scholarly journals How Retailer Co-Opetition Impacts Pricing, Collecting and Coordination in a Closed-Loop Supply Chain

2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (18) ◽  
pp. 10025
Author(s):  
Xinyi Li ◽  
Guoxuan Huang ◽  
Jie Chu ◽  
Benrong Zheng ◽  
Kai Huang
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Closed Loop ◽  
Bertrand Competition ◽  
Supply Chain System ◽  
Closed Loop Supply Chain ◽  
Electronic Manufacturing ◽  
Sustainable Performance ◽  
Closed Loop Supply Chains ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
The Impact

The cooperative and competitive (i.e., co-opetition) behavior between retailers plays a significant role in the development of operations and marketing strategies in a supply chain. Specifically, retailers’ co-opetition relationship pivotally influences the sustainable performance in a closed-loop supply chain. This study examines the impact of retailer co-opetition on pricing, collection decisions and coordination in a closed-loop supply chain with one manufacturer and two competing retailers. Based on observations in some industries (e.g., electronic manufacturing, fabric and textile, etc.), the cooperative and competitive relationships between retailers can be classified into the following three different modes: Bertrand competition, Stackelberg competition, and Collusion. In this paper, we establish a centralized and three decentralized game-theoretic models under these three co-opetition modes and characterize the corresponding equilibrium outcomes. The results indicate that the Bertrand competition mode yields the highest return rate, which is also superior to the other two modes for both the manufacturer and the supply chain system in terms of profitability. However, it can be shown that which mode benefits the retailers would depend on the degree of competition between the retailers and the relative remanufacturing efficiency. Interestingly, we find that the retailer’s first-move advantage does not necessarily lead to higher profits. In addition, we design a modified two-part tariff contract to coordinate the decentralized closed-loop supply chains under three different retailer co-opetition modes, and the results suggest that the optimal contractual parameters in the contracts highly rely on the remanufacturing efficiency and the competition degree between the two retailers. Several managerial insights for firms, consumers and policy makers are provided through numerical analysis.

scholarly journals Warranty Period Decision and Coordination in Closed-Loop Supply Chains Considering Remanufacturing and Consumer Behavior

2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (15) ◽  
pp. 4237 ◽  
Author(s):  
Xiaodong Zhu ◽  
Lingfei Yu ◽  
Wei Li
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Supply Chain ◽  
Supply Chains ◽  
Closed Loop ◽  
Supply Chain System ◽  
Closed Loop Supply Chain ◽  
Chain System ◽  
Warranty Period ◽  
Closed Loop Supply Chains ◽  
Decision Making Model

The closed-loop supply chain management model is an effective way to promote sustainable economic development and environmental protection. Increasing the sales volume of remanufactured products to stimulate green growth is a key issue in the development of closed-loop supply chains. By designing an effective warranty strategy, customer’s perceived value can be enhanced and market demand can be stimulated. This study cuts through the warranty period of closed-loop supply chain products. Based on the perspective of consumer behavior, game theory is used to construct the optimal decision-making model for closed-loop supply chains. The optimal warranty decision making for new products and remanufactured products under centralized and decentralized decision-making models is discussed. Further, the impact of the closed-loop supply chain system with warranty services and the design of contract coordination is also shown. We show that consumer preference has a positive impact on the sales of remanufactured products and the profits of enterprises; with the extension of the new product and remanufacturing warranty period, the profit of the supply chain system first increases and then decreases, and the value is maximized at the extreme point in the manufacturer-led decision-making model. Furthermore, the leader gains higher profits with bargaining power, but the profit of the supply chain system under decentralized decision model is less than that of the centralized decision model, reflecting the double marginalization effect. The revenue sharing contract and the two-charge contract designed in this study coordinate the closed-loop supply chain system with warranty services, so that the member companies in the supply chain can achieve Pareto improvement.

scholarly journals Comparison of Cooperation Modes in a Two-Period Closed-Loop Supply Chain System considering Green Manufacturing

2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 ◽  
pp. 1-19
Author(s):  
Chunmei Ma
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Service Provider ◽  
Closed Loop ◽  
Green Manufacturing ◽  
Coordination Mechanism ◽  
Supply Chain System ◽  
Closed Loop Supply Chain ◽  
Game Theoretical Approach ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Better Than

In order to improve the efficiency of collection and green manufacturing level in a closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) system, the manufacturer invests green manufacturing efforts in product design and production process and intends to cooperate with other CLSC members to achieve excellent performance. In a two-period CLSC system consisting of one manufacturer, one retailer, and one third-service provider, a game-theoretical approach is adopted to compare the optimal decisions and profits of the three green manufacturing cooperation modes, namely, the manufacturer cooperates with the retailer and third-service provider, respectively, and the noncooperation mode is a benchmark. Moreover, the impact of different cooperation modes on CLSC decision-making is analyzed as well. The results indicate that the influence of difference among cooperation modes on CLSC decision is significant, and cooperation is always better than noncooperation. From the perspective of consumers as well as recycling and profit, although the collection rate of used products is not the highest when the manufacturer cooperates with the retailer, the price of product is the lowest and the green property of product is the most obvious; thus, this is regarded as the suitable cooperation mode after a comprehensive analysis. Besides, a coordination mechanism is designed to solve the inefficiency caused by double marginalization. Finally, numerical examples are presented to intuitively observe the relationships between decisions and profits and the impact of different parameters on them in the three modes, and some management inspirations are proposed ultimately.

scholarly journals The Impact of Warranty Efficiency of Remanufactured Products on Production Decisions and Green Growth Performance in Closed-Loop Supply Chain: Perspective of Consumer Behavior

2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (5) ◽  
pp. 1420 ◽  
Author(s):  
Xiaodong Zhu ◽  
Lingfei Yu
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Supply Chains ◽  
Closed Loop ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Low Carbon ◽  
Green Growth ◽  
Closed Loop Supply Chain ◽  
Closed Loop Supply Chains ◽  
Warranty Service ◽  
The Impact

Consumers cannot fully assess the quality of remanufactured products prior to purchase. To reduce consumer risk, closed-loop supply chains adopt a warranty strategy to enhance perceived value among customers and stimulate green growth. Based on Stackelberg game theory and considering consumers’ low-carbon and remanufactured product preferences, this paper aims to explore the decision-making efficiency of closed-loop supply chains with warranty services. The results of the study show that consumers’ confidence in purchasing remanufactured products has increased the demand for new products and remanufactured products, in turn also increasing the interest of the member companies of the supply chain, and stimulating the realization of the potential value of remanufacturing, which is conducive to green growth. When a remanufactured product warranty period meets certain conditions, the member companies of the supply chain can obtain optimal profit. The optimal warranty entity selection of a closed-loop supply chain with a warranty service depends on the warranty efficiency of each entity, thus making it necessary to examine the products of each warranty party.

scholarly journals Pricing strategy of closed-loop supply chain under disruptions

Filomat ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 30 (15) ◽  
pp. 4059-4072 ◽  
Author(s):  
Xiaofeng Xu ◽  
Jiaguo Liu ◽  
Yongli Li ◽  
Xuelong Zhou
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Closed Loop ◽  
Supply And Demand ◽  
Profit Sharing ◽  
Supply Chain System ◽  
Closed Loop Supply Chain ◽  
Chain System ◽  
Depth Study ◽  
Contract Costs ◽  
The Impact

The aim of this paper is to understand how disruptions effect on closed-loop supply chain, and how to achieve the coordination of closed-loop supply chain under disruptions situation for the whole supply chain system. Design/methodology/approach- This paper analyzed the effect caused by the disruptions of the closed-loop supply chain from both supply and demand , and applied the established margin profits sharing contract to achieve coordination under the disruptions. Findings- From both supply side and demand side, it drew how the disruptions affect the closed-loop supply chain. When the disruptions have less effect on the forward and reverse cost of closed-loop supply chain, the impact of the closed-loop supply chain is controllable; when the disruptions have lager effect on the forward and reverse cost of closed-loop supply chain, the impact of the closed-loop supply chain is uncontrollable. Research limitations/implications- In this paper, the contract costs are ignored for zero. While in actual situation, to maintain the efficient implementation of this contract must spend considerable cost. Sometimes the cost may be too high to become hinder between manufacturers and retailers. This paper also does not make in-depth study on this issue, so it will be further study in the future. Originality/value- This paper also designed a set of differential profit sharing contract based on revenue sharing contract mechanism. The contract is easy to be managed, easy to be operated, making the closed-loop supply chain system can achieve coordination whether in steady state or under disruptions.

Research on Pricing Strategy of the Closed-Loop Supply Chain in Heterogeneous Market

2012 ◽  
Vol 236-237 ◽  
pp. 321-325
Author(s):  
Hong Wei Jiang
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Closed Loop ◽  
Pricing Strategies ◽  
Supply Chain System ◽  
Closed Loop Supply Chain ◽  
Waste Products ◽  
Pricing Decisions ◽  
Product Pricing ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Optimum Production

This paper constructs a closed-loop supply chain system with the manufacturer recycling waste products from the retailer based on game theory in heterogeneous market in which the price of the new product is different from that of the remanufactured product. The optimal pricing decisions of the supply chain without remanufacturing and the closed-loop supply chain with remanufacturing are obtained. Through theoretical analysis and numerical simulation, we obtain the optimum production and pricing strategies, and analyze the impact of the consumers’ acceptance for the remanufactured product on product pricing, which provides a basis for the closed-loop supply chain’s production decisions.

scholarly journals Analysis of the impact of COVID-19 on the coupling of the material flow and capital flow in a closed-loop supply chain

2021 ◽  
Vol 16 (1) ◽  
pp. 5-22
Author(s):  
W. Duan ◽  
H. Ma ◽  
D.S. Xu
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Material Flow ◽  
Closed Loop ◽  
Capital Flow ◽  
Simulation Software ◽  
Dynamics Simulation ◽  
Supply Chain System ◽  
Closed Loop Supply Chain ◽  
Chain System ◽  
The Impact

The complex and changeable external social and economic environment has a significant impact on the sustainable development of the closed-loop supply chain. In particular, the occurrence of uncertain emergencies increases the risk of interruption of the closed-loop supply chain, making it insufficient to analyze its complex changes from the perspective of material flow alone. Based on this analysis, the paper constructs a closed-loop supply chain material flow and capital flow coupling system composed of manufacturers, sellers and recyclers to explore the impact of material flow sudden interruption on the closed-loop supply chain system when an uncertain emergency occurs. In this paper, based on the closed-loop supply chain system coupled with logistics and capital flow, a system dynamics simulation model was established by using Vensim simulation software to analyze the impact of COVID-19 epidemic on manufacturers, sellers and recyclers under five scenarios. The results show that when COVID-19 outbreaks occur, the material flow of each main enterprise in the closed-loop supply chain is more easily influenced than the capital flow. At the same time, it can be found that the recyclers in the main enterprises of the closed-loop supply chain are more easily influenced by the material flow. The model constructed in this paper has applicability and can be used for related studies of closed-loop supply chain under other emergencies, but the scene design should be carried out according to the characteristics of emergencies themselves.

scholarly journals Research on Closed-Loop Supply Chain Decision-Making in Different Cooperation Modes with Government’s Reward-Penalty Mechanism

2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (11) ◽  
pp. 6425
Author(s):  
Quanxi Li ◽  
Haowei Zhang ◽  
Kailing Liu
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Closed Loop ◽  
Stackelberg Game ◽  
Recycling Rate ◽  
Transfer Payment ◽  
Closed Loop Supply Chain ◽  
Asymmetry Of Information ◽  
Optimal Decisions ◽  
The Government ◽  
The Impact

In closed-loop supply chains (CLSC), manufacturers, retailers, and recyclers perform their duties. Due to the asymmetry of information among enterprises, it is difficult for them to maximize efficiency and profits. To maximize the efficiency and profit of the CLSC, this study establishes five cooperation models of CLSC under the government‘s reward–penalty mechanism. We make decisions on wholesale prices, retail prices, transfer payment prices, and recovery rates relying on the Stackelberg game method and compare the optimal decisions. This paper analyzes the impact of the government reward-penalty mechanism on optimal decisions and how members in CLSC choose partners. We find that the government’s reward-penalty mechanism can effectively increase the recycling rate of used products and the total profit of the closed-loop supply chain. According to the calculation results of the models, under the government’s reward-penalty mechanism, the cooperation can improve the CLSC’s used products recycling capacity and profitability. In a supply chain, the more members participate in the cooperation, the higher profit the CLSC obtain. However, the cooperation mode of all members may lead to monopoly, which is not approved by government and customers.

scholarly journals Game-Theoretic Analysis to Examine How Government Subsidy Policies Affect a Closed-Loop Supply Chain Decision

2019 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 145 ◽  
Author(s):  
Izabela Ewa Nielsen ◽  
Sani Majumder ◽  
Subrata Saha
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Product Quality ◽  
Closed Loop ◽  
Investment Efficiency ◽  
Government Subsidy ◽  
Closed Loop Supply Chain ◽  
Government Organizations ◽  
Game Theoretic Analysis ◽  
Game Theoretic ◽  
The Government

The pros and cons of government subsidy policies in a closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) setting on optimal pricing, investment decisions in improving product quality, and used product collection under social welfare (SW) optimization goal have not been examined comprehensively. This study compares the outcomes of three government policies under manufacturer-Stackelberg (MS) and retailer-Stackelberg (RS), namely (i) direct subsidy to the consumer, (ii) subsidy to the manufacturer to stimulate used product collection, and (iii) subsidy to the manufacturer to improve product quality. Results demonstrate that the greening level, used product collection, and SW are always higher under the RS game, but the rate of a subsidy granted by the government is always higher under the MS game. Profits for the CLSC members and SW are always higher if the government provides a subsidy directly to the consumer, but productivity of investment in the perspective of the manufacturer or government are less. In a second policy, the government organizations grant a subsidy to the manufacturer to stimulate used product collection, but it does not necessarily yield the desired outcome compared to others. In a third policy, the manufacturer receives a subsidy on a research and development (R&D) investment, but it yields a sub-optimal greening level. This study reveals that the outcomes of subsidy policies can bring benefit to consumers and add a degree of complication for CLSC members; government organizations need to inspect carefully among attributes, mainly product type, power of CLSC members, and investment efficiency for the manufacturer, before implementing any subsidy policies so that it can lead to an environmentally and economically viable outcome.

scholarly journals Research on Closed-Loop Supply Chain with Competing Retailers under Government Reward-Penalty Mechanism and Asymmetric Information

2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 ◽  
pp. 1-20 ◽  
Author(s):  
Xiao-qing Zhang ◽  
Xi-gang Yuan ◽  
Da-lin Zhang
Keyword(s):  
Supply Chain ◽  
Asymmetric Information ◽  
Recovery Rate ◽  
Carbon Emission ◽  
Closed Loop ◽  
Retail Price ◽  
Closed Loop Supply Chain ◽  
Weee Recycling ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Decentralized Model

In manufacturer-led closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) with two competing retailers, the retailer-1 recycles WEEE whose fixed recycling cost is asymmetric information. Using dynamics game theory and principal-agent theory, three dynamic game models are built including (1) benchmark model without reward-penalty mechanism (RPM); (2) decentralized model with carbon emission RPM; (3) decentralized model with carbon emission RPM and recovery rate RPM. This paper discusses the influence of RPM and retailers competition on the CLSC and members benefits. The results show that (1) the carbon emission RPM increases retail price, but decreases the WEEE recycling motivation usually. On the contrary, the recovery rate RPM guides WEEE recycling and lowers the retail price effectively. (2) In any case, the retailer-1’s profit is higher than that of the retailer-2; apparently it suggests that the retailer recycling WEEE gains competitive advantages. Furthermore, both the recovery rate RPM and retailers competition are beneficial to improve the competitive advantage. The relationship between two retailers’ retail price is affected by many complicated factors. (3) The WEEE buyback price and WEEE recovery rate with high fixed recycling cost (H-type) are always higher than that of low fixed recycling cost (L-type), respectively, which means that the H-type fixed recycling cost has scale advantages; the greater the reward-penalty intensity and the fiercer the competition, the more obvious the scale advantages under certain condition. (4) The retailers’ competition can not only guide WEEE recycling but also improve retailers’ profits. Meanwhile, the impact of competition on the manufacturer is related to RPM, but the fierce competition decreases the manufacturer’s profit.

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