scholarly journals Optimal Emission Reduction and Pricing in the Tourism Supply Chain Considering Different Market Structures and Word-of-Mouth Effect

2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (7) ◽  
pp. 3893
Author(s):  
Xijia Huang ◽  
Shuai Zhu ◽  
Jia Wang
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Word Of Mouth ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Retail Price ◽  
Local Operator ◽  
Carbon Reduction ◽  
Price Demand ◽  
Tourism Supply Chain ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Tour Operator

In the context of carbon tax policy and word-of-mouth, local operators and tour operators in the tourism supply chain need to determine optimal wholesale price, carbon reduction level, and retail price of tour packages strategies. To address these decision-making issues, while considering the word-of-mouth effect, our paper considers a local operator determining wholesale price and carbon reduction level of the tour package and a tour operator determining retail price of the tour package. According to different bargaining powers, we study three scenarios: the local operator leading Stackelberg (LL), the tour operator leading Stackelberg (TL), and the static Nash game (NG). We develop three theoretical models and present some insights. We find that tourist’s sensitivity to word-of-mouth has positive (negative) impacts on optimal wholesale price, carbon reduction level, retail price, demand, and profits if the impact of word-of-mouth is positive (negative), while the impact of word-of-mouth is always having positive impacts on optimal decisions, demand, and profits. Interestingly, the NG market structure contributes the most environmentally-friendly products but mostly hurts the environment. The local operator under LL can obtain the largest profit, which is even larger than the profit of the tour operator, while the tour operator under NG and TL can obtain more profit than the local operator.

scholarly journals Research on the Dynamics Game Model in a Green Supply Chain: Government Subsidy Strategies under the Retailer’s Selling Effort Level

Complexity ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 ◽  
pp. 1-15 ◽  
Author(s):  
Xigang Yuan ◽  
Xiaoqing Zhang ◽  
Dalin Zhang
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Dynamic Game ◽  
Retail Price ◽  
Green Supply Chain ◽  
Government Subsidy ◽  
Principal Agent Theory ◽  
Effort Level ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Selling Effort

Based on dynamic game theory and the principal-agent theory, this paper examined different government subsidy strategies in green supply chain management. Assuming that the retailer’s level of selling effort involved asymmetric information, this study analyzed the impact of different government subsidy strategies on the wholesale price, the product greenness level, retail price, the level of selling effort, the manufacturer’s profit, and the retailer’s profit. The results showed that (1) the government’s subsidy strategy can effectively not only improve the product greenness level but also increase the profits of an enterprise in a green supply chain, which helps the retailer to enhance their selling effort; (2) regardless of whether the retailer’s level of selling effort was high or low, as the government’s subsidy coefficient increased, the wholesale price continued to decrease, and the product greenness level and retailer’s selling effort level also increased.

scholarly journals The Influence of Buyer Power on Supply Chain Pricing with Downstream Competition

2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (10) ◽  
pp. 2924
Author(s):  
Qiu Zhao
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Consumer Welfare ◽  
Retail Price ◽  
Retail Market ◽  
Pricing Decisions ◽  
Buyer Power ◽  
Downstream Competition ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Vertical Market

This paper aims to investigate the impact of buyer power on the wholesale price and retail price of, in the case, downstream competition. Based on a summary of the competitive characteristics of China’s retail market, a model of a vertical market was constructed to examine the influence of buyer power on the pricing decisions of manufacturers and retailers, and to analyze the mechanism of price decisions. The results showed that the buyer power of national retailers reduced the wholesale price, but the impact on local retailers remained uncertain. Although increasing buyer power initially increased the local retailer’s wholesale price and caused the ‘waterbed effect’, we found that this effect reverted when the buyer power reached a point at which the ‘anti-waterbed effect’ appeared. The opposite was true of the retail price. However, buyer power reduced the average retail price, and consumer welfare improved.

scholarly journals Contract Manufacturer’s Encroachment Strategy considering Fairness Concern in Supply Chain

2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-24
Author(s):  
Jing Shi
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Retail Price ◽  
Reservation Price ◽  
Numerical Examples ◽  
Fairness Concerns ◽  
Private Brand ◽  
Fairness Concern ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Positive Effect

More and more contract manufacturers have started to establish their own brands besides providing manufacturing service for retailers who operate exclusive well-known brands. This paper studies the encroachment strategy of a contract manufacturer in a supply chain and the impact of fairness concern. Four scenarios are investigated by building game models: no fairness concern, the retailer’s fairness concern, the contract manufacturer’s fairness concern, and both members’ fairness concern. The results show that when there is no fairness concern, the contract manufacturer always has motivation to encroach. However, when there exists fairness concern, only when the reservation price is sufficiently high, the contract manufacturer will encroach. Fairness concern has certain strength to stop the contract manufacturer’s encroachment. When the reservation price is sufficiently low, the encroachment of the contract manufacturer benefits the retailer, or else it will harm the benefit of the retailer. The effect of fairness concern on profit margin and wholesale price decisions is opposite under different encroachment strategies. However, the fairness concern has no impact on the retail price of the private brand. Under encroachment strategy, contract manufacturer’s or both members’ fairness concerns have positive effect on the retailer’s profit in certain conditions. However, the fairness concern always decreases the contract manufacturer’s profit no matter what the form it is. Numerical examples show that it is best for the supply chain that both members have fairness concern under no encroachment. However, when the contract manufacturer has a private brand, it is best for the supply chain that no one has fairness concern when the advantageous inequity concern parameter is sufficiently low. When the advantageous inequity concern parameter is sufficiently high, it is best for the supply chain that both members have fairness concern.

scholarly journals Impact of Risk Aversion on Price and Quality Decisions under Demand Uncertainty via the CARA Utility Function

2014 ◽  
Vol 2014 ◽  
pp. 1-15 ◽  
Author(s):  
Qinqin Li ◽  
Zhiying Liu ◽  
Yi He
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Risk Aversion ◽  
Demand Uncertainty ◽  
Absolute Risk ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Retail Price ◽  
Cost Coefficient ◽  
Stackelberg Model ◽  
Cara Utility ◽  
The Impact

This paper investigates optimal price and quality decisions of a manufacturer-retailer supply chain under demand uncertainty, in which players are both risk-averse decision makers. The manufacturer determines the wholesale price and quality of the product, and the retailer determines the retail price. By means of game theory, we employ the constant absolute risk aversion (CARA) function to analyze two different supply chain structures, that is, manufacturer Stackelberg model (MS) and retailer Stackelberg model (RS). We then analyze the results to explore the effects of risk aversion of the manufacturer and the retailer upon the equilibrium decisions. Our results imply that both the risk aversion of the manufacturer and the retailer play an important role in the price and quality decisions. We find that, in general, in MS and RS models, the optimal wholesale price and quality decrease with the risk aversion of the manufacturer but increase with the risk aversion of the retailer, while the retail price decreases with the risk aversion of the manufacturer as well as the retailer. We also examine the impact of quality cost coefficient on the optimal decisions. Finally, numerical examples are presented to illustrate the different degree of effects of players’ risk aversion on equilibrium results and to compare results in different models considered.

The Impact of Dual-Fairness Concerns Under Different Power

2019 ◽  
Vol 15 (3) ◽  
pp. 1-26
Author(s):  
Tianjian Yang ◽  
Guangdong Liu ◽  
Yao Wei ◽  
Xuemei Zhang ◽  
Xinglin Dong
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Equilibrium Structure ◽  
Retail Price ◽  
Green Supply Chain ◽  
Power Structures ◽  
Optimal Decisions ◽  
Fairness Concerns ◽  
Total Profit ◽  
The Impact

By analyzing the impact of different fairness concerns on a green supply chain, this study determines the optimal decisions under different power structures and conducts a comparative analysis of them. The findings of this study are summarized as follows: 1) under the manufacturer-dominated structure, retail price, wholesale price, product greenness, the manufacturer's profit, the total profit of the supply chain, the manufacturer's utility, and the retailer's utility are all negatively correlated with fairness concerns, but positively correlated with the retailer's profit; 2) under the retailer-dominated structure, fairness concerns have no impact on retail price, product greenness, or the total profit of the supply chain, are positively correlated with wholesale price and the manufacturer's profit and utility, and are negatively correlated with the retailer's profit and utility; 3) under the Nash equilibrium structure, fairness concerns have no impact on the green supply chain.

scholarly journals Green Supply Chain Pricing and Performance: a Fairness Preferences and Green Marketing Perspective

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hong Huo ◽  
Haiyan Zhong ◽  
Xiaoli Zhang
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Retail Price ◽  
Green Marketing ◽  
Green Supply Chain ◽  
Optimal Decision ◽  
Market Demand ◽  
Efficient Operation ◽  
And Performance ◽  
The Impact

This study investigates optimal decisions in a green supply chain consisting of a manufacturer and a leading retailer considering the green marketing and fairness preferences of member firms. Four Stackelberg game decision models are constructed in which the manufacturer and the re-tailer engage in green marketing separately when the manufacturer has no and has fairness preferences. The impacts of fairness preferences and green marketing on the optimal decision in the green supply chain are comparatively analyzed. The study finds that member firms perform green marketing regardless of the presence or absence of fairness preferences and that such be-havior increases the wholesale price, retail price, and market demand of low-carbon products as well as the profits of member firms and the supply chain. A more interesting finding is that the profit growth of member firms and the supply chain due to the manufacturer’s green marketing is more pronounced than that due to the retailer’s green marketing. When the retailer and the manufacturer engage in conduct green marketing, the manufacturer's fairness preferences have different effects on the wholesale price, retail price, market demand, level of green marketing efforts, member enterprises and profits of supply chain. Therefore, firms should consider the impact of green marketing and fairness preferences to make pricing and performance decisions, so as to achieve efficient operation of the whole supply chain and avoid double marginal effects. Finally, the above conclusions are verified through numerical simulation, providing a reference for the decision-making of member firms in the green supply chain.

scholarly journals Dynamic Adjustment Mechanism and Differential Game Model Construction of Mask Emergency Supply Chain Cooperation Based on COVID-19 Outbreak

2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (3) ◽  
pp. 1115
Author(s):  
Shufan Zhu ◽  
Kefan Xie ◽  
Ping Gui
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Differential Game ◽  
Production Technology ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Transfer Payment ◽  
Dynamic Adjustment ◽  
Supply Chain System ◽  
Government Subsidies ◽  
Technology Investment ◽  
The Impact

Incorporating the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on the mask supply chain into our framework and taking mask output as a state variable, our study introduces the differential game to study the long-term dynamic cooperation of a two-echelon supply chain composed of the supplier and the manufacturer under government subsidies. The study elaborates that government subsidies can provide more effective incentives for supply chain members to cooperate in the production of masks compared with the situation of no government subsidies. A relatively low wholesale price can effectively increase the profits of supply chain members and the supply chain system. The joint contract of two-way cost-sharing contract and transfer payment contract can promote production technology investment efforts of the supply chain members, the optimum trajectory of mask production, and total profit to reach the best state as the centralized decision scenario within a certain range. Meanwhile, it is determined that the profits of supply chain members in the joint contract can be Pareto improvement compared with decentralized decision scenario. With the increase of production technology investment cost coefficients and output self-decay rate, mask outputs have shown a downward trend in the joint contract decision model. On the contrary, mask outputs would rise with growing sensitivity of mask output to production technology investment effort and increasing sensitivity of mask demand to mask output.

Implications of Price Matching in Supply Chain Negotiation

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Weixin Shang ◽  
Gangshu (George) Cai
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Social Welfare ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Consumer Welfare ◽  
Problem Definition ◽  
Nash Bargaining ◽  
Price Matching ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Multiple Buyers ◽  
Wholesale Pricing

Problem definition: Few papers have explored the impact of price matching negotiation (PM), in which a channel matches its price with the resulting wholesale price bargained by another channel, on firms’ performances, consumer welfare, and social welfare, with and without supply chain coordination. Academic/practical relevance: Negotiation has been widely seen in determining both uniform and discriminatory wholesale prices, which affect outcomes of competitive supply chain practices. Methodology: To characterize the PM mechanism, we use game theory and Nash bargaining theory to compare PM with simultaneous negotiation (SN) through a common-seller two-buyer differentiated Bertrand competition model. Results: Our analysis reveals that PM can benefit the seller but hurt all buyers, which is at odds with some fair wholesale pricing clauses intending to protect buyers. Under coordination with side payments, however, all firms can conditionally benefit more from PM than from SN. Despite firms’ gains, PM leads to less consumer utility and social welfare compared with SN, unless the second buyer in PM is considerably less powerful than the first buyer. Coordination further worsens PM’s negative impact on consumer utility and social welfare. Moreover, the existence of a spot market can increase the wholesale price in PM, hurting buyers, consumers, and society. Furthermore, the qualitative results about PM remain robust under an alternative disagreement point for PM, multiple buyers, and other extensions. Managerial implications: This paper delivers insights on when price matching in supply chain wholesale price negotiation can benefit a seller, buyers, consumers, and society in a variety of scenarios. It advocates how managers can use PM to their own advantages and provides rationale to decision makers for policy regulations regarding wholesale pricing.

Contracts and Information Structure in a Supply Chain with Operations and Marketing Interaction

2016 ◽  
Vol 18 (04) ◽  
pp. 1650014 ◽  
Author(s):  
Fouad El Ouardighi ◽  
Gary Erickson ◽  
Dieter Grass ◽  
Steffen Jørgensen
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Information Structure ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Revenue Sharing ◽  
Open Loop ◽  
The State ◽  
Current State ◽  
Marketing Activities ◽  
Purchase Rate ◽  
The Impact

The objective of the paper is to study how wholesale price and revenue sharing contracts affect operations and marketing decisions in a supply chain under different dynamic informational structures. We suggest a differential game model of a supply chain consisting of a manufacturer and a single retailer that agree on the contract parameters at the outset of the game. The model includes key operational and marketing activities related to a single product in the supply chain. The manufacturer sets a production rate and the rate of advertising efforts while the retailer chooses a purchase rate and the consumer price. The state of the game is summarized in the firms’ backlogs and the manufacturer’s advertising goodwill. Depending on whether the supply chain members have and share state information, they may either make decisions contingent on the current state of the game (feedback Nash strategy), or precommit to a plan of action during the whole game (open-loop Nash strategy). Given a contract type, the impact of the availability of information regarding the state of the game on the firms’ decisions and payoffs is investigated. It is shown that double marginalization can be better mitigated if the supply chain members adopt a contingent strategy under a wholesale price contract and a commitment strategy under a revenue sharing contract.

scholarly journals Emergency Coordination Model of Fresh Agricultural Products’ Three-Level Supply Chain with Asymmetric Information

2016 ◽  
Vol 2016 ◽  
pp. 1-9 ◽  
Author(s):  
Juan Yang ◽  
Haorui Liu ◽  
Xuedou Yu ◽  
Fenghua Xiao
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Asymmetric Information ◽  
Supply Chain Coordination ◽  
Wholesale Price ◽  
Nonlinear Function ◽  
Retail Price ◽  
Agricultural Products ◽  
Agricultural Product ◽  
Coordination Model ◽  
Emergency Events

In consideration of influence of loss, freshness, and secret retailer cost of products, how to handle emergency events during three-level supply chain is researched when market need is presumed to be a nonlinear function with retail price in fresh agricultural product market. Centralized and decentralized supply chain coordination models are studied based on asymmetric information. Optimal strategy of supply chain in dealing with retail price perturbation is caused by emergency events. The research reveals robustness for optimal production planning, wholesale price for distributors, wholesale price for retailers, and retail price of three-level supply chain about fresh agricultural products. The above four factors can keep constant within a certain perturbation of expectation costs for retailers because of emergency events; the conclusions are verified by numerical simulation. This paper also can be used for reference to the other related studies in how to coordinate the supply chain under asymmetric and punctual researches information response to disruptions.

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