scholarly journals Representations, Affordances, and Interactive Systems

2021 ◽  
Vol 5 (5) ◽  
pp. 23
Author(s):  
Robert Rowe

The history of algorithmic composition using a digital computer has undergone many representations—data structures that encode some aspects of the outside world, or processes and entities within the program itself. Parallel histories in cognitive science and artificial intelligence have (of necessity) confronted their own notions of representations, including the ecological perception view of J.J. Gibson, who claims that mental representations are redundant to the affordances apparent in the world, its objects, and their relations. This review tracks these parallel histories and how the orientations and designs of multimodal interactive systems give rise to their own affordances: the representations and models used expose parameters and controls to a creator that determine how a system can be used and, thus, what it can mean.

2019 ◽  
Vol 30 (4) ◽  
pp. 719-750
Author(s):  
Rui P. Chaves ◽  
Adriana King

Abstract The idea that conventionalized general knowledge – sometimes referred to as a frame – guides the perception and interpretation of the world around us has long permeated various branches of cognitive science, including psychology, linguistics, and artificial intelligence. In this paper we provide experimental evidence suggesting that frames also play a role in explaining certain long-distance dependency phenomena, as originally proposed by Deane (1991). We focus on a constraint that restricts the extraction of an NP from another NP, called subextraction, which Deane (1991) claims is ultimately a framing effect. In Experiment 1 we provide evidence showing that referents are extractable to the degree that they are deemed important for the proposition expressed by the utterance. This suggests that the world knowledge that the main verb evokes plays a key role in establishing which referents are extractable. In Experiment 2 we offer evidence suggesting that the acceptability of deep subextractions is correlated with the overall plausibility of the proposition, suggesting that complex structures can evoke complex frames as well, if sufficiently frequent and semantically coherent, and therefore more easily license deeper subextractions.


2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Frederick Callaway ◽  
Jessica Hamrick ◽  
Tom Griffiths

In the history of cognitive science, there have been two competing philosophies regarding how people reason about the world. In one, people rely on rich, generative models to make predictions about a wide range of scenarios; while in the other, people have a large “bag of tricks”, idiosyncratic heuristics that tend to work well in practice. In this paper, we suggest that rather than being in opposition to one another, these two ideas complement each other. We argue that people’s capacity for mental simulation may support their ability to learn new cue- based heuristics, and demonstrate this phenomenon in two experiments. However, our results also indicate that participants are far less likely to learn a heuristic when there is no logical or explicitly conveyed relationship between the cue and the relevant outcome. Furthermore, simulation—while a potentially useful tool—is no substitute for real world experience.


Author(s):  
Richard S. Segall ◽  
Neha Gupta

In this chapter, a discussion is presented of what a supercomputer really is, as well as of both the top few of the world's fastest supercomputers and the overall top 500 in the world. Discussions are also of cognitive science research using supercomputers for artificial intelligence, architectural classes of supercomputers, and discussion and visualization using tables and graphs of global supercomputing comparisons across different countries. Discussion of supercomputing applications and overview of other book chapters of the entire book are all presented. This chapter serves as an introduction to the entire book and concludes with a summary of the topics of the remaining chapters of this book.


2020 ◽  
Vol 59 (4) ◽  
pp. 69-80
Author(s):  
Paweł Grabarczyk

The paper analyses selected philosophical aspects of Stanisław Lem’s Solaris. I argue that there is an interesting similarity between the history of “Solarist studies” –the fictional scientific discipline depicted by Lem and cognitive science. I show that both disciplines go through similar stages as they try to describe their main subject (the planet Solaris and human consciousness respectively). In the further part of the paper, I focus on two problems identified in cognitive science that can be directly related to the themes found in Solaris: the problem of the detection of intelligence and the problem of the notion of mental representations. I finish the paper by looking at the mysterious guests that stalk the main protagonists and show that they can be understood as heuristic models that are taken into account in the theories of mind uploading.


Author(s):  
Juan C. Vélez

RESUMENLa teoría representacional de la mente, basada en el concepto de representación, ha sido muy criticada, especialmente por recientes enfoques en la ciencia cognitiva, provenientes de la Biología y la Inteligencia Artificial. En este trabajo me centro especialmente en el punto de vista de Francisco Varela, quien sugiere la exclusión del término representación en la explicación de los sistemas cognitivos. Muestro que ello no es necesario, y que hay razones para hablar de representaciones en la relación que tenemos con el mundo en términos de conocimiento, por tanto, el antirrepresentacionalismo de Varela es inadecuado. En ese sentido me parece más afortunada la apreciación que hacen de la ciencia cognitiva y la filosofía de la mente Andy Clark y Pascual Martínez-Freire, y ésta es la postura que defenderé en contra de Varela.PALABRAS CLAVEMENTE, REPRESENTACIÓN, COGNITIVISMO, CONDUCTA, SISTEMAABSTRACTThe representational theory of the mind, based on the concept of representation, has been very criticized, specially by recent approaches to cognitive science, originated from Biology and Artificial Intelligence. In this work I focus my attention specially on the point of view of Francisco Varela, who suggests the exclusion of the term representation in the explanation of cognitive systems. I show that it is unnecessary, and that there are reasons to talk about representations in the relation that we have with the world in terms of knowledge, and therefore, Varela’s antirepresentacionalism is inadequate. In that connection the appreciation that Andy Clark and Pascual Martínez-Freire do of cognitive science and the philosophy of the mind seems more fortunate to me, and this is the position that I will defend against Varela.KEYWORDSMIND, REPRESENTATION, COGNITIVISM, BEHAVIOR, SYSTEM


2017 ◽  
Vol 64 (1) ◽  
pp. 93-98
Author(s):  
Ivana Petrovic

If you have ever had a premonition, or if ever some inner voice has dissuaded you from a certain action, you might have noticed that this experience involves a different kind of knowledge than that preceded by an inference. We call it a ‘hunch’, an ‘intuition’, or a ‘gut feeling’; in the nineteenth century this particular subvolitional form of thinking was called ‘unconscious cerebration’, and modern cognitive science recognizes it as a specific type of cognition characterized by quick, pre-attentive, and preconscious processing – Daniel Kahneman's famous ‘thinking fast’. The most fascinating aspect of Peter Struck's book on divination is an attempt to distinguish the type of cognition it entailed. The book offers an insightful analysis of Plato's, Aristotle's, the Stoics’, and the Neoplatonists’ views on divination, concluding that they saw divination as ‘surplus insight’, a specific kind of cognition. Since ‘our ability to know exceeds our capacity to understand that ability’, ‘our cognitive selves are to some…degree mysterious to us…The messages that we receive from the world around us add up, sometimes in uncanny ways, to more than the sum of their parts’ (15). Struck argues that, in the ancient world, the process by which we arrive at such surplus knowledge was acculturated as divination. He focuses on the philosophers’ views and does not attempt to provide an analysis of the technical and practical side of divination, which was based on knowledge and skill (though it must have involved intuition to some degree as well), or of the popular views on divination. Nevertheless, his book will be very useful to those interested in the philosophical views on divination and in the cognitive history of intuition. Cognitive science has spurred several important recent studies in Greek religion and is continuing to provide a useful framework for conceptualizing ancient (and modern) religious thinking and behaviour.


1999 ◽  
Vol 19 ◽  
pp. 22-42 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nick Ellis

Getting to know a second language is an act of cognition par excellence. Yet 'Cognitive Approaches to SLA' implies something more than the general research enterprise of SLA. It highlights the goals of cognitive psychologists who search for explanations of second language cognition in terms of mental representations and information processing. It places SLA within the broader remit of cognitive scientists, who—influenced by Marr (1982) to seek understanding at all three levels of function, algorithm, and hardware—work in collaborations involving cognitive psychology, linguistics, epistemology, computer science, artificial intelligence, connectionism, and the neurosciences. It implies the empiricism of cognitive psychology, searching for truths about the world through observation and experimentation and, at times, the rationalism of cognitive scientists who theorize through the construction of formal systems such as those in mathematics, logic, or computational simulation. Much of the research is purely theoretical, but, as in applied cognitive psychology, pure theory can often spin off into important applications, and applied research using longitudinal or training designs in field situations can often advance theory.


2021 ◽  
pp. 105971232110317
Author(s):  
Laura Mojica

Breathing Life into Biology is a brave attempt to do science while wearing its values on its sleeves. It is written under the commitment that life is intrinsically valuable, and its value has to be taken seriously in doing biology. Stewart defends a conception of life in which every living organism has a subjective point of view from which it makes sense of the world. Under this conception and the commitment that life is valuable in itself, the book presents the story of life from its origin and our history as humankind. However, the book is more successful in presenting the former than the latter. Yet Stewart’s conception of enaction opens the possibility for cognitive science and his conception of what makes us human enables us to embrace the histories and the forms of life of those who have been systematically silenced.


IEE Review ◽  
1991 ◽  
Vol 37 (10) ◽  
pp. 355
Author(s):  
D.A. Gorham

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