scholarly journals Institutional Diversity of Transferring Land Development Rights in China—Cases from Zhejiang, Hubei, and Sichuan

2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (23) ◽  
pp. 13402
Author(s):  
Chen Shi ◽  
Zhou Zhang

With the continuous urbanization, China is facing a dilemma of achieving two conflicting targets in land governance, i.e., the continuous supply of urban construction land to support urbanization and the preservation of cultivated land for food security. Under China’s dual land system, the implementation of the “Linkage between Urban-land Taking and Rural-land Giving” (Linkage) policy is of great significance in promoting more inclusive urbanization by commodifying the land development right and connecting urban and rural land markets. In the specific land property right system and changing land governance of China, this policy appears to provide an opportunity for stakeholders other than the state to compete for the value from the transfer of development rights (TDR) and triggers the emergence of diversified approaches in organizing land projects in rural China. Based on the theoretical perspective of New Institutional Economics and empirical evidence from Zhejiang Province, Hubei Province, and Sichuan Province, this paper conducts a comparative institutional analysis for China’s TDR practice and argues that the diversified operational approaches in China’s practice have aligned various interests of the stakeholders through flexible participation methods and elaborate reallocation of land property rights, in order to fit various institutional environments and material conditions

Water ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (10) ◽  
pp. 2172
Author(s):  
Laura M. Inha ◽  
Tapio S. Katko ◽  
Riikka P. Rajala

Water services face global challenges, many of which are institutional by nature. While technical solutions may suit several situations, institutional frameworks are likely to vary more. On the basis of constructive research approach and new institutional economics we analyze and illustrate water services and the roles of various water sector actors in Finnish water utility setting using the “soccer analogy” by the Nobel Laureate D.C. North: Institutions are the “formal and informal rules of the game” while organizations are the “players”. Additionally, we assess the Finnish water governance system and discuss issues of scale and fragmentation and distinguish terms water provision and production. Finally, we elaborate the limitations of the soccer analogy to water services through ownership of the systems. According to the soccer analogy, inclusive institutional development requires skillful players (competent staff), team play (collaboration), proper coaching (education), supporters (citizens, media), managers (policymakers), and referees (authorities). We argue that institutional diversity and player/stakeholder collaboration are the foundation for enhancing good multi-level water governance, and that water management, although fragmented, should be seen as a connector of different sectors. For successful outcomes, scientific results should be communicated to public in more common language.


2006 ◽  
Vol 157 (3-4) ◽  
pp. 84-90 ◽  
Author(s):  
Achim Schlüter

This contribution looks at the problems of bringing small, private forests into the wood production chain from an institutional theoretical perspective. This would conclude that institutional changes are inevitable. In practice, however, structures in small private forests are characterised by considerable inertia. Various approaches in New Institutional Economics are investigated to determine whether they can provide an explanation for this inertia. Explanatory power can only be developed by employing a combination of different approaches. The current extension of this theory into ideological and trading resources is equally necessary to understand the institutional change in forest management.


Agriculture ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 11 (9) ◽  
pp. 881
Author(s):  
Da Fang ◽  
Yan Guo

This paper focuses on the impact of a new rural land reform, the Separation of Three Rights Reform, on changes in China’s agricultural production organizations. We illustrate the impact of market and nonmarket mechanisms on allocating agricultural production factors under the new rural land market transition through a land system and factor allocation model. Based on the expansion paths of different types of factors in the model, we classify the development of Chinese agricultural production entities into “extensional expansion,” “labor-intensive expansion,” “land-intensive expansion,” and “exit of agricultural production.” These agricultural production paths correspond to agricultural enterprises, family farms, agricultural cooperatives, and small farmers’ exit. Further, empirical and economic geography analysis results show that the interaction of market and nonmarket mechanisms is the main drive that induces the current diversified organizations in rural China. Thus, this paper provides a comprehensive explanation of changing patterns of an agricultural production organization under the transition of the rural land market.


2020 ◽  
Vol 97 ◽  
pp. 104803
Author(s):  
Lanjiao Wen ◽  
Lioudmila Chatalova ◽  
Van Butsic ◽  
Fox ZhiYong Hu ◽  
Anlu Zhang

2018 ◽  
Vol 18 (1) ◽  
pp. 100-121 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hassan Darabi ◽  
Danon Jalali

Transaction cost theory is largely used to investigate the formal domain of land and housing. In the informal domain, however, this perspective has been employed largely as a supplement in addressing the other fundamental notion in new institutional economics—property rights—despite the possibility that informality in land development can emerge regardless of the informality or formality of such rights. To cover this gap, this study developed a theoretical framework based on transaction cost theory to explain the formal–informal dichotomy in land development. The proposed framework maintains that land development depends on engaging in transactions that involve total or partial ownership of a combination of capital and land through lease and/or sale contracts, which enable landowners to earn from the new rental prices produced by the increase in land prices. Landowners are afforded two avenues from which to reduce transaction costs, namely, formal and informal institutional frameworks, each defining and enforcing restrictive rules on agents’ actions. These avenues, however, are simultaneously a source of new transaction costs that can affect the expected financial return of land development. Landowners therefore tend to choose the institutional framework that entails lower transaction costs but enables higher gains. Thus, the higher transaction costs associated with a formal institutional framework are the primary deterrents to the selection of this structure. In turn, informal land development continues to expand, regardless of the existence of formal prohibitive measures. We investigated the formal–informal dichotomy in the rural land development process in Tehran Province, Iran. The results indicated that transaction costs cause inefficiency in formal institutions, thereby driving the perpetuation of informal development.


2010 ◽  
pp. 110-122 ◽  
Author(s):  
S. Avdasheva ◽  
N. Dzagurova

The article examines the interpretation of vertical restraints in Chicago, post-Chicago and New Institutional Economics approaches, as well as the reflection of these approaches in the application of antitrust laws. The main difference between neoclassical and new institutional analysis of vertical restraints is that the former compares the results of their use with market organization outcomes, and assesses mainly horizontal effects, while the latter focuses on the analysis of vertical effects, comparing the results of vertical restraints application with hierarchical organization. Accordingly, the evaluation of vertical restraints impact on competition differs radically. The approach of the New Institutional Theory of the firm seems fruitful for Russian markets.


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