scholarly journals Soviet economic assistance to China in the 1950s

Author(s):  
Andrey M. Belov ◽  
Dmitriy A. Bulyukin ◽  
Lee Tong

The Soviet-Chinese relations in the 1950s are considered in the article through the prism of the Soviet Union's economic help to China. The review of sources and historical literature devoted to the studied problem is provided, positions of both Russian and Chinese historians are estimated, concrete contracts and agreements between two countries are analysed. The authors come to a conclusion that what was the cornerstone of the Soviet economic help to China in the 1950s, in many respects meant the ideological reasons: what was the base of ideology of the leading parties of both countries, was Marxism-Leninism. What was a basis of the help to People's Republic of China from the Soviet Union became the aspiration to create the industry which would be modern at that time and would promote formation of the Chinese working class as the main ally of working class of the Soviet Union.

2020 ◽  
Vol 4 (4) ◽  
pp. 67-74
Author(s):  
N.R. Novoseltsev ◽  
◽  
A.V. Surzhko ◽  

The article examines the main aspects of cooperation between the USSR and the PRC in the field of physical culture and sports in the «golden age» of Soviet-Chinese relations in the 1950s. Sport has become one of the factors that contributed to active bilateral cooperation between the two countries. The Soviet Union, as an “elder brother”, provided the young People’s Republic of China with comprehensive assistance in the development of national physical culture and sports, shared experience, and also sent and received numerous sports delegations. The beginning of the Soviet-Chinese split for a long time suspended cooperation between the two countries, including in the sports field, which was resumed only in the 1980s.


2011 ◽  
Vol 46 (5) ◽  
pp. 1345-1369 ◽  
Author(s):  
MICHAEL SCHOENHALS

AbstractThis paper is concerned with the operational activities of the public security organs of the People's Republic of China during the immediate post-1949 period of regime consolidation. The main part of the paper is a case-study of a 1950 pilot scheme to recruit agents in critical sectors of industry and trade in the city of Yingkou in Northeast China, a scheme in due course subsumed under a nationwide programme with a similar focus. In the years to follow, the operational recruitment of agents would become one of China's arguably most important operational responses to the twin Cold War threats of economic espionage and—above all—sabotage. This paper's findings suggest, with respect to operational activities, that in order to represent and explain more fully, in Leopold von Ranke's words, ‘how things really were’, social and political historians may well want to shift their focus away from successive highly public Maoist ‘mass movements’ and look instead to what transpired out of the public eye in the interregnum of ordinary times that such movements punctuated. If and when they do, they will discover significant yet hitherto largely unexplored similarities between the work of the early People's Republic of China public security organs and their counterparts in the Soviet Union and other (former) socialist states.


Author(s):  
YAN MEI

It is argued that Soviet policy toward the People's Republic of China since 1960 has been reactive to Chinese initiatives. Both Chinese and Soviet policies are analyzed in the context of the maturation of the Sino-Soviet relationship. The U.S.-Soviet relationship is seen to be the principal axis of conflict within this triangle. China and the Soviet Union now exhibit an increasing realism and tolerance toward each other, with an attempt to minimize their ideological differences and former suspicions. Both countries are committed to normalizing the relationship.


Author(s):  
Richard A. Moss

The Sino-Soviet conflict, which first surfaced in the late 1950s and degenerated into armed border clashes in 1969, proved to be the main catalyst for Sino-American rapprochement. The China question almost immediately entered into the dialogue of the Kissinger-Dobrynin channel. Publicly, the Nixon administration said it would pursue relationships with both the Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of China. Privately, Nixon and Kissinger hoped to play the Soviets and the Chinese off each other—the concept of triangular diplomacy. Triangular diplomacy had less to do with the concrete and crude move of playing the powers off each other than it did with trying to influence the perceptions and emotions of Communist leaders. The documentary record suggests that it was only after Sino-American rapprochement had been set in motion in April-May 1971, with the Chinese Ping Pong diplomacy and the secret traffic through the Pakistani channel, that U.S. policymakers began to talk of playing the Communist powers off one another for American advantage.


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