Countering the Threat of Nuclear Terrorism Arising from Malicious Insiders

2021 ◽  
Vol 1 (2) ◽  
pp. 1-18
Author(s):  
Swini Adikari

Nuclear theft from malicious insiders is a significant threat to Pakistan’s nuclear weapons arsenal. Pakistan is a member of the Convention of the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM), which is an international agreement that adheres to the protection of nuclear materials and the recovery of stolen nuclear materials. However, this agreement does not specifically take into account the risk of security breaches arising from malicious insiders due to Pakistan’s rapidly growing nuclear arsenal. The purpose of this paper is to examine the heightened risk of insider threats in conjunction with Pakistan’s increasing nuclear force structure. The first section of the paper examines the history of the development of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons programme and discusses Pakistan’s current nuclear force structure. The second section examines the international and domestic policies that Pakistan follows to address the issue of insider threats to Pakistan’s nuclear facilities. The final section proposes two policy alternatives to address Pakistan’s growing insider threat risks and outlines how the Design Basis Threat assessment is the most effective solution for Pakistan’s growing insider threat.

Author(s):  
Deanna D. Caputo

Violence threat and insider threat assessment rely on successfully identifying, interpreting, and responding to concerning or malicious behaviors before egregious harm is done. Both types of threats benefit from multidisciplinary teams of experts skillfully putting together data points before physical, emotional, financial, reputational, or informational harm occurs. Usually the identified character (e.g., decision-making, interpersonal style, work style), stressors, and concerning behaviors demonstrated do not clearly indicate whether a person will assault coworkers, steal classified/proprietary information, sabotage systems, or proceed normally as a responsible employee. Empirically based risk factors and threat indicators provide opportunities to evaluate potential threats more appropriately earlier in the assessment process. This chapter is an overview of insider threat definitions and programs, what it takes to become an insider threat, and how research psychologists bring rigorous science to insider threat detection, providing a solid understanding of what is known and not known about nonviolent insider threats.


2021 ◽  
Vol 8 (3A) ◽  
Author(s):  
Ricardo Bastos Smith ◽  
Tereza Cristina Salvetti ◽  
Ana Paula Gimenes Tessaro ◽  
Júlio Takehiro Marumo ◽  
Roberto Vicente

In the second half of the twentieth century in Brazil, several nuclear facilities were built for the most varied objectives. The largest number of such facilities is at the Nuclear and Energy Research Institute in São Paulo (IPEN-CNEN/SP). For different reasons, some of these facilities had their projects finalized and were deactivated. Some of the equipment was then dismantled, but the respective nuclear and radioactive material remained isolated in the original sites awaiting the proper decommissioning procedures. The Celeste Project is an example of a facility where the nuclear material has been kept, and is subject to Argentine-Brazilian Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC) periodic inspections. Because of a number of interests, including financial and/or budgeting situations at the institutions, decades have passed without any further action, and the people who withold information and knowledge about these facilities have already moved away from the area or are in the process of. Therefore, because of the absence of knowledge management techniques in force at the time of establishing and operating these installations, this work proposes an analysis about the possible consequences in case of loss of perhaps the only one remaining knowledge, the one from the people who designed those departments and worked there.


2021 ◽  
pp. 155-163
Author(s):  
Osama, M. Atout

The topic of the article relates to the legal framework for nuclear material security represented in the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, which provides for certain levels of physical protection during the international transfer of nuclear materials, and sets a general framework for cooperation between states in the field of protection, recovery, and return of stolen nuclear materials, in addition to that it aims to prevent and detect Addressing criminal and other unauthorized acts directed against nuclear or other radioactive materials and related facilities and activities and urges states parties to track them down and adopt a system for extradition or prosecution of criminals. This article aims to highlight the importance of the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material in completing the legislative infrastructure of countries wishing to acquire a nuclear program, as it is one of the important legal tributaries to avoid the dangers resulting from the illicit trade in nuclear materials, their seizure, and their illegal use, sabotage or sabotage of nuclear facilities, Eliminate the threats posed by international terrorism and organized crime. The article also aims to shed light on the legal problems that hinder the achievement of the desired goals of the nuclear programs if the codes of conduct regarding the safety and security of radioactive sources are not followed, and that stem from the material protection Convention, and the case of illegal possession or use of radioactive material or a radioactive nuclear device, or assault Nuclear facilities and their harm. The article reviewed the need to complete the legal infrastructure necessary for the Egyptian nuclear program through Egypt's accession to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, so that through this, an integrated legal environment of services and support is available to ensure the preparation of the nuclear program to the fullest extent, raise its growth rates, and increase its efficiency, which leads To increase the chances of its success and its sustainability, by imposing prior protection on the prohibited activities, thus contributing to their elimination. The article presented the infrastructure of the Egyptian nuclear legislation, in particular the law on regulating nuclear and radiological activities and its implementing regulations, and the Egyptian system for accounting and control of nuclear materials to demonstrate the adequacy of these legislations to fully protect nuclear materials, and whether they cover important aspects related to supporting nuclear non-proliferation and combating terrorism. Strengthening the physical protection of nuclear materials and nuclear facilities for peaceful purposes. The conclusion of the article that Egypt's accession to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material will strengthen the infrastructure for nuclear legislation, and then strengthen and maintain the security of the Egyptian nuclear program, in addition to strengthening international cooperation in developing effective measures that guarantee the physical protection of nuclear materials. And nuclear facilities, without prejudice to national sovereignty or prejudice to the nuclear technology necessary for a peaceful nuclear program.


Química Nova ◽  
2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Carina Lisbôa ◽  
Olívio Oliveira Júnior ◽  
Delvonei Andrade

ANALYSIS OF ENVIRONMENTAL SAMPLES FOR NUCLEAR SAFEGUARDS PURPOSES IN BRAZIL. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is responsible for preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons by detecting early the misuse of nuclear material or technology, and by certifying that States are honouring their safeguards obligations.The analysis of environmental samples taken by IAEA inspectors during inspections is a powerful tool for nuclear safeguards. This tool was implemented in 1996, after a successful application in Iraq, when a clandestine nuclear weapons program was discovered. The science involved in this type of analysis depends on highly sensitive and selective analytical measurements for detecting traces of nuclear materials collected in the nuclear facility’s “environment”. The purposes of this article are to draw attention to the relevance of this subject in order to address a significant global problem and to present what have been developed in Brazil. Through compatible results with certified standards and IAEA requirements, Brazil has already demonstrated the potential of measuring the amount and isotopic composition of uranium and plutonium at the levels expected in typical environmental samples. Finally, this work suggests the necessary measurements to implement a reliable and consistent environmental samples program for nuclear safeguards in Brazil.


2019 ◽  
Vol 14 ◽  
pp. 3065-3072
Author(s):  
Dr. Rajkumar Singh ◽  
Hemlata Kumari

India, after its first nuclear explosion in 1974 moved to modernize and moderate nuclear policy as security environment in the region deteriorated further due to China, pursuing a strategy of containing India by using Pakistan as a surrogate, had supplied technology nuclear materials andwarhead designs for the Pakistani bomb. Clearly with Chinese help Pakistani detonated six nuclear devices as follow up of India’s repeat detonation in the second week of May 1998. This development  changed the security environment in South Asia forever and this time India convinced the international community that it would not become a destabilising nuclear force in the international system. Thus, in the post-1998 era India adopted two concepts, (i) No first use for attack or war and (ii) Credible minimum deterrence. As a step further in the direction India also signed with the US a nuclear deal under which it agreed to separate its civil and military nuclear facilities under international safeguard and supervision. The paper analyses the evolution of India’s nuclear capability in regional and global contexts.


Sensors ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 21 (12) ◽  
pp. 4155
Author(s):  
Bulent Ayhan ◽  
Chiman Kwan

Detecting nuclear materials in mixtures is challenging due to low concentration, environmental factors, sensor noise, source-detector distance variations, and others. This paper presents new results on nuclear material identification and relative count contribution (also known as mixing ratio) estimation for mixtures of materials in which there are multiple isotopes present. Conventional and deep-learning-based machine learning algorithms were compared. Realistic simulated data using Gamma Detector Response and Analysis Software (GADRAS) were used in our comparative studies. It was observed that a deep learning approach is highly promising.


Electronics ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 10 (9) ◽  
pp. 1005
Author(s):  
Rakan A. Alsowail ◽  
Taher Al-Shehari

As technologies are rapidly evolving and becoming a crucial part of our lives, security and privacy issues have been increasing significantly. Public and private organizations have highly confidential data, such as bank accounts, military and business secrets, etc. Currently, the competition between organizations is significantly higher than before, which triggers sensitive organizations to spend an excessive volume of their budget to keep their assets secured from potential threats. Insider threats are more dangerous than external ones, as insiders have a legitimate access to their organization’s assets. Thus, previous approaches focused on some individual factors to address insider threat problems (e.g., technical profiling), but a broader integrative perspective is needed. In this paper, we propose a unified framework that incorporates various factors of the insider threat context (technical, psychological, behavioral and cognitive). The framework is based on a multi-tiered approach that encompasses pre, in and post-countermeasures to address insider threats in an all-encompassing perspective. It considers multiple factors that surround the lifespan of insiders’ employment, from the pre-joining of insiders to an organization until after they leave. The framework is utilized on real-world insider threat cases. It is also compared with previous work to highlight how our framework extends and complements the existing frameworks. The real value of our framework is that it brings together the various aspects of insider threat problems based on real-world cases and relevant literature. This can therefore act as a platform for general understanding of insider threat problems, and pave the way to model a holistic insider threat prevention system.


Author(s):  
Huan Lin ◽  
Tai-Wei Lan ◽  
Min-Tsang Chang ◽  
Wuu-Kune Cheng

The “Nuclear Materials and Radioactive Waste Management Act” (NMRWMA) in Taiwan has been in use since 2002. To promote further administrative efficiency and improve regulatory capacity, an amendment of the act has been initiated by the Atomic Energy Council (AEC). It is now being reviewed by outside experts and related communities so as to include the best understanding of risk management factors. For the future decommissioning challenges of nuclear facilities, the act is also being amended to comply with the regulatory requirements of the decommissioning mandates. Currently the Taiwan government is conducting government reorganization, and AEC will be reformed but will remain as an independent regulatory body. AEC will then be capable of improving the regulatory capacity for facilitating licensing and inspection, ensuring operational safety, environmental protection and public involvement, and giving a more flexible administrative discretion, such as expending the margin of penalty. The amendment is also required to provide a formal legal basis for the Nuclear Backend Fund, and to mandate the waste producers to take responsibility for any final debt repayment. In addition, this amendment promotes measures to prevent accidents or emergencies concerning radioactive materials and facilities and procedures to reduce the impact and effect of any unexpected events. Furthermore, this amendment intends to implement the concept of information transparency and public participation so as to meet the public needs. Finally, radioactive waste final disposal tasks have to be completed by waste producers under the supervision of the AEC.


Author(s):  
A. Fenenko

During the last twenty years Washington has used the “counter-proliferation strategy” in Korean Peninsula. The Americans demanded that North Korea eliminate its nuclear arsenals and plutonium production facilities under the watchful eye of the “five powers’ commission” or the IAEA. Pyongyang's recent military provocation may now raise the specter of the United States or even South Korea delivering non-nuclear strikes against its nuclear facilities. That would give the USA an opportunity to raise the question of whether certain regimes should be allowed to acquire nuclear weapons or even to develop nuclear fuel cycle capacity. The last crises demonstrated that under certain circumstances North Korea could also initiate a military conflict in East Asia.


Author(s):  
Matthew R. Feldman

Based on a recommendation from the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board, the Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Nuclear Safety Policy and Assistance (HS-21) has recently issued DOE Manual 441.1-1 entitled Nuclear Material Packaging Manual. This manual provides guidance regarding the use of non-engineered storage media for all special nuclear material throughout the DOE complex. As part of this development effort, HS-21 has funded the Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) Transportation Technologies Group (TTG) to develop and demonstrate testing protocols for such onsite containers. ORNL TTG to date has performed preliminary tests of representative onsite containers from Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory and Los Alamos National Laboratory. This paper will describe the testing processes that have been developed.


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