scholarly journals THE IMPACT OF EGYPT'S ACCESSION TO THE CONVENTION ON THE PHYSICAL PROTECTION OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL FOR THE NUCLEAR LEGISLATIVE INFRASTRUCTURE

2021 ◽  
pp. 155-163
Author(s):  
Osama, M. Atout

The topic of the article relates to the legal framework for nuclear material security represented in the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, which provides for certain levels of physical protection during the international transfer of nuclear materials, and sets a general framework for cooperation between states in the field of protection, recovery, and return of stolen nuclear materials, in addition to that it aims to prevent and detect Addressing criminal and other unauthorized acts directed against nuclear or other radioactive materials and related facilities and activities and urges states parties to track them down and adopt a system for extradition or prosecution of criminals. This article aims to highlight the importance of the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material in completing the legislative infrastructure of countries wishing to acquire a nuclear program, as it is one of the important legal tributaries to avoid the dangers resulting from the illicit trade in nuclear materials, their seizure, and their illegal use, sabotage or sabotage of nuclear facilities, Eliminate the threats posed by international terrorism and organized crime. The article also aims to shed light on the legal problems that hinder the achievement of the desired goals of the nuclear programs if the codes of conduct regarding the safety and security of radioactive sources are not followed, and that stem from the material protection Convention, and the case of illegal possession or use of radioactive material or a radioactive nuclear device, or assault Nuclear facilities and their harm. The article reviewed the need to complete the legal infrastructure necessary for the Egyptian nuclear program through Egypt's accession to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, so that through this, an integrated legal environment of services and support is available to ensure the preparation of the nuclear program to the fullest extent, raise its growth rates, and increase its efficiency, which leads To increase the chances of its success and its sustainability, by imposing prior protection on the prohibited activities, thus contributing to their elimination. The article presented the infrastructure of the Egyptian nuclear legislation, in particular the law on regulating nuclear and radiological activities and its implementing regulations, and the Egyptian system for accounting and control of nuclear materials to demonstrate the adequacy of these legislations to fully protect nuclear materials, and whether they cover important aspects related to supporting nuclear non-proliferation and combating terrorism. Strengthening the physical protection of nuclear materials and nuclear facilities for peaceful purposes. The conclusion of the article that Egypt's accession to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material will strengthen the infrastructure for nuclear legislation, and then strengthen and maintain the security of the Egyptian nuclear program, in addition to strengthening international cooperation in developing effective measures that guarantee the physical protection of nuclear materials. And nuclear facilities, without prejudice to national sovereignty or prejudice to the nuclear technology necessary for a peaceful nuclear program.

Nuclear Law ◽  
2022 ◽  
pp. 161-171
Author(s):  
Bonnie Denise Jenkins

AbstractThe forthcoming arrival of small modular reactors and other advanced nuclear reactor technologies can be an immensely beneficial development in the world’s collective pursuit of energy security and meeting climate change objectives. The key question is whether or not these new reactor technologies significantly alter the fundamental premises underlying the existing nuclear security legal regime. The Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and its Amendment (A/CPPNM) are the only legally binding international instruments governing the physical protection of nuclear materials and nuclear facilities. Together the A/CPPNM and the international guidance on nuclear security comprise the current legal framework for nuclear security. This chapter examines whether the A/CPPNM adequately covers advanced reactor technologies; and whether the States that are interested in acquiring these new reactor technologies have the capacity to effectively implement the associated legal requirements, regulatory standards, and international guidance that comes along with such technologies. The analysis touches upon the role of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the IAEA Nuclear Security Guidance, and issues of cybersecurity.


2021 ◽  
Vol 8 (3A) ◽  
Author(s):  
Ricardo Bastos Smith ◽  
Tereza Cristina Salvetti ◽  
Ana Paula Gimenes Tessaro ◽  
Júlio Takehiro Marumo ◽  
Roberto Vicente

In the second half of the twentieth century in Brazil, several nuclear facilities were built for the most varied objectives. The largest number of such facilities is at the Nuclear and Energy Research Institute in São Paulo (IPEN-CNEN/SP). For different reasons, some of these facilities had their projects finalized and were deactivated. Some of the equipment was then dismantled, but the respective nuclear and radioactive material remained isolated in the original sites awaiting the proper decommissioning procedures. The Celeste Project is an example of a facility where the nuclear material has been kept, and is subject to Argentine-Brazilian Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC) periodic inspections. Because of a number of interests, including financial and/or budgeting situations at the institutions, decades have passed without any further action, and the people who withold information and knowledge about these facilities have already moved away from the area or are in the process of. Therefore, because of the absence of knowledge management techniques in force at the time of establishing and operating these installations, this work proposes an analysis about the possible consequences in case of loss of perhaps the only one remaining knowledge, the one from the people who designed those departments and worked there.


Author(s):  
Huan Lin ◽  
Tai-Wei Lan ◽  
Min-Tsang Chang ◽  
Wuu-Kune Cheng

The “Nuclear Materials and Radioactive Waste Management Act” (NMRWMA) in Taiwan has been in use since 2002. To promote further administrative efficiency and improve regulatory capacity, an amendment of the act has been initiated by the Atomic Energy Council (AEC). It is now being reviewed by outside experts and related communities so as to include the best understanding of risk management factors. For the future decommissioning challenges of nuclear facilities, the act is also being amended to comply with the regulatory requirements of the decommissioning mandates. Currently the Taiwan government is conducting government reorganization, and AEC will be reformed but will remain as an independent regulatory body. AEC will then be capable of improving the regulatory capacity for facilitating licensing and inspection, ensuring operational safety, environmental protection and public involvement, and giving a more flexible administrative discretion, such as expending the margin of penalty. The amendment is also required to provide a formal legal basis for the Nuclear Backend Fund, and to mandate the waste producers to take responsibility for any final debt repayment. In addition, this amendment promotes measures to prevent accidents or emergencies concerning radioactive materials and facilities and procedures to reduce the impact and effect of any unexpected events. Furthermore, this amendment intends to implement the concept of information transparency and public participation so as to meet the public needs. Finally, radioactive waste final disposal tasks have to be completed by waste producers under the supervision of the AEC.


Author(s):  
Matthew R. Feldman

Based on a recommendation from the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board, the Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Nuclear Safety Policy and Assistance (HS-21) has recently issued DOE Manual 441.1-1 entitled Nuclear Material Packaging Manual. This manual provides guidance regarding the use of non-engineered storage media for all special nuclear material throughout the DOE complex. As part of this development effort, HS-21 has funded the Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) Transportation Technologies Group (TTG) to develop and demonstrate testing protocols for such onsite containers. ORNL TTG to date has performed preliminary tests of representative onsite containers from Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory and Los Alamos National Laboratory. This paper will describe the testing processes that have been developed.


Author(s):  
Jurgita Paužaitė-Kulvinskienė ◽  
Agnė Andrijauskaitė

This chapter discusses the impact of the pan-European general principles of good administration in Lithuania. It shows that there is a general openness to incorporating these principles into the Lithuanian legal system, albeit not without limitations. This can be attributed to three major factors—legitimacy, a favourable legal framework and agency given to these principles by the domestic actors. Especially, administrative courts seem to be progressively facilitating their application. Yet, while in certain domains the said principles have permeated the Lithuanian legal system to a remarkable extent, in others their use seems to be somewhat underutilized, be it because of domestic regulatory sufficiency, EU influence or unwillingness to make use of these principles by adopting ‘softer’ legal instruments such as codes of conduct or administrative self-commitments.


2021 ◽  
Vol 5 (4(61)) ◽  
pp. 25-34
Author(s):  
Osama Mostafa Atout

The object of research is applying the requirements of nuclear safeguards to the processing and mining facilities through which the Nuclear Materials Authority (NMA). One of the most problematic places is the NMA carries out its related nuclear activities as the body responsible for managing and operating those facilities, which must have a prominent role in imposing physical protection on these materials to protect them. During use, storage, or internal transportation, NMA should take all security and legal measures and precautions to prevent Nuclear materials from any seizure and its recovery in the event of any seizure. In the course of the research it is shown that the implementation of these requirements requires obtaining the necessary license to practice these activities, and that these activities are subject to the control of the Nuclear and Radiation Control Authority, by establishing a system for the safety and security of this nuclear equipment and materials. So that the system covers all equipment, tools, tasks, supplies, equipment, and materials present in any of the Authority’s projects and sectors Scientific. As a result of the research we have reached the importance of applying nuclear safeguards to nuclear facilities in completing the nuclear infrastructure in Egypt and completing the construction of the Egyptian peaceful nuclear program considering international standards issued by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). In the future, the proposed approach is In the future, the proposed approach is to establish a general framework for the application of nuclear safeguards procedures to the processing and mining facilities of the NMA. These safeguards are applied as a basis for completing the nuclear legislative infrastructure, the safety of Nuclear Facilities and fulfilling the requirements of IAEA. This is done by establishing a specialized unit that includes many engineers, geologists and chemists to collect all engineering and technological data, information, designs, and drawings for all nuclear and radiological facilities, activities, and practices existing at the authority under the safety standards written about equipment, tools, devices, supplies, and tasks.


2021 ◽  
Vol 1 (2) ◽  
pp. 1-18
Author(s):  
Swini Adikari

Nuclear theft from malicious insiders is a significant threat to Pakistan’s nuclear weapons arsenal. Pakistan is a member of the Convention of the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM), which is an international agreement that adheres to the protection of nuclear materials and the recovery of stolen nuclear materials. However, this agreement does not specifically take into account the risk of security breaches arising from malicious insiders due to Pakistan’s rapidly growing nuclear arsenal. The purpose of this paper is to examine the heightened risk of insider threats in conjunction with Pakistan’s increasing nuclear force structure. The first section of the paper examines the history of the development of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons programme and discusses Pakistan’s current nuclear force structure. The second section examines the international and domestic policies that Pakistan follows to address the issue of insider threats to Pakistan’s nuclear facilities. The final section proposes two policy alternatives to address Pakistan’s growing insider threat risks and outlines how the Design Basis Threat assessment is the most effective solution for Pakistan’s growing insider threat.


Author(s):  
Shin-etsu Sugawara ◽  
Tomoaki Inamura ◽  
Haruki Madarame

After the September 11th terrorist attacks, the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material was revised, and many countries have enhanced their regulatory regimes about the management of sensitive information, especially in the physical protection system. Japan also amended the Nuclear Reactor Regulation Law in 2005 in step with this global movement. The major areas of this revision which are associated with sensitive information are as follows: formulation of the Design Basis Threat (DBT), introduction of inspection system of physical protection and obligation of confidentiality of the secret of physical protection. Through this amendment, the responsibilities of the national government and the utilities have been clarified. However, there is no prescription which ordains the role and responsibility of the local governments. In fact, the local governments receive various information from the utilities through the “Safety Agreements” which are concluded between the local governments and the utilities, and the Public Safety Commissions of prefectures are involved in the transportation of nuclear materials. Moreover, the Act on Special Measures concerning Nuclear Emergency Preparedness provides the engagement and the responsibility of the local governments in case of nuclear disaster. In addition, the Civil Protection Law also provides the formulation of local governments’ plans for a response to national emergencies including nuclear disaster which is caused by terrorist attacks. As described above, the local governments are in a position where they can or have to touch the sensitive information in a variety of ways. Originally, the local government employees have obligation of confidentiality by the Local Public Service Act. Thus, about the sensitive information, they have duty to keep secret. However, we are hard to say that there are complete systems to check this obligation, so we can point out that its effectiveness is doubtful. Especially, the sensitive information which is related to nuclear materials is vital for security of the nation as a whole. Under such awareness, we’re studying the change of the local governments’ way of the management of sensitive information accompanied by the strengthening of Japanese nuclear regulation, and the actual condition of it. Now, we interview some local governments’ departments in charge where nuclear facilities are located. In this paper, we discuss the actual condition and the problems around the local governments’ management of the sensitive information.


2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Janet Mary Chapman ◽  
Sondra Elise Spence ◽  
Gregory A. Baum ◽  
Frances Esquibel ◽  
Sondra Elise Spence

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