested Zionist accounts. After the 1941 German attack on the Soviet Union, the party, to gain the support of the Jewish community for a broad anti-fascist alliance, toned down its criticism of Zionism and, in the immediate post-war period, to accord with the Soviet Union's strategic objectives in the Middle East, it reversed its earlier opposition to Zionism. During the 1948 war and for some years thereafter it largely ignored the plight of the Palestinians and their nationalist aspirations.

2017 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 23-31
Author(s):  
Jakub Majkowski

This essay will firstly address the extent of Stalin’s achievements in leading the course for domestic policy of the Soviet Union and its contribution towards maintaining the country’s supremacy in the world, for example the rapid post-war recovery of industry and agriculture, and secondly, the foreign policy including ambiguous relations with Communist governments of countries forming the Eastern Bloc, upkeeping frail alliances and growing antagonism towards western powers, especially the United States of America.   The actions and influence of Stalin’s closest associates in the Communist Party and the effect of Soviet propaganda on the society are also reviewed. This investigation will cover the period from 1945 to 1953. Additionally, other factors such as the impact of post-war worldwide economic situation and attitude of the society of Soviet Union will be discussed.    


Author(s):  
Dina Rezk

In July 1958, an unknown nationalist, General Abdul Karim Qasim, came to the helm of power in Iraq. Chapter 3 reveals how analysts reacted to the brutal murder of his predecessor Nuri al Said, as Britain’s most important ally in the Middle East seemed to contract the Nasser ‘virus’ spreading through the region. Qasim quickly demonstrated that he was no Nasserist stooge however. Whilst British policymakers hoped in vain that the new Iraqi leader could be cultivated as a counterweight to Nasser, the intelligence community rapidly realised that Qasim had neither the charisma nor the popularity to compete with his Egyptian counterpart in the Arab Cold War. Qasim reliance on Iraqi Communists to counteract the influence of local Nasserites led to widespread fears that Iraq was on the brink of acquiring Soviet satellite status. This chapter brings to light for the first time the JIC’s nuanced analysis of the Iraqi Communist Party (ICP), suggesting to policy-makers that in fact the Soviet Union was acting as a restraining influence on the Iraqi communists. Qasim came to be increasingly depicted as ‘paranoid’ and ‘irrational’, whilst assessments of Nasser took on a new and more complimentary light as a ‘moderate’ potential ally in the quest to prevent Communist penetration of the Middle East.


2020 ◽  
Vol 14 (2) ◽  
pp. 44-66
Author(s):  
Maryna Berezutska

AbstractBandura art is a unique phenomenon of Ukrainian culture, inextricably linked with the history of the Ukrainian people. The study is dedicated to one of the most tragic periods in the history of bandura art, that of the 1920s–1940s, during which the Bolsheviks were creating, expanding and strengthening the Soviet Union. Art in a multinational state at this time was supposed to be national by form and socialist by content in accordance with the concept of Bolshevik cultural policy; it also had to serve Soviet propaganda. Bandura art has always been national by its content, and professional by its form, so conflict was inevitable. The Bolsheviks embodied their cultural policy through administrative and power methods: they created numerous bandurist ensembles and imposed a repertoire that glorified the Communist Party and the Soviet system. As a result, the development of bandura art stagnated significantly, although it did not die completely. At the same time, in the post-war years this policy provoked the emigration of many professional bandurists to the USA and Canada, thus promoting the active spread of bandura art in the Ukrainian Diaspora.


Author(s):  
Neville Kirk

Notwithstanding continuing similarities, Mann’s and Ross’s socialism was increasing characterised by differences. These similarities and, especially so, differences constitute the subject matter of chapter four. Mann and Ross continued to share commitments to the Social Revolution, labour movement unity and ethical and scientific socialism. Yet against these were Mann’s developing syndicalism, his downgrading of the political, especially parliamentary, means to socialism, and his synthesis of syndicalism and Bolshevism, as manifested in his membership of the Communist Party of Great Britain. He also had a positive impression of the Soviet Union right up to his death. In contrast, Ross increasingly attached equal importance to political and economic means, and in the 1920s worked actively in the Australian Labor Party. He opposed the application of the Soviet Bolshevik revolutionary model to Australia and fought against Australian communists. Ross’s growing attachment to Rationalism also signified that he was becoming more outspoken than Mann in his opposition to most kinds of religion. Yet, remarkably, the two men remained good friends and comrades. In conclusion, their case sheds new light upon the origins and character of late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century socialism.


2020 ◽  
pp. 331-369
Author(s):  
Michael Goldfield

Chapter 8 examines the role of the Communist Party, by far the largest Left group, during the 1930s and 1940s. It looks at the Party’s complex behavior, its many pluses and minuses, and its ties to the Soviet Union. In particular, it examines the role of CP activists as trade union militants and as the unabashed and unrelenting champions of civil rights, a role that distinguished them from the members of all other interracial organizations during this period. Yet it also looks at the Party’s role in demoralizing and destroying the left-wing movement in the 1930s and 1940s, even undermining many of the organizations and movements it had helped create, including those dedicated to civil rights.


2010 ◽  
pp. 205-226
Author(s):  
Joanna Nalewajko-Kulikov

The article presents a profile of Bernard Mark (1908–1966), a Holocaust historian and the director of the Jewish Historical Institute in Warsaw. Mark’s biography is based on various materials, both published and unpublished, from his pre-war involvement in the Communist Party of Poland, through the war years spent in the Soviet Union, to his various activities in post-war Poland: a researcher and socio-cultural activist, including his publications on the Holocaust


2009 ◽  
Vol 11 (4) ◽  
pp. 74-117 ◽  
Author(s):  
Zhihua Shen ◽  
Yafeng Xia

The Conference of World Communist and Workers' Parties held in Moscow in November 1957 was the largest gathering of world Communists since the birth of Marxism. Scholars have long assumed that the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) dominated the conference. Newly declassified archival records and memoirs indicate that the idea of convening a conference and issuing a joint declaration was proposed by both the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the CPSU. During the conference the CCP leader, Mao Zedong, played an important role. Mao's extemporaneous remarks at the conference shocked the leaders of the CPSU. His comments on the Soviet intraparty struggle, his blunt remarks about nuclear war, and his declaration that China would overtake Great Britain within fifteen years created doubts and dissatisfactions in the minds of the delegates and cast a cloud over the conference. The Moscow Declaration also revealed incipient Sino-Soviet disagreements, portending Beijing's challenge to Soviet leadership in the socialist bloc. Thus, the Moscow Conference was a turning point for Sino-Soviet relations.


Balcanica ◽  
2019 ◽  
pp. 339-366
Author(s):  
Kosta Nikolic

During the Second World War a brutal and distinctly complex war was fought in Yugoslavia. It was a mixture of an anti-fascist struggle for liberation as well as an ideological, civil, inter-ethnic and religious war, which witnessed a holocaust and genocide against Jews and Serbs. At least a million Yugoslavs died in that war, most of them ethnic Serbs. In their policies towards Yugoslavia, each of the three Allied Powers (the United States of America, the Soviet Union and Great Britain) had their short-term and long-term goals. The short-term goals were victory over the Axis powers. The long-term goals were related to the post-war order in Europe (and the world). The Allies were unanimous about the short-term goals, but differed with respect to long-term goals. The relations between Great Britain and the Soviet Union were especially sensitive: both countries wanted to use a victory in the war as a means of increasing their political power and influence. Yugoslavia was a useful buffer zone between British and Soviet ambitions, as well as being the territory in which the resistance to the Axis was the strongest. The relations between London and Moscow grew even more complicated when the two local resistance movements clashed over their opposing ideologies: nationalism versus communism. The foremost objective of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia (CPY) was to effect a violent change to the pre-war legal and political order of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia.


Author(s):  
David Bakhurst

The history of Russian Marxism involves a dramatic interplay of philosophy and politics. Though Marx’s ideas were taken up selectively by Russian populists in the 1870s, the first thoroughgoing Russian Marxist was G.V. Plekhanov, whose vision of philosophy became the orthodoxy among Russian communists. Inspired by Engels, Plekhanov argued that Marxist philosophy is a form of ‘dialectical materialism’ (Plekhanov’s coinage). Following Hegel, Marxism focuses on phenomena in their interaction and development, which it explains by appeal to dialectical principles (for instance, the law of the transformation of quantity into quality). Unlike Hegel’s idealism, however, Marxism explains all phenomena in material terms (for Marxists, the ’material’ includes economic forces and relations). Dialectical materialism was argued to be the basis of Marx’s vision of history according to which historical development is the outcome of changes in the force of production. In 1903, Plekhanov’s orthodoxy was challenged by a significant revisionist school: Russian empiriocriticism. Inspired by Mach’s positivism, A.A. Bogdanov and others argued that reality is socially organized experience, a view they took to suit Marx’s insistence that objects be understood in their relation to human activity. Empiriocriticism was associated with the Bolsheviks until 1909, when Lenin moved to condemn Bogdanov’s position as a species of idealism repugnant to both Marxism and common sense. Lenin endorsed dialectical materialism, which thereafter was deemed the philosophical worldview of the Bolsheviks. After the Revolution of 1917, Soviet philosophers were soon divided in a bitter controversy between ‘mechanists’ and ‘dialecticians’. The former argued that philosophy must be subordinate to science. In contrast, the Hegelian ‘dialecticians’, led by A.M. Deborin, insisted that philosophy is needed to explain the very possibility of scientific knowledge. The debate was soon deadlocked, and in 1929 the dialecticians used their institutional might to condemn mechanism as a heresy. The following year, the dialecticians were themselves routed by a group of young activists sponsored by Communist Party. Denouncing Deborin and his followers as ‘Menshevizing idealists’, they proclaimed that Marxist philosophy had now entered its ‘Leninist stage’ and invoked Lenin’s idea of the partiinost’ (‘partyness’) of philosophy to license the criticism of theories on entirely political grounds. Philosophy became a weapon in the class war. In 1938, Marxist-Leninist philosophy was simplistically codified in the fourth chapter of the Istoriia kommunisticheskoi partii sovetskogo soiuza (Bol’sheviki). Kraatkii kurs (History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks). Short Course). The chapter, apparently written by Stalin himself, was declared the height of wisdom, and Soviet philosophers dared not transcend its limited horizons. The ‘new philosophical leadership’ devoted itself to glorifying the Party and its General Secretary. The ideological climate grew even worse in the post-war years when A.A. Zhdanov’s campaign against ‘cosmopolitanism’ created a wave of Russian chauvinism in which scholars sympathetic to Western thought were persecuted. The Party also meddled in scientific, sponsoring T.D. Lysenko’s bogus genetics, while encouraging criticism of quantum mechanics, relativity theory and cybernetics as inconsistent with dialectical materialism. The Khrushchev ‘thaw’ brought a renaissance in Soviet Marxism, when a new generation of young philosophers began a critical re-reading of Marx’s texts. Marx’s so-called ‘method of ascent from the abstract to the concrete’ was developed, by E.V. Il’enkov and others, into an anti-empiricist epistemology. There were also important studies of consciousness and ’the ideal’ by Il’enkov and M.K. Mamardashvili, the former propounding a vision of the social origins of the mind that recalls the cultural-historical psychology developed by L.S. Vygotskii in the 1930s. However, the thaw was short-lived. The philosophical establishment, still populated by the Stalinist old guard, continued to exercise a stifling influence. Although the late 1960s and 1970s saw heartfelt debates in many areas, particularly about the biological basis of the mind and the nature of value (moral philosophy had been hitherto neglected), the energy of the early 1960s was lacking. Marxism-Leninism still dictated the terms of debate and knowledge of Western philosophers remained relatively limited. In the mid-1980s, Gorbachev’s reforms initiated significant changes. Marxism-Leninism was no longer a required subject in all institutions of higher education; indeed, the term was soon dropped altogether. Discussions of democracy and the rule of law were conducted in the journals, and writings by Western and Russian émigré philosophers were published. Influential philosophers such as I.T. Frolov, then editor of Pravda, called for a renewal of humanistic Marxism. The reforms, however, came too late. The numerous discussions of the fate of Marxism at this time reveal an intellectual culture in crisis. While many maintained that Marx’s theories were not responsible for the failings of the USSR, others declared the bankruptcy of Marxist ideas and called for an end to the Russian Marxist tradition. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, it seems their wish has been fulfilled.


2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (3) ◽  
pp. 191-221
Author(s):  
A. M. Fomin

After the defeat of France in the summer of 1940, Great Britain was left face to face with the Nazi Germany. It managed to endure the first act of the ‘Battle of Britain’, but could not wage a full-scale war on the continent. Under these conditions, the defense of the British positions in the Mediterranean and in the Middle East became a top priority for W. Churchill’s cabinet. The author examines three episodes of Great Britain’s struggle for the Middle East in 1941 (Iraq, Syria, Iran), framing them into the general logic of the German-British confrontation during this period.The author emphasizes that potential assertion of German hegemony in the Middle East could have made the defense of Suez almost impossible, as well as the communication with India, and would have provided the Reich with an access to almost inexhaustible supplies of fuel. Widespread antiBritish sentiments on the part of the local political and military elites could contribute greatly to the realization of such, catastrophic for Britain, scenario. Under these circumstances, the British government decided to capture the initiative. The paper examines the British military operations in Iraq and Syria. Special attention is paid to the complex dynamics of relations of the British cabinet with the Vichy regime and the Free France movement. As the author notes, the sharpest disagreements aroused on the future of Syria and Lebanon, and the prospects of granting them independence. In the Iran’s case, the necessity of harmonizing policies with the Soviet Union came to the fore. The growing German influence in the region, as well as the need to establish a new route for Lend-Lease aid to the USSR, fostered mutual understanding. After the joint Anglo-Soviet military operation in August-September 1941, Iran was divided into occupation zones. Finally, the paper examines the UK position with regard to the neutrality of Turkey. The author concludes that all these military operations led to the creation of a ‘temporary regime’ of the British domination in the Middle East. However, the Anglo-French and Anglo-Soviet rivalries had not disappeared and, compounded by the growing US presence in the region, laid basis for new conflicts in the post-war period.


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