scholarly journals It is Not Enough to Assess Conflicts of Interest When We Bring the Commercial Sector to the Policy Table; Comment on "Towards Preventing and Managing Conflict of Interest in Nutrition Policy? An Analysis of Submissions to a Consultation on a Draft WHO Tool"

Author(s):  
Elisa Chilet-Rosell ◽  
Ildefonso Hernández-Aguadozz

Ralston et al. offer us an interesting analysis of the consultation process of World Health Organization’s "Draft approach on the prevention and management of conflicts of interests in the policy development and implementation of nutrition programs at country level", in which it shows us how the industry tries to frame the discussion in individual conflicts of interest, avoiding structural conflicts of interest. We must not forget other issues of importance in policy-making, such as the imbalance of power between different actors and the strategies of undue influence used by food and beverage corporations. It is essential to develop regulatory-based tools and procedures that embody ethics and good governance and that can be applied systematically and routinely to prevent corporate influence in health policy making. A global observatory of corporate practices would also be needed to recommend to governments efficient actions to avoid corporate capture of their policies.

Author(s):  
June YY Leung ◽  
Sally Casswell

Background The World Health Organization (WHO) has engaged in consultations with the alcohol industry in global alcohol policy development, including currently a draft action plan to strengthen implementation of the Global strategy to reduce the harmful use of alcohol. WHO’s Framework for Engagement with Non-State Actors (FENSA) is an organization-wide policy that aims to manage potential conflicts of interest in WHO’s interactions with private sector entities, non-governmental institutions, philanthropic foundations and academic institutions. Methods We analysed the alignment of WHO’s consultative processes with non-state actors on "the way forward" for alcohol policy and a global alcohol action plan with FENSA. We referred to publicly accessible WHO documents, including the Alcohol, Drugs and Addictive Behaviours Unit website, records of relevant meetings, and other documents relevant to FENSA. We documented submissions to two web-based consultations held in 2019 and 2020 by type of organization and links to the alcohol industry. Results WHO’s processes to conduct due diligence, risk assessment and risk management as required by FENSA appeared to be inadequate. Limited information was published on nonstate actors, primarily the alcohol industry, that participated in the consultations, including their potential conflicts of interest. No minutes were published for WHO’s virtual meeting with the alcohol industry, suggesting a lack of transparency. Organizations with known links to the tobacco industry participated in both web-based consultations, despite FENSA’s principle of non-engagement with tobacco industry actors. Conclusion WHO’s consultative processes have not been adequate to address conflicts of interest in relation to the alcohol industry, violating the principles of FENSA. Member states must ensure that WHO has the resources to implement and is held accountable for appropriate and consistent safeguards against industry interference in the development of global alcohol policy.


Author(s):  
Ronald Labonté

With public health attention on the commercial determinants of health showing little sign of abatement, how to manage conflicts of interest (COI) in regulatory policy discussions with corporate actors responsible for these determinants is gaining critical traction. The contribution by Ralston et al explores how COI management has itself become a terrain of contestation in their analysis of submissions on a draft World Health Organization (WHO) tool to manage COI conflicts in development of nutrition policy. The authors identify two camps in conflict with one another: a corporate side emphasizing their individual good intents and contributions, and an non-governmental organization (NGO) side maintaining inherent structural conflicts that require careful proscribing. The study concludes that the draft tool does a reasonable job in ensuring COI are avoided and policy development sheltered from corporate self-interests, introducing novel improvements in global governance for health. At the same time, the tool appears to adhere to a belief that private economic (corporate) and public good (citizen) conflicts can indeed be managed. I question this assumption and posit that public health needs to be much bolder in its critique of the nature of power, influence, and self-interests that pervade and risk dominating our stakeholder models of global governance.


2021 ◽  
Vol 21 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Atefeh Esfandiari ◽  
Vahid Yazdi-Feyzabadi ◽  
Leila Zarei ◽  
Arash Rashidian ◽  
Hedayat Salari

Abstract Background Policymaking in the pharmaceutical sector plays a pivotal role in achieving the health systems’ goals. Transparency in the pharmaceutical policy could increase confidence in decision-making processes. This study aims to assess transparency in the public pharmaceutical sector of Iran. Methods This qualitative study with a content analysis approach was conducted in 2017 using the World Health Organization tool to explore pharmaceutical transparency. The perceptions of the various stakeholders of the health system through semi-structured interviews with a maximum variation of stakeholders were obtained in eight functions, including registration, licensing, inspection, promotion, clinical trials, selection, procurement, and distribution of medicines. Results There are some problems in two main categories: (1) General problems, including lack of transparency, conflict of interest, centralization, and monopoly. (2) Ethical problems include illegal payments, gifts, bribes, conflicts of interest, hidden power, hoarding, relationship-oriented behavior, medicine trafficking, and counterfeit medicine. Suggested solutions include evidence-based decision-making, the use of transparent and accountable processes, standardization, needs assessment, declaring a conflict of interest, skilled human resources, and tracking prescription. Conclusion Despite the development of effective pharmaceutical policy in the health care system and government interventions for the control of the market, in some functions, reviewing the pharmaceutical policy is essential. Additionally, declaring a conflict of interest statement must be at the core of policy development to provide greater transparency.


2021 ◽  
pp. tobaccocontrol-2020-056084
Author(s):  
Theresa Ikegwuonu ◽  
Shona Hilton ◽  
Katherine E. Smith ◽  
Christina H. Buckton ◽  
Mark Wong ◽  
...  

IntroductionThere is growing concern about transnational tobacco corporations’ (TTCs) and other commercial actors’ involvement in e-cigarette policy development. Previous analyses suggest that TTCs used e-cigarette debates to demonstrate alignment with public health and re-gain policy influence. Less is known about the engagement of other types of commercial actors in e-cigarette policy debates.MethodsThis paper is the first to empirically analyse commercial actors’ engagement in an e-cigarette policy consultation process and to examine their views on proposed regulation. It applies mixed methods, drawing on policy consultation submissions (n=32), semi-structured interviews (n=9) and a social network analysis of website links among 32 commercial actors.ResultsThe results show that commercial actors’ positions on e-cigarette regulation aligned with business interests. TTCs, independent e-cigarette manufacturers and other non-licensed commercial actors were opposed to most aspects of potential e-cigarette regulation (except for age of sale restrictions), whereas licensed commercial actors, including pharmaceutical companies, supported more stringent regulation. While collaboration was viewed as strategically important to gain policy influence, distinct commercial interests and concerns about TTC credibility led to strategic distancing and to collaboration being largely confined to sector boundaries. In addition to reiterating arguments employed by TTCs in previous regulatory debates, commercial actors focused on highlighting the technical complexity and harm reduction potential of e-cigarettes.ConclusionAwareness of the various commercial interests and strategic positioning of commercial actors in e-cigarette policy should inform public health advocacy and policy development, including managing conflicts of interest in the context of Framework Convention on Tobacco Control Article 5.3.


Author(s):  
Marc A. Rodwin

This commentary situates the comments submitted in response to the World Health Organization (WHO) draft guidance on conflicts of interest in national nutrition programs in light of: (1) WHO policies to protect WHO integrity; (2) the Framework of Engagement with Non-State Actors (FENSA); (3) WHO’s attempt to seek funds due to cuts in member contributions; and (4) attempts—often by corporate entities—to redefine conflicts of interest to avoid oversight of conflicts of interest and increase corporate influence. The WHO guidance defines conflicts of interest in ways that deviate from standard legal usage which confuses its analysis and facilitates the creation of conflicted public-private partnerships. The guidance suggests that nations can allow engagement with non-state actors when the benefits are greater than risks without separate check due to conflicts of interest. Instead, the WHO should have recommended that nations seek alternative ways to achieve their goals when non-state actors have significant institutional conflicts of interest.


Author(s):  
Gary Jonas Fooks ◽  
Charlotte Godziewski

The World Health Organization’s (WHO’s) draft Decision-Making Process and Tool to assist governments in preventing and managing conflicts of interest in nutrition policy marks a step-change in WHO thinking on large corporations and nutrition policy. If followed closely it stands to revolutionise business-government relations in nutrition policy. Ralston and colleagues outline how the food and beverage industry have argued against the decision-making tool. This commentary expands on their study by setting industry framing within a broader analysis of corporate power and explores the challenges in managing industry influence in nutrition policy. The commentary examines how the food and beverage industry’s collaboration and partnership agenda seeks to shape how policy problems and solutions are interpreted and acted on and explores how this agenda and their efforts to define conflicts of interest effectively represent non-policy programmes. More generally, we point to the difficulties that member states will face in adopting the tool and highlight the importance of considering the central role of transnational food and beverage companies in contemporary economies to managing their influence in nutrition policy.


2016 ◽  
Vol 1 ◽  
pp. 24-35
Author(s):  
Saefudin A Safi'i

The downfall of the New Order Regime in 1998 brought about significant change to Indonesia’s public sector.  Law number 22 of 1999, further refined by Law 32 of 2004, provide legal bases for district governments to administer the public sector. The central government also introduces the notion of good governance through the promulgation of various regulations. For Madrasah however, decentralization policy failed to provide clear legal bases as to how it relates to district government. Law 32 of 2004 verse 10 article 3 retains the centralized management by the Ministry of Religious Affairs. This however does not exclude Madrasah from public demand of implementing the principle of good governance. This study analyses the dynamics of principal-ship both in the Sekolah and the Madrasah in the era of decentralization. By comparing two research sites, this study sought to create better understanding about the context by which the organization climate of two different schools are shaped, and how principals and teachers perceives the notion of school leadership in the light of most recent policy development. To do this, interviews were undertaken and questionnaire-based data collection was also conducted. The study found that in the ground level implementation of decentralization policy, Sekolah developed more rigorous leadership compared to that in the Madrasah. This research recommends the adoption of stronger regulation regarding principal-ship of Madrasahs in order to create an environment that is more in tune with the spirit of public service reforms.


Author(s):  
Katherine Severi

Ralston et al present an analysis of policy actor responses to a draft World Health Organization (WHO) tool to prevent and manage conflicts of interest (COI) in nutrition policy. While the Ralston et al study is focussed explicitly on food and nutrition, the issues and concepts addressed are relevant also to alcohol policy debates and present an important opportunity for shared learning across unhealthy commodity industries in order to protect and improve population health. This commentary addresses the importance of understanding how alcohol policy actors – especially decision-makers – perceive COI in relation to alcohol industry engagement in policy. A better understanding of such perceptions may help to inform the development of guidelines to identify, manage and protect against risks associated with COI in alcohol policy.


Author(s):  
Rodrigo Elías Zambrano ◽  
Gloria Jiménez-Marín ◽  
Araceli Galiano-Coronil ◽  
Rafael Ravina-Ripoll

The growing number of children who are obese or overweight in certain countries or geographical areas is a fact, as evidenced by the continuous studies and reports on the subject, endorsed or carried out by the World Health Organisation and independent research. In this context, food and beverage advertising can contribute to this. The main objective of this research is to evaluate compliance with the Food and Drink Advertising Code for Children (PAOS Code) in Spain and its relationship with nutritional habits on television, specifically on channels aimed at children. The methodology is therefore mixed: on the one hand, a qualitative technique based on discourse analysis and, on the other, a quantitative technique based on the content analysis of the advertising broadcast for seven consecutive days on three specialised channels and two generalist channels on Spanish television. The results reveal a systematic noncompliance with this code, which translates into inadequate eating habits among children. The immediate conclusion is that 9 out of 10 parts of food and drink advertising do not comply with any of the rules of the PAOS Code and that self-regulation by the advertising companies is negligible and insufficient.


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