scholarly journals Sensibility First

2021 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 97
Author(s):  
Robert Hanna

In the practical realm just as in the theoretical realm, everything comes down to human sensibility as an equally empirical and non-empirical primitive starting point that constitutively motivates, intentionally pervades, and intentionally structures our innately-specified yet also “human, all-too-human” capacities for theoretical and practical rationality, all the way up. Strong Kantian non-conceptualism says that according to Kant, the faculty of human intuition or Anschauung, that is, human inner and outer sense perception, together with the faculty of imagination or Einbildungskraft, jointly constitute this sensible starting point for objective cognition and theoretical reason; and Kantian non-intellectualism says that according to Kant, human affect, desire, and moral emotion—in a word, the human heart—jointly constitute this sensible starting point for free agency and practical reason. Conjoined, they provide what I call the Sensibility First approach, which, in a nutshell, says that human rationality flows from the groundedness of our discursive, intellectual, and embodiment-neutral powers in our sensible, non-intellectual, and essentially embodied powers, without in any way reducing the former to the latter. If I’m correct about all this, then the result is a sharply non-classical and unorthodox, hence “shocking,” nevertheless fully unified and textually defensible approach to Kant’s proto-Critical philosophy (i.e., from 1768 to 1772), Critical philosophy (i.e., from 1781 to 1787) and post-Critical philosophy (i.e., from the late 1780s to the late 1790s) that encompasses his theoretical philosophy and the practical philosophy alike.

Author(s):  
Jill Vance Buroker

Kant’s Critical philosophy depends on the distinction between theoretical and practical reason, which he borrowed from Aristotle. But unlike Aristotle Kant claims that theoretical reason is subordinate to practical reason. This raises the possibility that theoretical judging could be a voluntary activity. This chapter investigates Kant’s view of the relation between theoretical judgments and the will. Based on Andrew Chignell’s recent work, it is argued that Kant recognizes the legitimate direct use of the will only in judgments he labels Belief (Glaube). With respect to Knowledge, his position is identical to Descartes’s position on clear and distinct perception. An analysis of Kant’s voluntarism regarding the activities of theoretical reason provides a model for subordinating theoretical reason to practical reason.


Author(s):  
Michael E. Bratman

In a series of essays—in particular, his 1994 essay “Assure and Threaten”—David Gauthier develops a two-tier pragmatic theory of practical rationality and argues, within that theory, for a distinctive account of the rationality of following through with prior assurances or threats. His discussion suggests that certain kinds of temporally extended agency play a special role in one’s temporally extended life going well. I argue that a related idea about diachronic self-governance helps explain a sense in which an accepted deliberative standard can be self-reinforcing. And this gives us resources to adjust Gauthier’s theory in response to a threat of what Kieran Setiya has called a “fragmentation of practical reason.”


Author(s):  
Karl Schafer

Contemporary forms of Kantian constitutivism generally begin with a conception of agency on which the constitutive aim of agency is some form of autonomy or self-unification. This chapter argues for a re-orientation of the Kantian constitutivist project towards views that begin with a conception of rationality on which both theoretical and practical rationality aim at forms of understanding. In a slogan, then, understanding-first as opposed to autonomy-first constitutivism. Such a view gives the constitutivist new resources for explaining many classes of reasons, while also offering a new way of understanding the unity of theoretical and practical reason. The chapter concludes by arguing that the resulting view is best understood, not so much as an alternative to autonomy-first constitutivism, but as a complement to it.


2015 ◽  
Vol 23 (2) ◽  
pp. 157-175
Author(s):  
Panagiotis Sotiris

On the occasion of the publication of the translation of Pierre Raymond’s text on Althusser’s materialism, we attempt an introduction to his theoretical trajectory. We begin with his conception of the conflict between materialism and idealism inLe passage au matérialismein 1973 and his thinking on the question of the history of sciences inL’histoire & les sciences(1975), before turning our attention to his elaboration on the question of a history of mathematics and in particular of the emergence of probabilistic reasoning. Then we examine his confrontation with the question of the relation between materialism and dialectics inMatérialisme dialectique et logique. After that, we proceed to his conception of the need to break with any form of teleology and finalism as the starting point for a new conception of causality (La résistible fatalité de l’histoireof 1982), before looking atDissiper la terreur et les ténèbresof 1992 and his attempt to rethink the question of practical reason. It is in light of the above presentation that we insist on the importance of Raymond’s text on Althusser.


Dialogue ◽  
2008 ◽  
Vol 47 (2) ◽  
pp. 331-350
Author(s):  
Jonny Anomaly

ABSTRACTThis essay examines and criticizes a set of Kantian objections to Parfit's attempt in Reasons and Persons to connect his theory of personal identity to practical rationality and moral philosophy. Several of Parfit's critics have tried to sever the link he forges between his metaphysical and practical conclusions by invoking the Kantian thought that even if we accept his metaphysical theory of personal identity, we still have good practical grounds for rejecting that theory when deliberating about what to do. The argument between Parfit and his opponents illuminates broader questions about the relationship between our metaphysical beliefs and our practical reasons.


2004 ◽  
Vol 60 (1/2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Yolanda Dreyer

Homosexuality: Church, tradition, and the Bible – homophobia, sarcophobia, and the gospelThe article demonstrates a trend in the current debate on the church’s attitude towards homosexuality, namely that exegetical results supersede authentic faith experiences of gays. It shows that this trend causes an untenable tension between the dialectical notions sola fidei and sola Scriptura. Such an unacceptable tension contributes to the social psychological phenomena of homophobia and sarcophobia. The article investigates this empirical approach (theoretical reason) to homo-sexuality from the dialectical perspective of a theological approach (practical reason). The latter includes an investigation of the epistemological processes behind exegetes’ diverse use of Scripture. The article aims to show that homophobia in society and church, and the sarcophobia of homosexuals can be challenged and healed if the church holds on to the dialectic between sola fidei and sola Scriptura and the dialectic between pastoral concerns and the engagement with the gospel of Jesus Christ.


1990 ◽  
Vol 28 ◽  
pp. 223-237
Author(s):  
Peter Winch

So is this it: I must recognize certain authorities in order to make judgments at all? (OC, 493)I want in this paper to consider Wittgenstein's great posthumous work On Certainty in a different perspective from the usual: from the point of view of certain deep questions in political philosophy. These questions concern the nature of the state's authority and the citizen/s obligation to it; the notion of legitimacy and the role of consent in this context. Such issues have many dimensions; but they arise in part out of difficulties in reconciling the application of such concepts with our understanding of human rationality, especially practical rationality. I think it has been, and remains, characteristic of the main tradition of discussion of such issues to leave certain important questions about the nature of practical rationality unasked. I believe that these questions are asked, though in a different context, in Wittgenstein's On Certainty.


Dialogue ◽  
1977 ◽  
Vol 16 (3) ◽  
pp. 510-518 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Gauthier

This interesting volume (published by Yale University Press, 1974) offers sustenance to almost all who have an appetite for the problems of practical reason. As the Proceedings of the First Bristol Conference on Critical Philosophy, it contains the five papers presented there, with the remarks of commentators and, in three cases, replies. First, the bill of fare.Roderick Chisholm opens with “Practical Reason and the Logic of Requirement”, about which I shall say no more than to quote the beginning of G.E.M. Anscombe's comment: “It is characteristic of Professor Chisholm to carry one always by a succession of small harmless-looking moves which then suddenly enable him to pull out some large kicking rabbits like a conjurer operating with a hat. This time he has produced the large kicking rabbits, but the initial movements do not seem as unsuspicious as usual.” (pp 17–18) Those who like what Chisholm does, will find fine detail in his paper, the comments, and his reply; unfortunately, for me Professor Chisholm's rabbits have the disconcerting invisibility of Harvey.


2018 ◽  
Vol 3 ◽  
pp. 133-153
Author(s):  
Darrel Moellendorf

After a short introduction into the recent discourse on the Anthropocene, I will discuss three different interpretations of the Anthropocene: the Anthropocene as promethean, as destruction and as inegalitarian. These interpretations cannot simply be settled by the facts since they concern the direction in which things might develop. Therefore, I will argue, they are not mere predictions based on theoretical reason. Because of the very fact that they are bound up with fundamental human interests and human moral concerns, they involve prospection based on practical reason and prospection is itself deeply associated with hope. The final part of my paper aims to show that we are justified to hold hope in the epoch of the Anthropocene.


2020 ◽  
pp. 151-175
Author(s):  
Christian Dieter Sauer

The reflections outlined in this paper on smell and taste in modern and contemporary art are divided into three larger chapters: an introductory literature review is followed by a general discussion of sense perception in terms of philosophy, physiology, and intellectual history; and this forms the backdrop for the main body, in which eight different approaches to olfactory and gustatory art are proposed. These categories take different levels as their starting point: for instance, they illuminate the significance of smell and taste as materialities, they address aspects of the process of perception, they posit questions concerning the affect of smell and taste, they consider spatial and temporal aspects, and they discuss the relation between perception and knowledge. The main body of the paper is concerned with these categories and their respective theoretical background, also providing concrete examples of relevant works of art.


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