scholarly journals Moral Judgement along the Academic Training

Author(s):  
Giulia D’Aurizio ◽  
Fabrizio Santoboni ◽  
Francesca Pistoia ◽  
Laura Mandolesi ◽  
Giuseppe Curcio

Moral reasoning and consequent decision making are central in the everyday life of all people, independent of their profession. It is undoubtedly crucial in the so-called “helping professions”, when the professional through his/her decisions can support or not support others. Our study aimed to investigate whether academic training can play an essential role in influencing moral reasoning. We used three different conditions: 20 moral personal, 20 moral impersonal, and 20 nonmoral dilemmas to assessed differences in moral judgement between students of Economics, Medicine, and Psychology at their first year and at the end of university training. We observed a difference between school and year of course: psychology students showing more time when asked to read and answer the proposed questions. Moreover, medical students showed a significant increase in sensitiveness to moral issues as a function of academic ageing, whereas such a moral sense regressed from the first to the fifth year of academic training in other students. Gender was also relevant, with women showing an increased response and reading times compared to than men when asked to cope with moral decisions. This study shows that the main factor driving moral decision making is the faculty to which one is enrolled, significantly modulated by sex and academic seniority.

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Sophia Strojny

<p>Moral dilemmas require individuals to make a life-altering choice. Due to the severity of the choice, we argue that there is a degree of fear in moral decision-making. We aimed to see how prevailing fears in each individual predicts moral decision-making habits. We looked into the emotional and physical divisions of fear to deem which dimension of fear is more dominant in each participant. Then analysed these results against reported deontological or utilitarian moral inclinations to see if higher reports of fear impact moral decision-making. Additionally, we included two secondary variables that are most prevalent in fear research (gender and thinking styles) as well as the impact of burden on moral choice. We found that our research was supported; fear tendencies are linked to individual behaviours and burden of moral decisions was influenced by what we fear and affected moral choices.</p>


2019 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Darius-Aurel Frank ◽  
Polymeros Chrysochou ◽  
Panagiotis Mitkidis ◽  
Dan Ariely

Abstract The development of artificial intelligence has led researchers to study the ethical principles that should guide machine behavior. The challenge in building machine morality based on people’s moral decisions, however, is accounting for the biases in human moral decision-making. In seven studies, this paper investigates how people’s personal perspectives and decision-making modes affect their decisions in the moral dilemmas faced by autonomous vehicles. Moreover, it determines the variations in people’s moral decisions that can be attributed to the situational factors of the dilemmas. The reported studies demonstrate that people’s moral decisions, regardless of the presented dilemma, are biased by their decision-making mode and personal perspective. Under intuitive moral decisions, participants shift more towards a deontological doctrine by sacrificing the passenger instead of the pedestrian. In addition, once the personal perspective is made salient participants preserve the lives of that perspective, i.e. the passenger shifts towards sacrificing the pedestrian, and vice versa. These biases in people’s moral decisions underline the social challenge in the design of a universal moral code for autonomous vehicles. We discuss the implications of our findings and provide directions for future research.


2018 ◽  
Vol 26 (6) ◽  
pp. 1753-1764 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mahnaz Khatiban ◽  
Seyede Nayereh Falahan ◽  
Roya Amini ◽  
Afshin Farahanchi ◽  
Alireza Soltanian

Background: Moral reasoning is a vital skill in the nursing profession. Teaching moral reasoning to students is necessary toward promoting nursing ethics. Objectives: The aim of this study was to compare the effectiveness of problem-based learning and lecture-based methods in ethics education in improving (1) moral decision-making, (2) moral reasoning, (3) moral development, and (4) practical reasoning among nursing students. Research design: This is a repeated measurement quasi-experimental study. Participants and research context: The participants were nursing students in a University of Medical Sciences in west of Iran who were randomly assigned to the lecture-based (n = 33) or the problem-based learning (n = 33) groups. The subjects were provided nursing ethics education in four 2-h sessions. The educational content was similar, but the training methods were different. The subjects completed the Nursing Dilemma Test before, immediately after, and 1 month after the training. The data were analyzed and compared using the SPSS-16 software. Ethical considerations: The program was explained to the students, all of whom signed an informed consent form at the baseline. Findings: The two groups were similar in personal characteristics (p > 0.05). A significant improvement was observed in the mean scores on moral development in the problem-based learning compared with the lecture-based group (p < 0.05). Although the mean scores on moral reasoning improved in both the problem-based learning and the lecture-based groups immediately after the training and 1 month later, the change was significant only in the problem-based learning group (p < 0.05). The mean scores on moral decision-making, practical considerations, and familiarity with dilemmas were relatively similar for the two groups. Conclusion: The use of the problem-based learning method in ethics education enhances moral development among nursing students. However, further studies are needed to determine whether such method improves moral decision-making, moral reasoning, practical considerations, and familiarity with the ethical issues among nursing students.


2020 ◽  
Vol 39 (6) ◽  
pp. 591-605
Author(s):  
Jarosław Horowski

Abstract The direct reference point for these analyses is the process of making moral decisions, but a particular point of interest is the difficulty associated with making decisions when acting subjects are aware that their choice of moral good can lead to the breakdown of relationships with those close to them (family members or friends) or to their exclusion from the group(s) that have been most important to them so far in their lives, consequently causing them to experience loneliness. This difficulty is a challenge for education, which in supporting the moral development of a maturing person should prepare her/him for choosing moral good even if this requires personal sacrifices. In these analyses, assuming that knowledge of moral good is not sufficient for morally good actions, I refer mainly to the virtues of character that facilitate making morally good decisions and I seek the answer to the question: what character traits (moral virtues) should be shaped in maturing persons, so that as adults they can resist moral evil, even when this will clearly lead to the experience of loneliness? I propose these character traits as expressing moral virtues—especially the cardinal virtues of prudence, justice, temperance and fortitude (neo-Thomistic approach). In this way, I join in the discussion relating to the teleology of education. I do not touch on the methodology of education, however. The argument is presented in two parts. In the first, I introduce the problem of decision-making implying consent to loneliness. In the second, I reflect on the characteristics of a person who is capable of making such a decision.


Author(s):  
Jeffrey W. Bulger

This treatise is a contribution towards the understanding of why humankind cannot agree on the foundation of morality and why moral pluralism is the logical constitution of moral reality. The synergistic-reflective-equilibrium model is the model that will describe how persons can make moral decisions as pluralistic agents. If this model is correct, then it will not be a new discovery, rather, it will be a new description of how pluralistic agents do in fact make moral decisions. This synergistic-reflective-equilibrium description should then be useful not only in giving a fuller understanding of how moral decisions ought to be made, but also how moral philosophy can be united into a pluralistic collective whole. The first part of this paper defines the synergistic-reflective-equilibrium mode. It briefly explains how it is a combination of both the theory model of moral decision-making and the intuition model of moral decision-making. The second part of this paper defines mid-level principles and explains how they are a natural development of the synergistic-reflective-equilibrium method. It will then be shown that both Mill and Kant used this method in their own moral theories. Lastly, it will be shown how "weighing and balancing" and "specification" are integral components in this model and were also practiced by Mill and Kant in their moral systems.


2017 ◽  
Vol 18 (1) ◽  
pp. 102-116 ◽  
Author(s):  
V. Chiasson ◽  
L. Elkaim ◽  
A. G. Weil ◽  
L. Crevier ◽  
M. H. Beauchamp

Neuroscientific evidence indicates that human social functioning is supported by a distributed network of frontal and temporal brain regions that undergoes significant development during childhood and adolescence. Clinical studies of individuals with early brain insults (EBI) to frontotemporal regions suggest that such lesions may interfere with the maturation of sociocognitive skills and lead to increased sociobehavioural problems. However, little attention has focussed on the direct assessment of sociocognitive skills, such as moral reasoning, following focal EBI. In the present study, the performance of 15 patients with focal EBI (8–16 years) was compared to that of 15 demographically matched controls on basic neuropsychological measures (IQ and executive functions), sociocognitive tasks (moral reasoning, moral decision-making and empathy) and parent reports of sociobehavioural problems and social adaptive skills. Patients with focal EBI had significantly lower levels of moral reasoning maturity, moral decision-making, and empathy than their matched controls, but did not differ on more general measures of cognition. Their parents also reported increased sociobehavioural problems. These findings suggest that focal EBI to frontotemporal regions can result in reduced sociocognitive capacities, more specifically moral reasoning, and increased vulnerability to sociobehavioural problems.


2021 ◽  
Vol 15 (05) ◽  
pp. 615-617
Author(s):  
Turki Abualait ◽  
Shahid Bashir

The nature of moral judgment is not only of longstanding philosophical interest, but also it is a matter of immediate practical concern. Currently, when the information, the advice, even the science and the sequela of the pandemic COVID-19 are all consistently and rapidly changing, it creates inconsistency in our decision making. Nevertheless, we lack of a detailed scientific understanding of how people make moral decisions. The letter is an effort aimed at understanding moral decision-making during the present pandemic of COVID-19.


2013 ◽  
Vol 19 ◽  
pp. 33-44
Author(s):  
Ibrahim Noorani ◽  
Khurram Shakir ◽  
Muddasir Hussain

Ethical enigma kernelling concerns about actions against concerns about consequences have been dealt by philosophers and psychologists to measure “universal” moral intuitions. Although these enigmas contain no evident political content, we decipher that liberals are more likely than conservatives to be concerned about consequences, whereas conservatives are more likely than liberals to be concerned about actions. This denouement is exhibited in two large, heterogeneous samples and across several different moral dilemmas. In addition, manipulations of dilemma averseness and order of presentation suggest that this political difference is due in part to different sensitivities to emotional reactions in moral decision-making: Conservatives are very much inclined to “go with the gut” and let affective responses guide moral judgments, while liberals are more likely to deliberate about optimal consequences. In this article, extracting a sample from Western Europe, we report evidence that political differences can be found in moral decisions about issues that have no evident political content. In particular, we find that conservatives are more likely than liberals to attend to the action itself when deciding whether something is right or wrong, whereas liberals are more likely than conservatives to attend to the consequences of the action. Further, we report preliminary evidence that this is partly explained by the kernel of truth from the parodies – conservatives are more likely than liberals to “go with the gut” by using their affective responses to guide moral judgment.


Author(s):  
Sergey N. Enikolopov ◽  
Tatina I. Medvedeva ◽  
Olga M. Boyko ◽  
Oksana Yu. Vorontsova ◽  
Olga Yu. Kazmina

Relevance. The COVID-19 pandemic reveals the problem of moral choices for a large number of people: who should be treated first; who can be considered as a subject for urgent vaccines and drugs testing; choice between personal convenience and observation of restrictions for the sake of the “common good.” The objective of the study was to evaluate whether the stress experienced by people during the COVID-19 pandemic can change moral decision making. Materials and methods. The data of an online survey conducted from March 30 to May 31 (311 people) were analyzed. The survey included sociodemographic questions, questions about assessing one’s current condition, the Simptom Check List-90-Revised (SCL-90-R), and the Moral Dilemmas Test, consisting of 30 dilemmas. The relationship of a number of utilitarian choices in personal moral dilemmas with sociodemographic characteristics, respondents’ assessments of their state and psychopathological characteristics was analyzed. Solving personal moral dilemmas was considered within subgroups of respondents with a high level of somatization and a high level of psychopathological symptoms and it was reviewed separately. Results. The results showed a high level of distress throughout the survey and an increase of utilitarian choices in personal moral dilemmas by the end of the survey. The number of choices in personal dilemmas was lower among older respondents, higher among men, and positively correlated with psychopathological symptoms. In the subgroup with a high level of somatization, personal choices slightly decreased by the end of the survey. On the contrary, in the subgroup with high levels of psychopathological symptoms, the number of personal choices significantly increased. Conclusions. Against the background of quarantine, assessments of moral standards change. The level of stress ambiguously affects moral decisions. A high level of somatization leads to a decrease in utilitarian personal choices, and a higher level of psychopathological symptoms leads to an increase in utilitarianш choices. Utilitarian personal choices are more often made by men and younger people


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kristopher M Smith ◽  
Coren Lee Apicella

Researchers hypothesize that social selection resulting from partner choice may have shaped deontological moral reasoning in humans. Indeed, people in Western societies judge deontologists to be more cooperative and trustworthy than utilitarians, and prefer them as partners. We test if the preference for deontologists as social partners generalizes to a small-scale society, specifically the Hadza, who are extant hunter-gatherers residing in Tanzania. We presented 134 Hadza participants with three ecologically-relevant sacrificial dilemmas and asked them to judge whether the actor should sacrifice one person to save five. We then randomly assigned participants to hear that the actor made either a deontological or utilitarian decision and asked them to make moral and partner choice judgments about the actor in the dilemma. Participants were ambivalent about whether the actor should make the utilitarian decision. However, participants who said the actor should make the deontological decision judged the utilitarian option worse, but participants who said the actor should make the utilitarian decision judged both actions to be equally bad. Regardless of whether participants believed the actor should make the utilitarian decision, participants judged the utilitarian actor lower on traits considered important for social partners, compared to the deontological actor. These results are consistent with the hypothesis that utilitarians are perceived worse than deontologists. However, because participants do not show a preference for the deontological option, it raises questions as to whether partner choice shaped deontological moral decision-making in humans.


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