scholarly journals Optimal Incentives Schemes under Homo Moralis Preferences

Games ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 28
Author(s):  
Roberto Sarkisian

This study focuses on the optimal incentive schemes in a multi-agent moral hazard model, where each agent has other-regarding preferences and an individual measure of output, with both being observable by the principal. In particular, the two agents display homo moralis preferences. I find that, contrary to the case with purely selfish preferences, tournaments can never be optimal when agents are risk averse, and as the degree of morality increases, positive payments are made in a larger number of output realizations. Furthermore, I extend the analysis to a dynamic setting, in which a contract is initially offered to the agents, who then repeatedly choose which level of effort to provide in each period. I show that the optimal incentive schemes in this case are similar to the ones obtained in the static setting, but for the role of intertemporal discounting.

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christian Ghiglino ◽  
David Juárez-Luna ◽  
Andreas Müller

Abstract Why do tax rates vary so much across countries? We study the role of other-regarding preferences and ethnic fragmentation in redistribution. A government is elected by altruistic voters and chooses a redistributive income tax. Altruism is directed toward social identity groups. Three main factors yield low levels of redistribution: (i) strong in-group altruism among rich voters—referred to as class altruism; (ii) weak universal altruism—in particular among the rich; and (iii) ethnic fragmentation among poor voters. We document survey evidence that the pattern of altruism in the United States and the European Union is consistent with the observed differences in taxes.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sinthu Sridharan ◽  
Rashmi Sudarsan ◽  
Ruibo Dong ◽  
Chi Cheong ◽  
Lasana Harris

Fairness and trust appraisals that engender economic exchange rely on thoughts about another person’s mind to satisfy self- (profit maximising) and other-regarding (social motives) preferences. Punishment should promote fairness and trust within economic exchange, guarding against free-riding and trust violations, but depends on other-regarding preferences concerned with the violator. Here, we explore an alternative to punishment that may instead promote self-regarding preferences—the opportunity for the decision-maker to annul (veto) the economic transaction. We test this veto approach by having participants assume the role of investor(s) in modified versions of the public goods (Studies one and three) and trust games (Studies two and four). Across four studies both online and in laboratory with two economic games, investor(s) could veto a transaction—annul a previous exchange—if the return from the other player(s) was deemed unsatisfactory. We find that this manipulation increased investment by the investor(s), consistent with games where second-party punishment is possible. Moreover, self-regarding preferences predicted veto behaviour, while other-regarding preferences predicted punishment behaviour. We argue that this veto approach can be an alternative to punishment that can safe-guard fairness and trust during economic exchange.


2012 ◽  
Vol 35 (1) ◽  
pp. 21-22 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marco Casari

AbstractThe claims about (1) the lack of empirical support for a model of strong reciprocation and (2) the irrelevant empirical role of costly punishment to support cooperation in the field need qualifications. The interpretation of field evidence is not straightforward, and other-regarding preferences are also likely to play a role in the field.


2007 ◽  
Vol 30 (1) ◽  
pp. 25-26 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas Getty

Evolutionary theory provides a firm foundation for the unification of the behavioral sciences, and the beliefs, preferences, and constraints (BPC) model is a useful analytical tool for understanding human behavior. However, evolutionary theory suggests that if other-regarding preferences expressed by humans have evolved under selection, they are ultimately, if not purely, in the constrained, relative self-interests of individuals who express them.


1996 ◽  
Vol 6 (4) ◽  
pp. 283
Author(s):  
N. Rishiraj ◽  
J. E. Taunton
Keyword(s):  

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-15
Author(s):  
Art Carden ◽  
Gregory W. Caskey ◽  
Zachary B. Kessler

We explore themes in Nobel Prize–winning economist James M. Buchanan’s work and apply his Ethics and Economic Progress to problems facing individuals and firms. We focus on Buchanan’s analysis of the individual work ethic, his exhortations to “pay the preacher” of the “institutions of moral-ethical communication,” and his notion of law as “public capital.” We highlight several ways people with other-regarding preferences can contribute to social flourishing and some of the ways those who have “affected to trade for the public good” might want to redirect their efforts. We show how Buchanan’s work has considerable implications for business ethics. Just as his economic analysis of politics changed how we understand government, we think his economic analysis of ethics can (and should) change how we understand business.


Author(s):  
Shafiza Ariffin Kashinath ◽  
Salama A. Mostafa ◽  
Aida Mustapha ◽  
David Lim ◽  
Mohd Farhan Md Fudzee ◽  
...  

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