Governance in an International Institution -
The World Bank and its Reorganisations
The governance of an institution is normally partly ensured by other institutions, which depend on yet other institutions for their governance. But who ultimately guards the guardians? For the liberal electoral democracies of Europe and America the answer that evolved from the political thought of the eighteenth century and the limited liability joint stock company of the nineteenth was, crudely put, checks and balances and voters, who could be the electorate or shareholders. Its limitation is that it presupposes a state and the right of the voters to vote in their own interest. How, then, can good governance be ensured for international organisations, especially the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, in which the representatives of the developed countries hold the majority of the votes on the Boards and are expected to cast them, not in their own immediate interests, but in the long term interest of the developing countries that borrow from these institutions?