scholarly journals Viewing Experience Model of First-Person Videos

2018 ◽  
Vol 4 (9) ◽  
pp. 106
Author(s):  
Biao Ma ◽  
Amy Reibman
Keyword(s):  
Video Processing ◽  
Processing System ◽  
Human Perception ◽  
Video Stabilization ◽  
First Person ◽  
Motion Information ◽  
Objective Tests ◽  
The Stability ◽  
Person Experience ◽  
Viewing Experience

First-Person Videos (FPVs) are recorded using wearable cameras to share the recorder’s First-Person Experience (FPE). Ideally, the FPE is conveyed by the viewing experience of the FPV. However, raw FPVs are usually too shaky to watch, which ruins the viewing experience. To solve this problem, we improve the viewing experience of FPVs by modeling it as two parts: video stability and First-Person Motion Information (FPMI). Existing video stabilization techniques can improve the video stability but damage the FPMI. We propose a Viewing Experience (VE) score, which measures both the stability and the FPMI of a FPV by exploring the mechanism of human perception. This enables us to further develop a system that can stabilize FPVs while preserving their FPMI so that the viewing experience of FPVs is improved. Objective tests show that our measurement is robust under different kinds of noise, and our system has competitive performance relative to current stabilization techniques. Subjective tests show that (1) both our stability and FPMI measurements can correctly compare the corresponding attributes of an FPV across different versions of the same content, and (2) our video processing system can effectively improve the viewing experience of FPVs.

scholarly journals Digital Video Stabilization: Algorithms and Evaluation

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marcos Roberto Souza ◽  
Helio Pedrini
Keyword(s):  
Digital Video ◽  
Human Perception ◽  
Video Stabilization ◽  
Camera Motion ◽  
Digital Cameras ◽  
Hardware Cost ◽  
Adverse Conditions ◽  
Detection And Tracking ◽  
The Stability ◽  
Digital Video Stabilization

Several devices have allowed the acquisition and editing of videos in various circumstances, such as digital cameras, smartphones and other mobile devices. However, the use of cameras under adverse conditions usually results in non-precise motion and occurrence of shaking, which may compromise the stability of the obtained videos. To overcome such problem, digital stabilization aims to correct camera motion oscillations that occur in the acquisition process, particularly when the cameras are mobile and handled in adverse conditions, through software techniques - without the use of specific hardware - to enhance visual quality either with the intention of enhancing human perception or improving final applications, such as detection and tracking of objects. This is important in order to avoid hardware cost and indispensable for videos already recorded. This work proposed three methods to perform digital video stabilization and two other techniques to evaluate video stabilization quality.

Design of a real-time video processing system with FPGA

2002 ◽  
Author(s):  
Wei Liu ◽  
Zeying Chi ◽  
Wenjian Chen
Keyword(s):  
Real Time ◽  
Video Processing ◽  
Processing System

The Logic of Ambiguity

Janus Head ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 18 (1) ◽  
pp. 14-29
Author(s):  
Elizabeth McManaman Tyler ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Lived Experience ◽  
Post Traumatic Stress Disorder ◽  
Traumatic Stress ◽  
Stress Disorder ◽  
First Person ◽  
Post Traumatic Stress ◽  
Post Traumatic ◽  
Insight Into ◽  
Person Experience ◽  
First Person Experience

While recent work on trauma provides insight into the first-person experience of Post-traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD), Aristotelian propositional logic, which underlies Western paradigms of thought, contains implicit ontological assumptions about identity and time which obscure the lived experience of PTSD. Conversely, Indian Buddhist catuskoti logic calls into question dualistic and discursive forms of thought. This paper argues that catuskoti logic, informed by Buddhist ontology, is a more fitting logical framework when seeking to describe and understand the first-person experience of PTSD, as it allows for ambiguity, non-duality, and polysemy.

scholarly journals A first-person theory of documentation

2019 ◽  
Vol 75 (1) ◽  
pp. 190-212 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tim Gorichanaz
Keyword(s):  
Theoretical Model ◽  
Design Methodology ◽  
Analytical Tool ◽  
First Person ◽  
Visual Artists ◽  
Art Making ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Person Perspective ◽  
Practical Implications ◽  
Person Experience

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to first articulate and then illustrate a descriptive theoretical model of documentation (i.e. document creation) suitable for analysis of the experiential, first-person perspective. Design/methodology/approach Three models of documentation in the literature are presented and synthesized into a new model. This model is then used to understand the findings from a phenomenology-of-practice study of the work of seven visual artists as they each created a self-portrait, understood here as a form of documentation. Findings A number of themes are found to express the first-person experience of art-making in these examples, including communicating, memories, reference materials, taking breaks and stepping back. The themes are discussed with an eye toward articulating what is shared and unique in these experiences. Finally, the themes are mapped successfully to the theoretical model. Research limitations/implications The study involved artists creating self-portraits, and further research will be required to determine if the thematic findings are unique to self-portraiture or apply as well to art-making, to documentation generally, etc. Still, the theoretical model developed here seems useful for analyzing documentation experiences. Practical implications As many activities and tasks in contemporary life can be conceptualized as documentation, this model provides a valuable analytical tool for better understanding those experiences. This can ground education and management decisions for those involved. Originality/value This paper makes conceptual and empirical contributions to document theory and the study of the information behavior of artists, particularly furthering discussions of information and document experience.

scholarly journals La vida y la revelación: los caminos insondables de Michel Henry

2021 ◽  
pp. 37
Author(s):  
Carlos Belvedere
Keyword(s):  
First Person ◽  
Late Work ◽  
Michel Henry ◽  
The Absolute ◽  
Person Experience ◽  
First Person Experience

Me propongo delinear las nociones de vida y revelación tal como son descritas en la obra temprana y en la obra tardía de Michel Henry. Además, cotejaré estas descripciones con la piedra de toque de la fenomenología, a saber, la experiencia en primera persona. A partir de ella levantaré una objeción material: que la vida no se revele en mí como una fenomenalidad pura distinguida del fenómeno propia-mente dicho pone en jaque el carácter absoluto de la manifestación pues hay al menos un caso en que no se cumple. Luego mostraré que, en sus últimos años, Henry da cuenta de este tipo de experiencia a partir de las figuras del mal. Argumentaré, por último, que aunque tiene el mérito de dar cuenta de una heterogeneidad posible de la experiencia, la respuesta ofrecida allí resulta insuficiente para retirar la objeción planteada inicialmente.My aim is to delineate the notions of life and revelation as they are described in the early work and in the late work of Michel Henry. In addition, I will compare these descriptions with the touchstone of phenomenology, namely, the first-person experience. Based on it I will raise a material objection: that life does not reveal itself in me as a pure phenomenality distinguished from the phenomenon itself calls into question the absolute character of manifestation because there is at least one case in which it is not fulfilled. Then I will show that, in his latest years, Henry accounts for this type of experience as a figure of evil. Finally, I will argue that, although it has the merit of accounting for a possible heterogeneity of the experience, the answer offered there is insufficient to withdraw the objection raised initially.

scholarly journals Immersive Journalism: Immersive Virtual Reality for the First-Person Experience of News

2010 ◽  
Vol 19 (4) ◽  
pp. 291-301 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nonny de la Peña ◽  
Peggy Weil ◽  
Joan Llobera ◽  
Bernhard Spanlang ◽  
Doron Friedman ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Virtual Worlds ◽  
Theoretical Background ◽  
News Story ◽  
First Person ◽  
Fundamental Idea ◽  
News Stories ◽  
Sense Of Presence ◽  
Head Mounted Displays ◽  
Immersive Systems ◽  
Person Experience

This paper introduces the concept and discusses the implications of immersive journalism, which is the production of news in a form in which people can gain first-person experiences of the events or situation described in news stories. The fundamental idea of immersive journalism is to allow the participant, typically represented as a digital avatar, to actually enter a virtually recreated scenario representing the news story. The sense of presence obtained through an immersive system (whether a Cave or head-tracked head-mounted displays [HMD] and online virtual worlds, such as video games and online virtual worlds) affords the participant unprecedented access to the sights and sounds, and possibly feelings and emotions, that accompany the news. This paper surveys current approaches to immersive journalism and the theoretical background supporting claims regarding avatar experience in immersive systems. We also provide a specific demonstration: giving participants the experience of being in an interrogation room in an offshore prison. By both describing current approaches and demonstrating an immersive journalism experience, we open a new avenue for research into how presence can be utilized in the field of news and nonfiction.

5 Models of the world: from perception to hallucination

2020 ◽  
Vol 91 (8) ◽  
pp. e2.3-e2
Author(s):  
Paul Fletcher
Keyword(s):  
Model Building ◽  
Processing System ◽  
Human Perception ◽  
Predictive Processing ◽  
External Reality ◽  
Consultant Psychiatrist ◽  
University Of Cambridge ◽  
The World ◽  
The University ◽  
The Brain

Paul Fletcher is Wellcome Investigator and Bernard Wolfe Professor of Health Neuroscience at the University of Cambridge. He is also Director of Studies for Preclinical Medicine at Clare College and Honorary Consultant Psychiatrist with the Cambridgeshire and Peterborough NHS Foundation Trust. He studied Medicine, before carrying out specialist training in Psychiatry and taking a PhD in cognitive neuroscience. He researches human perception, learning and decision-making in health and mental illness.We do not have direct contact with external reality. We must rely on messages from the sense organs, conveying information about the state of the world and our bodies. These messages are not easy to decipher, being noisy and ambiguous, but from them we have to construct models of the world. I will discuss this challenge and how we are very adept at creating a model of reality based on achieving a balance between what our senses are telling us and our expectations of what should be the case. This is often referred to as the predictive processing framework.Relying on this balance comes at a cost, rendering us vulnerable to illusions and biases and, in more extreme cases, to creating a reality that diverges from that experienced by others. This can arise for a variety of reasons but, at the root, I suggest, lies the nature of the brain as a model-building organ. Though this divergence from reality – psychosis – often seems inexplicable and incomprehensible, I suggest that a few core principles can help us to understand it and offers ways of thinking about how phenomena like hallucinations can be understood. Interestingly, the framework suggests ways in which apparently similar phenomena like hallucinations can arise from distinct alterations to the function of a predictive processing system.

Qualia, Robots and Complementarity of Subject and Object

1998 ◽  
pp. 54-62
Author(s):  
Piotr Boltuc
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Mind ◽  
First Person ◽  
German Philosophy ◽  
Secondary Qualities ◽  
Black And White ◽  
Complementary Approach ◽  
Subject And Object ◽  
First Time ◽  
Person Experience ◽  
First Person Experience

Jackson claims that a person who sees colors for the first time by this very fact acquires a certain knowledge which she or he could not have learned in a black and white world. This argument can be generalized to other secondary qualities. I argue that this claim is indefensible without implicit recourse to the first-person experience; also Nagel’s "what it is like" argument is polemically weak. Hence, we have no argument able to dismiss physicalism by consideration of first-person qualia (contra Jackson); however, it does not force us to endorse qualia-reductionism. In the second part of my paper I defend non-reductionism in a different way. Following Nagel and Harman, I try to avoid criticisms usually presented against Nagel, seeing subjectivity and objectivity as two complementary structures of the subjective and objective element of our language. I refer to classical German philosophy, phenomenology and Marxist dialectics which have developed a complementary approach crucial in the reductionist/anti-reductionist controversy in the philosophy of mind.

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