scholarly journals Pengaruh Mekanisme Good Corporate Governance Terhadap Manajemen Laba

Syntax Idea ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 3 (12) ◽  
pp. 2544
Author(s):  
Dwi Urip Wardoyo ◽  
Rekha Fakhriyah ◽  
Risca Amelia
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Literature Review ◽  
Earnings Management ◽  
Financial Reporting ◽  
Value Added ◽  
Financial Statements ◽  
Data Sources ◽  
Good Corporate Governance ◽  
Reported Earnings ◽  
A Company

One of the most important information in the financial reporting of a company is information about earnings. Users of financial statements can find out the extent to which the company has carried out value-added activities through profit information. The company's performance can also be seen from the company's profit information to be taken into consideration in making decisions. With a significant impact on earnings, the company's management will try to manage reported earnings. This study aims to determine what factors can affect earnings management. The method used in this study is a structured review or review method so that it can identify any factors that can affect earnings management. The method insearching for article data sources is done through Google Scholar (2019 - 2021) which provides relevant scientific writing articles according to this research. Based on the results of a literature review of 30 articles or journals revealed that good corporate governance has a negative or insignificant effect on earnings management

scholarly journals Analisis Good Corporate Governance Terhadap Manajemen Laba pada Perusahaan Manufaktur yang Terdaftar di Bursa Efek Indonesia

2021 ◽  
pp. 89-96
Author(s):  
Joyce Lim ◽  
Dian Lestari Siregar
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Earnings Management ◽  
Audit Committee ◽  
Institutional Ownership ◽  
Financial Statements ◽  
Managerial Ownership ◽  
Manufacturing Companies ◽  
Good Corporate Governance ◽  
Research Population ◽  
A Company

The inequality in obtaining information that occurs between the principal and the agent is known as information asymmetry, which provides an opportunity for managers to perform earnings management. Earnings management is done by manipulating various information contained in the financial statements of a company. Good Corporate Governance (GCG) is a solution to minimize earnings management so that the company's condition is healthier, which of course uses certain principles. This study aims to examine the effect of the GCG mechanism on earnings management. The GCG mechanism used in this study consists of independent commissioners, institutional ownership, managerial ownership, and an audit committee. The research population is manufacturing companies in the consumer goods industry sector listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX) for the 2015-2019 period using purposive sampling method. The results showed that partially or from each of the GCG mechanisms used by the study, independent commissioners had no effect on earnings management, managerial ownership had no effect on earnings management, institutional ownership had no effect on earnings management, and the audit committee had a significant effect on management. profit. However, simultaneously, independent commissioners, managerial ownership, institutional ownership, and the audit committee have a significant effect on earnings management.

scholarly journals MOTIVASI DAN STRATEGI MANAJEMEN LABA PADA ORGANISASI

2019 ◽  
Vol 8 (2) ◽  
pp. 68-80
Author(s):  
Ika Neni Kristanti
Keyword(s):  
Earnings Management ◽  
Financial Reporting ◽  
Financial Statements ◽  
Ceo Turnover ◽  
Motivational Factors ◽  
Earning Management ◽  
Political Motivation ◽  
Jones Model ◽  
A Company

Earnings management occurs when managers use valuations in financial reporting and in compiling transactions to change financial statements so as to mislead some stakeholders regarding the underlying results that depend on reported accounting figures or to influence contract outcomes that depend on reported accounting figures. The existence of earnings management in a company is inseparable from the various types or underlying motivational factors, while some of the motivations associated with the implementation of earnings management are bonus motivation, political motivation, tax motivation, CEO turnover motivation, IPO motivation. The models used in measuring earnings management include: Healy Model, DeAngelo Model, Jones Model, Industrial Model, Jones Modification Model, Dechow-Dichev Model, Kothari Model and Stubben Model. Keywords : earning management, motivation, measuring models

scholarly journals PENGARUH GOOD CORPORATE GOVERNANCE TERHADAP MANAJEMEN LABA

2012 ◽  
Vol 1 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Yufenti Oktafia
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Earnings Management ◽  
Business Performance ◽  
Conflicts Of Interest ◽  
Financial Statements ◽  
Financial Statement ◽  
Corporate Management ◽  
Financial Reports ◽  
Discretionary Accrual ◽  
Good Corporate Governance

Earning managements is a management action in the process of preparing financial statements to influence the level of earnings that is displayed. Earnings management is one factor that can reduce the credibility of financial statements. Add to bias earnings management in the financial statements and can interfere with the use of a trusted financial reports profit figures as a result of these engineering profit numbers without engineering. Corporate governance is a concept proposed to improve business performance through supervision or monitoring management performance and ensuring accountability of management to the stakeholders with a framework based on rules. The concept of corporate governance as proposed for the achievement of corporate management more transparent to all users of financial statements. If this concept is applied properly it is expected that economic growth will continue to rise in line with the transparency of corporate management a better and will benefit many parties. Detection possibility of earnings management in the financial statements, examined through the use of estimates of total accruals. Total accruals consist of nondiscretionary accrual and discretionary accruals. Earnings management occurs because of opposition from various interested parties on the financial statement information, which interested parties on financial statements information that is internal and external parties. Conflicts of interest that occurs is minimized by a mechanism that is capable of aligning the interests of external and internal parties. Agency theory suggests that earnings management issues can be eliminated with the supervision of their own through good corporate governance.<br /><br />Keywords: corporate governance, discretionary accrual<br /><br />

scholarly journals Pengaruh Good Corporate Governance Terhadap Manajemen Laba Perusahaan Sektor Barang Konsumsi

2021 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Veren Noviyanti ◽  
Heti Herawati
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Earnings Management ◽  
Audit Committee ◽  
Stock Exchange ◽  
Financial Statements ◽  
Managerial Ownership ◽  
Manufacturing Companies ◽  
Independent Variables ◽  
Management Board ◽  
Good Corporate Governance

Earnings management is a manager's deliberate action to manipulate financial statements with permissible limits with the aim of providing incorrect information for users of financial statements. The variables tested in this study consisted of independent variables and dependent variables. The independent variables tested in this study consisted of independent board of commissioners, managerial ownership, audit committee, and board of commissioners. While the dependent variable is earnings management as measured by the modified Jones model discretionary accruals. This study uses 52 data on manufacturing companies in the consumer goods sector listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange from 2016 to 2019. Sampling using the purpose sampling method. All data obtained from the company's annual financial statements. The results of this research show that partially independent board of commissioners and managerial ownership have no effect on earnings management, while the size of the board of commissioners and audit committee has a positive effect on earnings management. Independent board of commissioners, managerial ownership, audit committee, and board of commissioners simultaneously have no effect on earnings management.   Keywords: Good Corporate Governance, Earnings Management, Board of Independent Commissioner, Board of Commissioner, Audit Committee, Managerial Ownership

scholarly journals Good Corporate Governance: Does The Timeliness of Financial Reporting Has an Effect to The Investors’ Reaction?

2021 ◽  
Vol 17 (1) ◽  
pp. 11-23
Author(s):  
Reni Furwanti ◽  
◽  
Slamet Haryono ◽  
Dini Maulana Lestari ◽  
◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Financial Reporting ◽  
Audit Committee ◽  
Audit Quality ◽  
Financial Statements ◽  
Foreign Ownership ◽  
Good News ◽  
Good Corporate Governance ◽  
Negative Effect

This research aims to find out the influence of independent committee boards, audit committee repats, foreign ownership, and audit quality on the timeliness of financial reporting and their impact on investors' reactions both directly and indirectly. This research uses a quantitative method with population and sample of companies registered in Jakarta Islamic Index (JII). Data will be processed using path analysis using IMB SPSS Statistic 22 software. Based on the results of this research, it is known that directly, independent commissioner variables and audit quality have a positive effect on investor reactions, while foreign ownership variables and audit committee meetings have a negative effect on investors’ reactions. While the indirect influence can be known that only audit committee meetings, foreign ownership, and audit quality can have a significant impact on investors' reactions through the timeliness of disclosure of financial statements as intervening variables. The implication of this research is to prove that the existence of corporate governance in terms of determining the intensity of audit committee meetings, foreign ownership, and determination of KAP selection in improving the quality of audits can make the company more efficient and timely in disclosing its financial statements in order make positive reactions from investors that indicates good news for the company.

scholarly journals PENGARUH GOOD CORPORATE GOVERNANCE TERHADAP EARNINGS MANAGEMENT

2019 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 35
Author(s):  
Hexana Lastanti
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Earnings Management ◽  
Audit Committee ◽  
Financial Statements ◽  
Managerial Ownership ◽  
Management Problem ◽  
Good Corporate Governance ◽  
The Difference

<p class="Style2">To be able to achieve good corporate governance, in addition to managerial ownership, institutional ownership and board of directors, the role of the audit committee also needed to further enhance the quality of information contained in the financial statements in accordance with his duties. Good corporate governance is one way to address the practice of earnings management. Study to examine the effect of the mechanisms of good corporate governance on earnings management that uses the data in the Indonesian capital market, still very little is done. Earnings management is a management action in the process of preparing financial statements to influence the level of profit that is displayed. The goal is to improve the welfare of certain parties, which can be identified as an advantage. Earnings management problem is the agency problem that is often triggered by a separation of the role or the difference between the interests of the owners (shareholders) with managing the company's management.</p>

scholarly journals PENGARUH KINERJA KEUАNGАN DАN GOOD CORPORATE GOVERNANCE TERHADAP HАRGА SАHАM YАNG DIMΟDERАSI ΟLEH INTERNET FINANCIAL REPORTING

2021 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 11-25
Author(s):  
Herlina Putri Rianti ◽  
Аjeng Wijаyаnti
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Financial Reporting ◽  
Economic Value ◽  
Value Added ◽  
Market Value ◽  
Economic Value Added ◽  
Purposive Sampling ◽  
Good Corporate Governance ◽  
Market Value Added

Populasi dalam penelitian ini adalah perusahaan manufaktur sektor industri barang konsumsi yang terdaftar di Bursa Efek Indonesia (BEI) tahun 2014 – 2019. Teknik pengambilan sampel dilakukan dengan menggunakan teknik purposive sampling. Penelitian ini akan menggunakan software STATA dalam menganalisis data penelitian. Hasil pengujian menunjukkan economic value added tidak berpengaruh terhadap harga saham, market value added berpengaruh terhadap harga saham, dewan komisaris tidak berpengaruh terhadap harga saham, kepemilikan institusional tidak berpengaruh terhadap harga saham, internet financial reporting tidak berpengaruh terhadap harga saham, internet financial reporting memoderasi economic value added terhadap harga saham, internet financial reporting memoderasi market value added terhadap harga saham, internet financial reporting tidak memoderasi dewan komisaris terhadap harga saham dan internet financial reporting tidak memoderasi kepemilikan institusional terhadap harga saham. Kata kunci : Kinerja Keuangan, Economic Value Added, Market Value Added, Good Corporate Governance, Dewan Komisaris, Kepemilikan Institusional, Harga Saham, Internet Financial Reporting.  

scholarly journals The Causes and Effects of Earnings Management on Stock Prices

2019 ◽  
Vol 25 (116) ◽  
pp. 93-110
Author(s):  
Kawa Wali ◽  
Sabhi Saleh ◽  
Kees Van Paridon
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
The Netherlands ◽  
Earnings Management ◽  
Stock Returns ◽  
Financial Reporting ◽  
Stock Prices ◽  
Cash Flows ◽  
Corporate Reporting ◽  
Reported Earnings ◽  
The Relationship

This study uses the performance of the discretionary estimation models by using a sample of listed companies in the Netherlands and Germany. The actual accounting framework provides a wide opportunity for managers to influence data in financial reporting. The corporate reporting strategy, the way managers use their discretionary accounting, has a significant effect on the company's financial reporting. The authors contribute to the literature through enhancement to these models to accomplish better effects of identifying earnings management as well as to present evidence that is particular to the Dutch and German setting. For this, we followed the methodology of Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeney (1995) and Chan et al. (2006) and test which model can detect Dutch and German firm’s earnings management better by applying those models to the artificially manipulated earnings after adding some amount to the reported earnings. This investigation found that earnings are managed relatively more in Germany than in the Netherlands. The relationship between earnings management, stock returns, and corporate governance has been tested. Our results suggested that the strong or weak impact of corporate governance in these two countries varied. The multi-sectoral Jones model has a modest illustrative capacity. Finally, the results show that maximum discretionary accruals involve a large number of estimated errors which have foreseeable effect on income, stock returns and future cash flows. The decrease in level of earnings management indicates that the measurement error has been largely eliminated in the estimated performance -related accruals.

scholarly journals PENGARUH GOOD CORPORATE GOVERNANCE TERHADAP MANAJEMEN LABA

2013 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Yufenti Oktafia
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Earnings Management ◽  
Business Performance ◽  
Conflicts Of Interest ◽  
Financial Statements ◽  
Financial Statement ◽  
Corporate Management ◽  
Financial Reports ◽  
Good Corporate Governance ◽  
Management Issues

<p><em>Earning managements is a management action in the process of preparing financial statements to influence the level of earnings that is displayed. Earnings management is one factor that can reduce the credibility of financial statements. Add to bias earnings management in the financial statements and can interfere with the use of a trusted financial reports profit figures as a result of these engineering profit numbers without engineering. Corporate governance is a concept proposed to improve business performance through supervision or monitoring management performance and ensuring accountability of management to the stakeholders with a framework based on rules. The concept of corporate governance as proposed for the achievement of corporate management more transparent to all users of financial statements. If this concept is applied properly it is expected that economic growth will continue to rise in line with the transparency of corporate management a better and will benefit many parties. Detection possibility of earnings management in the financial statements, examined through the use of estimates of total accruals. Total accruals consist of nondiscretionary accrual and discretionary accruals. Earnings management occurs because of opposition from various interested parties on the financial statement information, which interested parties on financial statements information that is internal and external parties. Conflicts of interest that occurs is minimized by a mechanism that is capable of aligning the interests of external and internal parties. Agency theory suggests that earnings management issues can be eliminated with the supervision of their own through good corporate governance.</em></p> <p><em> </em></p> <p><strong><em></em></strong><em></em></p>

scholarly journals Busy boards and corporate earnings management: an international analysis

2019 ◽  
Vol 18 (4) ◽  
pp. 533-556 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stephen P. Ferris ◽  
Min-Yu (Stella) Liao
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Earnings Management ◽  
Financial Reporting ◽  
Audit Committee ◽  
Reporting Quality ◽  
Financial Reporting Quality ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Corporate Earnings ◽  
The Usa ◽  
Reported Earnings

Purpose Because of our limited understanding of the incidence and effect of board busyness globally, the mixed evidence of the effect of board busyness obtained in the USA and the divergence of international patterns of director busyness from that observed in the USA, the author contends that there is a strong need to examine board busyness from a global perspective. The literature, however, does not examine the effect of board busyness on reported earnings quality and certainly does not analyze it internationally. Consequently, the purpose of this study is to examine the effect of multiple board appointments on the quality of a firm’s reported earnings. Design/methodology/approach The research design for this study is empirical. It uses both univariate and multivariate statistical analysis to examine historical corporate accounting, finance and governance data. Findings Consistent with the busyness hypothesis of corporate governance, the author finds that firms with a higher proportion of busy independent directors or busy CEOs manage their earnings more extensively. Further, the findings of this study present that firms with a higher proportion of busy independent audit committee members have poorer financial reporting quality. Using a sample of American Depository Receipts (ADRs), this study determines that the ineffectiveness of busy boards regarding earnings management is mitigated by the listing regulations imposed by US exchanges. Research limitations/implications The author believes that this study offers new and important evidence regarding the debate whether busy directors provide knowledge, skill and corporate connections, or whether they are overextended and, thus, unable to fully perform their monitoring duties. This study shows that firms with busy directors are associated with poorer financial reporting quality and, consistent with the busyness hypothesis, are less effective as managerial monitors. Practical implications This study provides useful guidance regarding board design and the kinds of policies that firms should adopt regarding multiple boarding. Social implications The social implications focus on the public policy implications regarding the importance of effective corporate governance in the reporting of financial wealth, wealth creation and wealth management. Originality/value This is the first study that examines the relation between board/committee busyness and corporate earnings management using a comprehensive set of international firms. Second, the author expands the analysis of audit committee into a new dimension: committee quality as captured by the busyness of its independent members. This study also contributes to the ongoing debate in the corporate finance literature regarding the reputation and busyness hypotheses of multiple directorships.

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